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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Introduction  
 
Study Context 
Following on from the government’s manifesto to an annual reduction in road deaths and injuries, the 
British Road Safety Statement 2015 (BRSS) set out the government’s commitment to invest further in 
continuing road safety activity, and to conduct a Road Safety Management Capacity Review (RSMCR). 
A RSMCR is a strategic assessment, benchmarking and capacity building tool, originally developed by 
the World Bank's Global Road Safety Facility, to guide investments and assist countries in 
strengthening road safety management.  It is recommended for use by the OECD/International 
Transport Forum and the World Road Association as a first step in further developing and extending 
effective Safe System investment strategies, plans and projects in all countries and contexts. 
In May 2017, the DfT commissioned a RSMCR to benchmark and understand the current status of 
institutional delivery of road safety in Britain, and to identify practical and actionable opportunities for 
strengthening joint working, local innovation, and efficiency on a national and local basis.   
 
Safe System 
The overarching theme of the BRSS is the government’s adoption of the recommended Safe System 
approach to preventing death and serious injuries in road collisions. Its application is cited as a key 
national priority in the UK.  While building on current practice, some re-alignment in national road 
safety focus and activity will be necessary over time.  Safe System implementation towards zero deaths 
and serious injuries is a long-term project and is in different stages of development in different 
countries and jurisdictions.   
Safe System comprises both an explicit goal and strategy.  The long-term Safe System goal is for the 
ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries, through incremental targeted improvements within 
a specified safety performance framework.  The Safe System strategy aims for a more forgiving road 
system that takes human fallibility and vulnerability into account. The road traffic system is planned, 
designed, operated and used such that people are protected from death and serious injury in road 
collisions.  
 
Aims and Objectives of the Review 
The overarching aim of the RSMCR is to identify practical and actionable opportunities for 
strengthening joint working, local innovation, and efficiency on a national and local basis.  In particular 
the RSMCR seeks to understand the current status of institutional delivery of road safety in Britain by:  
 Examining national, regional and local structures, responsibilities, accountabilities, relationships 
and coordination;  
 Examining whether management effort and resources at all levels are being targeted effectively 
at designing, and enabling or delivering evidence-based interventions and initiatives that can 
have the greatest impact in preventing and reducing the number of road users killed and 
seriously injured;  
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 Assessing the current road safety delivery landscape against the Safe System road safety 
management assessment framework and determining whether there is an imbalance in 
resource effort for each element and at each level (national, regional and local);  
 Investigating how institutional capacity can be cost-effectively strengthened, within the context 
of the BRSS, to deliver a Safe System approach to road safety; and  
 Identifying areas and means for improved joint working, local innovation and efficiency.  
 
Executive Summary Structure 
This executive summary provides a summary of the methodology used for the RSMCR, key findings, 
strengths and weaknesses and recommendations for each institutional management function (IMF) 
and intervention in turn, and a summary of our conclusions. 
The full report and its appendices provide further details about RSMCR objectives, approach and 
assessment framework; the Safe System approach; the RSMCR findings and recommendations; and a 
report of perceptions and views of stakeholders who were consulted during the review. 
 
Methodology  
 
Approach to RSMCR  
Detailed World Bank guidance sets out the methodology for the conduct of a road safety management 
capacity review.  An assessment framework comprising a series of checklists is used, based on 
identified good practice road safety management. This allows detailed examination and benchmarking 
by experienced, independent road safety specialists of all elements of the road safety management 
system and their linkages against effective practice. The main elements of this assessment framework 
comprise the key institutional management functions (results focus, coordination, legislation, funding 
and resource allocation, promotion, monitoring and evaluation, research and development and 
knowledge transfer) which provide the foundation for multi-sectoral, system-wide interventions (safe 
roads and roadsides, safe speeds, safe vehicles, safe road use, post-crash care, safe and healthy modes, 
and safe work travel) to achieve results.  
Working across results, interventions and institutional delivery elements of road safety management 
provides a framework for addressing the United Nations Road Safety Collaboration ‘pillars’ and good 
practice implementation of the Safe System approach.  It provides a systematic format within which 
to address the study objectives and for engaging the key agencies and stakeholders who can deliver 
road safety results.  
 
Overview of study approach 
The overall approach encompasses a synthesis of wide ranging information to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of current road safety management capacity, how to overcome any 
weaknesses, and to inform the study conclusions and recommendations.  It has used an international 
road safety management assessment framework to benchmark activity against national and 
international good practice and to engage with the road safety community at national and local levels.   
The study commenced with a data gathering exercise, which comprised collation of national and 
international literature, statistical data, and information and reports published by stakeholders. 
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The main focus of the study involved a large stakeholder engagement programme, involving 
governmental departments and a wide range of other stakeholders involved in road safety.  
Participants included representatives from central government departments and agencies; local 
government departments; emergency services and trauma care; business and industry; advisory 
groups, associations and charities; and academic institutions. 
Methods of engagement for stakeholders included face to face in-depth interviews with individuals 
and small groups, in-depth telephone interviews, and workshops with plenary sessions and break out 
groups.  Over 80 stakeholders were engaged using these approaches.  Five online surveys were also 
undertaken, with local authority Road Safety Officers; local authority Highway Surveyors; Chief 
Constables across different police forces; ambulance trusts; and a sample of car fleet managers. 
Following collation of findings from the stakeholder engagement exercises, two half day workshop 
sessions were held for all those previously engaged to discuss the findings of the review and enable 
stakeholders and government representatives to comment on the deliverability of a selection of the 
draft recommendations.  This ensured the final report findings were realistic and practicable and 
appropriately represented the consensus and key themes from our research. The workshops 
comprised presentations of findings to date, plenary sessions and break out groups and were attended 
by about 70 representatives from a wide range of stakeholder organisations and central government. 
The report findings, identifying the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches, and 
recommendations on how best to deliver reductions in deaths and serious injuries towards the 
ultimate aim of elimination, are drawn from a synthesis and evaluation of the data and evidence 
collected, and views provided from the study team’s road safety specialists.  
 
Key Findings and Recommendations 
 
Introduction 
 
This section summarises the key findings and recommendations of the RSMCR in relation to road safety 
activity at national and local levels.   
 
The key recommendations in this summary document are primarily those suggested for the public 
sector, and are focussed on government adoption of a new road safety strategy, with the aim of 
providing focus for improving joint working, and embedding the Safe System ambition and approach 
into the delivery of national and local road safety activity.  A broader perspective of the shared 
responsibility to achieve ambitious road safety results between government, the business sector and 
civil society is provided in the main report, as are some linkages between recommendations.  
 
The remainder of this section is divided into three sections: 
 Section A:  Institutional Management Functions;  
 Section B:  Interventions; and 
 Section C:  Results. 
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SECTION A:  INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
 
Results Focus 
 
Key findings 
 
A focus on results is the overarching institutional management function, in the absence of which all 
other aspects of delivery lack cohesion.  
 
Safe System is an ambitious approach which, while building on current practice, is likely to necessitate 
some re-alignment in national and local road safety focus and activity over time.  The long-term goal 
to work towards the eventual elimination of deaths and serious injuries is evident in the safety 
performance framework for goals and interim measurable targets and objectives which the 
government has set for Highways England, and in the work carried out for the Safer Roads Fund.  This 
goal is being adopted increasingly in the United Kingdom in the devolved administrations, in towns 
and cities such as London, Bristol and Edinburgh, and in some local authority road safety strategies. 
 
While a high-level commitment to road safety in key DfT lead agency units is evident, the absence of 
defined national road safety ambition in a measurable safety performance framework is setting back 
effort.  There is general agreement that a more strategic focus on results (the prevention and reduction 
of deaths and serious injuries) is required and the evidence base for the efficacy of targets in reducing 
deaths and serious injuries is well established.1 2 The devolved administrations and many working at 
national and local levels want to see the re-establishment of a national road safety performance 
framework.  A good practice Safe System performance framework comprises a long-term goal towards 
zero deaths and serious injuries, supported by interim quantitative targets to reduce death and serious 
injuries, which are in turn supported by a set of measurable safety performance objectives  related to 
death and serious injury prevention and reduction.3 4 Examples of successful adoption of this 
framework can be found in Norway and Sweden which, despite the challenge for road safety presented 
by economic recovery following the global financial crisis in the last decade, maintain their global 
leadership in road safety with lower road fatality rates than achieved to date in Britain. 
 
Main strengths  
 Established Lead Agency (DfT) and adoption of Safe System approach in BRSS. 
 Understanding by many agencies and stakeholders of the importance of setting long-term road 
safety goals and measurable interim targets and objectives. 
 Specific goals, targets and objectives set for Highways England and by devolved administrations 
and some cities. 
 
Main weaknesses 
                                                          
1 Allsop R.E, Sze, N.N., Wong, S.C (2011) An update on the association between setting quantified road safety 
targets and road fatality reduction. Accident Analysis and Prevention 43 (2011) 1279–1283. 
2 OECD/ITF (2008). Towards zero: ambitious road safety targets and the safe system approach.  
3 World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF) (2009). Bliss T and J Breen, Implementing the Recommendations 
of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Country guidelines for the conduct of road safety 
management capacity reviews and the specification of lead agency reforms, investment strategies and Safe 
System projects, World Bank, Washington DC. 
4 OECD/ITF (2016). Zero Road Deaths and Serious Injuries: Leading a paradigm shift to a Safe System OECD 
Publishing, Paris 
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 Insufficient central government leadership in road safety over the last decade. 
 Road safety is not perceived as core business by all responsible agencies. 
 Lack of an agreed national safety performance framework to achieve results. 
 No explicit national long-term Safe System towards zero goal. 
 Safe System is not well understood nor is it filtering downwards from the lead agency. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should strengthen leadership in new British strategy in the following ways: 
 Develop and publish a new British road safety strategy and action plan to improve safety 
outcomes for all road users. 
 Strengthen the strategic capacity of Road User Licensing, Insurance & Safety (RULIS) to develop 
a new road safety strategy and to take the lead and coordinate road safety activity across DfT. 
 Provide leadership to local authorities, encourage Safe System activity and increased 
understanding of the concept.  
 Ensure that road safety objectives are evident in transport strategy and policy documents and 
in investment strategies such as for the Major Road Network. 
 Ensure that identified priority areas for action are consistent with implementing Safe System.  
 Underpin the government’s adoption of the Safe System approach with an agreed national road 
safety performance framework to form the core of a new British road safety strategy.  This 
would provide the focus for all other institutional delivery functions.  The national road safety 
performance framework would: 
 Set out the long-term Safe System/Towards Zero goal of working towards the ultimate 
prevention of deaths and serious injuries;  
 Set interim quantitative targets to 2030 to reduce the numbers of deaths and serious 
injuries; 
 Set measurable, intermediate outcome objectives for activities to 2030, for which there 
is a strong evidence base for a direct relationship to the prevention of death and serious 
injury and which are used by global road safety leaders. These include: 5 
▪ Increasing compliance with speed limits on different road types, 
▪ Reducing average speeds on different road types, 
▪ Increasing the level of seat belt use and child restraint use, 
▪ Increasing the level of helmet use for two-wheeled vehicle users, 
▪ Reducing driving while impaired by alcohol and drugs, 
▪ Increasing compliance with in-car telephone use rules, 
▪ Increasing the safety quality of the SRN and main road network to the highest 
iRAP *rating, 
▪ Increasing the safety quality of the new car fleet to the highest Euro NCAP * 
rating, and 
▪ Increasing compliance with emergency medical response times.  
 Set long-term goals and supporting interim quantified objectives for the new Major Roads 
Network along the lines adopted for the Strategic Road Network.  
                                                          
5 European Commission, Monitoring Road Safety in the EU: towards a comprehensive set of Safety Performance Indicators, 
European Commission, Directorate General for Transport, November 2017.  
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 Set out the shared benefits that road safety can bring to other societal objectives, e.g. public 
health, occupational health and safety, environment, tourism and the economy. 
 Ensure that achieving better road safety results is seen as core business and supported by 
appropriate capacity by all the responsible government departments and their agencies, in 
particular by all key units of the Department for Transport, Highways England, Home Office, 
Department of Health, and the Health and Safety Executive. 
 
Other central government Departments and agencies should: 
 Actively support the national road safety strategy, goals and objectives through adoption of 
policies to reduce deaths and serious injuries within their areas of responsibility. 
 
Local government should: 
 Appoint a cabinet lead for road safety, to ensure that road safety remains high priority for local 
authority activity, and to improve accountability for legal duties. 
 Adopt the Safe System approach and long-term goal towards the ultimate prevention of death 
and serious injuries in road safety strategies and plans. 
 Set measurable interim targets to 2030 to reduce the numbers of deaths and serious injuries 
with supporting road safety performance objectives, as proposed for the national framework. 
 
Police should: 
 Increase levels of enforcement of key road safety rules related to the prevention of death and 
serious injury. 
 Support improved crash investigation and encourage and facilitate the adoption of the widely 
recommended CRASH reporting system by all police forces.  
 
Business and civil Society should: 
 Engage with and support the national drive to work towards the ultimate prevention of deaths 
and serious injuries and related objectives. 
 
Coordination 
 
Key findings 
 
Successful road safety coordination in Britain is an increasingly complex task within the context of 
devolution and localism, the absence of national goals and quantified objectives to provide cohesion 
for multi-agency and multi-sectoral activity, and budget cuts. The Road Safety Delivery Group is a 
useful forum for discussion and information sharing but lacks focus for meaningful inter-agency 
coordination of activity aimed at achieving ambitious results.  Although there are good examples of 
joint working between national and local levels, such as the THINK! campaign and the Safer Roads 
Fund, there is a widely held view of a lack of central government support and leadership. The new 
Major Roads Network and investment fund provides a new opportunity for new regional coordination 
structures. 
 
Main strengths 
 Britain has a well-established information sharing structure at national level, bringing together 
key road safety partners. More regular reporting to Ministers on progress is envisaged. 
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 Mature, local road safety partnerships continue to play a key role. 
 New regional road safety coordination for the strategic road network is being developed by 
Highways England. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 The absence of a national road safety performance framework for the interim and long-term is 
resulting in a lack of focus and cohesion in coordination efforts and fragmented activity. 
 There is a lack of inter-departmental coordination to ensure that road safety objectives are 
embedded in the mainstream policies of responsible agencies. 
 Local road safety partnerships are suffering a loss of multi-sectoral involvement. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT and its governmental partners should: 
 Strengthen coordination across and between all levels of government in support of the national 
road safety performance framework which will provide focus, rationale and coherence for 
meaningful shared responsibility.  
 Establish a Minister-led, high-level Road Safety Strategic Partnership Group with senior 
representatives from central and local government, police and other key road safety partners 
focused on agreeing priorities within a new road safety strategy, and steering and overseeing 
delivery of Safe System ambition and quantified objectives.  This would be supported by a 
working group comprising key departmental, agency and stakeholder representatives with 
operational road safety responsibilities for road safety, and independent experts, to deliver Safe 
System objectives through multi-sectoral activity at national and local level. 
 Strengthen the capacity of DfT road safety staff to take the lead in coordination of road safety 
delivery, both within DfT and across all levels of government. 
 Strengthen coordination with local authorities by a variety of means: through establishment of 
the national road safety performance framework to provide cohesion for efforts, as well as 
through funding, incentives and guidance. 
 Support the establishment of regional road safety partnerships in coordination with Highways 
England for the major and local road network in support of goals and interim quantitative 
objectives with ring-fenced grant funding to local authorities. 
 
Local authorities and police should: 
 Work in partnership with civil society to deliver road safety results in support of the ultimate 
ambition for the elimination of deaths and serious injuries. 
 
Legislation 
 
Key findings 
 
Over the years, Britain has established a generally robust legislative framework and has earned a high 
reputation for its processes, including review and consolidation of legislative provisions for road safety.  
BREXIT, devolution and localism all raise additional complexities for the legislative framework for road 
safety. Key issues in the context of the changing organisation of road safety within Britain are how 
meaningful shared responsibility for implementing a Safe System approach can be delivered, as well 
as the extent to which legislation addresses the current road safety task. Additional concerns are 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 14 /173  
 
adherence to best practice, road users’ understanding of what applies where, and differing 
enforcement regimes in various parts of Britain. At the same time, reduced legislative capacity may 
provide opportunity for greater use of other tools such as incentives and investment. 
 
Main strengths 
 Britain has a generally robust legislative framework for road safety, built over a long period of 
time. 
 Review and consolidation processes of legislation are established.  
 Local authorities have a legal duty to carry out road safety activities. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 Institutional roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for implementing the long-term Safe 
System approach are not formally established. 
 Consolidation of road safety legislation is overdue, but there are capacity constraints. 
 No recent in-house review of needs to meet the current road safety task has been conducted.  
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT and its governmental partners should: 
 Clarify the shared responsibility for road safety across agencies by reviewing institutional roles, 
responsibilities and accountabilities and other specific legislative needs, in support of 
implementing the long-term, multi-sectoral Safe System approach. 
 Ensure capacity is available for identified evidence-based legislative road safety changes which 
address the prevention of death and serious injury.  
 Consider whether a new duty should be placed on local authorities to identify where 
responsibility lies for road safety at cabinet level. 
 Carry out periodic consolidation of road safety legislation in line with good practice.  
 
Funding and Resource Allocation 
 
Key findings 
 
The level of spending on road safety is not commensurate with the current estimated value of 
prevention of deaths and serious injuries (£8.3 billion). There are many opportunities for large returns 
on investment presented by a wide variety of systematic, demonstrably effective interventions. The 
organisation and availability of funding of road safety has undergone major changes since 2010 which 
is having, or will have, substantial effects on the amount and quality of activity.   
 
The removal of the ring-fenced Road Safety Grant and the substantial reductions in local highway 
investments and in traffic policing levels, experienced since 2010, have had visible impact on the level 
and quality of activity.  Most local authorities are struggling to carry out and prioritise effective road 
safety activity in a time of budget cuts and growing demand in other areas, such as social care, without 
the impetus provided in the past from national measurable objectives. There are recent positive 
developments on roads funding: the Safer Roads Fund, Highways England funding for the strategic 
roads network, and promised new investment in a new Major Roads Network, highway maintenance 
and cycling safety. 
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Main strengths 
 Britain’s past good practice in road safety investment is recognised globally. 
 New funding is planned/available for strategic roads, major roads and cycle safety. 
 The societal value of preventing death and serious injury used in cost-benefit analysis is based 
on willingness-to-pay methods and updated regularly. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 The removal of the Road Safety Grant and Partnership Grant has reduced local road safety 
capacity and activity.  
 Road safety activity receives only limited funding in most local government budgets and is given 
insufficient priority. 
 Substantial reductions in highway engineering budgets are inhibiting the integration of proactive 
road safety engineering into asset management. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Review the funding available to local authorities to ensure that highway maintenance and other 
safety critical activity is not cut in order to finance other services. 
 Ensure that at least 10% of all road infrastructure investment is allocated to road safety 
intervention and to ensure embedding of the Safe System approach into the mainstream of 
highway engineering practice (in line with UNRSC’s global road safety plan recommendation for 
the Decade of Action).   
 Consider reintroducing the ring-fenced Road Safety Grant for local authority road safety 
partnership activity, in order to ensure that sufficient levels of multi-sectoral activity take place. 
 Consider introducing a ring-fenced grant for the establishment of regional road safety 
partnerships. 
 Provide financial resource for roll out of training to local authorities on Safe System engineering 
to advance knowledge transfer. 
 Review the Safer Roads Fund once the evaluation is complete and consider if it should be 
extended. 
 Provide local authorities with dedicated resources for innovative Safe System demonstration 
projects to advance local implementation. 
 Ensure that the benefits for health of walking and cycling are supported by safety improvements 
by making funding available for safety measures as well as measures to increase activity. 
 
Other central government Departments and agencies should: 
 Review funding in support of measures to improve road safety within their responsibilities. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Review the priority given to road safety in budget allocations.  
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Promotion 
 
Key findings 
 
Britain has had a long tradition in promoting road safety as a shared responsibility across and between 
levels of government, supported by civil society and the business sector.  However, more recently 
there is less evidence of high-level promotion and leading by example across national government.  
There is insufficient focus on road death and injury as a major cause of harm, in particular for children 
and young adults.  More consistency is needed in messages on road deaths and enforcement of traffic 
law, and in public health and child welfare promotion. 
 
Main strengths 
 Adoption of the Safe System approach in the BRSS provides an opportunity to refresh national 
road safety activity and align it with other societal objectives such as health promotion and 
occupational health and safety. 
 There is advocacy for strong activity on road safety from non-governmental bodies and in 
London, other cities and by Highways England. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 Strong high-level promotion of road safety at national level is not evident. 
 There is a lack of promotion of good practice nationally and locally. 
 Safe System is poorly understood and needs better communication and promotion. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT and other central government departments and agencies should: 
 Promote the shared responsibility for road safety at a high level to provide national leadership. 
 Promote the Safe System ambition for the ultimate elimination of deaths and serious injury as 
the new transport safety culture for professional road safety work in Britain.  
 Develop ‘leading by example’ strategies in line with this ambition. 
 Promote Towards Zero in public communication strategies. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Promote Safe System as the new transport safety culture in Britain to professionals and devise 
Towards Zero community promotion and engagement strategies. 
 Promote the shared responsibility for road safety at a high level to provide local and city 
leadership. 
 
Civil society should: 
 Promote Safe System and Towards Zero as the new transport safety culture to professionals, 
businesses and the community.  
 Promote the take up of BS ISO 39001 and other strategic road safety management tools. 
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Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Key findings 
 
The collection, review, dissemination and sharing of data, as well as performance review, has 
traditionally been a national strength and consistent with international best practice. The adoption of 
the Safe System focus on the prevention and reduction of deaths and serious injuries, and supporting 
measurable indicators for targeting related system-wide activity and performance, presents new 
monitoring and evaluation needs. These include review of data and survey needs as well as providing 
a home for central storage of all relevant statistical data relating to Safe System implementation. 
 
Currently, the main road safety monitoring role of the Statistics Travel and Safety Division of the DfT is 
the production of the annual national database of statistics on road casualties and the annual 
publication Road Casualties Great Britain.   A planned review of the national road crash injury reporting 
system is expected in summer 2018 and will need to address new data needs. A positive development 
which is discussed later in Section 5.2 is the process of adoption by DfT of the responsibility for the 
CRASH reporting system and the work being carried out to facilitate its take-up by all police forces at 
no cost. At the same time, there is over-reliance on national data on deaths and serious injuries for 
understanding crashes and outcomes, and the collection and targeting of intermediate outcomes 
would allow closer safety management.  At national level some such data is collected periodically, but 
neither comprehensively nor sufficiently regularly, nor brought together to inform policymaking in a 
systematic way.  Although the DfT is assiduous in its evaluation of new interventions and programmes 
there are some concerns that, despite this, too little emerges in terms of policy development. 
 
A national professional debate has commenced about how road collision investigation can be 
expanded.  The view expressed by collision investigation experts is that all road fatalities could be 
investigated using a Safe System approach.  This would involve an independent expert assessment of 
every police investigation which, together with Coroners’ and other data provides much other useful 
data and allows comprehensive and themed analysis.  The need to expand the RAIDS programme to 
allow more collision investigation of severe injuries was also highlighted during the review.   
 
Main strengths 
 Monitoring and evaluation is supported by a national STATS19 road accident database. 
 An improved police reporting system, CRASH, is being rolled out. 
 Highways England, Transport for London and others are starting to look at safety performance 
indicators in support of quantified objectives and Safe System implementation. 
 Some data tools are available in support of a Safe System approach, e.g. iRAP safety ratings of 
the strategic and main road network and Euro NCAP ratings. 
 The DfT has commissioned a Road Safety Management Capacity Review, in line with 
recommended practice. 
  A national discussion is taking place on how road collision investigation can be enhanced. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 The review of STATS19 is long overdue and there have been delays in the widespread adoption 
of CRASH but which are now being addressed.  
 Annual monitoring of key indicators linked to the prevention of death and serious injury is not 
carried out, and there are no longer public opinion surveys on attitudes to road safety.  
 Integration of key final and intermediate outcome data to support the implementation of Safe 
System is lacking. 
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 The scope of current in-depth crash investigation to determine serious and fatal collision and 
injury causation is too limited. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Review data needs for delivering a national Safe System performance framework. 
 Carry out the anticipated review of STATS19 data at the earliest opportunity. 
 Establish the level of underreporting of serious injury collisions by linking STATS19 and health 
data sets (the last linkage was in 2012). 
 Review crash investigation to consider how the current system for investigation of fatal and 
serious crash injuries can be enhanced, and set out options for such a system. 
 Develop the capacity of the DfT Statistics and Analysis Division to fulfil key national monitoring 
and evaluation requirement related to Safe System implementation. 
 Commission regular monitoring reports to track progress in delivery of key road safety 
objectives. 
 
The Home Office and police should: 
 Alongside the DfT, ensure that one national crash reporting system (CRASH) is used by all police 
forces.  
 Monitor actual levels of enforcement of key road safety rules including those relating to excess 
alcohol and drugs, speeding, seat belt use, and in-car telephone use. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Measure key safety performance indicators e.g. average speeds, seat belt use, crash helmet use, 
and iRAP ratings related to the number and risk of death and serious injuries, to inform a local 
performance framework with reference to the proposed national framework. 
 Monitor outcomes of local road safety programmes in line with goals and quantified objectives 
to ensure that value for money is being obtained. 
 
Research and Development and Knowledge Transfer 
 
Key findings 
 
Successful road safety activity in Britain has been underpinned by a long tradition of road safety 
research commissioned by DfT and the EU which has contributed to the evidence base for policy 
development and evaluation, together with the global road safety knowledge base. The UK has played 
a major role in road safety research and development internationally.  A notable example is found in 
vehicle safety research, which has strongly contributed to the development of good practice crash 
tests and protocols and informed vehicle safety legislation and consumer information. The UK road 
safety research capacity is well developed and embraces a range of institutes and university 
departments and units, as well as charitable foundations which commission and promote research 
findings.  The establishment of a national road safety research strategy and capacity framework has 
been suggested by several research funders. 
 
The major area of UK funded safety research is the £80 million allocated to industry led 
commercialisation initiatives on autonomous vehicles through Innovate UK. The current DfT RULIS 
research budget of £2 million funds a young driver project (Driver2020), which is evaluating five non-
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legislative interventions aimed at reducing young driver collision risk.  Some concerns have been 
expressed on current research funding levels, procurement methods, including frameworks, and 
priorities.  There is no longer a road safety research advisory group or a national road safety research 
strategy. Demonstration projects have been an important part of the programme in the past and could 
play a valuable role in developing Safe System measures. 
 
Central government and its partners in Britain also have a strong tradition in providing a framework 
for knowledge transfer. This is of increasing importance in providing guidance on Safe System 
implementation. A start has been made to this process in the development of initial guidance on 
proactive road safety engineering by the DfT, Road Safety Foundation, and RAC Foundation under the 
auspices of the Safer Roads Fund. 
 
Time and budget constraints have limited the engagement of central and local government staff with 
international research groups, attendance at conferences and participation in international networks, 
to the detriment of professional development. 
 
Main strengths 
 Strong capacity for road safety research exists in the UK. 
 Good practice guidelines, training programmes, demonstration projects and workshops are 
established national mechanisms for knowledge transfer. 
 Initial guidance on implementing a Safe System approach through proactive road safety 
engineering is being developed. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 There is no national road safety advisory body to help to identify priorities nor a national road 
safety research strategy. 
 There are concerns about research funding and problems created by the framework 
procurement process. 
 The road safety profession is generally insufficiently aware of the state of the art in 
implementing Safe System. 
 There is a knowledge gap and lack of engagement in public and private sectors in the 
implementation of a Safe System approach. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Establish a national road safety research advisory group to provide independent expert advice 
on research priorities related to implementing Safe System. 
 Develop and publish a national multi-sectoral road safety research strategy covering all Safe 
System elements to support and reinforce the shared responsibility for road safety results 
 Increase dedicated road safety research budget and programme management capacity to 
support the implementation of a Safe System approach and demonstration projects across the 
UK. 
 Encourage partners to fund research in line with their core road safety responsibilities. 
 Improve current research procurement methods. 
 Establish a register of road safety research competencies and programmes. 
 Continue to build policy evaluation and monitoring into the research programme. 
 Provide guidance on Safe System implementation. 
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 Commission Safe System demonstration projects. 
 
SECTION B:  INTERVENTIONS 
 
Safe Roads and Roadsides 
 
Key findings 
 
Implementing the Safe System approach has major implications for the safe planning, operation and 
perhaps use of the road network, and involves engineering approaches to: 
 Establish clear urban and rural road hierarchies which better match function to speed limit and 
layout and design; 
 Separate oncoming traffic on high-volume, high-speed roads to prevent head-on collisions and 
provide crash protective roadsides to address run-off road collisions; and 
 Ensure safe speeds at intersections to reduce fatal and serious side collisions and ensure safe 
speeds on roads and streets with dangerous mixed use where separation of motor vehicles and 
vulnerable road users may be difficult. 
 
The focus on prevention and mitigation of death and serious injury requires predictive, and not 
reactive approaches to risk; updated design standards to take account of human tolerance to injury; 
speed management that takes account of the protective quality of roads and roadsides, road function 
and use, and the protection afforded by vehicles travelling on the network. 
 
For the Strategic Roads Network, Highways England is clearly providing safety engineering leadership 
in many aspects of Safe System, although some experts engaged with note that core attention to speed 
management is missing.  
 
While comprising only 11% of the total network, the Major Road Network carries 56% of traffic and 
produces around 51% of road traffic deaths.  The desirability and opportunity for government to set a 
similar safety performance framework for a new Major Road Network, as for the current strategic road 
network, has been suggested.  This would include targeting iRAP star rating performance in support of 
a long-term goal and interim objectives to prevent and mitigate death and serious injury, and 
embedding the Safe System approach into the mainstream of the planning, design, operation and use 
of the network.  
 
Safe System leadership and activity in safety engineering is also evident at city levels in London and 
some other cities.  In support of the Mayor’s Vision Zero goals and targets in his new transport strategy, 
London is working on key safety performance indicators to more closely manage its interventions.  New 
attention in recent years has been given to cycling safety alongside its promotion as a healthy activity.  
Bristol provides a further example of a city adopting Safe System, where systematic speed 
management is being put in place to improve the safety of walking and cycling. 
 
In general, however, Safe System is not well understood at local level. Prioritisation of road sections 
requiring treatment by fatal and serious risk is not generally evident in local network management. 
However, the Safer Roads Fund programme is generally viewed as encouraging highly useful and 
complementary proactive Safe System implementation for 50 local major roads which present the 
highest risks of death and serious injury. 
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Main strengths 
 Highways England is leading the adoption of Safe System principles for the SRN, including new 
designs for expressways, and is working to measurable safety targets. 
 The Safer Roads Fund is encouraging proactive engineering approaches on 50 highest risk locally 
managed A roads. 
 Mayors in several cities are leading Safe System urban road engineering to protect vulnerable 
road users. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 There is no national policy and guidance on safe roads and roadsides and Safe System is not yet 
part of the mainstream of national highway engineering practice. 
 Road classification, speed management on motorways, and the design and layouts of main road 
networks and urban roads, are not in line with Safe System principles. 
 Safety activity on local roads is under-resourced compared with investment in the Strategic Road 
Network. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Review the national road hierarchy, speed limit classification, and urban and rural design 
standards to align with Safe System principles. 
 Develop national guidance on integrating the Safe System approach into the mainstream of 
highway engineering. 
 Provide resources to local authorities for training on Safe System engineering and for 
demonstration projects. 
 Allocate at least 10% of all road infrastructure investment to road safety intervention, as 
recommended in the UNRSC’s Global Road Safety Plan for the Decade of Action, and to ensure 
embedding of the Safe System approach into the mainstream of highway engineering practice.  
 
HE should: 
 Publish an annual star rating performance of the Strategic Road Network. 
 Identify, in partnership with local authorities, road sections for priority treatments on the Major 
Roads Network and local roads using iRAP tools. 
 Carry out in-service training in implementing the Safe System approach. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Review local road classification to ensure that speed limits match function, road design and 
layout to conform with Safe System principles. 
 Adopt the Safe System approach into the mainstream of highway engineering and ensure that 
prevention of death and serious injury is an explicit objective in maintenance. 
 
Public Health England should: 
 Play a highly visible role in supporting evidence-based intervention for Safe Roads and 
Roadsides. 
  
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 22 /173  
 
Safe Speeds 
 
Key findings 
 
Safety engineers note that the road classification in Britain is not generally aligned to Safe System. 
Posted speed limits allow speeds that are in excess of the design limits of roads and roadsides and 
vehicle capability to protect against death and serious injury.  This is particularly the case on the single 
carriageway rural road network where inappropriate but allowable speed within the 60mph limit is 
often cited as a contributory factor in road crashes.  In urban areas, 20mph limits are being increasingly 
implemented in city centres, residential areas and other areas with high volumes of pedestrians and 
cyclists, often supported by road humps and chicanes.  There is concern that new government 
guidance on emissions may lead local authorities to remove such speed management devices without 
reference to the safety impact.  Better speed management has not been cited to this review as an 
operational priority by the DfT, Highways England, police activity, or local authority activity.  
 
Compliance with speed limits is still poor, especially in urban areas and on motorways, and exceeding 
the speed limit features amongst the top five contributory factors for many types of collision. Even 
small changes in mean speed affect fatal and serious crash risk.  A 5% decrease in mean speed could 
produce a 30% reduction in deaths.  Speed prosecution thresholds are considered by professionals to 
be too high.  Speed cameras have proven effectiveness, and recently average speed cameras have 
been shown to reduce fatal and serious collisions by 36%.  Speed awareness courses as an alternative 
to prosecution are seen by many, though not all, as a useful educational measure and their 
effectiveness in terms of reoffending is being evaluated. 
 
Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) can help drivers to comply with speed limits and an overridable 
option is being examined within the EU’s General Safety Regulation review. Research in Britain 
indicates a potential 21% reduction in fatal crashes and a 14% reduction in serious crashes from the 
fitment of overridable ISA.   This is an in-vehicle system in which the driver chooses whether the system 
restricts the vehicle’s speed and/or the speed it is restricted to.  Procurement processes and insurance 
schemes also present opportunities to promote ISA. 
 
Main strengths 
 Successful speed management includes speed cameras and residential area speed reduction 
measures. 
 British research has contributed to promising in-vehicle technologies. 
 Speed compliance levels are regularly monitored. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 The road and speed limit classification system is not aligned to Safe System principles. 
 Compliance with speed limits is not high in urban areas and on motorways. 
 Speed limits are too high where protection from roads and vehicles is insufficient. 
 Leadership on speed management is lacking. 
 National guidance is lacking on Safe Speeds within a Safe System approach. 
 
Key recommendations 
The DfT should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed as a design parameter of the Safe System approach. 
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 Review national speed limits on roads in Britain as soon as possible.  
 Establish better speed management as a national priority by targeting percentage increases in 
speed limit compliance and work with partners to achieve this. 
 Promote the benefits of average speed cameras, fixed site and mobile cameras to key agencies, 
highway authorities and the community. 
 Re-establish national multimedia advertising on the adverse, daily consequences of speeding. 
 Assist drivers in complying with speed limits by promoting mandatory, overridable Intelligent 
Speed Assistance (ISA) in EU Whole Vehicle Type Approval; and fast-track this nationally via 
government procurement policies and safe travel policies. 
 
HE should: 
 Establish speed management as a priority for network safety management, in line with the Safe 
System approach. 
 Roll out a programme of cameras on motorways and A roads, including average speed cameras. 
 
The Ministry of Justice should: 
 Review international best practice with national speed prosecution thresholds. 
 
The Home Office should: 
 Work with partners to improve speed limit compliance and promote the benefits of speed 
cameras. 
 
The police should: 
 Include speed limit compliance in policing priorities and work with DfT, HE and local authorities 
to combine publicity and police enforcement of speed limits. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed and its management to a Safe System approach and 
review priority interventions for local roads. 
 Target percentage increases in compliance with speed limits, work with partners, e.g. DfT, HE, 
police to ensure better compliance and review progress annually. 
 Require ISA in the public procurement of transport services. 
 
Public Health England should: 
 Play a highly visible role in supporting evidence-based intervention for Safe Speeds. 
 
Safe Vehicles 
 
Key findings 
 
The UK has a proud heritage in vehicle safety advocacy, policy and research. Vehicle safety 
interventions address crash avoidance, crash protection and mitigation in the event of a crash, and 
post-crash response.  
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The current focus of international vehicle policy work emphasises market driven approaches and 
futurist intervention for connected and autonomous vehicles.  While experimentation with driverless 
vehicles are in the pipeline, Highways England estimates that the roll out of fully autonomous vehicles 
on the Strategic Road Network is unlikely before 2050.  The path towards this will need research, 
regulation and evaluation but safety benefits in the meantime will be derived from available safety 
technologies.  However, there is widespread concern that short and medium-term vehicle safety 
priorities and investments are not competing well with the connected and autonomous vehicle 
agenda.   
 
A range of life-saving driver assistance technologies, including intelligent speed assistance, 
autonomous emergency braking systems for pedestrian and cyclists await adoption in EU legislation 
and promotion by national fast-tracking.  Substantial savings in deaths and serious injuries have been 
identified by research. There is wide support for requiring 5* Euro NCAP star rating in public 
procurement and for setting targets to improve take up in the new vehicle fleet, as practiced in some 
other countries. In addition, the need for an expansion of in-depth crash investigation has been 
highlighted.  
 
Main strengths 
 The UK has made a strong contribution to international vehicle safety standards including Euro 
NCAP, and there is strong vehicle safety research capacity. 
 The need for vehicle safety requirements in public procurement is national policy and London is 
a leader in this. 
 Insurance sector initiatives via in-vehicle monitoring hold promise. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 Policy and research agendas are dominated by the creation of a market for automated vehicles. 
 Vehicle safety measures are not prioritised for their casualty reduction value. 
 Crash injury investigation has become too limited. 
 National guidance is lacking on Safe Vehicles within a Safe System approach. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Promote vehicle safety technologies such as Intelligent Speed Adaptation, Autonomous 
Emergency Braking for Pedestrians and improvements in key crash tests for front, side and 
pedestrian protection, in regulation, consumer information and procurement policies. 
 Restore the previous priority given to vehicle safety policy and research in DfT vehicles activity 
and research procurement. 
 Engage fully in Euro NCAP technical activities and provide equal financial resource to that 
provided by other governmental board partners. 
 Set and monitor national targets to improve vehicle safety quality to Euro NCAP 5* in the new 
car fleet.  
 In coordination with the Government Buying Service, announce measures to include Euro NCAP 
5* rating (including 60% pass of pedestrian tests), motorcycle anti-lock braking systems, 
Intelligent Speed Assistance, autonomous emergency braking for pedestrians and seat belt 
reminders in all seating positions in the public procurement of transport services across 
government.  
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 Strengthen national policy leadership on the operational safety of commercial vehicles and 
review the safety of commercial vehicles operating standards. 
 Extend the RAIDS crash investigation programme so it is large enough to inform new policy and 
monitor new technologies in cars. 
 Work with business to ensure transparent evaluation of insurance sector in-vehicle initiatives to 
reduce young driver risk through telematic applications for wider roll-out, ongoing and as an 
extension to the Driver2020 research. 
 Review research procurement procedures and protocols to ensure that urgent research needs 
can be addressed by the appropriate expertise. 
 Publish a road map for the safety management of increasing and mixed automation levels of 
connected and autonomous vehicles. 
 Allay wide concerns about the safety quality of vehicle type approval post BREXIT and in 
international trade deals. 
 
Local Government should: 
 Include Euro NCAP 5* rating and key vehicle safety measures in the public procurement of local 
transport services. 
 
Safe Road Use 
 
Key findings 
 
The Safe System approach aims to create a forgiving road and vehicle environment that accommodates 
human error and takes account of human tolerance to injury.  New emphasis is given to increasing the 
protective qualities of roads and in-vehicle driver assistance technologies which will produce 
sustainable improvements in safe road use over time.  However, road users are also expected to 
comply with road traffic law and regulations, assisted by education and publicity to improve knowledge 
and attitudes and enforcement frameworks to aid compliance. 
 
There is general support for the national driver licensing and testing framework.  However, young 
driver crash injury rates and numbers, as well as the increasing vulnerability of ageing road users, 
continue to be of concern.  Concerning the former, the Driver2020 research programme is evaluating 
a variety of voluntary interventions.  However, this review found support for managing initial exposure 
to risk through graduated licensing, an approach that has been found effective in several countries.  
An urgent issue is the need to revise provisions concerned with penalty points earned by offending 
learner motorcyclist licences, as has been highlighted in the recent DfT consultation. 
 
Commercial vehicle and driver responsibility is shared by DfT and DVSA, along with the Traffic 
Commissioners.  There are some concerns regarding vehicle operators from overseas and about the 
devolved approach adopted by central government on some aspects of heavy goods vehicle safety 
which would benefit from a uniform, national approach. 
 
A number of key safety rules are directly related to the number and risk of death and serious injury.   
These include rules on speeding, impairment by alcohol, drugs and fatigue, seat belt and child restraint 
use, crash helmet use and the use of distracting devices such as in-car telephones. Compliance levels 
indicate that road users need more assistance through such measures as in-vehicle driver assistance 
devices, safety engineering and speed management, and police enforcement and supporting publicity 
campaigns. 
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Main strengths 
 Britain has a comprehensive framework for driver licensing and testing and a long tradition of 
coordinated safety publicity and enforcement engaging the community. 
 Safety partnerships coordinating publicity and enforcement are well established. 
 Research and some surveys on safe road use and behaviours are carried out. 
 Local authority safety work is supported by Road Safety GB and through guidance developed by 
the RAC Foundation. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 The needs of high-risk young drivers and riders are not fully addressed in the licensing system. 
 There is a lack of national leadership in the safety of heavy goods vehicle operation. 
 Levels of education, publicity and police enforcement have been reduced. 
 National guidance is lacking on Safe Road Use within a Safe System approach. 
 Surveys of all key safe behaviours are not carried out. 
 
Key Recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Review how Safe Road Use can be supported within a Safe System approach (in addition to that 
provided by other Safe System elements) through improved road user standards and assisting 
compliance with key road safety rules. 
 Ensure that driver licensing standards better address the needs of high-risk young drivers and 
riders and older drivers by: 
 Monitoring graduated driver licensing developments in Northern Ireland to inform 
decision on implementing in Britain, together with review of latest UK Driver2020 
research and overseas research findings. 
 Revising provisions concerned with penalty points earned by offending learner 
motorcyclist licences as highlighted in the recent DfT consultation. 
 Reviewing age requirements for the renewal of driver licences and accompanying 
provisions, as recommended by the Older Drivers Task Force.   
 Lower the blood alcohol limit to 50mg/100ml for the general driving population which could 
produce identified reductions of at least 120 deaths and serious injuries in alcohol-related road 
collisions6, and would be in line with current public opinion survey evidence and internationally 
identified good practice.  
 Review the safety of commercial vehicle operating standards. 
 Carry out THINK! campaigns across a wide range of media, coordinated with police enforcement 
effort, to promote Towards Zero and secure better compliance with key road safety rules.  
 Commission research into public perception of the risk of being detected for key road safety 
offences, e.g. excess alcohol and speed. 
 
  
                                                          
6 Allsop R E (2015). Saving Lives by Lowering the Legal Drink-Drive Limit, University College London 
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The Home Office should: 
 Support police enforcement of safety rules by providing more finance and equipment, in 
particular evidential roadside breath testing devices, and national guidance. 
 
The Ministry of Justice should: 
 Review speed offence prosecution thresholds against international best practice. 
 
The police should: 
 Upgrade the priority given to enforcement in policing strategy and increase activity. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Devise community engagement strategies to promote the Towards Zero goal of the ultimate 
prevention of deaths and serious injuries. 
 Ensure an evidenced-based approach to determining priorities for safe road use and adopting 
Safe System principles and appropriate capacity for local education, training and combined 
publicity and enforcement of key road safety rules. 
 
Public Health England should: 
 Play a highly visible role in supporting evidence-based intervention for Safe Road Use. 
 
Post-Crash Care 
 
Key findings 
 
Post-crash care concerns the rescue, treatment and rehabilitation of crash victims. Effective care 
reduces mortality rates and improves recovery rates from injury through prompt emergency rescue 
and care at the roadside, good diagnosis and stabilisation, fast transport to hospital, quality trauma 
care and good rehabilitation. Research indicates that deaths could be reduced by one-third by reducing 
the time between crash occurrence and arrival of medical services from 25 to 15 minutes. The 
development of regional major trauma centres has made a real contribution to reducing deaths and 
better recovery and outcomes. The Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN) has a large trauma 
database and provides research-based recommendations that have led to major changes in trauma 
care. 
 
The review was unable to engage with policy makers in the health sector. There is no national 
information on the efficiency of emergency response in general, but monitoring of ambulance 
response times has shown a deterioration in recent years.  First responder first aid is also provided by 
trained police who attend collisions, some trained fire crews, and driving instructors. 
 
The new in-vehicle eCall system that will be fitted to all new cars from April 2018 will provide an 
automated message to the emergency services following a collision. Substantial savings in deaths and 
serious injuries have been identified by research from a fully operational system.  However, there is 
concern by some that this system may divert emergency vehicles to sites where they are not needed 
or which do not need to be prioritised in terms of threat to life or consequences of serious injury. 
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Main Strengths 
 Significant changes in major trauma centre organisation have taken place and response to major 
trauma is targeted and monitored. 
 There is continuing improvement in standards of emergency care and training, and first 
responder training is offered. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 Post-crash care is not embedded in road safety strategies and its specific contribution to 
reducing death and serious injury in road crashes in Britain is not well-researched. 
 Ambulance and hospital accident and emergency services are under pressure and not meeting 
national targets. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Include post-crash care in road safety strategy to improve survivability and reduce permanent 
impairment resulting from road collisions. 
 Review the contribution of improvements to response rates, trauma care and long-term 
rehabilitation of crash victims to reducing death and the long-term consequences of serious 
injury.  
 
The Department of Health and National Health England should: 
 Address regional variations in emergency medical response times. 
 Report on the effectiveness of major trauma care in preventing death and the long-term 
consequences of serious injury.  
 Commission research on the cost of long-term care resulting from permanent impairment from 
road traffic injury. 
Public Health England should:  
 Recognise that road traffic injury is a major cause of premature death and long-term serious 
injury in their Strategic Plan and include road safety as an area for action. 
Local authorities should: 
 Actively include post-crash care as a key road safety strategy in a Safe System approach. 
 Work with the local health sector to identify local improvements in post-crash care. 
 
Safe and Healthy Modes 
 
Key findings 
 
While different travel modes are promoted for different reasons, there is a substantial difference in 
levels of fatal crash injury risk between different modes of travel.   Rail is the safest land travel mode, 
followed by bus and coach travel.  The fatality risks per billion passenger miles of travelling by car, 
although relatively low compared with more vulnerable modes, are 5 times higher than by bus travel.  
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At the other end of the injury risk spectrum, the fatality risks of travelling by motorcycle are 52 times 
higher than by car, 3.5 times higher than by bicycle and almost 3 times higher than by foot.  
 
There has been substantial new activity in recent years to promote active travel in the context of 
sustainable transport policies and the promotion of healthy lifestyles.  This reflects public demand for 
greater equity between motorised and vulnerable modes and includes the development of a new 
national cycling and walking strategy and the recently established cycling safety review. Given the 
greater vulnerability of pedestrians and cyclists to the risk of death and serious injury, with a 16 and 
15 times higher death rate by distance respectively than car occupants, new attention to the planning 
and design of safe environments in line with Safe System principles is urgently needed. The long-term 
public health benefits of walking and cycling are large, but promotion of increased activity needs to be 
supported by planning the road environment, vehicles and safety equipment with the safety of 
vulnerable modes in mind in order to reduce death and serious injury risk.   
 
A new strategy was introduced in April 2017 setting out ambitious goals for increases in cycling and 
walking and focusing mainly on the former. Whilst there are specific, measurable targets set for 
increasing cycling and walking, and an unspecified goal for improving the safety of cyclists, there are 
no objectives set for increasing the safety of pedestrians, and walking is seen as the “poor relation” in 
policy announcements.  Whereas 6% of deaths and 14% of serious injuries are amongst cyclists, over 
four times as many pedestrians (25%) are killed in road collisions. 
  
The strategy also encourages local authorities to take account of the needs of pedestrians and cyclists 
and to reduce conflicts with traffic, and many have already established an active travel policy. There is 
widespread support for lower speed limits in urban areas, although the results of DfT’s research on 
the use of 20mph limits without self-enforcing measures is awaited.  The review of cycle safety will 
consider whether a new offence equivalent to causing death by careless or dangerous driving should 
be introduced for cyclists, as well as wider issues for cycling safety.  In March 2018, the DfT published 
a Call for Evidence on Cycling and Walking Safety, in support of the ambition in the Cycling and Walking 
Investment Strategy to make cycling and walking the natural choice for shorter journeys, or as part of 
a longer journey. 
 
Main strengths 
 A national cycling and walking investment strategy has been produced and new national policy 
on cycling and walking safety is being developed. 
 Local plans for walking and cycling are being encouraged and promoted, and London and other 
cities are targeting safety improvements for pedestrians and cyclists. 
 Research is being carried out on 20mph speed limits. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 Britain’s safety record for pedestrians and cyclists does not compare well to the leading road 
safety performers internationally. 
 The emphasis in the walking and cycling strategy is on cycling safety. 
 Specific quantitative targets have been set to increase walking and cycling, but not for reducing 
the numbers of deaths and serious injuries for pedestrians and cyclists. 
 Compliance with urban speed limits is poor; urban design standards need updating. 
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Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Encourage modal shift in support of environmental, safety and health objectives by promoting 
the use of the safest modes e.g. rail, bus and coach travel and the healthiest modes of walking 
and cycling.  
 Support walking and cycling with safety improvements to address risks of serious and fatal injury 
risks associated with cycling and walking which are lower than for motorcycling but appreciably 
higher than those travelling by car or public transport.  
 Substantially upgrade the priority given to the safety of pedestrians which compares poorly 
internationally. 
 Establish measurable safety performance indicators which relate to the prevention of death and 
serious injury to pedestrians and cyclists in the new national road safety strategy. 
 Carry out a national review of urban design standards with pedestrians and cyclists in mind and 
align with Safe System principles. 
 Support demonstration projects applying innovative Safe System treatments. 
 Consider extending the Safety Helmet Assessment and Rating Programme (SHARP) scheme to 
include bicycle helmets. 
 
Local authorities should: 
 Review the urban street classification and align with Safe System principles. 
 Ensure that there is safe access to public transport taking account of the needs of elderly and 
disabled people. 
 Improve compliance with urban speed limits. 
 Ensure capacity for effective community pedestrian safety initiatives. 
 
Safe Work Travel 
 
Key findings 
 
Road deaths at work are the leading cause of all deaths in the workplace, contributing at least 30% of 
deaths and 22% of serious injuries. The size of the problem is under-estimated due to uncertainty as 
to the accuracy of journey purpose data in the national road crash injury data system, the lack of any 
requirement for employers to record work-related road traffic injury in the national occupational 
health and safety database (RIDDORS), and lack of monitoring and evaluation of work-related road 
safety intervention at company and national levels. Work-related road safety is identified as an area 
deserving increased national focus by central and local government, national experts, road safety 
organisations and by the business sector.  
 
The national policy framework for work-related road safety is led by the DfT, in cooperation with the 
HSE. Fleet management and procurement was set out as an objective in the BRSS. The DfT has 
identified the vehicle leasing sector as a key collaborator ‘as it accounts for one tenth of cars and up 
to one quarter of Heavy Goods Vehicles on our roads’. 
 
The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents has had long-term involvement in creating awareness 
about what employers can do through establishing networking such as the Occupational Road Safety 
Alliance.  Driving for Better Business campaigns to raise awareness of the importance of work-related 
road safety in the business community and public sector.  
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The Transport Safety Commission has also made several recommendations in this field and has set up 
a Work-related Road Safety Forum comprising the DfT, HSE and a range of organisations and experts 
concerned with work-related road safety. Their aim is to bring key partners together, achieve better 
understanding of the problem and identify useful next steps.  The British Standards Institution (BSI) 
has engaged very actively in the international development of BS: ISO 39001 (2012) which set out a 
new Road Traffic Safety Management System standard with requirements and guidance for use. 
 
Recent research concludes, beyond confirming the problems noted above, that there is a weak 
regulatory and compliance framework around work-related driving. While corporate manslaughter 
legislation is in place, it is barely used for cases involving work-related road collisions and injuries.   
 
Main strengths 
 A new national policy for work-related road safety is foreseen in the BRSS. 
 Highways England has a Health and Safety Plan. 
 The UK has been actively involved in developing a recent ISO standard on road traffic safety 
management systems for organisations.  
 A Work-related Road Safety Forum has been set up by the Transport Safety Commission. 
 Some but not all local authorities have adopted safe travel policies. 
 Business sector networks exist to increase awareness of the importance of work-related road 
safety. 
 
Main weaknesses 
 Work-related road safety has not been a priority in occupational health and safety policy and 
management in Britain. 
 Data reporting mechanisms and intervention monitoring are insufficient. 
 BSI: ISO 39001 is not widely promoted, nor is much in use by organisations in Britain. 
 
Key recommendations 
 
The DfT should: 
 Work with the HSE to provide governmental leadership and better coordination for effective 
work-related road safety activity in Britain. 
 Conduct a research programme to extend the evidence base for effective national work-related 
road safety. 
 Review the reporting of ‘journey purpose’ in STATS19 data in the STATS19 review.  
 Encourage the adoption of BSI: ISO 39001 Road Traffic Safety Management System Standard 
through public procurement policies and other incentives, following a review of how greater 
take up can be encouraged. 
 Support local authority work-related road safety activity.  
 Establish a Safe Travel Policy for government services taking Safe System principles into account. 
 
The Health and Safety Executive should: 
 Upgrade priority given to work-related road safety, which is the leading cause of death at work. 
 Require reporting of work-related road collisions to RIDDOR when someone has been injured 
on the roads whilst using the road for work, or when someone driving or riding for work injures 
a member of the public.  
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Local authorities should: 
 Engage with local employers on work-related road safety. 
 Encourage the adoption of BSI: ISO 39001 Road Traffic Safety Management System Standards 
through public procurement policies and other incentives. 
 Establish a Safe Travel Policy for local government services taking Safe System principles into 
account. 
 
SECTION C:  RESULTS 
In 2016, 1,792 people lost their lives on British roads, the highest total since 2011. Between 2000 and 
2010 road deaths fell by 48% from 3,409 to 1,850, but the trend has been broadly flat since 2010. 
There was a 5% drop in UK fatalities compared to 17% for the EU average in the period between 2010 
and 2015.   
A further 24,101 crash victims were seriously injured in 2016. Road traffic injury represents a leading 
national cause of major trauma and for some age groups, a leading, if not lead cause of death when 
compared to all other causes.  
Research-based forecasts indicate that unless more effective action is taken, 350,000 people will be 
killed or seriously injured in Britain between 2010 and 20307.  Apart from this human cost, the societal 
value of prevention of the projected 3.5 million casualties of all severities is estimated to be around 
£160 billion. The annual value of prevention of death and serious injury in 2016 is estimated at £8.3 
billion.  
 
Programme phasing and prioritisation  
 
The preceding sections set out the key recommendations from the Review.  Together with those 
additionally in the main report they provide a comprehensive programme of inter-related activities for 
the implementation of Safe System in Britain to achieve road safety results.  The proposed programme, 
to be implemented over the next three years, envisages action by Central Government, Local 
Government, Police, the Business Sector and Civil Society to provide a coordinated and more ambitious 
approach for the delivery of improvements in safety outcomes for all road users.  
 
The priority for action to implement the Review’s recommendations is for DfT, as Lead Agency, to set 
in train the necessary steps for strategy development and coordination of road safety delivery, as set 
out in recommendations for Results Focus and Coordination. Of key importance is the recommended 
national road safety performance framework to form the core of national strategy, with the setting of 
a long-term goal, quantitative targets for the interim, and key road safety performance indicators for 
targeting progress and monitoring outcome objectives, together with related funding, monitoring and 
evaluation, and research requirements. Urgent action is also needed concerning recommendations for 
important improvements in vehicle safety via legislation and public procurement.  In addition, it will 
be necessary within the current consultation to ensure that, as recommended, the prevention of death 
and serious injuries on the Major Roads Network is appropriately and explicitly addressed in 
performance frameworks and investment programmes.  An overarching task is for the DfT to develop 
an Action Plan for the full programme of implementation of recommendations involving all agencies, 
taking account of current activities and opportunities, and ensuring that priority areas for action are 
                                                          
7 Mitchell C G B and R E Allsop (2014). Projections of road casualties in Great Britain to 2030, PACTS, London. 
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consistent with Safe System objectives. This would also need to establish key reviews to embed Safe 
System and to encourage Safe System activity and increased understanding of the concept by all 
sectors. 
 
This approach would ensure that resources are put in place at an early stage to deliver a 
comprehensive and multi-sector programme underpinned by an Action Plan detailing priorities and 
phasing of activities.  
 
Conclusions  
Britain is one of the global leaders in road safety and has achieved its results over decades by means 
of a systematic, planned, research-based response to road safety problems. Notwithstanding the good 
progress achieved, and as in most other countries active in road safety, there is widespread concern 
about current road safety results amongst the road safety community in Britain.  This review has found 
strong support for more ambitious activity to address the large scope for preventing avoidable death 
and serious injury in road crashes. 
The context for road safety is constantly changing and is set to change in ever more fundamental ways 
by 2030.  The roll-out of known, effective safety measures is essential to address the increasing risks 
from trends in choice of active travel modes and the need to address the safe mobility of an ageing 
population. The introduction of new technologies such as driverless cars will need careful planning and 
anticipation of possible risks such that the potential road safety benefits are realised. 
The government has embarked upon an ambitious long-term course in adopting the Safe System 
approach in line with international best practice.  Most professionals view Safe System as a sound 
approach which involves the extension and deepening of current practice.  The Highways England 
strategic framework, the strategic work in some cities, and the recent launch of Safer Roads Fund are 
widely cited as highly promising.  At the same time, Safe System is not yet fully launched or promoted, 
nor is there sufficient understanding across the sectors of what this means for their road safety work 
in Britain. This review makes a variety of recommendations, summarised in the preceding sections, to 
address this.  
In any country or jurisdiction, the context for road safety activity is highly complex (given its multi-
sectoral and multi-disciplinary nature), and careful leadership is a critical success factor.  Bold 
leadership and further steps by the national lead agency for road safety, the DfT, are sought. 
In Britain, the complexity of this road safety context has increased in recent years, both due to new 
developments in localism and greatly reduced budgets, as well as some falling away from successful 
past practice. This is evident in many sectors and is the cause of widespread concern by practitioners 
and professionals, including policymakers.  There is national consensus amongst those with everyday 
responsibilities for road safety that the priority given to road safety has been slipping for some years 
into unknown territory and that the momentum and rate of progress in casualty reduction seen in 
previous decades has been lost.  Continued fragmentation and dilution of established effective practice 
is a threat to future road safety performance.   
The principal conclusion of this review is that the absence of a national road safety performance 
framework is impeding progress.  It is clear that this has been a major factor in the marked reduction 
in priority and observable recession in results-focused road safety activity in virtually every sector, and 
in both national and local government.  
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 34 /173  
 
Over a two-decade period up to 2010 a carefully derived strategic national safety policy framework 
and quantified casualty reduction targets provided focus for national and local activity and substantial 
reductions in deaths and serious injuries in road crashes were achieved.  
It is widely reported that the absence of national quantitative targets to reduce death and serious 
injury since 2010 has contributed to a different focus from, or reduced focus on, death and serious 
injury prevention and reduction in important policy areas. While localism is cited nationally as being 
the primary reason for the withdrawal of targets, road safety professionals (across many sectors, 
including local government) are not convinced, observing that locally relevant targets are set in many 
other areas e.g. housing, other areas of public health, motor vehicle emissions and walking and cycling.   
Professionals have reported problems with retaining a road safety priority, or in some cases even the 
function itself, in local authority policymaking and investments. Problems are evident in the low 
priority now given to enforcing key road safety rules.  Above all, a lack of a rationale for joint working 
was reported within departments, across central government, with and within local authorities and 
across the wider road safety profession.  The lessening involvement of key agencies with core 
responsibilities at national and local level is challenging meaningful shared road safety responsibilities 
in key sectors.  Current activity, in general, remains highly fragmented and lacks focus.    
The relationship between setting quantified road safety targets and achievement of the reduction of 
death and serious injuries in road collisions is well established in research findings.  International 
organisations working with road safety see target-setting as a global success story.  Successful 
application of a Safe System approach requires a Safe System performance framework. This comprises 
the setting of an explicit long-term goal towards the ultimate prevention of death and serious injury, 
and interim measurable targets to reduce deaths and serious injuries.  These must be underpinned by 
a range of supporting, targeted, measurable outcomes and outputs which are directly linked to the 
prevention of death and serious injury. As noted in global guidance on road safety management 
provided by the World Bank, national goals and quantified objectives are the essential foundation 
stone in support of achieving better results.  In their absence, the focus and rationale for all other 
institutional delivery functions (i.e. coordination, funding and resource allocation, legislation, 
promotion, monitoring and evaluation, research and development and knowledge transfer) lack 
cohesion. 
A further conclusion reached in this review, is the lack of appropriate investment in results-focused, 
evidenced-based road safety activity which has influenced the amount and quality of road safety work. 
In many areas, including policing and health and local authority work, this has been severely reduced.  
Alongside the setting of goals and quantitative targets, more financial resource is required to improve 
joint working, innovation and efficiency in delivery.  It is clear that the current level of spending is not 
commensurate with the current value of prevention and that there are many opportunities for large 
returns on investment presented by a wide variety of systematic, demonstrably effective 
interventions. The long-term Safe System approach involves working towards the prevention of serious 
and fatal crash injury risk for as long as it takes to achieve it acceptably and affordably. Safe System 
treatments in The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and elsewhere have so far shown good ratios of 
benefits to cost and have proved to be publicly acceptable.  Large, potential returns in investment for 
the British road network have been identified. 
In summary, Britain has taken a bold next step in addressing the need for results focused road safety 
management by adopting Safe System in the British Road Safety Statement.  In order to make a success 
of this and to prevent the substantial avoidable tragedies experienced daily on UK roads this report 
concludes that critical success factors will be: 
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 Strong ministerial leadership; 
 A planned, systematic, accountable approach to road safety management with clear roles and 
responsibilities; 
 The adoption of a national long-term goal towards the ultimate prevention of death and serious 
injury; and 
 The adoption of national interim quantitative targets to 2030 to reduce death and serious injury, 
supported by a set of related safety performance objectives to foster closer management, more 
efficient delivery and use of public resource to achieve better results. 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION, CONTEXT & REVIEW APPROACH 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Review Context   
1.1.1 For many years, the United Kingdom has been a global road safety leader and is currently 
ranked in fourth place in terms of number of road deaths per number of inhabitants.8    
1.1.2 Since 2000, there has been a 47% decrease in the numbers of deaths.  However, in recent 
years, progress has slowed with just a 3% reduction in deaths achieved between 2010 and 
2016.  During 2016, 1,792 deaths and 24,101 serious injuries were reported in Britain.  In 
reporting these results, the Department for Transport (DfT) acknowledged the road safety 
challenges brought about by a recovering economy, stating that “while Britain is in a 
period of stronger growth (in comparison with the recent recession) there is unlikely to 
be as large falls in casualties as there were earlier on without further significant 
interventions.”  
1.1.3 Following on from government’s manifesto commitment9 to an annual reduction in road 
deaths and injuries, the British Road Safety Statement, 2015 (BRSS) set out the 
Government’s commitment to carry out continuing road safety activity. The BRSS also 
committed to addressing the socio-economic burden of road traffic death and injury on 
the economy. The value of preventing reported deaths and serious injuries in road crashes 
in 2016 was estimated at £8.3 billion.  National and international road safety research and 
experience indicate that death and serious injury in Britain is largely preventable and that 
further cost-effective solutions could be deployed more often or more effectively 
1.1.4 In Britain, led by the DfT, national responsibilities for road safety are shared across 
government agencies and between levels of government with the engagement of civil 
society and the business sector.  Some responsibilities are currently shared with the 
European Union, while some are shared by all the devolved administrations in the United 
Kingdom. 
1.1.5 Between 1987 and 2010 a national safety performance framework provided focus for 
national and local activity.  No such framework has existed for Britain as a whole since 
2010.  In recent years, further decentralisation of some areas of public policy to local 
authorities has taken place and the impact of this on road safety activity needed to be 
clarified.  At the same time, public sector departments with responsibilities for road safety 
have not been immune from the general, annual budgetary constraints towards reducing 
the national deficit.   
1.1.6 The overarching theme of the BRSS is the government’s adoption of the recommended 
Safe System approach to preventing death and serious injuries in road collisions. Its 
national application is cited as a key priority. The government’s commitment to 
embedding a Safe System approach is evident in the safety performance framework for 
the short and longer term which it has set for Highways England.  Safe System is being 
increasingly adopted in Britain in the devolved administrations, in towns and cities, and 
in local authority road safety strategies.  Safe System is an ambitious approach which, 
                                                          
8 IRTAD (2017), Road Safety Annual Report, ITF/OECD, Paris. 
9 No manifesto commitment for road safety was made in the subsequent Conservative Party’s 2016 election 
manifesto. 
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while building on current practice, is likely to necessitate some re-alignment in national 
road safety focus and activity over time.  
1.1.7 The government committed to conduct a Road Safety Management Capacity Review 
(RSMCR) in the BRSS. In May 2017 the DfT commissioned SYSTRA Ltd. (SYSTRA), and 
partners Jeanne Breen, Kate McMahon and Professor Pete Thomas, to undertake a 
RSMCR to understand the current status of institutional delivery of road safety in Britain 
and to identify practical and actionable opportunities for strengthening joint working, 
local innovation, and efficiency on a national and local basis.   
1.2 Road Safety Management Capacity Review (RSMCR) 
1.2.1 Road safety management is a production process comprising a foundation of institutional 
management which produces system-wide interventions to produce results, usually 
expressed as goals and targets.10    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Road safety management system11 
1.2.2 Road safety management capacity is understood as a jurisdiction’s readiness and 
capability to implement the necessary actions in an effective, efficient and timely manner 
and to achieve the changes in policy, standards and practice required to manage for better 
results.   
1.2.3 A Road Safety Management Capacity Review (RSMCR) is a widely-used and specific 
benchmarking tool to support institutional delivery of national road safety strategy.  It 
involves independent, qualitative peer review of a jurisdiction’s road safety management 
system capacity across the good practice dimensions of results, interventions and 
institutional management functions.  
1.2.4 This strategic assessment, benchmarking and capacity building tool was originally 
developed by the World Bank's Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF) to guide investments 
and assist countries in strengthening road safety management. 10    The tool has been 
                                                          
10 Global Road Safety Facility (2009) Bliss T and Breen J. Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety Management 
Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe System Projects. World 
Bank, Washington DC. 
11 Bliss and Breen 2009, building on frameworks of LTSA 2000, Wegman 2001, Koornstra et al 2002, Bliss, 2004. 
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widely tested and used successfully in many low and middle-income countries and in two 
high-income jurisdictions, Sweden and Western Australia. A RSMCR is recommended for 
use by the OECD/International Transport Forum and the World Road Association (PIARC) 
as a first step in further developing and extending effective Safe System investment 
strategies, plans and projects in all countries and contexts.12 13 
1.3 The Safe System Approach  
1.3.1 Safe System is an ambitious approach to road safety management based on well-
established safety and organisational principles. It is a synthesis of current knowledge 
about how to effectively manage for better results, and builds on best practice.  It is 
recommended to all countries by international organisations such as the OECD, World 
Bank and World Road Association, and is being widely adopted worldwide at national, 
local and city levels. 14 15 16 
1.3.2 Safe System comprises both an explicit goal and strategy.  The long-term Safe System goal 
is for the ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries through incremental targeted 
improvements within a specified safety performance framework.  The Safe System 
strategy aims for a more forgiving road system that takes human fallibility and 
vulnerability into account. The road traffic system is planned, designed, operated and 
used such that people are protected from death and serious injury in road collisions. 5 6 7 
  
                                                          
12 OECD/ITF (2008) Towards Zero: Achieving Ambitious Road Safety Targets through a Safe System Approach. Paris 
13 World Road Association (PIARC) (2015) Road Safety Manual https://roadsafety.piarc.org/en 
14 OECD/ International Transport (2008). Towards zero: ambitious road safety targets and the safe system 
approach. 
15 OECD/International Transport Forum (2016), Zero Road Deaths and Serious Injuries: Leading a paradigm shift 
to a Safe System OECD Publishing, Paris. 
16 World Road Association (PIARC) (2015) Road Safety Manual https://roadsafety.piarc.org/en 
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Safe System Principles  
 People make mistakes and crashes will occur. A minority of crashes with serious 
consequences are caused by deliberate offences and risk-taking behaviour, the 
majority result from simple errors of perception or judgement by otherwise 
compliant users. 
 People are vulnerable. Our bodies have a known, limited ability to withstand crash 
forces without sustaining serious or fatal injury.   
 Roads and traffic are inherently dangerous. Past design has not sufficiently built 
in protection. A safe road traffic system needs to be tolerant of human physical 
limitations, so that crashes do not lead to death and serious injury. 
 Risk factors that are directly linked to road death and serious injury must be 
addressed. 
 Safe System requires shared responsibility which is accountable and cuts across 
sectors. Those who plan, design, operate and use the road system share 
responsibility for creating a road system in which crash forces do not result in 
death or serious injury. This responsibility is shared across government, business 
and civil society, and across both large and small organisations, requiring careful 
governmental leadership and an effective safety performance framework. 
 All parts of the system need to be strengthened: roads and roadsides, speeds, 
vehicles, the emergency medical system and road user standards - if one part fails, 
other parts will protect. 
 Safe System requires a proactive approach placing road safety in the mainstream 
of road traffic system planning, design and operation and use.  
 
1.3.3 While a long-term goal is not set out explicitly, the overarching theme of the British Road 
Safety Statement (BRSS) is the Government’s adoption of the Safe System approach to 
the prevention of death and serious injuries in road collisions.17  It states:  
“We can never entirely eradicate road collisions because there will always be some 
degree of human error; when collisions do occur the human body is inherently 
vulnerable to death or serious injury; and because of this, we should manage our 
infrastructure, vehicles and speeds to reduce crash energies to known levels that can be 
tolerated by the human body.” 
1.3.4 The World Bank and the OECD identify four phases in road safety management based on 
the experience of high income countries, including the UK, and an increasing focus on 
systematic treatments and ambitious results. 18 19  An outline of the paradigm shift to the 
                                                          
17   Department for Transport (2015). Working Together to Build a Safer Road System, British Road Safety  
     Statement, London. 
18 OECD/ International Transport (2008). Towards zero: ambitious road safety targets and the safe system 
approach, Paris. 
19 World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF) (2009). Bliss T and J Breen, Implementing the 
Recommendations of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Country guidelines for the conduct 
of road safety management capacity reviews and the specification of lead agency reforms, investment 
strategies and Safe System projects, World Bank, Washington DC. 
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best practice Safe System approach is provided below.  Further details are provided in 
Appendix A, Section 1.    
 
 
The evolutionary path to Safe System 5 6 
 
Phase 1: 1950s-60s: Road user responsibility is the main focus 
Phase 2: 1970s-80s: ‘Systems approach’ to intervention, pre-crash, during-
crash and post-crash phases and system-wide 
measures 
Phase 3: 1980-90s: 
 
Targeted national plans of varying ambition, safer 
roads, safer vehicles, safer users 
Phase 4: Mid-1990s: 
 
Safe System goal and strategy involves:  
 scaling up of ambition – long-term goal towards 
the ultimate prevention of death and serious 
injury, interim quantitative targets for deaths and 
serious injuries, objectives for measurable 
activity; 
 direct focus on better protecting all users; 
 closer management of system-wide intervention; 
and 
 shared responsibility and accountability. 
 
1.3.5 The application of Safe System is cited as a key national priority in the UK.  While building 
on current practice, some re-alignment in national road safety focus and activity will be 
necessary over time.  A comparison of Safe System with traditional approaches to road 
safety is presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Comparing traditional and Safe System approaches 
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES SAFE SYSTEM APPROACH 
Aiming to reduce crashes in general  
Aiming to prevent death and serious injury while 
accepting that crashes will occur 
Limiting road safety ambition to a specified 
period 
Aiming for the prevention of all death and serious 
injury over the long-term assisted by time-limited, 
interim targets 
Asking how the driver crashed? Asking why the road user was fatally or serious 
injured? 
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TRADITIONAL APPROACHES SAFE SYSTEM APPROACH 
Blaming the driver for the cause of the    
crash 
Recognising that roads and roadsides, speeds, 
vehicles and emergency medical system design 
and performance all play a large part, and that 
good design can prevent death and serious injury 
Reacting to crashes or incidents 
Proactively identifying highest serious and fatal 
injury risks and working across the system to 
address them 
Safety is a function of mobility 
Mobility is a function of safety. Safe mobility is the 
goal 
Safety is an add-on 
Road safety embedded in mainstream sectoral 
policy as a core responsibility and designed in 
Short term safety benefits accounted for in 
investments and maintenance (e.g. FYRR). 
Long-term safety benefits are accounted for in 
investments, e.g. 20 years 
1.3.6 Safe System implementation towards zero deaths and serious injuries is a long-term 
project and is in different stages of development in different countries and jurisdictions.  
Further details of identified best practice in implementing the Safe System approach are 
provided in Appendix A, Section 2. 
1.4 Aims and Objectives of this Review 
1.4.1 The overarching aim of the RSMCR is to carry out desk research and qualitative research 
to identify practical and actionable opportunities for strengthening joint working, local 
innovation, and efficiency on a national and local basis.  In particular, the RSMCR seeks to 
understand the current status of institutional delivery of road safety in Britain by:  
 Examining national, regional and local structures, responsibilities, accountabilities, 
relationships and coordination;  
 Examining whether management effort and resources at all levels are being 
targeted effectively at designing, and enabling or delivering, evidence-based 
interventions and initiatives that can have the greatest impact in preventing and 
reducing the number of road users killed and seriously injured;  
 Assessing the current road safety delivery landscape against the Safe System road 
safety management assessment framework and determining whether there is an 
imbalance in resource effort for each element and at each level (national, regional 
and local);  
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 Investigating how institutional capacity can be cost-effectively strengthened, 
within the context of the DfT’s Road Safety Statement, to deliver a Safe System 
approach to road safety; and  
 Identifying areas and means for improved joint working, local innovation and 
efficiency.  
1.4.2 The RSMCR engages with the main governmental agencies and stakeholders who can 
deliver results in an appraisal of current approaches to road safety management.  It aims 
to: 
 Create a platform for a national dialogue on strengths and weakness of current 
activities to achieve better results based on international and national good 
practice; 
 Address issues which are complex and important such as leadership, accountability 
for results and funding;  
 Seek information and views from a wide range of sources with reference to the 
assessment framework;  
 Provide feedback on any identified capacity weaknesses and how these can be 
addressed;  
 Assist the development of a high-level consensus of senior management, wherever 
possible, on useful next steps to achieve better results; and 
 Identify practical and actionable opportunities for strengthening delivery.  
1.5 Report Structure 
1.5.1 The full approach to the review, including methodology, is provided in Chapter 2.   
1.5.2 The findings of the review are provided as follows: 
 Chapter 3 examines Institutional Management Functions; 
 Chapter 4 examines Interventions; and 
 Chapter 5 examines Results. 
1.5.3 In the Chapter 6 we present our conclusions, based on the study findings. 
1.5.4 The report is supplemented by appendices, as follows: 
 Appendix A outlines the Safe System approach in more detail; 
 Appendix B provides a summary of the perceptions and views of stakeholders who 
were consulted during the review;  
 Appendix C provides the full assessment framework which was used to guide the 
review; and 
 Appendix D summarises the references cited within the report. 
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2. REVIEW APPROACH  
2.1 Approach to RSMCR  
2.1.1 Detailed World Bank guidance sets out the methodology for the conduct of a road safety 
management capacity review.20   
2.1.2 An assessment framework comprising a series of checklists is used, based on identified 
good practice road safety management. This allows detailed examination and 
benchmarking by experienced, independent road safety specialists of all elements of the 
road safety management system and their linkages against effective practice. The main 
elements of this assessment framework comprise the key institutional management 
functions (results focus, coordination, legislation, funding and resource allocation, 
promotion, monitoring and evaluation, research and development and knowledge 
transfer) which provide the foundation for multi-sectoral, system-wide interventions 
(safe roads and roadsides, safe speeds, safe vehicles, safe road use, post-crash care, safe 
and healthy modes, and safe work travel) to achieve results.  
2.1.3 Working across results, interventions, institutional delivery elements of road safety 
management provides a framework for addressing the United Nations Road Safety 
Collaboration pillars and good practice implementation of the Safe System approach. It 
provides a systematic format within which to address the study objectives and for 
engaging the key agencies and stakeholders who can deliver road safety results.  
2.1.4 The review traditionally engages with senior management of agencies and organisations.  
On the basis of evidence collected, and with reference to a range of published reports and 
statistical data, a draft report is presented, identifying the strengths and weaknesses in 
current approaches and recommendations on how best to overcome weaknesses. Report 
recommendations are tested at a final workshop to establish their feasibility for 
implementation by the road safety partnership.  In some country reviews a long-term 
investment strategy is prepared with project concepts for demonstration projects to 
launch it. 
2.2 Methodology 
2.2.1 The overall approach to this study required an initial data gathering stage, continuous 
reference to the state of the art in road safety management as the review progressed21 
and engagement with a wide range of senior management, experts and stakeholders 
across road safety delivery.  This allowed for synthesis of a broad range of information on 
the part of the senior road safety expert team to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of current road safety management capacity, how to overcome any 
weaknesses and to inform our conclusions and recommendations. 
                                                          
20 Global Road Safety Facility (2009) Bliss T and Breen J. Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety Management 
Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe System Projects. 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
21 Comprised of national and international reports, stakeholder reports, information from conferences 
attended by road safety experts.  Data sources used are referenced throughout the report and provided in the 
reference table. 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 45 /173  
 
2.2.2 The complex organisational context for road safety required a variety of approaches to 
address the very broad range of organisations to be consulted.  Methods of engagement 
for key stakeholders included face to face meetings with individuals and small groups (in 
line with established good practice in RSMCR), telephone interviews, and a larger 
workshop with plenary sessions and break out groups.  In total 56 stakeholder 
organisations were engaged with during this phase of the study.  Those consulted 
included stakeholders from: 
 Central government departments and agencies; 
 Local government; 
 Emergency services (police, fire service and ambulance service) and trauma care; 
 Business and industry; 
 Civil society (advisory groups, associations and charities); and 
 Academic institutions. 
2.2.3 A list of organisations consulted is provided in Appendix B.   
2.2.4 Semi-structured topic guides were used to aid the discussions.  These were tailored to the 
individuals being interviewed to reflect their role and involvement in the road safety 
agenda, and followed the assessment framework, as found in Assessment C. 
2.2.5 In addition, five on-line surveys were undertaken with road safety practitioners involved 
in delivering road safety.  Links to relevant on-line questionnaires were sent out by 
relevant umbrella bodies. Questionnaires for each organisation type were carefully 
tailored to address their specific remit in the road safety agenda.  Questionnaires, which 
followed the assessment framework in Appendix C, were sent to: 
 Road Safety Officers in each local authority (distributed via RSGB)  
- 33 questionnaires were returned; 
 
 Local Authority Highway Surveyors in each local authority (distributed by ADEPT) 
- 24 questionnaires were returned; 
 
 Chief constables (distributed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council)  
- 12 questionnaires were returned; 
 
 Ambulance trusts (distributed via the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives)  
- 1 questionnaire was returned22; 
 
 Car fleet managers (distributed to members by the Association of Car Fleet 
operators)  
- 17 questionnaires were returned; and 
 
 Road haulage company managers (distributed to members by the Road Haulage 
Association) 
- 4 questionnaires were returned. 
                                                          
22 Due to only receiving one response out of a possible 10 English Ambulance Trusts, this data was analysed and 
reported on within the stakeholder interviews. 
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2.2.6 Following collation of findings from the stakeholder engagement exercises a half day 
workshop was held for all those previously engaged.  The workshop provided a forum to 
discuss the findings of the review and enable stakeholders to comment on the 
deliverability of the recommendations formed to date.  This ensured that the findings to 
date were realistic and practicable and appropriately represented the consensus and key 
themes from our research.  The workshop comprised presentations of findings to date, 
plenary sessions and break out groups. 
2.3 Assessment Framework 
 
Overview 
2.3.1 This section presents the broad scope of the review largely based on the internationally 
recognised road safety management assessment framework produced by the World 
Bank23.  An updated assessment framework provided the review team with the system-
wide scope for the conduct and the reporting of the road safety management capacity 
review.  A model of the framework is presented in Figure 2.24 
  
                                                          
23 Global Road Safety Facility: Bliss T and J Breen (2009). Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety Management 
Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe System Projects. Global 
Road Safety Facility, World Bank, Washington. 
24 This road safety management model is based on World Bank Global Road Safety Facility, Bliss and Breen (2009) building 
on the frameworks of Land Transport Authority (2000), Wegman, (2001), Koornstra et al (2002), Bliss, (2004), and updated, 
Breen, (2017) with reference to World Road Association (2015); OECD/ITF (2016). 
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Figure 2. Safe System road safety management system model and assessment framework   
2.3.2 Assessment framework questions to be addressed by the review team were tailored for 
the purposes of this capacity review to assess all three elements of the national road 
safety management system, and are provided in Appendix C.  The general scope is 
summarised below. 
 
Institutional management functions 
2.3.3 Based on research into successful, results-focused road safety management, institutional 
management comprises a range of functions. The overarching function is results focus 
supported by coordination, legislation, funding and resource allocation, promotion, 
monitoring and evaluation and research and development and knowledge transfer.  This 
part of the report is structured under these headings.  Capacity for the delivery of each 
function is important at national, local and organisational levels to produce effective, 
system-wide intervention. 
2.3.4 Successful practice underlines the important role played by the lead agency acting on 
behalf of national government. The overarching institutional delivery role of the lead 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                Results 
 
Final outcomes 
Long-term Safe System goal & interim 
targets to reduce and ultimately prevent 
deaths and serious injuries 
 
Intermediate outcomes 
Targeted, measurable safety performance indicators 
for activity linked to preventing deaths and serious injuries 
 
Institutional outputs 
Deliverables that seek improvements in intermediate and final 
outcomes which can also be measured, targeted and monitored. 
     Interventions 
           Safe Roads and Roadsides, Safe Speeds, Safe Vehicles                                                                 
             Safe Road Use, Post-Crash Care, Safe and Healthy Modes, Safe Work Travel 
                     Institutional management functions   
Results focus - leadership, goal and target-setting, Coordination, Legislation, Funding and resource 
allocation, Promotion, Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and development and knowledge transfer 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 48 /173  
 
agency is the development of strategy and performance frameworks to facilitate results-
focused, multi-sectoral road safety activity in full consultation with key agencies and the 
broader road safety partnership. The lead agency has a key role in the delivery of all 
institutional management functions while other sectors may lead in the specific delivery 
of intervention. 
 
Interventions 
2.3.5 Safe System intervention comprises activity within and between the following: Safe Roads 
and Roadsides, Safe Speeds, Safe Vehicles, Safe Road Use, Post-Crash Care, Safe and 
Healthy Modes and Safe Work Travel. The latter two elements are being given new 
attention in view of encouragement being given to public transport use, the growth of 
active travel and the opportunities provided by more focus on work-related road safety.  
2.3.6 This element of the assessment framework seeks to establish how far current practice is 
aligned with Safe System principles and key aspects of the delivery of interventions at 
system and organisational levels. These include consideration of a number of factors 
which are provided in Appendix C. 
 
Results 
2.3.7 The final element of the assessment framework is to review the results achieved 
nationally in terms of: 
 Final outcomes (deaths, serious injuries and societal value of prevention); 
 Intermediate outcomes (measurable activity directly linked to the prevention of 
death and serious injury (seat belt use, crash helmet use, level of average speeds, 
speed limit compliance, safety quality of roads (iRAP rated) and vehicles (Euro NCAP 
rated), emergency medical response times); and 
 Institutional outputs (measurable institutional activity which is directly linked to 
achieving intermediate outcomes). 
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SECTION 2: INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
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3. INTRODUCTION TO INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT 
FUNCTIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 World Bank guidance on road safety management identifies seven institutional 
management functions which provide the foundation on which national road safety 
management systems are built25,26.  These comprise: 
 Results focus; 
 Coordination; 
 Legislation; 
 Funding and resource allocation; 
 Promotion; 
 Monitoring and evaluation; and 
 Research and development and knowledge transfer. 
3.1.2 This guidance is based on identified effective practice over time amongst successful 
performers, including the United Kingdom led by the Department for Transport, as well 
as identified unsuccessful practice and performance.  It represents the first ever 
codification of the key elements of institutional delivery and is taken up in guidance and 
manuals by other international organisations including the International Transport 
Forum27, the World Road Association 28 and the International Standards Organisation29.   
3.1.3 Chapters 4 to 10 outline the findings of the RSMCR under each of the seven institutional 
management function headings. 
  
                                                          
25  Global Road Safety Facility (2009) Bliss T and Breen J. Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety  
     Management Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe   
     System Projects. World Bank, Washington DC. 
26  Global Road Safety Facility (2013) Bliss T and Breen J.  Road Safety Management Capacity Reviews and Safe System  
     Projects Guidelines (2013) Global Road Safety Facility, World Bank, Washington DC. 
27  International Transport Forum (2016), Zero Road Deaths and Serious Injuries: Leading a paradigm shift to a  
     Safe System OECD Publishing, Paris. 
28  World Road Association (PIARC) (2015) Road Safety Manual https://roadsafety.piarc.org/en 
29 International Standards Organisation (2012) ISO 39001 International Standard: Road Traffic Safety (RTS) 
Management Systems - Requirements and Guidance for Use (2012 
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4. RESULTS FOCUS 
4.1 Classification 
4.1.1 Results focus is the overarching institutional management function in managing for better 
road safety results.  All other institutional management functions are subordinate to this 
function and contribute to its achievement.   
4.1.2 Results focus concerns the pragmatic specification of ambition to improve road safety and 
the means agreed to achieve this ambition.  It addresses leadership, goal and target-
setting and accountabilities for these, and defines the level of safety to be achieved in the 
long-term and in the interim.  It sets out a safety performance management framework 
for the delivery of interventions and their intended outcomes.  The aim is to provide a 
clear and accountable focus on results to allow for cohesion and direction of all other 
institutional functions and related interventions, and to prevent the efficiency and 
effectiveness of safety initiatives from being undermined.   
 Leadership role – The lead agency for road safety plays the major role in driving the 
national, multi-sectoral shared responsibility for road safety into concerted results-
based action with involvement in all institutional management functions. It usually 
takes responsibility for managing coordination comprising inter-governmental 
coordination, vertical coordination, coordination of delivery partnerships between 
government, professions, non-government, business sectors and Parliament. It 
plays the key role, alongside other key partners and stakeholders in ensuring a 
comprehensive legislative framework; securing sustainable sources of annual 
funding; creating a rational framework for resource allocation; high-level 
promotion of the shared responsibility for road safety; monitoring and evaluation 
of safety performance; and directing research and development and knowledge 
transfer. 
 
 Goals, targets and objectives – The setting of a long-term Safe System goal for the 
ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries, supported by time-limited 
quantified targets to reduce deaths and serious injuries and the factors that are 
linked to these represents results focus in its most ambitious form.   
 
 Accountability – A variety of accountability mechanisms are used in successful 
practice.  Long-term approaches are often enshrined in legislation. Public service 
targets and annual performance agreements are means by which government 
demonstrates its role and accountability for road safety responsibilities. Multi-
sectoral strategies demonstrate commitment and provide the opportunity for 
formal sign up of the shared responsibility for delivering goals and targets. 
Memoranda of understanding between partiesare used to cement working 
partnerships towards target delivery.  Regional and local accountabilities are 
established through regional and local targets, performance monitoring and 
funding mechanisms. The lead agency and the top management of organisations 
adopt goals and measurable objectives.  Annual reporting and result conferences 
provide transparency, encourage declaration of intent and confirm the wider 
shared responsibility.  
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4.2 Main findings 
 
Introduction 
4.2.1 Successful road safety management in bringing national road safety outcomes under 
better control has been highlighted internationally and in global guidance.30  As in other 
high-performing countries, the expectation of achieving further success in Britain is 
rooted in the aspirations of all working in the field. 
 
Who is responsible? 
4.2.2 In Britain, led by the Department for Transport (DfT), national responsibilities for road 
safety are shared across government departments and agencies (transport, highways, 
health, justice, policing, health and safety), between levels of government (central and 
local), the business sector (e.g. manufacturers of vehicles and safety equipment, the fleet 
and haulage industries and insurance) and civil society (e.g. advisory groups, associations 
and charities).  Some responsibilities are currently shared with the European Union, for 
example the Whole Vehicle Type Approval scheme within Single Market harmonisation. 
While some responsibilities are shared by all the devolved administrations in the United 
Kingdom, some aspects of delivery are pursued separately.  The DfT takes the lead in road 
safety on behalf of the UK in international harmonisation and other work.   
4.2.3 The main activity in the UK is carried out nationally and locally, although in England there 
is fledgling activity at regional level. The Secretary of State for Transport has responsibility 
on behalf of government for safety of the road traffic system in England and Wales; it is 
the Transport Minister in Scotland. Lead responsibility for road safety in Northern Ireland 
lies with the Department of the Environment.  Within the DfT, Road Safety Standards and 
Services Directorate (RSSS), which sits within the Roads, Devolution and Motoring Group, 
is in the lead on road safety policy and the coordination of road safety activity.  Within 
RSSS the key road safety strategic capacity lies within Road User Licensing Insurance and 
Safety Division (RULIS). However, other divisions have responsibilities that are relevant to 
road safety policy, for example International Vehicle Standards, Freight Operator 
Licensing, Active Accessible Travel where cycling and walking policy sits, Local Transport 
Infrastructure and national road investment.   
4.2.4 In addition to central DfT divisions some major activities relevant to road safety are 
located in the agencies responsible for Driver and Vehicle Standards (DVSA), Driver and 
Vehicle Licensing (DVLA), and Vehicle Certification (VCA).  These agencies play a key role 
with regard to driver training and testing and vehicle roadworthiness standards.  
Responsibility for safety on the strategic roads network rests with Highways England 
(which has taken over from the former Highways Agency and this is discussed in the Safe 
Roads and Roadsides section). This means that RSSS and RULIS have important roles in 
coordinating road safety policy responsibilities across several other Divisions in the 
Department, the Departmental Agencies, and Highways England. 
                                                          
30 World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (GRSF) (2009). Bliss T and J Breen, Implementing the Recommendations 
of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Country guidelines for the conduct of road safety 
management capacity reviews and the specification of lead agency reforms, investment strategies and Safe 
System projects, World Bank, Washington DC. 
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4.2.5 At national level, the other key central government Departments are the Home Office, 
the Department of Health and the Ministry of Justice. 
4.2.6 The Home Office has been ‘in the front line’ of the first duty of the government which is 
to ‘keep citizens safe and the country secure’. In recent years, however, where 
operational responsibilities for road traffic policing have been further devolved amongst 
police and police and crime commissioners, it has played a lesser role.  While it sets 
strategic lines of policy in many areas, including some where localism is increasingly 
active, there is no national policing strategy nor evident commitment to keeping citizens 
safe on the road.   
4.2.7 The Department of Health, supported by a range of agencies including National Health 
England and Public Health England, has the mission of ‘helping people to live better for 
longer’.  It has core, strategic responsibility for road injury surveillance in the health 
sector, emergency medical response, major trauma care, the rehabilitation of road crash 
victims and road injury prevention. Death and serious injury in road traffic is a leading 
cause of death for school aged children and young adults and the lead cause of major 
trauma. Engagement in this review with the health sector in general has proved to be 
problematic, and a strong focus on road traffic injury prevention was not evident either 
in published documents or in the views of several stakeholders.  The Public Health England 
“Strategic Plan for the Next Four Years: better outcomes by 2020” sets out how the 
organisation intends to protect and improve the nation’s health.  Despite showing that 
road collisions are tenth in a list of causes of years of life lost between 1990 and 2013, 
there is no mention in the Plan of any road safety oriented activity or any objective to 
reduce the effects of road collisions on public health.  There is an intention to “support 
work across government on sustainable travel to promote increased levels of physical 
activity through walking and cycling” but no recognition that this needs to be done in 
conjunction with measures to improve safety for walkers and cyclists. 
4.2.8 The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has responsibility for courts, prisons, sentencing and 
penalties.  Its main concern regarding road safety is serious driving offences causing death 
or injury. It is content for DfT to take the lead on offences such as speeding and mobile 
phones.  DfT takes advice from MoJ on changes to penalties and offences, but in general 
the initiative for legislation comes from DfT, especially for lower level offences. 
4.2.9 The Department for International Development (DFID) plays a key role in supporting road 
safety work and international organisations such as the World Bank’s Global Road Safety 
Facility in low and middle-income countries. 
4.2.10 The lessening involvement of key agencies reported by stakeholders and evident from key 
published policy documents and websites (including Home Office, Department of Health, 
NHS, PHE and Ministry of Justice) with core responsibilities raises important questions of 
ownership of road safety and the meaningful recognition of shared road safety 
responsibilities in key sectors.   
4.2.11 Local authorities have a general duty under Section 39 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 to 
carry out road accident studies and a range of ensuing, appropriate preventative action. 
The Localism Act 2011 paved the way for major changes in the delivery of public policy.  
At local level, the distribution of road safety responsibilities is varied and complex.  They 
generally sit within transport, health, roads or a mixture of these.   
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Goals and target-setting 
4.2.12 In good practice, road safety is cited as a key, explicit objective in transport strategy as 
shown in Box 1. 
BOX 1: STRATEGIC GOAL STATEMENTS OF GOOD PRACTICE COUNTRIES 
European Union: “EU transport policies aim at fostering clean, safe and efficient travel throughout Europe, 
underpinning the internal market of goods and the right of citizens to travel freely throughout the EU.” 
European Commission, Transport Directorate, 2011 
Sweden “The objective of transport policy is to ensure the economically efficient and sustainable provision 
of transport services for people and businesses throughout the country.” Accessibility is the functional 
objective and health, safety and environment are the impact objectives. “The design, function and use of 
the transport system will be adapted to eliminate fatal and serious accidents. It will also contribute to the 
achievement of the environmental quality objectives and better health conditions.” Ministry of Enterprise, 
Energy and Communications, Stockholm, May 2009 
Norway: “The Government aims to provide an effective, universally accessible, safe and environmentally 
friendly transport system that covers the Norwegian society’s transport requirements and advances 
regional development.” National Transport Plan, 2010–2019. Norwegian Ministry of Transport and 
Communications 
Scotland: Our vision is of “an accessible Scotland with safe, integrated and reliable transport that supports 
economic growth, provides opportunities for all and is easy to use; a transport system that meets everyone’s 
needs, respects our environment and contributes to health;” National Transport Policy December 2006, 
Scottish Executive, Edinburgh 
Australia: “Australia requires a safe, secure, efficient, reliable and integrated national transport system that 
supports and enhances our nation’s economic development and social and environmental well-being." 
National Transport Policy, Australian Transport Council, 2009 
New Zealand: “The government’s vision for transport in 2040 is that: ‘People and freight in New Zealand 
have access to an affordable, integrated, safe, responsive and sustainable transport system.’” New Zealand 
Transport Strategy, 2008 Ministry of Transport  
4.2.13 From 1987 until 2010 a carefully derived strategic national safety policy framework 
provided focus for national and local activity and substantial reductions in deaths and 
serious injuries in road crashes in Britain.  
4.2.14 A comprehensive road safety strategy together with a target to reduce all casualties by 
one-third by 2000, based on the average for 1981-1985, was published in 1987.  Although 
the target for all casualties was not met there was a reduction of 39% in deaths and 49% 
in serious injuries by 2000. A new road safety strategy for the year 2010 was published in 
200031 that set casualty reduction targets, based on the average for 1994-98, of a 
reduction of 40% in the number killed and seriously injured, and 50% for children killed 
and seriously injured.  As shown in Table 2, all these targets were exceeded by 2010.  
                                                          
31 Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions (2000). Tomorrow’s roads-safer for everyone, 
London  
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Table 2. Reported road casualties by severity 
 
1994-98 
AVERAGE 
BASELINE 
2000 2010 % CHANGE 
BASELINE 
TO 2010 
2015 2016* 
Killed 3578 3409 1850 -48 1730 1792 
KSI 47656 41564 24510 -49 23874 25893 
All 319928 320283 208648 -35 186189 181384 
Child KSI 6860 5202 2502 -64 1964 2102 
* due to changes in reporting systems in 2016 serious casualties not fully comparable with earlier years. 
4.2.15 In 2011, an independent evaluation of the Delivery of Local Road Safety commissioned by 
the Department for Transport found that “the existence of national targets has provided 
a useful stimulus to local partnership working.” 32  
4.2.16 Post-2010 there was a change in focus away from national numerical casualty targets and 
in 2012 the British Road Safety Statement was published with a commitment to invest in 
further road safety activity. 33  This is discussed further below. As Table 2 shows, all 
casualties continued to decline between 2010 and 2015, whilst deaths rose slightly in 
2016, but the changes in reporting systems explained in the DfT’s statistical release make 
full comparisons of 2016 with 2015 uncertain. 34  
4.2.17 While goal and target-setting has continued in other areas of public policy, e.g. health, 
walking and cycling, emissions, house-building, no such measurable framework has 
existed for national road safety performance in Britain since 2010.  This has taken place 
against the background of localism, involving further decentralisation of some areas of 
public policy to local authorities, and annual budgetary constraints towards reducing the 
national deficit.  In line with a government manifesto commitment in 2010 to an annual 
reduction in road deaths and injuries (which was not renewed in 2015) the British Road 
Safety Statement (BRSS) was published in late 2015 with a commitment to invest further 
in continuing road safety activity, but endorsing devolution and local decision‐making 
rather than centralised national targets for the UK.33  
4.2.18 The overarching theme of the BRSS is the government’s adoption of the internationally 
recommended Safe System approach to the prevention and reduction of death and 
serious injuries in road collisions. Its national application is cited as a key national priority 
and a range of strategies and activities is foreseen.  As outlined earlier, Safe System is an 
ambitious approach which, while building on current practice, is likely to necessitate some 
re-alignment in national and local road safety focus and activity over time.  The long-term 
Safe System goal for the eventual elimination of deaths and serious injuries is not set out 
explicitly in the BRSS for Britain as a whole.  Departmental road safety targets are not set, 
                                                          
32  AECOM/TIHR Road Safety Research Report No 124: Delivery of Local Road Safety, DfT, September 2011. 
33  Department for Transport (2015). Working Together to Build a Safer Road System, British Road Safety  
      Statement, London. 
34 DfT (2017). Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain; 2016 Annual Report, September 2017. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/648081/rrcgb2016-01.pdf 
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apart from those for reducing cyclist casualties in the Walking and Cycling Strategy. The 
DfT’s plan for 2015-2020 aims for ‘safe, secure and sustainable transport’.   
4.2.19 This goal and supporting measurable targets and strategy is being adopted increasingly in 
the United Kingdom in the devolved administrations, in towns and cities such as London 
and Bristol and in some local authority road safety strategies.  The government’s 
commitment to embedding a Safe System approach nationally is evident in the safety 
performance framework for longer term goals and interim targets which it has set for the 
Strategic Road Network and in the setting up of a Safer Roads Fund (discussed in 
subsequent  sections on Funding and Safe Roads and Roadsides).35 36  The objectives are: 
that by 2040, the number of KSI on the Strategic Road Network should approach zero; by 
2020, the aim is for a 40% killed and serious injury reduction (2005–09 baseline); and by 
2020 > 90% of travel on the Strategic Road Network should be on roads with an iRAP 
rating of 3* (or equivalent).   
4.2.20 The National Police Chiefs Council has a 5-year strategy for England “Policing the Roads in 
Partnership 2015-2020” that has a safety objective “working in partnership to achieve 
safe roads, free from harm” and a commitment to the reduction of collisions leading to 
road death and serious injury, but it does not include numerical targets. 
4.2.21 Public Health England has not set or been set goals or targets for road traffic injury 
prevention but includes killed or seriously injured on England’s roads in its performance 
indicator framework.37 
4.2.22 Globally such target-setting is widely advocated by the World Health Organisation, the 
International Transport Forum, World Bank, World Road Association and national experts. 
The World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention recommended national road safety 
strategies with ambitious but realistic targets.38 In the 2008 and 2016 reports the 
International Transport Forum recommended the adoption of a Safe System approach 
comprising a long-term goal, supported by robust interim targets and intervention 
strategy .39 40  The World Bank report on implementing the recommendations of the World 
Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention recommended that countries should prepare a 
national road safety strategy and plan of action with ambitious safety targets.41  The 
relationship between setting quantified road safety targets and road fatality reduction is 
well established in research findings.42 
4.2.23 Though not yet evident as a consideration in national policymaking, the UK is a signatory 
to global road safety targets in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals and to the 
collective responsibility for meeting the long-term EU road safety goal to 2050 and a 
casualty reduction target of 50% between 2010 and 2020.  
                                                          
35  Highways England Delivery Plan 2015-2020 (2015), HMSO, London. 
36 DfT announcement 13th January 2017. 
37 Department of Health (2016). Improving outcomes and supporting transparency Part 2: Summary technical 
specifications of public health indicators Updated August 2016 
38 WHO (2004). World report on road traffic injury prevention. Geneva. 
39 OECD/ITF (2008). Towards zero: ambitious road safety targets and the safe system approach.  
40 OECD/ITF (2016). Zero Road Deaths and Serious Injuries: Leading a paradigm shift to a  
   Safe System OECD Publishing, Paris 
41 World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (2009). op. cit. 
42 Allsop R.E, Sze, N.N., Wong, S.C (2011) An update on the association between setting quantified road safety 
targets and road fatality reduction. Accident Analysis and Prevention 43 (2011) 1279–1283. 
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4.2.24 The Review has found widespread concern amongst most stakeholders including several 
key agencies43 that the absence of explicit national goals and interim targets and the 
safety performance monitoring associated with these is having a negative and serious 
impact on the focus on results and levels of activity, both nationally and locally. The lack 
of a national target has had an impact on the priority given to road safety locally and its 
ability to compete for scarce funds.  As is typical for many paradigm shifts in knowledge, 
Safe System is well understood by a small cadre of well-informed, professional experts.  
However, despite the reference material available in the international literature, the 
implementation of the Safe System approach is not well understood and is in its infancy, 
and there are capacity problems for its delivery.  As stakeholders indicated44, while it has 
been well-received in many instances, many are aware of the term without fully grasping 
what it means for their organisation, whilst others admit to lacking knowledge of it. 
 
National and local leadership 
4.2.25 The DfT, as lead agency, carries out its road safety duties in a more complex context than 
was evident a decade ago. A focus on the government’s large transport projects e.g. 
autonomous vehicles and high-speed rail, localism, reductions in staffing and resourcing, 
austerity, the lack of a manifesto commitment to goals and targets for road casualty 
prevention and reduction all shape current activity.   While a high-level commitment to 
road safety in key units is evident, the absence of defined national road safety ambition 
in a measurable safety performance framework is setting back effort.  A typically 
expressed DfT view was that while the focus on death and serious injury is not specified, 
it is ever present within departmental activity.  However, it was also noted that the focus 
was ‘different’ when compared with previous times of targeted reductions in deaths and 
serious injuries and more Cabinet office scrutiny, leading to a more reactive as opposed 
to proactive approach.  It is evident that the absence of targets and perceived lack of 
rationale for joint working is making inter-departmental and inter-agency coordination as 
well as coordination across DfT more difficult.  While the operational strategic policy 
priorities are limited to young drivers, rural roads, and automated vehicles, there seems 
to be general agreement that a more strategic focus on where to make the most impact 
is required across the whole system and to identify new priorities, underpinned by the 
Safe System approach.  In terms of accountability, the only mechanism through which 
government is publicly held to account is through stakeholder, media and political 
pressure.  
4.2.26 Approaches to road safety at local level are diverse.  Leadership responsibilities for road 
safety in local authorities are often assigned to lead units and elected representatives, but 
the picture is mixed and are sometimes shared between more than one local authority 
office.  In cases where responsibility is not specifically assigned, problems with joint 
working, both internally and externally, as well as the monitoring of performance are 
reported. Representative organisations report that around half of local authorities have 
set targets to reduce deaths and serious injuries; some have adopted Safe System; a few 
are sceptical of what could be achieved in the current context; and most believe Safe 
System implementation is dependent upon new resource and national guidance. 
                                                          
43 See Appendix B, Results Focus: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local Government; Advisory 
Groups; Associations and Charities; Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
44 See Appendix B, Results Focus: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local Government; Advisory 
Groups; Associations and Charities; Business and Industry; Emergency Services; and Academic Institutions 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 58 /173  
 
Organisations representing Roads Directors, Chief Police Officers, local road safety 
managers all report that, even where local targets exist, substantial barriers are presented 
by the lack of national targets and the associated ownership of and leadership on these.  
These include difficulties in maintaining road safety as a local priority, in sectoral activity, 
in road engineering and in the publicity and enforcement associated with key road safety 
rules and community education.   
4.2.27 Aside from changes in national budget arrangements for road safety, the lack of national 
targets has had impacts on levels of staffing, financial resources, coordination and all 
other delivery functions associated with achieving better results which are discussed 
later.  Many local authorities report that there is too much funding pressure to respond 
to local demands which are unrelated to KSI priorities.  As reported by in an in-depth joint 
PACTS/RAC Foundation review of local authority activity:  
“The loss of targets has had a significant impact on the impetus for road safety activity 
in some councils and the ability of local practitioners to negotiate with “those who don’t 
understand, don’t value or don’t see the role for road safety in the local priority list”.45 
4.2.28 A commonly held view amongst many stakeholders, including local government and 
devolved administrations, is that without more ambition in the national effort there is 
danger of stagnation and complacency and failure to build on past success. The devolved 
administrations and many working at national and local levels want to see the re-
establishment of a national road safety performance framework with a long-term Safe 
System goal and supporting measurable targets and objectives to help correct this focus.   
While the devolved administrations and local authorities are free to set their own goals, 
there are many key areas which are delivered by central government agencies alone, such 
as driver and vehicle safety standards and road network safety management and 
investment frameworks. 
4.2.29 Against concerns about the plateauing of road deaths in recent years, there is strong 
support for the setting of goal and targets from most stakeholders, including the devolved 
administrations, governmental agencies, local government, and the police.  In Motoring 
for the Future, the House of Committee Transport Committee recommended that DfT 
should adopt a strategy that included the objective of “reduced or eliminated fatalities 
and serious injuries on roads” and “consider what impact setting targets to reduce serious 
injuries and fatalities might have on road safety in the UK”.46  
4.2.30 In the past, national targets have also provided a strong focus for the activity of 
professional organisations, NGOs and the research sector.  
4.2.31 An additional need pointed out by safety experts and reflected in the advice of 
international organisations, is to explore synergies between road safety and other societal 
goals and priorities to establish the shared benefits.  The World Road Association has 
carried out a recent, comprehensive review of the opportunities which include: 47 
                                                          
45 PACTS/RAC Foundation (2015). Road Safety Since 2010, RAC Foundation, London. 
46 House of Commons Transport Committee, Motoring for the Future 2015: 9-13). 
 
47  World Road Association (PIARC) (2015). Road Safety Manual: A manual for practitioners and decision makers on implementing safe system 
infrastructure, World Road Congress (PIARC), Paris. https://roadsafety.piarc.org/en/introduction 
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 Environment, public health and road safety. For example, land use and 
transportation planning and the provision of safe infrastructure facilities to 
promote increased walking and cycling (where the challenges of simultaneously 
enhancing take up of cycling and ensuring safe cycling are large). Measures to 
reduce vehicle speeds will, in addition to safety benefits, also result in less 
greenhouse gas emissions and local air pollution, greater energy security, and 
improved physical wellbeing.  
 Liveable City, Safe City policies providing efficient networks where the shortest or 
quickest routes coincide with safe routes.  Road safety can also be aligned with 
tourism goals since the risks of road traffic injuries are appreciably higher for 
tourists than many other types of health risk.  Road safety also aligns well with 
societal provisions for the rights of the child. Governments signing the Convention 
are required to provide a safe environment and protection to children from injury 
and violence48. 
 In regional and neighbourhood policies, road safety improvements can contribute 
substantially to poverty reduction goals and international development. Road safety 
also needs to be at the heart of occupational health and safety objectives since road 
traffic injury is a leading contributor to work-related death. 
 Not least, activity to address death and serious injury in road traffic is inter-linked 
to economic objectives, given the substantial value of prevention of the death and 
injury burden, and the contribution of road safety to the sustained quality and value 
of national goods and services.  
 
  
                                                          
48   The Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN General Assembly Resolution 44/25 (1989), 
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4.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
4.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for results focus is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. Strengths and weaknesses of Results Focus 
 
4.4 Recommendations 
4.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF results focus. 
 
Strengths 
 An established lead agency (DfT) with 
long-standing high reputation and 
identified Minister with road safety 
responsibilities. 
 Leadership by the DfT in moving to the 
Safe System approach.    
 National adoption of the Safe System 
approach in British Road Safety 
Statement (2015). 
 Understanding by many agencies and 
stakeholders of the importance of 
setting road safety goals, targets, 
objectives. 
 Long-term Safe System goal and interim 
casualty reduction targets set by 
government for Highways England with 
disaggregated targets across its 7 
regions for the SRN. 
 Specific goals and targets set in walking 
and cycling strategy for reducing cyclist 
casualties. 
 Long-term Safe System goal and interim 
casualty reduction targets set by 
devolved administrations; by TfL for 
London; and in other cities such as 
Bristol. 
 At metropolitan and city level, some 
Mayors are providing strong road safety 
leadership. 
 Goals and targets to reduce death and 
serious injuries set by a number of local 
authorities. 
 Initiation of road safety management 
capacity review to explore opportunities 
for enhanced activity at national, 
regional and local levels.  
 
Weaknesses 
 Insufficient central government leadership 
in road safety over the last decade. 
 Road safety is not perceived as core 
business by all responsible government 
agencies. 
 Lack of an agreed national safety 
performance framework to achieve results. 
 A strong national focus on demonstrably 
effective action to prevent and mitigate 
death and serious injury is not universal 
amongst agencies. 
 No interim targets set to reduce deaths and 
serious injuries at national level. 
 No intermediate outcomes/performance 
indicators agreed at national level. 
 No road safety targets in annual agency 
plans.  
 No explicit long-term Safe System goal set 
for future road safety at national level.  
 Formal accountabilities for improving road 
safety are not set out at national level. 
 Nationally identified priority areas for 
action are, as yet, insufficiently consistent 
with implementing a Safe System 
approach.   
 Safe System is not understood by many and 
is not filtering downwards from lead agency 
level. 
 A holistic Safe System approach is not 
evident in local authority road safety 
activity. 
 A reduction in local authority target-setting 
is reported. 
 Local priorities are often directed by 
perceptions of need by elected 
representatives and public, rather than on 
an evidence-base. 
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Central government and its agencies 
4.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Strengthen national leadership in delivering improvements in safety outcomes for 
all road users through the development and publication of a new British road safety 
strategy and action plan. 
 Strengthen the strategic capacity of RULIS to develop a new road safety strategy 
and to take the lead and coordinate road safety activity across DfT and with key 
partners. 
 Ensure that achieving better road safety results is seen as core business and 
supported by appropriate capacity by all the responsible government departments 
and their agencies.  
 Provide leadership to local authorities, encourage Safe System activity and 
increased understanding of the concept.  
 Ensure that road safety objectives are evident in the mainstream of transport 
strategy and policy documents and in investment strategies such as for the Major 
Road Network. 
 Ensure that identified priority areas for action are consistent with implementing 
Safe System.  
 Underpin the government’s adoption of the Safe System approach with an agreed 
national road safety performance framework to form the core of a new British road 
safety strategy.  This would provide the focus for all other institutional delivery 
functions - coordination, legislation, funding and resource allocation, promotion, 
monitoring and evaluation and research and development and knowledge transfer.  
The national road safety performance framework would: 
 Set out the long-term Safe System/Towards Zero goal of working towards the 
ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries;  
 Set interim quantitative targets to 2030 to reduce the numbers of deaths and 
serious injuries; 
 Set measurable, intermediate outcome objectives for activities to 2030 
which are directly related to the prevention of death and serious injury. The 
main indicators used in implementing Safe System strategies are:  
1. Increasing compliance with speed limits on different road types 
2. Reducing average speeds on different road types 
3. Increasing the level of seat belt use and child restraint use 
4. Increasing the level of helmet use for two-wheeled vehicle users 
5. Reducing driving while impaired by alcohol and drugs 
6. Increasing compliance with in-car telephone use rules 
7. Increasing the safety quality of the SRN and main road network to the 
highest iRAP *rating 
8. Increasing the safety quality of the new car fleet to the highest Euro 
NCAP * rating 
9. Increasing compliance with emergency medical response times.  
 Set a safety performance framework for the new Major Roads Network 
comprising a long-term goal towards the prevention of death and serious 
injury, supported by interim, time-bound quantitative objectives to reduce 
death and serious injury, as well as setting quantitative objectives which 
include improvements in iRAP star ratings.  
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 Set out in national strategy the shared benefits that road safety can bring to 
other societal objectives, e.g. public health, occupational health and safety, 
environment, tourism and the economy. 
 To ensure effective shared responsibility, set out formal accountabilities for 
improving road safety and ensure, through high-level leadership and 
promotion, that road safety is seen as core business by all the responsible 
government departments and their agencies. 
4.4.3 The Home Office should: 
 Recognise that the prevention of death and serious injury in road traffic is a core 
responsibility of the Home Office and actively support the enforcement of key road 
safety rules and related activity in national policing strategy. 
 Support the establishment of a new national road safety performance framework 
towards the ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries in road crashes and 
objectives for better compliance with key road safety rules. 
4.4.4 The Department of Health and Social Care and its agencies, National Health England and 
Public Health England, should: 
 Recognise their core responsibility in policies and activities for road injury 
surveillance in the health sector, emergency medical response, major trauma care, 
the rehabilitation of road crash victims and road injury prevention.  
 Recognise in policies and activities that road traffic injury is a leading cause of death 
for school aged children and young adults and the lead cause of major trauma.   
 Support the establishment of the new road safety performance framework towards 
the ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries in road crashes. 
4.4.5 The Health and Safety Executive should: 
 Recognise in policies and activities its core responsibility for the prevention of death 
and serious injury in work-related road traffic and ensure that it is in the 
mainstream of occupational health and safety policy. 
 Support the establishment of the new national road safety performance framework 
towards the ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries in road crashes. 
4.4.6 The National Police Chiefs Council and police forces should: 
 Conduct increased enforcement of key road safety rules related to the prevention 
of death and serious injury. 
 Support improved crash investigation and encourage and facilitate the adoption by 
all police forces of a single reporting system – CRASH – to the national road casualty 
database.  
 Support the establishment of a national road safety performance framework 
towards the ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries in road crashes (see 
results focus). 
4.4.7 Highways England should: 
 Ensure that interventions on the Strategic Road Network are appropriately focused 
on the prevention of death and serious injury and increasingly aligned with its long-
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term goal, interim quantitative targets, and its star rating improvement objectives 
rather than focussed on the prevention of all collisions.  
 
Local government 
4.4.8 Local authorities should:    
 Appoint a cabinet lead for road safety to ensure that road safety remains high 
priority for local authority activity and to improve accountability for legal duties. 
 Look to best international practice and city practice in London for leadership of Safe 
System, road safety goal and target-setting and integrating road safety into public 
procurement when benchmarking their activity.   
 Adopt the Safe System approach and long-term goal towards the ultimate 
prevention of death and serious injuries in road safety strategies and plans. 
 Set measurable targets to 2030 to reduce the numbers of deaths and serious 
injuries and supporting road safety performance frameworks, as proposed for the 
national framework. 
 Adopt a policy of promoting evidence-based approaches to road safety to make 
best use of public resource. 
 Engage fully and support the national implementation of the Safe System approach 
by implementing it into the mainstream of local authority activity in all relevant 
sectors, e.g. highway engineering, public health, procurement of transport services. 
 
Professional sector and civil society 
4.4.9 Professional organisations, NGOs and the research sector should: 
 Focus activity on the prevention and mitigation of serious and fatal injury in road 
crashes in professional road safety work. 
 Engage fully and support the national implementation of the Safe System approach 
into the mainstream activity of all sectors concerned with road safety. 
 
Business and industry 
4.4.10 Business and industry should: 
 Focus on the mitigation and prevention of serious and fatal injury in road crashes 
and engage fully and support the national implementation of the Safe System 
approach into the mainstream of all sectors concerned with road safety (see also 
safe work travel and knowledge transfer). 
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5. COORDINATION 
5.1 Classification 
5.1.1 Coordination concerns the orchestration and alignment of the interventions and other 
related institutional management functions delivered by government partners and 
related community and business partnership to achieve the desired focus on results. It is 
addressed across four key dimensions: 
 Horizontally across central government; 
 Vertically from central to regional and local levels of government; 
 Specific delivery partnerships between government, non-government and business 
at the central, regional and local levels; and 
 Parliamentary and elected representative relations at central, regional and local 
levels. 
5.1.2 The aim of coordination is to produce accountable decision-making at senior institutional 
levels which are appropriately resourced at national, regional and local levels.  This 
includes an identified secretariat in the lead agency, which has an assigned role and 
capacity for the function, to harmonise delivery arrangements across partner agencies to 
achieve road safety results and to serve as a platform for mobilising political will and 
resource.  In addition, opportunities are taken to align road safety objectives with other 
key sustainable development objectives, for example, public health, environmental 
protection, occupational health and safety and reducing disadvantage to identify shared 
benefits, as discussed in the Results Focus section.  
5.2 Main findings 
5.2.1 Successful road safety coordination in Britain is an increasingly complex task within the 
context of devolution and localism, the absence of national goals and targets to provide 
cohesion for multi-agency and multi-sectoral activity, and current budgetary constraints.   
 
Coordination across central government and key partners 
5.2.2 As demonstrated both internationally and nationally, an effective partnership of 
governmental departments and agencies with core responsibilities is key to national 
delivery of better road safety results.  The main government departments and agencies 
with road safety responsibilities are viewed as transport, highways, health, justice, 
policing and health and safety.  Since the first British casualty reduction target was set in 
1987 there has been a strong tradition in cross-agency coordination to achieve agreed 
targets, orchestrated on behalf of government by the lead agency, the DfT.  There was 
extensive interdepartmental and stakeholder involvement in the development of the road 
safety strategy and targets for 2010, through the Interdepartmental Road Safety Working 
Group and a series of stakeholder groups on specific topics, followed by the setting up of 
a Road Safety Advisory Panel. However, the level of commitment across central 
government was variable, and after the second three-year review of the Strategy a Road 
Safety Delivery Board was established bringing together key delivery partners and tasked 
“to monitor progress in delivering the strategy, to sort out problems and issues, to assist 
in developing closer partnerships and to spread good practice.” The Scottish Government 
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continues this tradition with its good practice decision-making coordination hierarchy 
comprising the Strategic Partnership Board and Operational Partnership Board. 
5.2.3 Currently, a Road Safety Delivery Group (RSDG) brings together key departments and 
agencies and stakeholders to share information on national road safety activity and in 
support of the British Road Safety Statement and wider devolved responsibilities.  Several 
agencies and organisations consulted49 identified that this is a valuable discussion and 
information-sharing group, rather than a decision-support forum, as in previous times.  
The level of inter-agency coordination of former years is not evident.  A lessening of 
interest amongst several key government agencies, as evidenced by reported lack of 
attendance or limited contributions to the RSDG or difficulties in bi-lateral engagement 
was reported to the review by several organisations. The devolved administrations, 
amongst others, believe there is useful information sharing within the RSDG, but missed 
opportunities for better coordination activity across the UK in key areas of road safety 
which could add value everywhere.   
5.2.4 The DfT reports to a Road Safety Minister and a view was expressed that greater 
coordination was envisaged in terms of reporting on progress achieved on joint delivery 
of road safety results. 
5.2.5 There is no formal inter-departmental group on road safety for government decision-
making, as in previous past practice and as recommended internationally.  The view within 
DfT is that the absence of targets and the lack of recognition that road safety delivery goes 
beyond the responsibilities of DfT would make it difficult to ensure that the right people 
would attend. Furthermore, a view was expressed that meetings might not represent 
good use of senior people’s time given constraints on resources. The engagement with 
other agencies is generally on an issue by issue basis rather than at a broad strategic level. 
5.2.6 DfT works with Ministry of Justice on legislation for serious driving offences, and the 
Sentencing Council, (an independent body including judiciary, Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP), police victims etc.), promotes greater consistency in sentencing, sets 
out culpability criteria and increases public understanding of sentencing, including 
dangerous driving.  Activity around the British Road Safety Statement by different units 
within the DfT is coordinated by an internal DfT Portfolio Board chaired by RULIS. Some 
forty-seven progress reports on actions are periodically provided. The functions of this 
group are under review.  The main links are with the Active Accessible Travel (who are 
responsible for walking and cycling), Freight Operator Licensing and International Vehicle 
Standards. However, there was little coordination evident between RULIS and Active 
Accessible Travel on the Cycling and Walking Strategy.  The Strategy includes targets for 
increased cycling and walking, but does not have numerical safety targets, only a broad 
objective to reduce cyclist KSIs.  Following the announcement of the cycle safety review 
responsibility for cycle safety moved to RULIS and this is a permanent change and good 
coordination between the two units is reported. 
5.2.7 The potential for achieving better coordination across government around achieving 
ambitious results is seen widely by the road safety professionals as being highly desirable. 
                                                          
49 See Appendix B, Coordination: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Advisory Groups, 
Associations and Charities 
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5.2.8 On the basis of identified good practice and on the basis of findings from discussions with 
policymakers and stakeholders, the review concludes that a new national road safety 
coordination hierarchy should be established to strengthen joint working.  This would 
comprise a Minister-led, high-level Road Safety Strategic Partnership Group (RSSPG) with 
senior representatives from central and local government, police and other key road 
safety partners focused on agreeing priorities within a new road safety strategy and 
steering and overseeing delivery of Safe System ambition and quantified objectives.  The 
RSSPG would be supported by a working group comprising key departmental, agency and 
stakeholder representatives with operational road safety responsibilities for road safety, 
and independent experts, to deliver Safe System objectives through multi-sectoral activity 
at national and local level.  Strengthened coordination would also require the 
strengthening of the capacity of RULIS to take the lead in coordination of road safety 
delivery within DfT and across all levels of government. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Proposal for a national road safety coordination hierarchy 
 
 
ROAD SAFETY STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP GROUP (RSSPG) 
Chair: Minister for Road Safety 
Director level membership from DfT, Health, Home Office, 
HE, DVSA, HSE, Devolved administrations, Local authority 
association lead, NPCC traffic lead, ADEPT highways lead, 
other invited partners. 
Function: 
Steering and overseeing delivery of a new national road 
safety strategy and performance framework. Meeting 
three times annually. 
 
 
 
ROAD SAFETY WORKING GROUP (RSWG) 
Chair: Head of Road Safety DfT 
Road safety management level membership from DfT 
units, Health, Home Office, HE, DVSA, HSE, Devolved 
administrations, Local authority association, NPCC, 
ADEPT, other invited partners and experts. 
Function: 
Reporting to the RSSSPG, the RSWG would have 
responsibilities for the development of a new national 
road safety strategy and performance framework and 
identifying delivery priorities and mechanisms.  Meeting 
every two months.  A new road safety research advisory 
group would report to this group.  (See Research section) 
 
Coordination secretariat 
Sits within road safety 
strategy unit within RULIS. 
Function: 
To support effective national 
coordination across and 
between levels of 
government; to coordinate 
with regional road safety 
partnerships for major and 
local network safety 
management. 
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Vertical coordination between central and local government 
5.2.9 When countries reach an advanced phase of their road safety management system, more 
responsibilities are often devolved to regional, state and provincial government as well as 
local authorities and districts, adding to and building on what can be achieved at central 
level.  In identified good practice, this enhancement of scope of road safety activity is 
supported by national safety performance and investment frameworks within which 
regional and local targets are set along with regional and local coordination partnerships; 
national guidance; performance monitoring and a range of other delivery support. 
5.2.10 Police, roads directors and road safety managers are represented on the DfT’s Road Safety 
Delivery Group, and the Safer Roads Fund is providing new focus for safety engineering 
activity. Highways England has commenced the establishment of a regional road safety 
coordinator in each of its seven regions in support of multi-sectoral activity at local level 
to reach regional targets for the strategic road network.  Coordination between the 
THINK! campaign and local education, training and publicity is reported as being generally 
good though with some room for strengthening in the sequencing of activity. Multi-
sectoral coordination in road safety in cities such as London is strong and effective 
between TfL, the Boroughs and the Metropolitan Police. 
5.2.11 Despite this evidence of joint working between national and local levels, many local 
professionals report a general sense of abandonment by central government in the 
support of their road safety delivery.   
5.2.12 The main focus for DfT in regional partnerships is currently connectivity rather than safety, 
and the previous Regional Offices that coordinated local authority road safety activity no 
longer exist. A road safety focus in Local Enterprise Partnerships is not evident.  Regional 
traffic engineering groups which discuss aspects of road safety from time to time have 
been set up by ADEPT but are limited to the sector.  No multi-sectoral regional road safety 
partnerships are evident although, such local safety partnerships exist and could provide 
a regional model to achieve economies of scale.   Regional road safety coordination will 
be important for the new Major Road Network on which the DfT will be consulting shortly 
(see Safe Roads and Roadsides.) 
5.2.13 While many local road safety partnerships are operational and are reported to be working 
effectively, others are losing their previous traction in terms of membership and budgets.  
Some involve broad sectoral groupings of roads, health, police, fire service and sometimes 
local business, engineering consultancies and national non-governmental organisations.  
Others involve police-led partnerships, in some cases with less partnership working than 
previously.  The Road Safety Partnership Grant which was available to local authorities 
before 2010 is no longer available. 
5.2.14 The table below sets out good practice coordination arrangements for decentralised work 
according the World Bank (2009). 
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Table 4. Characteristics of good practice decentralisation50 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF GOOD PRACTICE DECENTRALISATION 51 
 
CURRENT CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT PRACTICE 
FOR GREAT BRITAIN 
Establishing a legal duty for road safety at local and regional levels • 
Requiring regional and local targets within a national target 
framework • 
Establishing and funding regional and local coordination bodies • 
Providing specific allocations of resource for effective road safety 
measures • 
Helping to establish community partnerships with local road safety 
coordinators financed by the lead agency to stimulate local action • 
Identifying safety performance indicators and monitoring of action 
against set targets • 
Source: Based on World Bank , 200953 
5.2.15 The potential for achieving better vertical coordination and support between central and 
local government around achieving better results is large and seen widely by the road 
safety community as being highly desirable. 
 
Bilateral delivery partnerships 
5.2.16 Within DfT a police liaison officer (PLO) acts as facilitator and advisor on police matters 
related to road safety policy implementation to assist DfT in understanding the role of 
police, and how policy can be practically delivered by the police52. DfT is in the process of 
assuming responsibility for the Collisions Reporting and Sharing (CRASH) from the Home 
Office.  The DfT has taken the opportunity to modernise the system, place it in an Azure 
cloud and ensuring it can work on any mobile device.  This renewed system known as 
CRASH 7 will be rolled out to police forces in summer 2018.  There remains a reluctance 
in a number of forces to adopt the system, even though it is cost-free. The PLO is also 
working with the Home Office in seeking to deliver Evidential Roadside Breath Test 
equipment capable of achieving Type Approval. 
5.2.17 Police and highway authorities continue to engage at national, local and city levels, 
although in most places traffic policing levels have reduced significantly (See Safe Road 
                                                          
50 Green: in place; Amber: partially in place; Red: not in place 
51  World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (2009), Bliss T and Breen J Implementing the Recommendations of the 
World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety Management 
Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe System Projects, 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
52 See Appendix B, Coordination: Central Government Departments/Agencies 
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Use). Establishing good relationships with PCCs seen as important, but their focus is local 
rather than regional. 
5.2.18 At local authority level, new bilateral partnerships are being established with Public 
Health England and Accident and Emergency Departments (e.g. Cambridgeshire County 
Council with Addenbrookes Hospital) in a few areas as funding and monitoring and 
evaluation initiatives53.   The most common alignments with other societal goals are with 
public health, active travel and sustainable development. 
 
Engagement with civil society and business 
5.2.19 A wide range of civil society and business organisations work together in road safety with 
varying involvement and interests in road safety54. Organisations are working to improve 
the coordination of advocacy activity.   
5.2.20 The British Road Safety Statement highlighted the importance of work-related road safety 
and efforts are currently being made through PACTS and the Transport Safety Commission 
to achieve better cooperation and coordination between government agencies and the 
profession.  See section on Safe Work Travel for further discussion. 
5.2.21 The Motorists’ Forum is also identified by many as a useful and broad coordination body, 
though its priority is currently perceived as emissions reduction. 
 
Engagement with Parliament 
5.2.22 The DfT engages in House of Commons Transport Committees on road safety issues and 
with other parliamentary committees and groups.  Annual road safety debates in the 
Commons have taken place, although in recent years, Westminster Hall debates and 
House of Lords debates have largely been initiated by Parliamentarians. 
5.2.23 An All-Party Transport Safety Parliamentary Group exists and meets regularly.  The 
secretariat is provided by the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) 
which is a member of the DfT’s Road Safety Delivery Group.  The Constituency Dashboard 
(run by Road Safety Analysis for PACTS supported by Direct Line) is proving helpful in 
Parliamentary engagement with road safety. 
 
International coordination for national results 
5.2.24 European Union road safety coordination is pursued within the European Commission’s 
High-Level Group on Road Safety, a range of other committees and within the Council of 
Ministers groups.  A key issue is the effect of BREXIT on relationships with the EU and on 
road safety. 
5.2.25 Britain is also represented in UN ECE Working Groups and chairs the UN WP 29 World 
Forum on vehicle standards. The DfT is also a member of the influential European New 
Car Assessment Programme which it helped to establish in the late 1990s, though is 
observed to take a lesser role at the current time.   Britain contributes via health and 
                                                          
53 See Appendix B, Coordination: Local Government 
54 See Appendix B, Coordination: Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; Business and Industry; and 
Academic Institutions 
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transport officials to the WHOs Global Road Safety Status Report and the International 
Transport Forum’s Annual Road Safety Report.  In recent years, vehicle safety experts 
observe that central government experts have contributed less to international road 
safety review with little engagement with expert ITF/OECD working groups and their 
research reports compared with past periods due to resource constraints.  
5.2.26 The police have strong involvement in the European TISPOL organisation on traffic 
policing and various national sectors engage with their European and international 
counterparts at technical and sectoral level. PACTS and other national organisations are 
members of the European Transport Safety Council and engage actively in EU road safety 
work.  The UK research sector plays a large role in EU road safety research programmes. 
5.2.27 In conclusion, Britain has a range of well-established coordination structures at national 
and local levels but activity, in general, remains highly fragmented and lacks focus.  
Coordinated decision-making processes and structure across the governmental agencies 
for policy, strategy, legislation and budgets needs tightening to achieve better results and 
take forward the Safe System approach. 
5.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
5.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for coordination is provided in Table 5. 
Table 5. Strengths and weaknesses of Coordination 
Strengths 
 Britain has a well-established 
information sharing structure at 
national level bringing together key road 
safety partners. 
 More regular reporting to Ministers on 
progress is envisaged.  
 Mature, local road safety partnerships 
continue to play a key role.   
 New regional road safety coordination 
for the strategic road network is being 
developed by Highways England. 
 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 The absence of a national road safety 
performance framework for the interim 
and long-term is resulting in a lack of focus 
and cohesion in coordination efforts and 
fragmented activity. 
 Inter-departmental coordination has been 
insufficient to ensure that road safety 
objectives and Safe System are embedded 
in the policies of responsible agencies. 
 Little engagement in road safety delivery is 
evident by key Departments. 
 Vertical coordination between central and 
local government is present but insufficient 
when compared with identified good 
practice.   
 Multi-sectoral involvement is reported to 
be falling away in local road safety 
partnerships. 
5.4 Recommendations 
5.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF coordination. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
5.4.2 The DfT and its governmental partners should: 
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 Strengthen coordination across and between all levels of government in support of 
the national road safety performance framework which will provide focus, rationale 
and coherence for meaningful shared responsibility (see also Results Focus).  
 Establish a Minister-led, high-level Road Safety Strategic Partnership Group with 
senior representatives from central and local government, police and other key 
road safety partners focused on agreeing priorities within a new road safety 
strategy, and steering and overseeing delivery of Safe System ambition and 
quantified objectives.  This would be supported by a working group comprising key 
departmental, agency and stakeholder representatives with operational road 
safety responsibilities for road safety, and independent experts, to deliver Safe 
System objectives through multi-sectoral activity at national and local level. 
 Strengthen the capacity of DfT road safety staff to take the lead in coordination of 
road safety delivery within DfT and across all levels of government. 
 Strengthen coordination with local authorities by a variety of means: through 
establishment of the national road safety performance framework to provide 
cohesion for efforts, as well as through funding, incentives and guidance. 
 Support the establishment of regional road safety partnerships in coordination with 
Highways England for the major and local road network in support of goals and 
interim quantitative objectives with ring-fenced grant funding to local authorities. 
5.4.3 Highways England should: 
 Develop further the capacity of its fledgling regional road safety partnerships to 
include a focus on the proposed Major Road Network and local roads.  
 
Local government 
5.4.4 Local authorities should: 
 Work in partnership with civil society to deliver road safety results in support of the 
ultimate ambition for elimination of deaths and serious injuries. 
 
Professional sector and civil society 
5.4.5 The professional sector and civil society should: 
 Make efforts to engage in activity needed to build Safe System implementation 
capacity in Britain. 
 Coordinate through a national organisation (for example PACTS, whose current 
efforts in Safe System promotion could be built upon). 
 
Business and industry 
5.4.6 Business and industry should: 
 Actively seek opportunities to work with the public sector to improve road safety 
in their sector. 
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6. LEGISLATION 
6.1 Classification 
6.1.1 Legislation is defined by the Word Bank as concerning “the legal instruments necessary 
for governance purposes to specify the legitimate bounds of institutions, in terms of their 
responsibilities, accountabilities, interventions and related institutional management 
functions to achieve the desired focus on results.”   This means ensuring that government 
department and agency role, responsibilities and accountabilities are clearly defined in 
legislation and other instruments.  
6.1.2 This function ensures that legislative instruments for road safety are well matched to the 
road safety task.  It addresses land use, road, vehicle, user safety standards (e.g. driver 
licensing and testing and key road safety rules) and post-crash medical care standards and 
compliance with them. It involves capacity of specialist legislative and technical expertise 
within government to develop and consult on enforceable standards and rules with due 
consideration to cost, effectiveness, practicality and public acceptability. 
6.2 Main findings 
 
Introduction 
6.2.1 Over the years Britain has established a robust legislative framework and has earned a 
high reputation internationally for its processes including review and consolidation of 
legislative provisions for road safety. 55 The responsibility for legislation on driving 
offences is shared between the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the DfT, but which 
department takes responsibility for different elements is not always clear.  In general, it 
is considered that initiative for legislation comes mainly from the DfT, particularly for 
lower level offences. The MoJ is perceived to take responsibility for more serious breaches 
of the law that result in sentencing rather than fixed penalties. 
6.2.2 Various legislative needs concerning specific interventions; alignment to the Safe System 
approach; the potential implications of BREXIT and new international trade deals for 
legislation and standards, and legislative needs related to the management of 
occupational road risk are raised in later discussion under the specific interventions to 
which they are relevant.  
6.2.3 The principal matter outlined here is whether or not legislation addresses the current road 
safety task in terms of the bounds of institutional delivery within the organisation of road 
safety in Britain.  
 
Legislated roles and responsibilities 
6.2.4 A key issue in an increasingly complex and changing organisational context is how 
meaningful shared responsibility for implementing a Safe System approach can be 
                                                          
55 World Bank Global Road Safety Facility (2009), Bliss T and Breen J Implementing the Recommendations of the 
World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention. Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety Management 
Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe System Projects, 
World Bank, Washington DC. 
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delivered.  Are the roles and responsibilities and accountabilities of the key agencies set 
out sufficiently?  From the evidence collected for this review, it appears that the recent 
accountability framework around the establishment of Highways England may provide 
the only national good practice example.  The role, responsibility and accountability 
framework of the lead agency, the road safety duties and accountabilities of other central 
government departments and agencies, as well as those of local authorities for road 
safety, all deserve further review, as cited in World Bank good practice guidance and this 
is supported by stakeholders who expressed concern that it is often confusing to see 
where responsibilities lie in an increasingly decentralised context.  New local and regional 
road safety partnerships discussed in the previous section and later Intervention sections 
may benefit from more formal establishment.  
6.2.5 Countries implementing Safe System as the long-term approach to road safety typically 
set up in-house reviews of roles and responsibilities.  Sweden set up a Committee of 
Enquiry for this purpose and decided to embed their long-term approach to road safety 
in legislation to provide formal endorsement and in the interests of continuity.   In the 
Netherlands, the Start-Up of Sustainable Safety involved the specification of new 
contractual, accountable arrangements between central government and regional 
agencies. 
 
Legislative capacity issues 
6.2.6 In the current context, the capacity needs associated with addressing the transport-
related aspects of BREXIT mean that potential for reviewing or introducing or 
consolidating road safety legislation (which is overdue) in line with identified good 
practice is likely to be confined to the most urgent priorities and to the initiatives of 
Parliamentarians.  For instance, in its response to the consultation on “Driving offences 
and penalties relating to causing death or serious injury” the Ministry of Justice states that 
it intends to bring forward proposals for legislation when parliamentary time allows.56  
6.2.7 It was also noted that reduced legislative capacity may provide opportunity for greater 
use of other tools such as incentives and investment and encourage a stronger focus on 
legislative needs of greater rather than lesser consequence for road safety. 
 
Harmonisation issues within and outside the UK  
6.2.8 BREXIT, possible international trade deals which involve mutual recognition of standards 
of differing safety quality, devolution and localism all raise additional complexities for the 
legislative framework for road safety.  Adherence to best practice, understanding by road 
users of what applies where, and differing enforcement regimes in various parts of Britain 
are all key issues.  
6.2.9 Most professionals working in road safety expressed a desire for a similar legislative 
environment post BREXIT, including retaining unified licence rules and standards, and EU 
Whole Vehicle Type Approval. The ‘danger in the detail’ of mutual recognition policies for 
standards in international trade deals was a commonly expressed concern.  A view was 
also expressed that BREXIT will provide an opportunity in due course to look beyond 
                                                          
56 Ministry of Justice. October 2017. Response to the consultation on driving offences and penalties relating to 
causing death or serious injury. 
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European legislation, particularly in relation to improved safety management of 
commercial vehicles and their drivers. 
6.2.10 Some legislation applies to the whole of Great Britain or the UK whilst some aspects are 
devolved. Professionals pointed to the need to ensure that each British jurisdiction 
ensures that it is working to international best practice e.g. blood alcohol, speed limits 
and graduated driver licensing rules, and that it learns from the activity of its neighbours.  
6.2.11 Some sub-national jurisdictions lead in road safety by adopting specific good practice 
requirements for goods vehicles before they allow access to their networks and in public 
procurement processes.  The TfL’s Work-Related Road Risk (WRRR) requirement provides 
one example.  National leadership in the national promotion and adoption of regulations 
reduces the burden on the business sector in dealing with a variety of requirements.   
6.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
6.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for legislation is provided in Table 6. 
Table 6. Strengths and weaknesses of Legislation 
Strengths 
 Britain has a generally robust legislative 
framework for road safety built over a 
long period of time. 
 Review and consolidation processes of 
legislation are established.  
 Local authorities have a legal duty to 
carry out road safety activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weaknesses 
 Institutional roles, responsibilities and 
accountabilities for implementing the long-
term Safe System approach are not 
established. 
 The role of the governmental lead agency 
for road safety is not set out in legislation.  
 Local lead responsibilities for road safety 
lack clarity.  
 No recent in-house review of needs to meet 
the current road safety task has been 
conducted.  
 Consolidation of road safety legislation is 
overdue.  
 The current capacity for managing 
legislation on road safety is being used 
elsewhere. 
6.4 Recommendations 
6.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF legislation. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
6.4.2 The DfT and its governmental partners should: 
 Clarify the shared responsibility for road safety across agencies by reviewing 
institutional roles, responsibilities and accountabilities and other specific legislative 
needs, in support of implementing the long-term, multi-sectoral Safe System 
approach (See also section on Results Focus). 
 Set out the national lead agency role for road safety in legislation. 
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 Consider whether a new duty should be placed on local authorities to identify 
where responsibility lies for road safety at cabinet level (see local authority 
recommendation under Results Focus). 
 Consider specific new legislation for issues raised in later intervention chapters, 
including a review of national road classification and speed limits, the blood alcohol 
limit and graduated driver licensing. 
 Carry out periodic consolidation of road safety legislation in line with good practice.  
 Ensure capacity is available for identified evidence-based legislative road safety 
changes which address the prevention of death and serious injury.   
 Take forward legislation as soon as practicable following the MoJ’s response to the 
consultation on “Driving offences and penalties relating to causing death or serious 
injury”. 
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7. FUNDING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
7.1 Classification 
7.1.1 Funding and resource allocation concerns the financing of interventions and related 
institutional management functions on a sustainable basis using a rational evaluation and 
programming framework to allocate resources to achieve the desired focus on results.  
7.1.2 This function seeks to ensure that road safety funding mechanisms are sufficient and 
sustainable. As part of this, a rational framework for resource allocation allows the making 
of strong business cases for road safety investments based on cost-effectiveness and cost-
benefit analyses.  To achieve more ambitious performance, countries may need to 
establish new funding sources and mechanisms and align with other societal objectives to 
increase the scope for safety investments and build better business cases. For example, 
the United Nations Road Safety Collaboration’s Global Road Safety Plan (2011) 
recommends that 10% of all infrastructure spending should be allocated to road safety 
treatments. 
7.2 Main findings 
 
Introduction 
7.2.1 The value of preventing reported deaths and serious injuries in road crashes in 2016 was 
estimated at £8.3 billion.  It is very difficult to provide an estimate of what is being spent 
on road safety at governmental level, let alone the entire national spend at the current 
time.  It is clear, however, that the level of spending is not commensurate with the current 
value of prevention. Stakeholders consulted as part of the review reflected the view of 
road safety experts in asserting that there are many opportunities for large returns on 
investment presented by a wide variety of systematic, demonstrably effective 
interventions.  The long-term Safe System approach involves working towards the 
prevention of serious and fatal crash injury risk for as long as it takes to achieve it 
acceptably and affordably. Safe System treatments in The Netherlands, Sweden, Norway 
and elsewhere have so far shown good ratios of benefits to cost and have proved to be 
publicly acceptable.57  
7.2.2 The British Road Safety Statement commits to: “Maintaining investment in local road 
safety activity and management in a way that supports devolved local decision making 
(including the important contribution safer and more sustainable environments can make 
to improving health outcomes) and ensuring Highways England continues to improve road 
safety.” 
7.2.3 The organisation and availability of funding of road safety has undergone major changes 
since 2010 which are having or will have substantial effects on the amount and quality of 
activity.   
7.2.4 Some recent developments are positive, such as: 
 the new ring-fenced Safer Roads Fund (2016); 
                                                          
57 PACTS (2016), Transport Safety Commission, London. 
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 Highways England safety funding for the strategic roads network;  
 promised new investment in a new Major Roads Network, highway maintenance 
and the amounts available for cycling safety; 
 DfT funding of CRASH system for use by police forces in national crash database 
reporting   
7.2.5 These provide many opportunities for putting the Safe System approach in the 
mainstream of network safety and asset management. (See Safe Roads and Roadsides.) 
7.2.6 Other developments have been negative but are still shaping activity today. The removal 
of the ring-fenced Road Safety Grant and the substantial reductions in local highway 
investments and in traffic policing levels experienced since 2010 have had visible impact 
on the level and quality of activity.  According to stakeholder interviews and surveys with 
local authority representatives58, most local authorities are struggling to carry out and 
prioritise effective road safety activity and to move to the new Safe System paradigm.  
Even where alternative sources of funding are explored, all activity to prevent death and 
serious injury in road crashes is constrained by current levels of funding and protracted 
bidding processes.   
7.2.7 For the moment, road safety remains an add-on rather than being in the mainstream of 
local activity. Against the large expenditure on transport projects such as HS2, recent 
announcements of larger highway investments and spending on autonomous vehicles, 
choices are being made in the transport sector at national and local levels.  The prevention 
of avoidable and costly deaths and serious injuries in road collisions has a low priority in 
investment choices, despite positive rates of return on investment in safety measures,  in 
a time of budget cuts and growing demand in other areas such as social care.  At local 
level, as reported in previous sections, local authorities are finding it harder to prioritise 
funding for road safety without the impetus provided in the past from national targets59. 
Added to these problems there is the need for resource allocation processes in asset 
management and other activity to better support the implementation of a Safe System 
approach. 
 
Public sector investments 
 
(a) Highway engineering funding 
 
Highways England - Strategic road network 
7.2.8 In England, the Strategic Road Network is managed by Highways England on behalf of the 
Transport Secretary with other road and local transport networks managed by local 
authorities.  The strategic road networks of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
devolved to their respective governments, with the remainder of the road network 
managed by local authorities.  Highways England is responsible for delivering £11.351 
billion of improvements, including a range of safety measures, to England’s motorways 
and major A roads by 2020. This includes a ring-fenced fund of £250 million for Cycling, 
Safety and Integration. Of this around £105 million will be spent on additional safety 
measures.  It is not possible to separate out more general safety expenditure from other 
capital expenditure within the £11.351 billion.  
                                                          
58 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Local Government 
59 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Local Government 
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Major Roads Network – Highways England and local authorities 
7.2.9 In July 2017, the Transport Investment Strategy set out the DfT’s priorities and approach 
for future transport investment decisions on investment in transport infrastructure.  It 
envisages investment of over £15 billion between 2015 and 2021 on England’s motorways 
and major trunk roads. The document includes a commitment to consult on ring-fenced 
funding and the establishment of a new ‘Major Road Network’. This would see a share of 
the annual National Road Fund, funded by Vehicle Excise Duty (VED), given to local 
authorities to improve or replace the most important A-roads under their management.  
 
Greater London Authority Transport Grant 
7.2.10 As outlined in the British Road Safety Statement, the Department for Transport provides 
the Greater London Authority (GLA) with a transport grant for Transport for London (TfL). 
For 2015/16, £1.516 billion from DfT contributed to TfL’s capital programme, which 
included a £4 billion Road Modernisation Plan29 to improve junctions, bridges, tunnels 
and public spaces in the capital and implement innovative designs for cycling in London.  
 
Local roads funding      
7.2.11 Local roads comprise 98% of the road network in England which local highway authorities 
have a legal duty to maintain.   The main source of funding for local transport projects in 
England is through the DfT’s Local Transport Directorate, which is mainly capital funding.  
7.2.12 The British Road Safety Statement stated “Between 2010 and 2015, DfT allocated £4.7 
billion to local highway authorities in England (outside London) to help repair the local 
roads for which they are responsible and make them safe for all road users. This funding 
was £1 billion more than provided in the previous Parliament. In addition, in November 
2015, the government announced that it was allocating £6.1 billion between 2015/16 to 
2020/21. As part of this funding, from 2016/17, we are introducing an incentive element 
(totalling £578 million between 2016/17 to 2020/21) which will reward those authorities 
who can demonstrate that they are operating efficiently and effectively.  This was 
updated in the Roads Funding Information Pack published in January 2017 which set out 
various elements of funding and showed allocations by region: 
 Local Highways Maintenance funding – Needs Element: £4.7 billion over 6-year 
period up to the end of this Parliament, £801 million in 2017/18. 
 Local Highways Maintenance Challenge Fund - £75 million in 2017/18 through a 
bidding round. 
 Local Highways Maintenance Incentive/Efficiency Element - £75 million in 2017/18 
through a mechanism additional to the Needs Based Formula funding. 
 Pothole Action Fund - £70 million initially allocated for 2017/18 with a further 
£46million new funding for that year added in Autumn Budget 2017. 
 National Productivity Investment Fund - £185 million allocated by formula funding 
in 2017/18. Following a competition in summer 2017, a further £244million will be 
allocated to local authorities for in2018/19 and 2019/20 (see below). 
 Safer Roads Fund - £175 million between 2017/18 and 2020/21, £25 million in 
2017/18 (see below). 
7.2.13 The allocation for maintenance totals £5.3 billion up to 2021, £1.02 billion of which is for 
2017/2018.  This compares with £3.7 billion a decade ago. The funding for road safety 
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schemes in the Information Pack is targeted at specific sections of local “A” roads, for 
which local authorities compete for funding.  
7.2.14 In October 2017, the winners of a £345.3 million funding package to improve local roads 
and public transport in England was announced to upgrade essential local roads, cut 
congestion, improve safety and shorten journey times for drivers.  £244 million of this 
funding is from the competition for the National Productivity Investment Fund, the 
remaining £101.3 is for two new major roads, in Middlewich in Cheshire and Worcester 
in the Midlands.   
7.2.15 The Review has found that highway maintenance revenue budgets have been cut by 
around 50% since 2010, having had to compete, largely unsuccessfully, with other local 
revenue needs.  Highway authorities report that this is affecting work across the board 
with safety work reported to frequently be carried out only when presenting a minimal 
cost. Safety has not been explicitly included in asset management and road maintenance 
activity despite the opportunities for large returns on investment and the need to 
integrate Safe System approaches into the mainstream of highway engineering, as 
identified by the World Road Association.60  The main focus is reported to be on life of the 
asset, road surface conditions and treatments that require less repair (as opposed to life-
saving treatments such as safety barriers which require replacement after fulfilling their 
crash protective function)61. See Safe Roads and Roadsides for further discussion.    
7.2.16 The integrated Transport Block Funding is a capital grant for all local authorities to spend 
on small scale transport improvements which can include road safety.  This has been an 
important source of funding for local authority safety engineering work. The current 
budget is £258 million per annum up to 2020/21, £1.3 billion in total. This represents a 
cut of nearly half of annual allocations before 2010.  Only a few local authorities have 
maintained their capital spend on road safety.  Despite the case that can be made for it, 
activity to address road death and serious injury numbers and risks is not competing 
successfully with other policy objectives due to local funding pressures.  All activities have 
been hit.  
Table 7. Summary of capital funding sources 
FUNDING STREAM 2017/18 ALLOCATION METHOD 
Highways Maintenance Block Needs Element 801 Formula 
Highways Maintenance Block Incentive 
Element 
75 Formula 
Highways Maintenance Challenge fund 
(Tranche 1 £100m, Tranche 2A £75m)  
175 Competed 
Integrated Transport Block 258 Formula 
                                                          
60  World Road Association (PIARC) (2015). Road Safety Manual: A manual for practitioners and decision makers 
on implementing safe system infrastructure, Paris. https://roadsafety.piarc.org/en/introduction 
61 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Local Government; and Advisory Groups, Associations and 
Charities 
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FUNDING STREAM 2017/18 ALLOCATION METHOD 
Pothole Action Fund (£70m plus extra £46m 
announced at Budget 2017) 
116 Formula 
National Productivity Investment Fund for 
2017/18 
185 Formula (in 2017/18 only) 
Safer A Roads Fund 25 Targeted with bids required 
7.2.17 According to the Local Authority Revenue Expenditure and Financing: 2017-18 Budget, 
England produced by communities department DCLG, spending by local authorities on 
highways and transportation is set to fall to £4.24bn in 2017/18 compared with £4.4bn 
last year (2016/17), which in turn saw a fall of £521m (around 10%) from 2015/16. 
Analysis published by the Local Government Association ahead of the Autumn Budget 
forecasts that for every pound of council tax collected by councils 56p could be spent on 
caring for the elderly, vulnerable adults and children. This is up from 41p in 2010/11. 
Howard Robinson, chief executive of the Road Surface Treatments Association (RSTA) said 
(prior to this review): ‘The result will be more poorly maintained roads and more potholes. 
Local government in England faces a £5.8bn funding gap by 2020. The Government must 
recognise that councils cannot continue without sufficient resources that enable 
adequate funding for all areas of council services. The local road network is a council’s 
most important asset yet they are forced to ransack their highways budget to fund other 
services.’ The Road Surface Treatments Association (RSTA) pointed to the estimated 
£12bn repairs backlog on local authority roads and said that as the country’s most 
important infrastructure asset, the road network, ‘should have a realistic level of 
investment that is ring-fenced for spending on highways maintenance’.62 
 
Removal of the Road Safety Grants in 2010 
7.2.18 The specific road safety grant of £110 million per year was announced on 15 December 
2005. It replaced the previous system of funding safety cameras through fine income. 
Some £71.5 million was allocated to authorities for their road safety needs using the 
existing Local Transport Plan (LTP) road safety formula using the number of casualties over 
the '94-'98 period. The remaining funding of approximately £25.5 million was allocated 
on the basis of the quality of road safety delivery and future plans. From 1 April 2007 
safety cameras were integrated into the local transport plan system and authorities had 
greater flexibility to use this grant to implement any locally agreed mix of road safety 
measures. The Road Safety Partnership Grant (RSPG) scheme was launched in October 
2006 to supplement the specific ring-fenced Road Safety Grant. A total of 27 schemes in 
25 local authorities were approved for delivering projects between 2007 and 2009, and 
they received a total of £4.6 million for RSPG Round 1. The second round of the Road 
Safety Partnership Grant took place for two years starting in 2008/09. A total of 19 
projects were funded in this second round of RSPG at a total cost approaching £2.2million. 
These grants ended in 2010. 
                                                          
62 Transport Network Newsletter 15 November 2017 (not as part of the RSMCR) 
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7.2.19 Education, training and publicity activity has suffered from the removal of the grants and 
local road safety officer capacity dipped by around 25% between 2010 and 2015. 
7.2.20 A PACTS survey (2015) 63of 34 English local authorities found that when it came to road 
safety: 
 85% thought the changes in resources and capacity since 2010 had had a negative 
impact; 
 76% thought the changes in national leadership and strategy were detrimental; and 
 60% rated progress in road safety overall as poor. 
Table 8. Reported examples of local authority budget cuts 
7.2.21 Local road safety representatives report64 that most funding comprises DfT funds: 
 The Safer Roads Fund; 
 The Local Access Fund; 
 Local Transport Plans; 
 Sustainable Transport Grants; and 
 Bikeability. 
7.2.22 Little or no money from health or any other sectors, including business is provided for 
road safety use in local authorities. Around 80% of local authority representatives 
reported that total funding has decreased over the last 5 years. 
 
The Safer Roads Fund – local A roads 
7.2.23 The Safer Roads Fund (2017) represents the first recent full engagement with local 
authorities on road safety since the removal of the Road safety Grant in 2010.  The Fund 
totals £175 million between 2017/18 and 2020/21. The DfT has invited proposals from 
eligible local highway authorities to improve the safety of 50 specific sections of local A’ 
roads, where the risk of fatal and serious collisions is highest, based on the analysis by 
the Road Safety Foundation.  This is providing a major encouragement for local safety 
engineering work, not just in terms of the opportunities for specific investment but in 
                                                          
63 PACTS/ Road Safety Foundation (2015). Road Safety Since 2010, London 
64 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Local Government 
 
Authority 1: Total safety engineering budget for 2017/18 is £594,000 down from £1.5m in 2010. 
Loss of Road Safety Grant has led to staff cuts and the safety engineering team comprises 3 staff 
compared with 8 in 2010. Staffing of road safety education/safe routes to school has reduced by 70 
per cent.  The loss of the Grant has had an impact on activity e.g. ETP, work-related road safety (all 
WRRS staff lost post 2010), and engineering.  The current total ETP budget is £600,000 and 
demonstrates concerted activity to engage with other agencies to supplement funding. 
 
Authority 2: Received £28 million in the last LTP, £19 million of that was for highway maintenance 
– the integrated transport block grant has the remainder. A severe 50% cut.  Road safety losing out 
to other priorities e.g. public transport, cycling etc. The speed awareness course levy managed by 
the road safety partnership is used to support additional road safety activities. 
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increasing understanding and encouraging pro-active Safe System approaches in central 
government and locally.  At the same time, compared with other spend, the Fund is 
allocating £25 million for the 2017/18 round representing just over 2% of the £1.2 billion 
allocated to the local roads funding budget.  An evaluation of the Safer Roads Fund is 
underway.  Initial responses made within this current review have been positive, though 
teething problems associated with a new process and on-going guidance development 
have been reported65.  In view of its solid base, it is likely that a good case can be made 
for expansion and further roll out.  
 
Funding for cycling and walking 
 
DfT Cycling and Walking programmes 
7.2.24 The DfT runs a number of programmes dedicated to cycling and walking, in addition to 
the larger Government local transport programmes that support walking and cycling.  
 Bikeability: £50 million from 2016/17 to 2019/20 for cycle training; 
 Cycle ambition cities: £191 million for 2013 to 2018 for cycle networks; 
 Highways England designated fund for cycling, safety and integration: £100 million 
for cycling from 2015/16 to 2020/21 out of the ring-fenced fund of £250 million; 
 Access fund: £80 million revenue from 2016/17 to 2020/21 in support of cycling 
and walking objectives. 
7.2.25 In March 2018 the DfT also announced an investment of £100,000 each in 3 innovative 
cycle safety projects. In addition, there are a number of funding streams which are 
devolved to local bodies: 
 Local growth fund: £12 billion from 2016/17 to 2020/21 for strategic economic 
growth plans of which £4billion has so far been allocated to transport projects 
including £600 million for cycling and walking. 
 DfT highways maintenance block: £3.8 billion from 2016/17 to 2020/21, not ring-
fenced and local highway authorities spend it according to their priorities. 
 Integrated Transport Block: £1.3 billion from 2016/17 to 2020/21 of which around 
11% is typically allocated to cycling and 4% to walking. 
7.2.26 It is not possible to identify safety expenditure within these programmes separately from 
programmes to encourage cycling and walking, though the international literature 
indicates that provision of cycling facilities will generally have safety benefits.  It was also 
noted in the review that while increasing cycling and walking creates challenges for road 
safety, making improvements in safety can also increase activity in these modes. Public 
Health England’s public policy statements do not indicate that they have considered the 
safety implications of its objective to “support work across government on sustainable 
travel to promote increased levels of physical activity through walking and cycling” and 
the conclusion of this review is that they should do so. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
65 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local 
Government; Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
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(b) Police enforcement funding 
 
Traffic policing 
7.2.27 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary reports that the police workforce has been 
reduced by 18% from 243,900 officers in 2010 to 200,600 in 2016.  However, the reduction 
in traffic officer numbers has been particularly sharp, doubling that percentage cut.  The 
National Police Chiefs’ Council reports that since 2010, traffic officer numbers have 
reduced by around 36% from 5,500 to 3,500.66 Policing levels have declined due to budget 
cuts, local decision-making and increasing use of automation. Currently, there is no 
separate traffic police function in some police forces although many forces have retained 
a discrete traffic policing role.  
7.2.28 One local authority reports that despite offers to pay for police outputs as an overtime 
activity (a specific Council budget was available at one time for breath testing and other 
outputs) there is currently little take-up since police officers are overstretched and 
without appetite for additional duties. 
7.2.29 There is wide acknowledgement by the police and others that the absence of a national 
road safety target is having an adverse effect on the amount of police enforcement 
activity67.  As Lord Simon stated during his intervention in the Queen’s Speech “At present 
there is a lack of investment and recognition of the role that roads policing plays in 
protecting our communities from harm.”68 
 
Diversionary courses 
7.2.30 Following the ending of the Road Safety Grant system in 2010 a new arrangement for 
funding of speed camera activity was set up to reimburse police forces for the cost of 
running courses.69  The fee paid by course participants covers the cost incurred by the 
training provider and £45 to the police for their costs of enforcement. As this is based on 
a national average it may be above or below the actual costs incurred. A third element of 
£4 is retained by UKROEd, the company responsible for administering the courses. Any 
surplus from this charge is given to the Road Safety Trust, a registered charity, to disburse 
for their charitable activity. Also see Road Safety Trust below. 
 
Bi-lateral funding – DfT and Police 
7.2.31 The DfT is working with the National Police Chiefs’ Council to further increase 
enforcement against drug-drivers and provided £1,000,000 funding to police forces in 
England and Wales to help them build their drug-driving enforcement capability. This 
includes training more officers with drug recognition and impairment testing skills to 
enable more effective and targeted enforcement.  
                                                          
66  Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2016). State of Policing – The Annual Assessment of Policing in 
England and Wales 2016 
67 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Local Government; Advisory Groups, Associations & 
Charities; and Emergency Services 
68https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/2017-06-27/debates/A4E7BDD8-94A4-4C34-A740-
DE0C36289C01/Queen%E2%80%99SSpeech 
69 Diversionary courses e.g. speed awareness courses that are offered to drivers detected within the range of 
10% plus 2 and 10% plus 9 in excess of the speed limit as an alternative to prosecution. 
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(c) Funding for research and development and knowledge transfer 
7.2.32 The largest road safety research funding in the UK comes from the European Union’s 
research programme, currently the Horizon 2020 Programme. Horizon 2020 is the biggest 
EU Research and Innovation programme ever with nearly €80 billion of funding available 
over 7 years for a wide variety of topics. Examples of recent road safety projects in which 
the UK has participated are SafetyNet, SafetyCube, DaCoTa and SUPREME (Summary and 
publication of best practice in road safety in EU member states). Access to this funding 
after BREXIT is uncertain. 
7.2.33 DfT safety research is currently focusing on autonomous vehicles and testing which has 
reduced the scope for a more strategic vehicle safety approach for the interim.  The 
vehicle safety research budget is reported to be 50% of what it was 10 years ago.  RULIS 
has a small safety research budget of around £2 million compared with £5 million before 
2010.  (See research and development and knowledge transfer section). 
7.2.34 A range of charitable organisations such as the Road Safety Trust, Rees Jeffreys Road 
Fund, Road Safety Foundation and RAC Foundation play an important role in funding road 
safety research projects.  The Road Safety Trust was set up to support improvements in 
road safety in the United Kingdom through contributions into research and development 
of “practical measures and trial or demonstration projects, whether through education, 
engineering or enforcement, aimed to reduce death and injury to all road users.” Grants 
of up to £100,000 are normally awarded. The trust also owns a wholly owned trading 
subsidiary, UKROEd. This company oversees the central administration, development, and 
quality of six diversionary courses currently offered by police officers as an educational 
alternative to prosecution. Any surplus from the company’s activity is donated to the Trust 
in order for it to achieve its charitable objectives. Although this is welcome new funding 
for road safety research and practical interventions, income is not a foregone conclusion 
since levels of enforcement may change over time and levels of compliance may rise 
significantly, thereby reducing income to UKROEd. 
7.2.35 In terms of knowledge transfer and Continuous Professional Development, there is little 
engagement with international bodies such as OECD due to time and money constraints. 
   
(d) Financial incentives for road safety 
7.2.36 The vehicle leasing sector believes that Treasury incentives to encourage attention to 
safety in vehicle purchasing would be helpful70.  While large ‘blue chip’ companies are 
increasingly asking for Euro NCAP 5 *, incentives are needed for the rest of the market. 
7.2.37 An additional incentive used to assist in work-related road safety is the provision of small 
grants to encourage employers to take up of the BSI ISO 39001 International Standards 
on Road Traffic Safety Management Systems.  Such practice has been carried out in Japan 
and is identified good practice by the International Standards Organisation (2017).71 
                                                          
70 See Appendix B, Funding & Resource Allocation: Business and Industry 
71 International Standards Organisation (2017). Start Up Guide to ISO 39001, Geneva. 
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(e) Resource allocation processes 
7.2.38 Preparing strong business cases for road safety investments is necessary to allow road 
safety to compete successfully with other funding demands.   
7.2.39 DfT use recommended willingness to pay methods in assessing the value of a life in cost 
benefit analysis, and this is updated annually to reflect current prices.  However, cost- 
benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis are not often used at local level to prioritise 
investment.  
7.2.40 The relative benefits of investments are not always assessed on an equal footing.  For 
example, the benefits of reducing travel time are often assessed over decades, as are 
safety benefits in major road scheme assessments, while safety investment benefits in 
maintenance programmes are often assessed over one to two years. The Safer Roads 
Programme departs from this tradition by looking at safety benefits over a 20-year period. 
In Highways England activity the safety benefits of investments are considered over 60 
years for major schemes, but for small schemes and maintenance benefits are still 
measured over one to two years, although they trying to move away from traditional First 
Year Rate of Return assessments, which are also typically used by local highway 
authorities for local safety schemes. 
7.2.41 The contribution of road crashes to increased travel time is not yet transparently 
identified in resource allocation processes although this is being worked on by the DfT.  
For example, there is currently a lack data on the costs of congestion attributable to 
collisions.  
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7.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
7.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for funding and resource allocation is provided 
in Table 9. 
Table 9. Strengths and weaknesses of Funding and Resource Allocation 
 
Strengths  
 Britain’s practice in past decades in 
securing sustainable funding and 
resource allocation for road safety 
investment has been recognised as 
global good practice. 
 Large potential has been identified for 
demonstrably effective activity for a 
substantial return on investment. 
 New safety investment in the strategic 
roads network is expected as the Safe 
System approach is increasingly 
implemented. 
 New funding for cycling safety is 
available. 
 The Safer Roads Fund provides an 
important new funding mechanism to 
support priority local authority safety 
engineering activity. 
 The societal value of preventing death 
and serious injury is updated regularly.  
 Willingness-to-pay methods in the 
valuation of a statistical life  (VOSL) are 
used in cost-benefit analysis at national 
level.  
 
 
Weaknesses 
 The societal value of preventing deaths and 
injuries far exceeds the small amounts 
currently being spent. 
 Substantial reductions in highway 
engineering budgets are inhibiting the 
integration of road safety engineering into 
asset management. 
 Safety is not highlighted as a key, explicit 
objective in the Major Roads Network 
Investment consultation 
 The removal of the Road Safety Grant and 
Partnership Grant has reduced local road 
safety capacity and activity.  
 Road safety activity receives only limited 
funding in most local government budgets 
and is given insufficient priority. 
 Cost- benefit and cost-effectiveness 
analysis are not often used at local level to 
prioritise investment.  
 Longer term benefits of safety investment 
(20 years) are not generally taken account 
of in small scheme and asset management 
activity. 
 The contribution of road crashes to 
increased travel time is not transparently 
identified in resource allocation processes. 
 
7.4 Recommendations 
7.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF funding and resource 
classification. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
7.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Ensure that at least 10% of all road infrastructure investment is allocated to road 
safety intervention and to ensure embedding of the Safe System approach into the 
mainstream of highway engineering practice (in line with UNRSC’s global road 
safety plan recommendation for the Decade of Action) for the Major Roads 
Network and other investments.   
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 Review the funding available to local authorities to ensure that highway 
maintenance and other safety critical activity is not cut in order to finance other 
services. 
 Consider reintroducing the ring-fenced road safety grant for local authority road 
safety partnership activity in order to ensure that sufficient levels of multi-sectoral 
activity take place. 
 Consider introducing a ring-fenced grant for the establishment of regional road 
safety partnerships. 
 Provide financial resource for roll out of training to local authorities on Safe System 
engineering to advance knowledge transfer. 
 Review the Safer Roads Fund once the evaluation is complete and consider if it 
should be extended. 
 Provide local authorities with dedicated resource for demonstration projects of 
innovative Safe System treatments to advance local implementation. 
 Ensure that the benefits for health of walking and cycling are supported by safety 
improvements by making funding available for safety measures as well as measures 
to increase activity. 
7.4.3 The Home Office should:  
 Promote investment in the enforcement of key road safety rules. 
 Ensure that resources are available for type approval and procurement processes. 
7.4.4 National Health England should: 
 Review funding for ambulances and accident and emergency departments in 
hospitals to improve response times and trauma care. 
7.4.5 Public Health England should: 
 Review funding for road traffic injury prevention in its health improvement plans. 
7.4.6 The Health and Safety Executive should: 
 Promote BSI ISO 39001 standard on road safety management systems and consider 
providing small ‘start up’ incentives to assist organisations in the creation of a road 
safety management system as in identified good practice in Japan, published by the 
International Standards Organisation.  
 
Local government 
7.4.7 Local authorities should: 
 Review the priority given to road safety in budget allocations.  
 
Business and industry 
7.4.8 Business and industry should: 
 Look for ways to support national and local road safety activity through sponsorship 
opportunities.  
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8. PROMOTION 
8.1 Classification 
8.1.1 Promotion concerns the sustained communication of road safety as a core business for 
government and society and emphasises the shared societal responsibility for the delivery 
of the interventions to achieve results. 
8.1.2 This function goes beyond the understanding of promotion as road safety advertising 
supporting particular interventions and addresses the overall level of ambition set by 
government and society for road safety performance. This means promoting the 
importance of road safety in general in public statements and in policy documents and 
the long-term and interim ambitions for better results.  
8.2 Main findings 
8.2.1 Britain has had a long tradition in promoting road safety as a shared responsibility across 
and between levels of government, supported by civil society and the business sector.   
8.2.2 However, high-level promotion across national government of the shared responsibility 
for road safety or showing leadership by example has not been evident in recent national 
road safety activity or by Ministers.  Public Health England, for example, has a key health 
promotion role with opportunities to regularly promote the need for road injury 
prevention as a public health issue. 
8.2.3 Traffic police and victims’ organisations note the lack of public profile and attention by 
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary given to road death and injury which are 
frequent occurrences compared with harm from rare high-profile crime such as 
homicide72. Despite the headline title: Promoting improvements in policing to make 
everyone safer, there was no mention at all of road traffic, traffic policing or road safety 
in the 2016 HM Chief Inspector’s report.73  In 2015, the only mention made was in relation 
to a joint report on the investigation and prosecution of fatal road traffic incidents.74 
They believe a higher level of promotion is required and more consistency is needed in 
messages on road deaths and enforcement of traffic law. 
8.2.4 Road traffic injury is a leading cause of death for school-age children and young adults. Its 
prevention and mitigation is promoted by road safety organisations, however, it does not 
seem to be promoted strongly by national organisations and agencies concerned with 
public health and child welfare.   
8.2.5 Concern also exists as to how commonly policymakers and practitioners excuse 
themselves from failing to promote key road safety concerns or in carrying out key action 
on the grounds that they might upset the public by increasing enforcement or carrying 
out more effective speed management75.  
                                                          
72 See Appendix B, Promotion: Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; and Emergency Services 
73 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary (2016). State of Policing – The Annual Assessment of Policing in 
England and Wales 2016 
74 HMCPSI HMIC (2015). Joint Inspection of the investigation and prosecution of fatal road traffic incidents. 
 
75 See Appendix B, Promotion: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Local Government 
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8.2.6 The Safe System approach, adopted in 2015, is rarely mentioned or promoted by central 
or local government and while well supported, the principles and how to implement them 
are is not well understood76.  Promotion is carried out by the non-governmental sector, 
including the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety, the Road Safety 
Foundation, other such organisations and by the research sector.  
8.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
8.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for promotion is provided in Table 10. 
Table 10. Strengths and weaknesses of Promotion 
 
Strengths 
 The adopted Safe System approach 
provides an opportunity to refresh 
national road safety activity, as well as 
aligning with other key societal 
objectives. 
 The Safe System approach is being 
strongly promoted in London, other 
cities and by Highways England.  
 Advocacy outside government for 
strong activity on road safety is evident. 
 Several organisations understand and 
promote the Safe System approach.  
 A new road safety management system 
standard BS ISO 39001 (2012) adopts 
the Safe System goal and approach. 
Weaknesses 
 Strong promotion of road safety at 
Ministerial and Director level in all key 
national agencies and many local agencies 
is not evident. 
 Strong promotion of national and local 
good practice is not evident. 
  The Safe System approach, though 
adopted, has yet to be launched at national 
level.  
 Safe System is poorly understood and 
supporting management tools (e.g. BS ISO 
39001 and safety rating tools) are not 
widely used yet in public and private sector 
policies. 
 
8.4 Recommendations 
8.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF promotion. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
8.4.2 The DfT, alongside its governmental partners and agencies should: 
 Promote the shared responsibility for road safety at a high level to provide national 
leadership. 
 Promote the Safe System ambition for the ultimate elimination of deaths and 
serious injury as the new transport safety culture for professional road safety work 
in Britain.  
 Develop ‘leading by example’ strategies in line with this ambition. 
 Promote Towards Zero in public communication strategies. 
 Run an annual conference and an annual prize on implementing the Safe System 
approach and innovative measures to provide professional stimulus and 
encouragement. 
 
                                                          
76 See Appendix B, Promotion: Local Government 
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Local government 
8.4.3 Local authorities should: 
 Promote Safe System as the new transport safety culture in Britain to professionals 
and devise community Towards Zero promotion and engagement strategies. 
 Promote the shared responsibility for road safety at a highest level to provide local 
and city leadership.  
 
Professional sector and civil society 
8.4.4 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Promote Safe System towards the ultimate prevention of death and serious injury 
as the new transport safety culture in Britain to government and professionals and 
develop a Towards Zero communication strategy for the wider public.  
 Promote the shared responsibility for road safety at the highest level to provide 
professional leadership.  
 Promote identified international and national good practice in Safe System 
implementation to government. 
 Promote the take up of BS ISO 39001 and other strategic road safety management 
tools. 
 
Business and industry 
8.4.5 Business and industry should: 
 Promote Safe System to and within organisations towards the ultimate prevention 
of death and serious injury as the new transport safety culture in Britain. 
 Promote the shared responsibility for road safety by top management to provide 
organisational leadership.  
 Promote the take up of BS ISO 39001 and other strategic road safety management 
tools. 
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9. MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
9.1 Classification 
9.1.1 Monitoring and evaluation concerns the systematic and ongoing measurement of road 
safety outputs and outcomes (intermediate and final) and the evaluation of interventions 
to achieve desired results. 
9.1.2 This function involves periodic monitoring and evaluation of road safety goals, targets and 
programmes allows assessment of performance and identifies any necessary adjustments 
to be made.  A range of monitoring and evaluation tools are available to assist in the 
objective assessment of the safety quality of the road network, vehicles, emergency 
medical system response and compliance with key safety rules.  The organisation of 
independent crash investigation, inspection, audit and capacity review are also part of 
this function. 
9.2 Main findings 
 
Introduction 
9.2.1 The collection, review, dissemination and sharing of data, as well as performance review, 
has traditionally been a national strength and consistent with international best practice.  
Adherence to “what is measured is managed” has underpinned national approach and 
performance.  Between 2000 and 2010 regular annual monitoring reports of progress in 
delivering the 2010 target were published, and two comprehensive three-year reviews 
were carried out.  The annual publication Road Casualties Great Britain is the primary data 
source based on the national Stats19 accident reporting system. 
9.2.2 Current activity in monitoring and evaluation has its strengths and weaknesses and is 
shaped by the recent national context for road safety – notably the lack of a safety 
performance framework of targets and indicators, budget cuts and the adoption of the 
Safe System approach.  Here, the focus on the prevention and reduction of deaths and 
serious injuries and supporting measurable indicators for related system-wide activity and 
performance present new monitoring and evaluation needs.   
9.2.3 Monitoring and evaluation is a core function of lead agency activity and requires 
appropriate capacity and resource.  While the capacity of the Statistics Travel and Safety 
Division of the DfT was reported not to have changed in size, staff reported that its activity 
is largely reactive.    The review team believes that some further development in capacity 
would be needed to fulfil key national monitoring and evaluation development and 
statistical oversight related to the implementation of Safe System.  This includes review 
of data and survey needs as well as providing a home for central storage of all relevant 
statistical data relating to Safe System implementation.  Its main role is the production of 
the national database of annual statistics on road accidents. 
 
Monitoring of final outcomes – deaths and serious injuries 
9.2.4 A planned review of the national road crash injury reporting system is expected in 2018.  
Stakeholders believe that this is urgently required, the last having been carried out around 
eight years ago and with unprecedented changes in context.  These include the need for 
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the adoption of CRASH as the universal crash-reporting system, the need for additional 
reporting to a MAIS 3 or above internationally agreed definition of serious injury, and the 
need to improve the accuracy of journey purpose reporting77.  
9.2.5 There are also several data needs for any active travel policy but which are not yet 
collected within Stats 19.  These include pedestrian falls on the pavement (which are at 
least comparable to numbers being fatally and serious injured on the highway); improved 
reporting of cycle only collisions and multiple cycle collisions off the highway. 
9.2.6 Currently, there are several reporting systems in use of varying quality by police forces in 
Britain – CRASH, NICHE and COPA (Met Police).  A commonly held view amongst road 
safety professionals is the superiority of the CRASH system (which is used by 
approximately half of forces) and the need for adoption of this system by all forces78.  A 
new, much improved version of CRASH, CRASH7, which includes an application suitable 
for any police mobile device, is expected in summer 2018 .  This new system would make 
increase the efficiency and accuracy of reporting collisions, reduce double keying; provide 
live time access to statistical data to highway authorities and cost-savings for both police 
and local authorities.  DfT is working with the Home Office to take over the management 
of and facilitate the take up of CRASH by all forces without cost. 
9.2.7 The under-reporting of road crash injury is a phenomenon experienced even in better 
performing countries.   Periodic data linkage between accident and emergency 
attendance data on road crash casualties and the national road crash data is required to 
ascertain under-reporting levels.  The last linkage exercise was carried out in 2008 and an 
update is now needed. 
 
Monitoring of intermediate outcomes – indicators related to deaths and serious injuries 
9.2.8 Indicators related to deaths and serious injuries are safety performance indicators which, 
using available tools and protocols, measure the safety quality of the road network (e.g. 
measuring by IRAP star ratings), the vehicle fleet (e.g. measuring by EURO NCAP star 
ratings), emergency medical response and compliance with key road safety rules (speed 
limits and average speed on different road types, helmet use, seat belt use in all seating 
positions, driving unimpaired by   alcohol and other drugs and in-car telephone use while 
driving).  These form the backbone of a results-focused Safe System approach.  
9.2.9 Safety professionals, nationally and internationally (e.g. OECD expert groups, World Road 
Association, WHO) believe there is over-reliance on national data on deaths and serious 
injuries for understanding crashes and outcomes, and that the collection and targeting of 
intermediate outcomes allows closer safety management79.  At national level some such 
data is collected periodically, but neither comprehensively nor sufficiently regularly, nor 
brought together to assist policymaking systematically.  Further information of what is 
available is provided in the Results section of this review. 
                                                          
77 See Appendix B, Monitoring and Evaluation: Academic Institutions 
78 See Appendix B, Monitoring and Evaluation: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Advisory 
Groups, Associations and Charities 
79 See Appendix B, Monitoring and Evaluation: Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; Business and 
Industry and Academic Institutions 
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9.2.10 Highways England are working with some indicators (e.g. safety ratings of the road 
network) and Transport for London is developing specific safety performance indicators 
to inform their new road strategy.  At local level, resource and lack of targeting of desired 
performance mean that road safety activity is not well monitored.  There is a lack of 
routine monitoring of key safety problems e.g. average speeds and drink-driving. 
 
Public opinion survey of attitudes to road safety and intervention  
9.2.11 Over many years, public opinion surveys of attitudes to road safety and intervention have 
been carried out and published regularly the DfT which has served a useful purpose in 
supporting the case for necessary intervention to reduce death and serious injury.  
Whereas various organisations carry out surveys on specific interventions, not systematic 
opinion tracking appears to be carried out at national level. 
 
Evaluation of effectiveness of programme and interventions 
9.2.12 The review has found wide acknowledgement that the DfT is historically and generally 
assiduous in its evaluation of new interventions and programmes.   
9.2.13 However, several concerns were expressed during this review.  The first involves the lack 
of systematic evaluation of the safety of new vehicle safety technologies – a key areas of 
activity concerned with the prevention and reduction of death and serious injury.  
Secondly, a ‘silo’ and inward-looking approach within organisations at local and national 
levels to successful intervention being carried out in different sectors and internationally.  
Finally, there were some concerns that while evaluation is carried out, too little emerges 
in terms of new policy development.  Often, research and evidence based 
recommendations for intervention successfully carried out elsewhere are not followed 
through80. 
 
Collision investigation 
9.2.14 Since the late 1960 investigation of all fatal road collisions is carried out by the police 
across the UK.  Recent reviews of police crash investigation include one conducted jointly 
in 2015 by HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary (HMCI) and the HM Chief Inspector of the 
Crown Prosecution Service  (HMPCI) which found that the investigation by police staff of 
fatal road traffic incidents was professional and thorough.  Despite variations in 
organisational structure and staffing complements in roads policing departments, 
standards of investigation and evidence gathering were satisfactory.  Recommendations 
were made aimed at improving and standardising the training of all road death 
investigation officers and especially senior investigating officers and family liaison 
officers; recognising and supporting the family liaison officer role; and reassuring both 
victims’ families and the public that a road death investigation is not treated as in any way 
less important than any other homicide. 81 
9.2.15 A follow up review 2017 by a road crash victims’ organisation expressed concerns that 
cuts in police budgets and numbers have fallen disproportionately on traffic police and 
                                                          
80 See Appendix B, Monitoring and Evaluation: Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; and Academic 
Institutions 
81  HMPCI and HMIC (2015) Joint inspection of the investigation and prosecution of fatal road traffic incidents, 
London, HMSO. 
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collision investigation has suffered. Many of the advances in guidance and training 
produced by the Association of Chief Police Officers that had occurred in the first decade 
of this century have been reversed.  A range of recommendations are made including 
updating of guidance to reflect best practice; more active oversight by the HMIC; and 
higher promotion by DfT of good practice.82 
9.2.16 Britain has also had a long tradition in road crash investigation carried out by universities 
and institutes with support from central government and industry funding.  This has not 
attracted the financial or human resource or public profile when compared with the more 
formal investigative work of other transport modes, which is of concern to the road safety 
profession83.  There is additional concern that recently the sample sizes of downsized RAID 
crash investigations are too small to generate much useable information84.  Inspired by a 
report from the Transport Safety Commission85, a national professional debate has 
commenced about how road collision investigation can be expanded.  The view expressed 
by collision investigation experts is that all road fatalities could be investigated using a 
Safe System approach.  This would involve using an independent expert assessment of 
every police investigation which, together with Coroners data provides much other useful 
data and allows comprehensive and themed analysis.  A recent national meeting 
convened by PACTS and the DfT explored a variety of options and achieved some 
consensus about the usefulness of possible pilots. 
9.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
9.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for monitoring and evaluation is provided in 
Table 11. 
  
                                                          
82 RoadPeace (2017): Road death investigation: overlooked and underfunded, London. 
83 See Appendix B, Monitoring and Evaluation: Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
84 See Appendix B, Monitoring and Evaluation: Academic Institutions 
85 Transport Safety Commission (2015) UK Transport Safety: Who is responsible? PACTS, London. 
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Table 11. Strengths and weaknesses of Monitoring and Evaluation 
 
Strengths 
 A wide range of databases is available in 
support of monitoring and evaluation. 
 Efforts are being made to improve the 
quality and or efficiency of key data 
systems. A review of STATS 19 data is 
planned. A new version of CRASH – 
CRASH7 is expected in Summer, 2018. 
 Highways England, Transport for London 
and others are starting to look at safety 
performance indicators in support of 
goals, targets and Safe System 
implementation. 
 Independent review of the road safety 
management system is carried out in the 
form of a Road Safety Management 
Capacity Review. 
 Some data is available in support of a 
Safe System approach, e.g. iRAP safety 
ratings of the strategic and main road 
network; Euro NCAP data. 
 Evaluation of programmes and 
interventions are carried out. 
 A national discussion is taking place on 
how road collision investigation can be 
enhanced.  
Weaknesses 
 The CRASH system of collision reporting is 
not universally adopted. 
 A review of STATS 19 is long overdue. 
 No national, systematic compilation, 
storage, and analysis of the range of data 
needed to inform road safety policy and 
Safe System is carried out. 
 Annual monitoring of the safety quality of 
roads and vehicles, emergency medical 
response and key safety behaviours linked 
to the prevention and reduction of death 
and serious injury is not carried out. 
 There is a lack of integration of key final 
and intermediate outcome data to support 
the implementation of Safe System. 
 There is an absence of long-term outcome 
analysis in trauma registries. 
 The scope of current in-depth crash 
investigation to determine collision and 
injury causation is too limited (in terms of 
numbers investigated). 
 Periodic record linkage between transport 
and health data is needed to understand 
levels of under-reporting. 
 Public opinion survey of attitudes to road 
safety and intervention has ceased to be 
carried out regularly. 
 
9.4 Recommendations 
9.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF monitoring and evaluation. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
9.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Review data needs and tools for delivering the proposed national Safe System 
performance framework and embark upon new surveys and protocols wherever 
necessary. 
 Carry out the anticipated review of STATS 19 data at the earliest opportunity. 
 Establish the level of underreporting of serious injury collisions by linking STATS 19 
and health data sets (the last linkage was in 2012). 
 Review crash investigation to consider how the current system for investigation of 
fatal and serious crashes can be enhanced and set out options for such a system. 
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 Make greater national use of key Safe System monitoring tools, e.g. Euro NCAP 
(national fleet and government procurement) and iRAP safety ratings (for new 
major roads network).   
 Develop the capacity of the DfT Statistics and Analysis Division to fulfil key national 
monitoring and evaluation requirements related to the implementation of Safe 
System.  This includes a review of data and survey needs, as well as providing a 
home for central storage of all relevant statistical data. 
 Alongside the Home Office, ensure that one national crash reporting system 
(CRASH) is used by all police forces. Ensure that national outcome data is available 
in a timely and user-friendly form to assist with performance monitoring. 
 Commission regular monitoring reports to track progress in delivery of key road 
safety objectives. 
 Undertake periodic peer reviews of national road safety management. 
9.4.3 The Home Office, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, and the National Chief 
Police Council should: 
 Alongside the DfT, ensure that one national crash reporting system (CRASH) is used 
by all police forces.  
 Monitor actual levels of enforcement of key road safety rules including those 
relating to excess alcohol and drugs, speeding, seat belt use, and in-car telephone 
use. 
9.4.4 National Health England should: 
 Monitor the role of trauma care and emergency medical response in reducing death 
and serious injury (see also post-crash care). 
9.4.5 Public Health England should:  
 Monitor public attitudes to road traffic injury prevention and priorities for road 
safety. 
9.4.6  The Health and Safety Executive should: 
 Report work-related road collisions to the Reporting of Injury, Diseases and 
Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) database when someone has been 
injured on the roads whilst using the road for work or when someone driving or 
riding for work or commuting injures a member of the public. 
 
Local government  
9.4.7 Local authorities should: 
 Measure key safety performance indicators including average speeds, excess 
speeds, seat belt use, mobile phone use, helmet use, Euro NCAP and iRAP ratings, 
and emergency medical response related to the number and risk of death and 
serious injuries.  
 Use the key safety performance indicators to inform a local road safety 
performance framework with reference to the proposed national framework. 
 Monitor outcomes of local road safety programmes in line with goals and targets 
to ensure that value for money is being obtained. 
 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 97 /173  
 
Professional sector and civil society 
9.4.8 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Continue to assist in the development, review and promotion of new and existing 
monitoring and evaluation tools in support of Safe System. 
 
Business and industry 
9.4.9 Business and industry should: 
 Set up a monitoring system to record road casualties whilst the road has been used 
for work or when someone driving or riding for work injures a member of the public. 
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10. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND KNOWLEDGE 
TRANSFER 
10.1 Classification 
10.1.1 Research and development and knowledge transfer concerns the systematic and ongoing 
creation, codification, transfer and application of knowledge that contributes to the 
improved efficiency and effectiveness of the road safety management system to achieve 
results. 
10.1.2 This function has guided the design and implementation of national strategies that have 
sustained reductions in road deaths and injuries, in the face of growing mobility and 
exposure to risk. It aims to produce a sustainable cadre of international, national and local 
professionals who can contribute to research-based approaches and knowledge to road 
safety policy, programmes and public debate.  
10.2 Main findings 
10.2.1 There is a very strong national tradition in supporting in research and development in 
system-wide road safety activity which, together with reference to the global road safety 
knowledge base, has underpinned successful road safety activity in Britain.   A wealth of 
road safety research commissioned by DfT has been published over many years which has 
contributed to the evidence base for policy development and evaluation. The United 
Kingdom has played a major role in road safety research and development internationally. 
A notable example is the support for vehicle safety research which strongly contributed 
to the development of good practice crash tests and protocols informing vehicle safety 
legislation and consumer information. These have been implemented internationally and 
have resulted in very substantial reductions in deaths and serious injuries at home and 
abroad. 
10.2.2 While no register of current road safety research capacity exists, the UK road safety 
research capacity is well developed and embraces a range of institutes and university 
departments and units, as well as charitable foundations which commission and promote 
research findings. The idea of establishing a periodically updated list of researchers and 
key fields to enable monitoring of current research capacity has been initiated by the Road 
Safety Trust and raised with other funders at the Highways England Behavioural 
Symposium held in March 2017.  This would need to be government-led and multi-
sectoral. 
10.2.3 Most road safety research carried out by the national research sector is via the EU 
HORIZON programme.  BREXIT is not yet affecting invitations to be part of EU-wide 
research proposals. 
10.2.4 The stated emphasis in UK-funded safety-related research is on autonomous vehicles 
where Britain, alongside the United States and Japan, is playing a major development role.  
A large amount of resource is being allocated here. Around £80 million has been allocated 
to industry led commercialisation initiatives through Innovate UK calls. However, the sum 
available for safety research and standards development is very low. 
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10.2.5 Road safety aspects and the risks associated with the interaction of different levels of 
automation in on-road vehicles are not, in practice, at the forefront.  Key issues relate to 
how such vehicles will be used and misused and concern that occupants will overly trust 
the system, crash protective elements etc.  Vehicle safety experts also believe that the 
current research and analysis programme should be focussing on desired changes and the 
large opportunity provided for a range of vehicles safety measures within the General 
Safety Regulation and Pedestrian Safety Regulation due next year; driver distraction and 
fatigue, as more in-vehicle functions become available for driver use and also on better 
HMI interfaces. 
10.2.6 The current DfT RULIS budget of £2 million funds a young driver project (Driver2020) being 
carried out by TRL and partners which is evaluating five non-legislative interventions (non-
legislative): 
 
1) Post-test. Voluntary agreement between parent and driver about when to drive, 
e.g. driving at night and length of driving experience. An on-line log book is kept. 
2) Log-book learners. Pre-test. Hours of driving logged.     
3) Telematics. Post-test. Black box fitment.  Feedback being explored. Incentives etc. 
4) Hazard perception training. Pre-test.  
5) Educational intervention– the only one without previous evidence base. 
10.2.7 Engagement with commissioners of research and the research community has identified 
some concerns about the current focus, approaches and processes or deviations from 
useful past practice, as well as several opportunities for enhancing current activity yet 
further.   Funding for research has been reduced in recent years.  
10.2.8 A key concern amongst some researchers is that road safety research is ‘in recession’ with 
transport and road safety no longer a priority in the UK and with very limited lead agency 
road safety research support and budget86.  A frequently expressed concern is that 
priorities for road safety research are discussed internally within the DfT, rather than 
following regular consultation with road safety experts, and that the resulting focus may 
not align with perceived needs87.  There is no longer a road safety research advisory group. 
For example, some concern is expressed that the current focus on future, post-2030 
vehicles may be distracting attention away from vehicles safety needs over the next 
fifteen years.  
10.2.9 Good practice organisation recognises that lead agency needs a range of technical inputs 
from external experts.  In the past, DfT has set up a national research advisory group as 
well as technical groups who can contribute to road safety strategy development.  Some 
terms of reference for a new group are set out in the box below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
86 See Appendix B, Research & Development: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local Government; 
Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
87 See Appendix B, Research & Development: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Academic 
Institutions 
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Role of national road safety research advisory group 
 
Function: 
To provide expert advice to a new National Road Safety Working Group (see Coordination section) 
on: 
 multi-sectoral road safety research needs in support of an evidence-based approach to the 
implementation of Safe System within national road safety strategy;   
 dissemination of research findings to policymakers and professionals; 
 cooperative approaches across central government and the devolved administrations;  
 coordinated approaches amongst research funding bodies.  
 
 Chair and Membership: 
To be chaired by DfT (as lead agency) head of road safety research.  Membership by invitation of 
DfT to: 
 interested government departments, agencies and units (e.g. Health, HE, Home Office, 
vehicles, roads);  
 the devolved administrations;  
 invited multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary road safety research experts;  
 key research funding bodies in public and private sectors. 
10.2.10 In terms of research procurement, current frameworks (pre-March 2018) can prove to be 
time consuming for research commissioners (a lead in of six months can prove 
inconvenient for urgent cases) and problematic for universities which have to compete 
with the large capacity of a limited number of large consultancies in research bidding 
frameworks. This can create a barrier to widening the pool of researchers available for 
road safety research projects.  Past efforts to build road safety research competence in, 
for example, university psychology departments, was fruitful in bringing new academics 
into the field.  There is concern about the challenges for SMEs, the sustainability of road 
safety expert capacity in smaller academic units and that specialist activity is limited or 
excluded. 
10.2.11 It is also evident that current research capacity is not yet sufficiently addressing Safe 
System needs and is not sufficiently aware of the opportunities it presents.  For example, 
international experience demonstrates that Safe System demonstration projects provide 
a useful means of launching and further evaluating successful innovative treatments and 
engaging different sectors in new activity.  Demonstration projects have been an 
important part of the DfT road safety research programme in the past and could play a 
valuable role in developing Safe System measures.  Current research spending, just one 
quarter of what it was a decade ago, is too small to support the implementation of a new 
policy such as Safe System and needs to be increased along with an increase in research 
management capacity. This needs to be supported by the external advice on road safety 
strategy development referred to in paragraph 10.2.9 above. The challenge of 
implementing Safe System across sectors is great and many recommendations for further 
work are made within this review.   
10.2.12 While further research spending is required from all key agencies and organisations 
involved in supporting activity, a lead by example from the DfT is needed.  DfT has been 
the key player with the largest budget and is able to target research at highest policy 
needs 
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Knowledge transfer 
10.2.13 Central government and its partners in Britain have a strong tradition in providing a 
framework for knowledge transfer.  Good practice guidelines, demonstration projects, 
workshops and conferences are established national mechanisms for knowledge transfer. 
88. However, current knowledge transfer activity to allow Safe System implementation is 
insufficient. 
10.2.14 The production of national guidance is highly important in a localism context, especially 
when local authorities are being encouraged to respond positively to the introduction of 
new national approaches such as Safe System 
10.2.15 The DfT is seen as the home for national guidance and developing guidance on Safe 
System implementation.  A start has been made to this process in the development of 
initial guidance in implementing a Safe System approach through proactive road safety 
engineering by the DfT, Road Safety Foundation, and RAC Foundation under the auspices 
of the Safer Roads Programme.  At the same time, a great deal more needs to be done in 
terms of professional leadership. While different sectors are trying to ‘do their bit’, views 
were expressed that guidance from some professional organisations, including DfT, were 
needed, in order to effectively identify and promote best practice89.  
10.2.16 Activities in north western European countries and Australasia serve to illustrate some of 
the opportunities for Safe System guidance. 
Table 12. Examples of Austroads Safe System guidance for Australasia (2016) 
Safe System Assessment Framework, Research Report. AP-R509-16, Sydney.  
Safe System Roads for Local Government Research Report. AP-R518-16, Sydney.  
Asset Management within a Safe System, Publication No. AP-R442-13, Sydney.  
Safe System in the Planning Process, Research Report. AP-R488-15, Sydney. 
10.2.17 There is little evidence of engagement with international bodies such as OECD due to time 
and money constraints, and both central and local government struggle to attend 
international conferences and participate in international networks90.  The training 
budgets at central and local government levels and funds to attend conferences and 
workshops have all but disappeared in recent years (some staff use annual holidays to 
attend). Together with staff reductions and staff turnover there are limits to continuing 
professional development in the road safety field.  
10.2.18 Some current knowledge transfer activities include: 
 The Road Safety Observatory is being further developed as well as links established 
to the European Road Safety Observatory; 
 Safe System conferences are carried out by PACTS and Salford University; 
                                                          
88 See Appendix B, Research & Development: Local Government 
89 See Appendix B, Research & Development: Local Government; Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; 
Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
90 See Appendix B, Research and Development: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local 
Government; and Academic Institutions 
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 Safe System training has commenced in the academic/professional field; 
 Knowledge transfer on websites e.g. BRAKE and PACTS; and 
 The EU project SafetyCube has the potential to be a useful knowledge transfer tool. 
10.3 Summary of strengths and weaknesses 
10.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for research and knowledge transfer is provided 
in Table 13. 
Table 13. Strengths and weaknesses of Research and Knowledge Transfer 
Strengths 
 Strong capacity for road safety 
research exists in the United Kingdom. 
 Good practice guidelines, 
demonstration projects, workshops 
etc. are established national 
mechanisms for knowledge transfer. 
 Initial guidance on implementing a Safe 
System approach through proactive 
road safety engineering is being 
developed. 
 Safe System training has commenced 
in the academic sector. 
 
Weaknesses 
 Wide concern exists about research funding 
post-BREXIT. 
 Current research capacity is not yet 
sufficiently addressing Safe System needs. 
 There is no national road safety research 
strategy. 
 There is no national road safety research 
advisory body to help identify priorities. 
 The HE SPATS research procurement process 
is creating unforeseen problems both for 
commissioners and research organisations. 
 The road safety profession is generally 
insufficiently aware of the state of the art in 
implementing Safe System. 
 Current knowledge transfer activity to allow 
Safe System implementation is insufficient. 
 Professional institutions and organisations in 
key sectors have been generally slow to 
engage in Safe System. 
 
 
10.4 Recommendations 
10.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the IMF research and development. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
10.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Establish a national road safety research advisory group to provide independent 
expert advice on research programmes and methods, in line with identified good 
practice. 
 Carry out a review to assess Safe System research needs with assistance from the 
new national road safety research advisory group. 
 Develop and publish a national multi-sectoral road safety research strategy 
covering all Safe System elements to support and reinforce the shared 
responsibility for road safety results. 
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 Increase dedicated road safety research budget and programme management 
capacity to support the implementation of a Safe System approach and 
demonstration projects across the UK. 
 Encourage partners to fund research in line with their core road safety 
responsibilities. 
 Establish a register of road safety research competencies and programmes to assist 
understanding of national capacity and procurement processes. 
 Promote coordination and knowledge sharing amongst devolved administrations 
and road safety research commissioning bodies via the national road safety 
research advisory group. 
 Provide Safe System guidance particularly on how to integrate Safe System into the 
mainstream of highway engineering, e.g. planning and asset management. 
 Facilitate study tours of Safe System implementation overseas. 
 Continue to consider alternatives to, and request improvements in, the system for 
research procurement. 
 Strengthen the capacity of policy leads and research managers to ensure that 
research results are incorporated in policy development and implementation. 
 Continue building policy evaluation and monitoring into the research programme. 
 
10.4.3 The Home Office should: 
 Review research needs concerned with the enforcement of key road safety rules, 
including the carrying out of research into the perceived and actual risk of detection 
for key road safety rules.   
 
10.4.4 The Department of Health, National Health England and Public Health England should: 
 Review research needs concerned with the prevention and mitigation of death and 
serious injuries in road crashes.  These include the potential to reduce the 
consequences of serious injury through improved access to the emergency medical 
system, better trauma care and the rehabilitation of crash victims; and the cost of 
long-term care of permanent impairment from road traffic injury. 
10.4.5 The Health and Safety Executive should: 
 Review research needs alongside the DfT in relation to improving work-related road 
safety.   
 
Local government  
10.4.6 Local authorities should: 
 Seek the help of the research and professional sector in helping to ensure an 
evidence-based approach to road safety activity and to create strong business cases 
for investment. 
 
Professional sector and civil society 
10.4.7 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Review research capabilities for high quality road safety research. 
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 Contribute to the review of Safe System research needs. 
 Cooperate with the establishment of a register of road safety research 
competencies and programmes. 
 Encourage the setting up of a research advisory group and active participation in 
such a group by experts in the relevant disciplines. 
 
Business and industry 
10.4.8 Business and industry should: 
 Collaborate in research projects wherever appropriate. 
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SECTION 3: INTERVENTIONS 
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11. INTRODUCTION TO INTERVENTIONS 
11.1 Introduction 
11.1.1 Safe System interventions address all elements of the planning, design, operation and use 
of the road traffic system, and focus on the prevention and mitigation of death and serious 
injury (ITF 2016, World Road Association 2015).  This focus shapes the selection of 
systematic interventions or measures accordingly. Intervention focuses on the 
implementation of evidence-based approaches to reduce exposure to the risk of death 
and serious injury; to prevent death and serious injury; to mitigate the severity of injury 
when a crash occurs, and to reduce the consequences of injury.   
11.1.2 Safe System goes beyond traditional good practice with more focus than previously on 
improving the ‘engineered’ elements of the system to be compatible with the human 
element.  While crashes will occur, the aim is for the total system to be designed to 
prevent and minimise death and serious injury.  The rationale is to separate or safely 
integrate different modes of road use to achieve safe mobility. At its core, Safe System 
addresses the critical interfaces between the key design elements - allowable vehicle 
speeds, the available assistive and protective elements of roads and vehicles to prevent 
or mitigate severe crash injury outcomes and, if all else fails the efficiency of emergency 
medical response to reduce the consequences of injury.91 
11.1.3 The core Safe System intervention elements used in this review are based on international 
guidance and national teaching, and also include specific areas covered by the British 
Road Safety Statement and of growing national interest, e.g. active travel and work-
related road safety. 
11.1.4 The intervention elements are: 
 Safe Roads and Roadsides; 
 Safe Speeds; 
 Safe Vehicles; 
 Safe Road Use; 
 Post-Crash Care; 
 Safe and Healthy Modes; and 
 Safe Work Travel. 
11.1.5 Chapters 11 to 18 outlined the findings of the RSMCR under each of the 7 intervention 
elements. 
  
                                                          
91 World Road Association (PIARC) (2015). Road Safety Manual https://roadsafety.piarc.org/en 
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12. SAFE ROADS AND ROADSIDES 
12.1 Classification 
12.1.1 Safe Roads and Roadsides concerns the planning, design and operation of roads and 
roadsides. Research has shown that road-related factors are strongly linked to fatal and 
serious injury causation in road collisions. The aim is to support correct road use in the 
form of ‘self-explaining’ roads and ‘forgiving roadsides’ such that if crashes occur, they do 
not lead to death and serious injury.   
12.2 Main Findings 
 
Introduction 
12.2.1 The Strategic Road Network (SRN) that is managed by Highways England comprises 4,400 
miles, including motorways, which is 2% of the English road network by length, and carries 
one third of England’s road traffic.  Local authority roads comprise the remaining 98% of 
the road network (184,100 miles), ranging from country lanes and residential streets to 
major arterial routes.  The busiest 4,400 miles of the local road network carry around 16% 
of all traffic. The proposed Major Roads Network that comprises 4% of England’s total 
road network, carries 43% of all traffic and 16% of those killed or seriously injured 
nationally in road crashes. 92  Just under half of this network is managed by local 
authorities, the remainder by Highways England. 
12.2.2 A Road Safety Foundation study indicates that the majority of road deaths since 2010 
occurred on the network outside cities and towns; 50% of deaths took place on 10% of 
the network and the risk of death on A roads was around eight times greater than the risk 
on motorways. In terms of crash types on the A road and motorway network, run-off 
crashes with roadside objects are the leading cause of death, while side impacts at 
junctions are the leading cause of serious injury.  Head-on crashes and impacts with 
pedestrians and cyclists hit at speed are the additional most important crash types in the 
network which involve death and serious injury. 93 
 
Safe System and Safe Roads and Roadsides 
12.2.3 Implementing the Safe System approach has major implications for the safe planning, 
operation and use of the road network, even for countries such as the United Kingdom 
which are active in road safety.   
12.2.4 Safe System engineering approaches on major roads involve: 
 Establishing clear urban and rural road hierarchies which better match function to 
speed limit and layout and design; 
 Separating oncoming traffic on high-volume, high-speed roads to prevent head-on 
collisions and provide crash protective roadsides to address run-off road collisions; 
and 
                                                          
92 Quarmby D and Carey P (2016). A Major Road Network for England, Rees Jeffreys Road Fund. 
93 Dawson J and Box E (2017). Supporting the Safer Roads Fund. Presentation to DfT Safer Roads Seminar. 
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 Ensuring safe speeds at intersections to reduce fatal and serious side collisions, and 
ensuring safe speeds on roads and streets with dangerous mixed use where 
separation of motor vehicles and vulnerable road users may be difficult.94  
12.2.5 The Safe System approach focuses on the prevention and mitigation of death and serious 
injury, as opposed to other outcomes, and involves adopting predictive approaches to 
assess fatal and serious injury risk, rather than reactive approaches based on actual 
numbers of a variety of crash outcomes.   A variety of Safe System intervention is practised 
daily by road engineers in Britain - aspects of speed management and the widespread 
implementation of roundabouts are notable examples. However, the Safe System 
approach challenges traditional approaches to road engineering planning, design and 
operation.95   Many parts of the network allow speeds which are in excess of the 
protective quality of roads and roadsides, most notably on single carriageway rural roads. 
Some key road engineering standards will now need to be updated to align with Safe 
System principles to take sufficient account of human tolerance to injury thresholds. 
These include design standards at junctions and the management of road use from low- 
to high-speed environments which expect vulnerable road users and users of smaller 
vehicles to compete successfully against faster, bigger vehicles.  
 
Strategic Road Network and Major Road Network 
 
Safe System assessment frameworks 
12.2.6 Systematic risk rate mapping and star rating using objective data is carried out by 
International and European Road Assessment Programmes (iRAP, EuroRAP). Risk rate 
mapping assesses the risk of death and serious injury based on historical data.  Some 
results from the latest annual Euro RAP risk mapping report by the Road Safety 
Foundation are presented in ‘Risk Mapping of Major Roads’. 
Table 14. Risk mapping of major roads 
 
            EuroRAP risk mapping of major roads  
 
 EuroRAP Risk Maps for Britain’s major roads have been published by the Road Safety 
Foundation since 2002, and show the risk to a road user of being involved in a fatal or serious 
crash.  These annual Risk Maps for Britain’s motorways and A roads have become a key 
national road safety performance indicator revealing measurement of risk on roads across 
nations, regions and authorities. Half (51%) of British road deaths are concentrated on the 
mapped network which comprises 10% of the whole road network.  
 The Road Safety Foundation’s latest annual report (2017) found that fatal and serious injury 
crashes on the network reduced by just under 1% between 2010-12 and 2013-15. 96 The 
analysis reveals that crashes leading to serious injury increased on the EuroRAP network in 6 
of the 10 British nations and regions. Improvements in Scotland and Yorkshire and the 
Humber masked a generally worsening safety performance, particularly in the South East and 
South West.  
 The report showed that in 2013-15, 6% of vehicle travel on the EuroRAP network was on 
unacceptably higher risk roads (high or medium-high risk).  91% of motorway travel, but only 
                                                          
94 UNRSC (2012). Safe roads for development: a policy framework for safe infrastructure on major road   
    transport networks, Geneva. 
95  Ciaburro T and Spencer J (2016) UK Road Safety - Seizing the Opportunities, Safer Roads, PACTS, London. 
96  Road Safety Foundation (2017). Cutting the Cost of Dangerous Roads, November 2017, Basingstoke. 
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3% of travel on single carriageways, was on roads rated low risk.  Local authority roads are 
higher risk than trunk roads, with 13% of local authority travel on high or medium-high risk 
roads. 
 Other findings include: 
 The largest single cause of death on the network was run-off road crashes (30%) 
 The largest single cause of serious injury on the network was crashes at junctions (33%) 
 High risk single carriageway roads are 67 times more risky than low risk single 
carriageways 
 Single carriageway A roads are 7 times the risk of motorways and nearly 3 times the 
risk of     
 dual carriageway A roads. 
 
12.2.7 An outline of iRAP star rating is given below.  A rating has been undertaken for the SRN 
using the latest version of the iRAP model but has not been published, although 
prioritisation of treatments for sections of the network with high fatal and serious injury 
risk is reported to have commenced.  An investment plan in support of the iRAP star rating 
target has not yet been published. An earlier iRAP star rating97 of the SRN in 2010 
indicated that:  
 
 50% of all motorways are rated 4* and 50% are 3*. 
 20% of dual carriageway A roads are rated 4* and 78% are 3*. 
 62% of single carriageway A roads are rated 2*, most of the rest are 3*. 
12.2.8 A Safe System Assessment Framework has also been devised by Austroads for Australasia 
which, while a tool based on subjective judgement, is also proving to be a useful tool in 
new road projects. 98 
Table 15. Using star ratings to assess the safety quality of motorways and main roads 
 
 Star ratings carried out by EuroRAP and iRAP assess the level of protection against the risk of 
death and serious injury in collisions for all main user groups afforded by the road 
environment. 50 attributes of the built-in infrastructure are coded at 100 metre intervals to 
predict risk of death and serious injury.  In the latest protocol, each road is given a star rating 
from 1 to 5 stars.  Recommended levels for different types of roads are 5* for nationally 
significant roads, 4* for national roads and 3* for busy regional roads.    
 
 Minimum star ratings for the infrastructure safety of major roads are increasingly being used 
as policy targets for both new and existing roads.  Studies indicate large crash reduction and 
cost benefits when moving upwards from one star to another. The risk of death or serious 
injury per kilometre travelled on a 5* road is approximately 10% of the risk on a 1* road. 99  
Barrier treatments, well-designed roundabouts and traffic calming treatments can produce 
reductions in serious and fatal injuries of 80% or more.100  Crash costs can be halved with 
each star rating.  The Road Safety Foundation, through its work with local authorities on new 
local A road schemes within the Safer Roads Fund programme, is conservatively forecasting 
                                                          
97   Ratings based on V1 of the iRAP model. The latest, more sophisticated model now includes star ratings to 5* 
for different road users and a risk component. 
98  Austroads (2016), Safe System Assessment Framework, AP-R509-16, Melbourne. 
99  OECD/ITF (2016). Zero Road Deaths and Serious Injuries: Leading a Paradigm Shift to a Safe System, Paris. 
100 EuroRAP (2011) Crash rate -Star Rating comparisons: Review of available evidence, May 2011,   
    iRAP/EuroRAP Working Paper 504.2, Basingstoke. 
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that for every £1 invested, there will typically be more than £3 in return from the 
recommended schemes. 
 
12.2.9 The government has announced that it is considering the development of ring-fenced 
major roads funding in its consultation paper of 23rd December2017.101  Several 
engineering professionals highlighted the desirability and opportunity for government to 
set a similar safety performance framework for a new Major Road Network, as for the 
SRN goal and targets set out below. This would include targeting iRAP star rating 
performance in support of a long-term goal and interim targets to prevent and mitigate 
death and serious injury and embedding the Safe System approach into the mainstream 
of its planning, design, operation and use.  
12.2.10 Highways England is clearly providing safety engineering leadership in many aspects of 
Safe System, although some experts engaged with note that core attention to speed 
management is missing.  As Highways England has outlined 102, implementing Safe System 
on the SRN means: 
 
 Recognising that road elements have known effects on safety which, when 
measured, quantify the risk of death and serious injury on road sections and routes.  
Using Star Ratings will further strengthen proactive management and mitigation of 
risk before crashes and casualties occur; 
 Systematic treatment of entire routes and networks is required; 
 Reducing/controlling energy exchanged in crashes; 
 Creating self-explaining and forgiving networks; and 
 Acknowledging that road users make mistakes. 
12.2.11 In line with good practice, the government has set a target hierarchy for Highways England 
comprising a long-term goal with a supportive interim target for reducing deaths and 
injuries and a supporting star rating target:  
 
 By 2040, the number of deaths and serious injuries on the SRN should approach 
zero; 
 By 2020, there should be a 40% reduction in deaths and serious injuries (2005–09 
baseline); and 
 By the end of 2020 > 90% of travel on the strategic road network should be on roads 
with an iRAP rating of 3* (or equivalent). 
12.2.12 Amongst its activity, Highways England is ensuring that new designs for expressways (a 
new road type which is part-A road and part-motorway) are building in proactive elements 
to prevent death and serious injury. 
 
City streets 
12.2.13 Safe System leadership and activity in safety engineering is also evident at city levels in 
London and other cities.  Transport for London (TfL) has introduced a 3 by 3 street 
classification which distinguishes between different types of street for planning purposes, 
                                                          
101 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/proposals-for-the-creation-of-a-major-road-network 
102 Highways England, Leonard R (2016) Star Ratings for the Strategic Road Network, PACTS Conference, 
November 2016, London. 
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as shown in Figure 3.103 This is seen by transport experts as a highly useful city model for 
setting out a framework for safety intervention.104  An urban star rating is under 
development by EuroRAP.  
Figure 4. TfL’s Street Type Matrix 
 
 
 
 
12.2.14 In support of the Mayor’s Vision Zero goals and targets in his new transport strategy, 
London is working on key safety performance indicators to more closely manage its 
interventions.  New attention in recent years has been given to cycling safety alongside 
its promotion as a healthy activity.  Bristol provides a further example of a city adopting 
Safe System, where systematic speed management is being put in place to improve the 
safety of walking and cycling.  
12.2.15 In general, however, Safe System is not well understood at local level. Prioritisation of 
road sections requiring treatment by fatal and serious risk is not generally evident in local 
network management. Where funding allows, local authorities are employing traditional 
approaches of treatments at cluster sites based on historical injury numbers105. However, 
the Safer Roads Fund, although challenging to its participants, is generally viewed as 
encouraging highly useful and complementary proactive Safe System implementation for 
50 local major roads which present the highest risks of death and serious injury.  The 
maximum potential bid is £200,000 per kilometre of route. Beyond that local authorities 
make a 10% contribution.   Some local authorities generally report that this provides a 
sizeable incentive in monetary terms to implement effective activity, but a few local 
authorities reported that they are not incentivised by this because of maintenance 
costs106.  Supported by the RAC Foundation’s Pathfinder Project and Road Safety 
Foundation training, iRAP assessments and the development of safer road investment 
programmes are underway.  It is expected that guidance for proactively addressing high-
                                                          
103 http://content.tfl.gov.uk/street-types-matrix.pdf accessed 30.11.17 
104 Quarmby D and Carey P (2016). A Major Road Network for England, Rees Jeffreys Road Fund. 
105 See Appendix B, Safe Roads & Roadsides: Local Government 
106 See Appendix B, Safe Roads & Roadsides: Local Government 
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risk regional roads will be produced by DfT, the RAC Foundation and the Road Safety 
Foundation at the end of 2017.    
12.2.16 The Road Safety Foundation reports that there are 36 persistently higher risk A roads that 
are not being addressed by the Safer Roads Fund, with a total length of 472km and 
associated economic loss of £195 million over 3 years.  A further 6,111 kilometres on more 
than 550 sections of unacceptably high-risk roads identified by the latest risk mapping will 
need to be addressed by the Safer Roads Fund “in the drive to bring road deaths towards 
zero”.107 
12.2.17 A range of action has been identified in engagement with the road safety engineering 
profession and experts to launch Safe System implementation. These include: 
 
 A review of the national road classification; a review of existing road infrastructure 
design standards to better reflect Safe System principles, philosophies and 
approach;  
 The use of established tools such as iRAP star ratings as an important means of 
objective assessment of the safety quality of much of the road network;  
 Demonstration projects of innovative treatments; 
 Promotion of Safe System by key professional organisations;  
 A programme of national guidance on Safe System implementation; and 
 A programme of training in Safe System and ring-fenced funding. 
12.3 Strengths and weakness 
12.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for safe roads and roadsides is outlined in Table 
16. 
Table 16.  Strengths and weaknesses of Safe Roads and Roadsides 
 
Strengths 
 The adoption of Safe System principles has 
commenced for the SRN, led by Highways 
England. 
 New designs for expressways are building in 
proactive elements to prevent death and 
serious injury. 
 Measurable targets for the safety quality of 
the road network have been set for the 
SRN. 
 Mayoral leadership in several cities for Safe 
System urban road engineering to better 
protect vulnerable road users is evident.  
 The Safer Roads Fund is focusing attention 
and providing encouragement of proactive 
 
Weaknesses 
 There is no national policy on safe roads and 
roadsides. 
 Safe System is not yet part of the 
mainstream of national highway engineering 
practice. 
 There are no national measurable targets for 
the safety quality of all roads and roadsides.  
 Road classification in Britain is not aligned 
with Safe System principles.  
 Engineering approaches remain generally 
reactive rather than proactive. 
 Speed management on motorways, main 
road networks and urban roads is 
                                                          
107 Road Safety Foundation (2017). Cutting the Cost of Dangerous Roads, November 2017, Basingstoke. 
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Safe System approaches on the 50 highest 
risk locally managed A roads. 
 Partnership working by the DfT, the RAC 
Foundation and Road Safety Foundation to 
develop guidance on local road safety 
assessment. 
inconsistent with a Safe System approach 
(see also Safe Speeds Section 13.2). 
 Safety is not an explicit, key objective in 
plans for major road network infrastructure 
investment. 
 Local activity of safe roads and roadsides has 
been substantially under-resourced 
compared with investment in the strategic 
road network (see Funding Section 7.2).  
 No national guidance is available for 
implementing Safe System into the 
mainstream of engineering intervention. 
 
 
12.4 Recommendations 
12.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention safe roads and 
roadsides. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
12.4.2 The DfT should:  
 Review the national road hierarchy and speed limit classification for alignment with 
Safe System principles (see also DfT recommendations under legislation and safe 
speeds). 
 Undertake a comprehensive review of urban and rural design standards to establish 
if these align with Safe System principles. 
 Ensure that at least 10% of road infrastructure investment is devoted to road safety 
intervention in line with the UNRSC recommendation in the Global Road Safety Plan 
to prevent death and serious injury and to embed the Safe System approach into 
the mainstream of highway engineering activity (see also DfT recommendation 
under funding and resource allocation). 
 Increase the amount of ring-fenced resource for the recently introduced Safer 
Roads Fund, initially to address high-volume/medium to high-risk sections and to 
allow national roll-out in the event of successful evaluation.  
 Commission/undertake the development of national guidance on integrating the 
Safe System approach into the mainstream of highway engineering, including in 
road assessment, planning and asset management (see also DfT recommendation 
under research and development). 
 Provide ring-fenced resource for roll out of training to local authorities on Safe 
System engineering. 
 Provide ring-fenced resource for demonstration projects of innovative Safe System 
treatments. 
12.4.3 Highways England should: 
 Publish an annual star rating performance of the Strategic Road Network.  
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 Identify road sections for priority treatments on the Major Roads Network using 
iRAP star rating and risk mapping, in partnership with local authorities (see below). 
 Extend the fledgling regional road safety partnerships for the Strategic Road 
Network to cover the Major Roads Network.  
 Carry out a programme of in-service training in implementing the Safe System 
approach. 
 Provide ring-fenced resource for demonstration projects of innovative Safe System 
treatments. 
 
Local government 
12.4.4 Local authorities should: 
 Review the local and city road classification for alignment with Safe System 
principles. 
 Adopt the Safe System approach into the mainstream of highway engineering 
activity. 
 Ensure that the prevention of death and serious injury is an explicit objective in 
asset management activity (including maintenance). 
 Target improvements in iRAP star rating on A roads. 
 Identify road sections for priority treatments on the Major Roads Network using 
iRAP star rating and risk mapping. 
 
Professional sector and civil society 
12.4.5 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Promote the Safe System approach to road safety engineering practice through 
advocacy and training. 
 
 
Business and industry 
12.4.6 Business and industry should:  
 Review its capacity to assist with the implementation of Safe System intervention 
(civil and highway engineering industry).  
 Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention in products and services 
for safe roads and roadsides and foster innovative Safe System treatments e.g. two 
plus one carriageway treatments. 
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13. SAFE SPEEDS 
13.1 Classification 
13.1.1 Safe Speeds concerns speed and its management as central to a Safe System approach. It 
cuts across most Safe System intervention categories. The aim of speed management on 
the network is not necessarily to universally lower speed limits but to match allowable 
speeds with road function, the safety quality of road design and layout, the protection 
afforded by vehicle design and the risk of death and serious injury.  If crashes occur, they 
should not lead to death and serious injury.   
13.2 Main Findings 
 
Introduction 
13.2.1 Speed is a central design parameter in implementing the Safe System approach. Here, the 
emphasis is on determining allowable speeds by the protective quality of roads, roadsides 
and vehicles and ensuring the compliance of drivers and riders.  Safe Speeds is recognised 
by professionals working nationally as a key strategy for national attention.108 
      
 
Role of speed in intervention choice 
 
 Even small changes in mean speed affect fatal and serious crash risk:  
 An accepted principle is that every 1% increase in mean speed produces a 4% increase in 
fatal crash risk and a 3% increase in serious crash risk. Every 1% decrease in mean speed 
produces a 4% decrease in fatal crash risk and a 3% decrease in serious crash risk.109  
 Small changes in speed also influence the effectiveness or otherwise of road and vehicle 
interventions to prevent death and serious injury. 
 Thresholds for death and serious injury risk in different crash scenarios and road use types are 
known: 
 In-depth Cooperative Crash Injury Study (CCIS) data from Great Britain for 2000–09 
110indicates that the risk of pedestrian fatality is estimated to be approximately 1% at an 
impact speed of 20 mph, 7% at an impact speed of 30 mph, 31% at an impact speed of 40 
mph.  
 For pedestrians hit by the fronts of cars, the risk of death rises rapidly (4.5 times from 30 
mph to 40 mph). In car-to-car side impacts the fatality risk is 85% at 40 mph. 
 For belted occupants in the best designed cars (Euro NCAP 5*), the thresholds for severe 
and fatal injury have been identified as 45 mph (travel speed at impact) in head-on car-to-
car crashes.111    
 In car-to-car side impacts the fatality risk is 85% at 40 mph according to CCIS data. 
                                                          
108 PACTS (2017) Speed summit report. http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/report-final-  
     web.pdf accessed 30.11.17. 
109  Nilsson G. (2004). Traffic safety dimensions and the power model to describe the effect of speed on safety.   
Bulletin 221, Lund Institute of Technology, Lund. 
110  Richards D. C. (2010). Relationship between Speed and Risk of Fatal Injury: Pedestrians and Car    
     Occupants, Transport Research Laboratory, RoadSafetyWebPublicationNo.16, DfT: London 
111 Tingvall C and Howarth N, 1999. Vision Zero – an ethical approach to safety and mobility. Paper presented  
     to 6th ITE Conference Road Safety and Traffic Enforcement Beyond 2000,6-7 September,1999, Melbourne. 
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Allowable speeds and geometric road design 
13.2.2 Representative bodies of road engineers and managers, as well as road safety researchers 
in Britain, acknowledge that the national road classification in Britain is not generally 
aligned to Safe System112. In Sweden and The Netherlands, early implementation of Safe 
System involved review of national road classifications to ensure alignment of road 
function, design and layout and speed limit.  Much of the network in Britain posts speed 
limits and allows speeds which are in excess of the protective elements of roads and 
roadsides and vehicles against death and serious injury. One highway engineering 
organisation also noted that the variety of speed limits imposed by local authorities is 
leading to inconsistency of approach. 
13.2.3 The lack of alignment with Safe System is evident particularly on the single carriageway 
rural network where 60 mph is the national speed limit for road use by low and high-
speed vehicles, motorised and non-motorised vehicles, farm and leisure traffic.  Here, 
inappropriate speed by users within the posted speed limit is typically cited as a regular 
contributory factor in road crashes, rather than inappropriate road design and speed limit 
which does not encourage appropriate speed. 
13.2.4 Updates to DfT speed limit circulars for local authorities (2012)113 is reported by at least 
one local authority to have led to some reductions from 60mph to 50 mph. 
13.2.5 In urban areas, 20 mph speed limits are being increasingly implemented in city centres, 
residential areas and other areas with high volumes of pedestrians and cyclists114. The DfT 
has commissioned research, due to report in 2018, to assess the impact of 20mph speed 
limits which do not contain self-enforcing physical characteristics such as road humps or 
chicanes. TfL are trialling the effectiveness of such 20 mph limits, without traffic calming 
measures such as speed humps.  According to 20’s Plenty, all but two Inner London 
Boroughs and over half of the UK’s 40 largest urban authorities now have a policy of 
setting 20mph as the default limit for all their streets.115 The provision of supporting road 
humps and chicanes are notable examples of successful design in the research literature.  
Road safety managers and organisations have expressed concern about new government 
guidance on emissions which invites local authorities to consider removing such speed 
management devices to improve driving flow without reference to safety impact or the 
cost of removal116 117 118. PACTS has noted that while there may be a small number of 
specific locations where the removal of humps is justified due to poorer design, well 
designed and well-maintained humps and other devices can smooth traffic flows and keep 
speeds down, which should improve air quality.119 
                                                          
112 See Appendix B, Safe Speeds: Local Government; and Academic Institutions 
113 Setting local speed limits (Department for Transport circular 01/2013)  
114 See Appendix B, Safe Speeds: Local Government; and Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
115 http://www.roadsafetygb.org.uk/news/6097.html accessed 30.11.17. 
116 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/air-quality-plan-for-nitrogen-dioxide-no2-in-uk-2017 
117 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/speed-bumps-disappear-uk-roads-air-pollution-
government-plan-emissions-councils-remove-a7862811.html 
118 See Appendix B, Safe Speeds: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Advisory Groups, 
Associations and Charities 
119 PACTS (2017). Press Release, Thursday 26th July 2017 http://www.pacts.org.uk/2017/07/pacts-reminds-
government-not-to-overlook-safety-in-air-quality-moves/  accessed 30.11.17 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 117 /173  
 
13.2.6 Local authority speed management is typically based on casualty data rather than Safe 
System principles and measurement, e.g. using of iRAP rating or measurement of mean 
speed or excess speed120. 
 
In-vehicle driver assistance technologies - ISA 
13.2.7 Britain has played a key role in the development of intelligent speed assistance (ISA) which 
can help drivers comply with speed limits. An option for an overridable system by the 
driver, currently one of the measures for possible mandatory requirement being 
examined within the EU’s General Safety Regulation review, is highly favoured and 
promoted by UK vehicle safety research experts and safety organisations.121  In an 
overridable system, also known as Voluntary ISA, drivers can choose whether the system 
restricts their vehicle speed and/or the speed it is restricted to.  This system uses digital 
maps and speed sign recognition to detect the current speed limit and help prevent the 
driver from accelerating over it.  Over 90% of journey miles are on main roads in Britain 
which have known (mapped) speed limits.  Research in Britain indicates a potential 21% 
reduction in fatal crashes and a 14% reduction in serious crashes from the fitment of 
overridable ISA.122    
13.2.8 Several manufacturers already sell cars in Europe with various implementations of ISA 
including Ford, Mercedes-Benz, Peugeot/Citroen, Renault and Volvo.  Euro NCAP, the 
consumer safety rating organisation, gives points for vehicles that include ISA.   
13.2.9 Buses and HGVs are legally required to fit speed limiters (restricting them to speeds of 
62mph and 56mph respectively). At city level, TfL are requiring ISA to be fitted in London 
buses.  
13.2.10 Additional systems such as Automated Emergency Braking to slow vehicle speed, 
especially systems which can help reduce pedestrian death and serious injury, are also 
considered priorities by those involved in vehicle safety work.  An official DfT view on 
whether or not the UK would support mandatory requirement of such technologies was 
not available since the UK response to the European Commission’s review of the General 
Safety Regulation and the Pedestrian Safety Regulation was under consideration.  
 
Speed enforcement 
13.2.11 While there has been a gradual increase in compliance with speed limits between 2011 
and 2016, annual monitoring continues to indicate poor levels of compliance with speed 
limits across road types:123  Stakeholders perceive this as a key road safety problem. 
 46% of cars and 47% of light commercial vehicles exceeded the speed limit on 
motorways in 2016 
                                                          
120 See Appendix B, Safe Speeds: Local Government 
121 http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/Safer-Vehicles-2016-Summary-FINAL.pdf 
122 Carsten O (2012). Personal communication of additional results to study Lai F, Carsten O and Tate F. How much benefit does Intelligent 
Speed Adaptation deliver: An analysis of its potential contribution to safety and environment, Accident Analysis and Prevention 48 (2012) 
63– 72. 
 
123 Department for Transport (2017) Vehicle Speed Compliance Statistics: GB 2016, HMSO, London. 
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 Single carriageway roads where the national speed limit applies (60 mph for cars) 
had the highest levels of speed limit compliance, with 8% of cars exceeding the 
speed limit 
 On 30mph roads, 53% of cars, 56% of light commercial vehicles and 43% of 
articulated heavy goods vehicles exceeded the speed limit; and 
 On 20mph roads with free-flow conditions (i.e. excluding roads with traffic calming 
measures - which may not be typical of most 20 mph roads), 81% of cars exceeded 
the speed limit.  
13.2.12 According to STATS19 data, exceeding the speed limit features amongst the top five 
contributory factors for collisions involving motorcyclists of all engine sizes, young car 
drivers (17-24 years old) and the other vehicles involved in collisions with pedestrians.124 
13.2.13 Speed cameras at fixed sites and mobile cameras have been used with substantial casualty 
reduction effects.   More recently, average speed cameras along sections of road are being 
used increasingly and have been shown to achieve a large 36% reduction in fatal and 
serious collisions.125  Several experts and practitioners noted the case for installing 
average speed cameras widely on the motorway and trunk road network as well as on 
sections of single carriageway rural roads. 
13.2.14 Road safety managers report that camera partnerships are generally well run and making 
a good contribution, but there is some concern that they are seen as a cash cow by some 
political authorities and media.  While many safety camera partnerships have withstood 
changes in funding mechanisms and levels, in others the level of activity is reported to 
have diminished.  Recent information produced through Freedom of Information (FOI) 
request indicates that some 50% of fixed speed cameras are switched on.126  No recent, 
published information is available on users’ perception of the risk of detection for 
speeding offences.  There is no monitoring of recent speed camera developments in terms 
of further roll out or withdrawal, although road managers suspect that the national 
picture is patch 
13.2.15 A review of international best practice with national speed prosecution thresholds (which 
are considered by the review team and the NPCC traffic police lead 127as being high 
compared with those for example in Victoria, Australia) to inform national policy has not 
been carried out128. 
13.2.16 Many professionals pointed to the need for combined publicity and enforcement to 
address speeding (see Safe Road Use).  
 
Speed awareness courses 
13.2.17 Speed awareness courses are available to drivers and riders in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland as a very popular alternative to prosecution for certain speed offences 
that would otherwise incur three penalty points and a £100 fine. UKROEd, a subsidiary of 
                                                          
124 Reported Road Casualties Great Britain 2016 
125 Owen R, Ursachi G and Allsop RE (2016). Effectiveness of Average Speed Cameras in Great Britain, RAC 
Foundation, 2016, London. 
126 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/nov/04/only-half-of-britains-fixed-speed-camera-are-active 
127 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/two-cars-a-minute-break-speed-limit-outside-west-mercia-police-chief-
anthony-banghams-hq-v97st8bdv 
128 See Appendix B, Research and Development: Emergency Services 
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the Road Safety Trust charity, administers courses under the National Driver Offender 
Retraining Scheme (NDORS).  Such courses are available for a typical cost of £85 to 
offenders who have not been convicted of any other speeding offence in the past three 
years and where driving is in the range of 10% plus 2mph and 10% plus 9mph of the limit.  
A number of private organisations (such as AA Drivetech, the TTC Group, DriveSafe) and 
public bodies (such as police forces and local authorities) deliver NDORS courses. 
13.2.18 Some professionals see such courses as a useful educational measure which help to create 
more sympathetic attitudes to speed cameras and other interventions, whereas others 
are sceptical citing the gap in the evidence for the effectiveness of these programmes in 
reducing rates of reoffending. A current DfT study, due to report in 2018, is evaluating the 
effectiveness of these programmes in terms of reoffending.  Some police representatives 
expressed concern that offenders may be eligible for repeat courses if speeding within 
different speed limits within the 3-year period, although monitoring by the Road Safety 
Trust reported to the review shows a low frequency of this129. In some media 
commentary, such courses are seen as generating income, used for road safety purposes, 
for the police who receive a flat fee to cover course provision expenses that may be higher 
or lower than the actual cost incurred by a specific force. UKROEd is currently reviewing 
the model for cost recovery. 
13.2.19 Better speed management has not been cited to this review as an operational priority of 
lead agency, Highway Agency, police activity, or local authority activity130. Token support 
has been shown by all key sectors, apart from road safety organisations and urban 
Mayors, who are lending political leadership to speed management within their 
jurisdictions. 
 
Insurance industry incentives 
13.2.20 Several professionals noted that telematics-based insurance policies for targeted groups 
would make slowing down of interest to the driver, due to incentives, e.g. reduced 
premiums and cash back.  While there is evidence of limited use of these to date, it was 
suggested that the practice deserved further encouragement and research131. 
13.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
13.3.1 A summary of strengths and weakness for safe speeds is provided in Table 17. 
Table 17. Strengths and weaknesses of Safe Speeds 
 
Strengths 
 Britain has a well-established record of 
speed management using a variety of 
means.  
 Successful activity includes mobile, fixed 
site and average speed camera 
 
Weaknesses 
 There are no specific actions in the British 
Road Safety Statement related to speed. 
 The road and speed limit classification system 
in Britain is not aligned to Safe System 
principles. 
                                                          
129 Impact Evaluation of the National Speed Awareness Course. May 2018. Ipsos Mori, George Barrett and the 
Institute for Transport Studies University of Leeds. 
130 See Appendix B, Safe Speeds: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local Government; Emergency 
Services; and Academic Institutions 
131 See Appendix B, Safe Speeds: Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
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implementation and speed management 
in residential areas. 
 Research in Britain has contributed to the 
development of promising in-vehicle 
technologies such as overridable 
intelligent speed adaptation.  
 Updates to DfT speed limit circulars for 
local authorities is reported to have led to 
some reductions from 60mph to 50 mph. 
 Speed compliance levels, average speeds 
and the number of speed offences are 
monitored and published annually by DfT. 
 The potential and need to shift the culture 
on speed is recognised such that users 
perceive speeding as seriously as excess 
alcohol. 
 
 Compliance with speed limits is not high in 
urban areas or on motorways.  
 Speed limits are too high where roads, 
roadsides and vehicles offer inadequate 
protection, leading to inappropriate, 
allowable speeds. 
 There is little leadership in government, its 
agencies and in the responsible sectors for 
better speed management. 
 Local authority speed management is 
typically based on casualty data rather than 
Safe System principles and measurement. 
 Reference to international best practice with 
national speed prosecution thresholds is not 
carried out. 
 
13.4 Recommendations 
13.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention safe speeds. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
13.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed as a design parameter of the Safe System 
approach. 
 Review national speed limits on roads in Britain as soon as possible.  
 Establish better speed management as a national priority by targeting percentage 
increases in speed limit compliance and reductions in average speeds and work 
with partners to achieve this. 
 Promote the benefits of average speed cameras, fixed site and mobile cameras to 
key agencies, highway authorities and the community. 
 Re-establish national multimedia advertising on the adverse, daily consequences of 
speeding. 
 Assist drivers in complying with speed limits by promoting mandatory Intelligent 
Speed Assistance (ISA), a voluntary overridable system, in EU Whole Vehicle Type 
Approval; and fast-track this nationally via government procurement policies and 
safe travel policies. 
13.4.3 Highways England should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed as a fundamental design parameter of the 
Safe System approach and establish its better management as a stated priority for 
its road network, through a wide-ranging review. 
 Target percentage increases in compliance with speed limits, work with partners to 
ensure better compliance and review progress annually. 
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 Roll out a programme of average speed cameras, fixed site and mobile cameras on 
motorways and A roads to improve compliance. 
13.4.4 The Ministry of Justice should: 
 Carry out a review of international best practice with national speed prosecution 
thresholds to inform policy and operational practice. 
13.4.5 The Home Office should: 
 Acknowledge that better speed enforcement is fundamental to its mission to keep 
citizens safe. 
 Work with partners (including DfT and the THINK! campaign, and local authorities 
as well as the police) to ensure better compliance with speed limits. 
 Promote the benefits of average speed cameras, fixed site and mobile cameras to 
key agencies, highway authorities and the community. 
13.4.6 Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary and Police and Crime Commissioners 
should: 
 Annually review progress in improving compliance with speed limits through police 
enforcement. 
13.4.7 The Police should: 
 Ensure that better compliance with speed limits is amongst policing priorities.  
 Work with partners (including DfT, HE, and local authorities) to combine publicity 
and police enforcement of speed limits. 
 
Local government 
13.4.8 Local authorities should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed and its management to a Safe System 
approach and review priority interventions for local roads. 
 Target percentage increases in compliance with speed limits, work with partners to 
ensure better compliance and review progress annually. 
 Require Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) in the public procurement of transport 
services.  
 
Professional sector and civil society 
13.4.9 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed and its management to a Safe System 
approach. 
 Promote the need for better speed management in advocacy to government, 
highway authorities and police at national and local levels and to the community. 
 Include speed management in in-house management systems of organisations to 
improve road safety. 
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Business and industry 
13.4.10 Business and industry should: 
 Acknowledge the central role of speed and its management to a Safe System 
approach. 
 Create incentives for better speed compliance in the insurance sector. 
 Include speed management in the road safety management systems of 
organisations. 
 Fit ISA as standard in all new cars, vans, heavy goods vehicles, buses and coaches. 
 Introduce in-vehicle speed monitoring for light van and heavy vehicle commercial 
operations. 
 Require ISA fitment in fleet purchasing.  
 Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention in products and services 
for Safe Speeds (for instance ISA, speed monitoring and other innovative products 
as and when they emerge). 
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14. SAFE VEHICLES 
14.1 Classification 
14.1.1 Safe Vehicles concerns the planning, design, operation and use of vehicles to provide 
driver and rider assistance and crash protective designs to prevent and mitigate fatal and 
serious injuries and risks. The aim is to support correct in-vehicle use and to protect 
drivers and passengers as well as road users outside the vehicle such that if crashes occur, 
they do not do not lead to death and serious injury. 
14.2 Main Findings  
 
Introduction 
14.2.1 It is widely acknowledged that improved vehicle safety performance is brought about by 
the combination of regulation and harmonised standards, consumer information, and 
public procurement policies to fast-track fitment of proven safety technologies and 
industry initiatives.  Vehicle safety is recognised as being a key Safe System strategy and 
a demonstrably efficient and effective means of preventing and mitigating death and 
serious injury. 
14.2.2 Vehicle safety interventions address crash avoidance, crash protection and mitigation in 
the event of a crash, and post-crash response.  They involve vehicle measures to:  
 
 Assist drivers and riders to comply with speed limits, seat belt and excess alcohol 
laws; 
 Provide intelligent assistance to driving tasks to mitigate the risk of loss of control, 
and collision with other road users and the infrastructure; 
 Reduce distraction from other in-car devices and services or external factors;  
 Provide vital crash protection for a range of crash scenarios and age and gender 
characteristics for road users both inside and outside of the vehicle; and 
 Assist in the notification of crashed to aid post-crash care. 
14.2.3 Safe System approaches aim to integrate vehicle safety measures with other system 
measures, e.g. separated facilities in the road network, in-vehicle lane departure systems 
linked to road markings, crash-protective medians and roadsides and speed management 
to ensure tolerable kinetic energy in the event of a serious and fatal crash.   
14.2.4 A UK conference on vehicle safety concluded that the single greatest contribution to the 
prevention of road death and serious injury in Britain has been vehicle safety.132   While 
much has been achieved, UK vehicle safety research indicates that there is very large 
potential for savings in death and serious injuries through further measures.133 134 UK 
                                                          
132 http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/Safer-Vehicles-2016-Summary-FINAL.pdf accessed 
30.11.17 
133   Hynd D, McCarthy M, Carroll JA, Seidl S, Edwards M, Visvikis C, Reed R and A Stevens (2014), Benefit and   
      Feasibility of a Range of New Technologies and Unregulated Measures in the fields of Vehicle Occupant   
      Safety and Protection of Vulnerable Road Users: Final Report, TRL, Crowthorne. 
134   Seidl M, Hynd D, McCarthy M, Martin P, Hunt H, Mohan S, Krishnamurthy V and S O’Connell: TRL Ltd. In 
depth cost-effectiveness analysis of the identified measures and features regarding the way forward for EU 
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vehicle safety experts believe that mandatory, financial incentive and consumer 
information routes, including industry own initiatives are inter-related, all needed, with 
each playing their part. 
 
Global and EU vehicle safety standards 
14.2.5 Most areas of vehicle safety requirements are established at international level, 
recognising the global nature of the car industry and the need for vehicle market 
variations to be minimised for cost reasons.  Minimum vehicle performance standards are 
largely agreed within the UN ECE WP29 (World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle 
Regulations) and currently are mandated by EU Regulations.  The EU has exclusive 
competence within the Single Market for vehicle safety standards (Article 114 of the 
Treaty). EU Whole Vehicle Type Approval means that vehicles certified in one EU Member 
State are valid for sale in all other EU Member States. The European Parliament has played 
a key role through co-decision processes in ensuring that Treaty obligations to deliver a 
high level of protection in standards was met. The UK is an active contributor at the UN 
ECE WP29 and chairs its Technical Group for active safety requirements, and the ITS 
Automated-Driving group.   
 
The UK contribution 
14.2.6 At policymaking, professional and research levels, the UK has a made a strong 
contribution to vehicle safety and, thereby, to the large reductions in killed and seriously 
injured casualties, both nationally and throughout Europe, where a substantial 55% 
reduction in car occupant deaths has been achieved over the last 15 years.   
14.2.7 During the 1990s, and with a new focus of the importance of safety within harmonisation 
processes, the UK played a major development role, both in research and policy terms.  It 
contributed to the EU research and development funding and international collaboration 
in the 1980s and 1990s which led to the development of world-leading vehicle crash 
testing standards and protocols.  UK research led the development of the first 
biomechanically based European safety requirements for frontal and side impact crash 
tests and the first pedestrian safety requirements for cars. It played the major role in the 
development of the European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) in 
conjunction with the Swedish government, the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile 
(FIA) and the European consumer and road user organisations. This coordination 
facilitated a highly positive response from the European car industry in providing new 
safety designs and equipment for car occupant protection. Legislative and consumer 
information initiatives were rooted in British leadership in research, advocacy, 
policymaking and Parliamentary action.135 
 
Current UK vehicle safety policies 
14.2.8 The British Road Safety Statement outlines current policy priorities.  These largely 
comprise promoting the development and adoption of connected and autonomous 
vehicle technologies in a way that maximises safety benefits and encouraging the faster 
                                                          
vehicle safety. Final Report, European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, 
Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Brussels. 
135 http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/Safer-Vehicles-2016-Summary-FINAL.pdf accessed on 
30.11.17 
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uptake of safer vehicles via the promotion of clear consumer information and the 
procurement of safer vehicles. 136   
14.2.9 DfT acknowledges that the autonomous vehicle development priority is absorbing most 
current capacity in the International Vehicles Standards section.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
that automation, at levels that exceed human capabilities, is not considered imminent by 
some stakeholders. There is no clear policy that addresses the introduction of lower level 
Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) that in some cases have been shown to be 
very effective in preventing crashes. Internal consideration of the vehicle safety needs in 
the context of the EU reviews has received little attention to date.  The current focus is 
‘different’ from the strong focus on the prevention and mitigation of death and serious 
injury of previous years137.   
14.2.10 Safe System proposes a holistic view of casualty reduction such that vehicle measures are 
considered together with risks and other measures related to the road and road users. A 
strategy that fully integrates all three dimensions of safety is therefore essential.   
Interviewees reported there is only occasional coordination of approaches and vehicle 
safety is predominantly in a silo of its own. 
14.2.11 Vehicle safety research experts across UK research institutions expressed concern that 
the UK’s inputs on vehicle safety regulatory standards has lessened, focusing more on 
removing barriers to trade and market driven approaches including the market for the 
longer-term introduction of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV) than regulating 
for vehicle safety.   
14.2.12 In terms of the level of activity evident to date, either on the regulatory or consumer 
information front, vehicle safety measures for the next 15 to 20 years do not seem to be 
high on the list of current Departmental priorities which is of concern to safety experts 
and others138.  
 
Legislative standards 
14.2.13 The GSR and PSR reviews: The EU is currently embarking on a review of key vehicle safety 
measures within the General Safety Regulation 661/2009 and the Pedestrian Safety 
Regulation 78/2009 of high importance for future road safety results. EU-funded research 
by TRL has underpinned the review and has assessed costs and benefits.134 135   
14.2.14 The European Commission is considering a priority list of regulation to promote casualty 
reduction with the following measures, considered by independent vehicle safety experts 
in this review to have the largest potential for casualty reduction: 
 Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) (voluntary, overridable and mandatory systems); 
 Pedestrian and cyclist AEB for all vehicles (M1, M2 M3 and N1, N2, N3)139; 
                                                          
136 Department for Transport (2015) Working Together to Build a Safer Road System, British Road Safety 
Statement (2015), London. 
137 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Academic Institutions 
138 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Academic Institutions 
139  Category N1: Vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of goods and having a maximum mass not 
exceeding 3,5 tonnes. 
Category N2: Vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of goods and having a maximum mass 
exceeding 3,5 tonnes but not exceeding 12 tonnes. 
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 Drowsiness and attention detection (M1, M2 M3 and N1, N2, N3); 
 Distraction and attention detection (M1, M2 M3 and N1, N2, N3); 
 Improved car and light van (M1 and N1) crashworthiness for pedestrians (head 
form to windscreen testing); 
 Vehicle front design improvements – direct vision (M3 and N3); 
 AEB for cars and light vans (M1 and N1); 
 Lane keeping assist (M1 and N1); 
 Event data recorders; 
 Alcohol interlocks; 
 UNECE regulation No 135 – pole side impact; and 
 UNECE regulation No 137 – front impact full overlap. 
14.2.15 Costs and benefits have been outlined and the Commission is currently carrying out an 
impact assessment.  Future amendments will be recommended to the European 
Parliament in early 2018.   
14.2.16 UK vehicle safety experts consulted as part of the review believe that progress in these 
areas represents the most important contribution to road safety in Britain that is available 
at the current time.  Furthermore, they believe that there is a particular need for further 
development of pedestrian protection features on vehicles. The current protocols both of 
Euro NCAP and of the Pedestrian Safety Regulation do not provide adequate protection 
of pedestrians whose heads strike the vehicle A pillar and/or windscreen140.  Further 
benefits provided for pedestrians might also benefit cyclists. Furthermore, they believe 
that the starting point for the mandating of intelligent speed adaptation is a voluntary 
overridable system.141 
14.2.17 One expert commented further that at this time EU legislative crash tests for vehicle 
occupants are only based on human tolerance thresholds of 50th percentile males., while 
The DfT reports that the UN ECE has recently agreed new requirements to address the 
ageing population, children and women. 
14.2.18 Technologies identified by TfL as having the greatest benefit to reducing casualties in 
London, based on trials and other information, were Intelligent Speed Assistance, 
Pedestrian Autonomous Emergency Braking, Pedestrian secondary safety features and 
Alcolocks. 141 
                                                          
Category N3: Vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of goods and having a maximum mass 
exceeding 12 tonnes. 
Category M1: Vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of passengers and comprising no more than 
eight seats in addition to the driver's seat. 
Category M2: Vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of passengers, comprising more than eight 
seats in addition to the driver's seat, and having a maximum mass not exceeding 5 tonnes. 
Category M3: Vehicles designed and constructed for the carriage of passengers, comprising more than eight 
seats in addition to the driver's seat, and having a maximum mass exceeding 5 tonnes. 
 
 
140 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Academic Institutions 
141 http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/Safer-Vehicles-2016-Summary-FINAL.pdf, accessed 
on 30.11.17. 
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14.2.19 The DfT has started to engage with the EU GEAR 2030 (High Level Group on the 
Competitiveness and Sustainable Growth of the Automotive Industry in the European 
Union).    
 
European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) 
14.2.20 Euro NCAP was set up in 1997 and has 12 board members comprising 8 government 
members and 4 representatives of consumer and motoring organisations.  Euro NCAP 
tests around 96% of all new sales in EU countries and has regularly produced roadmaps 
for its future activity, the latest being to 2025. 
14.2.21 Higher levels of safety performance than required by legislation are promoted by the Euro 
NCAP through vehicle safety information that is presented to consumers.  Euro NCAP star 
ratings are based on more demanding levels of performance in tests that underpin the 
legal requirements or performance requirements based on new tests that Euro NCAP 
partners have developed.  Safety ratings take account of crash protection, crash 
avoidance technologies and various new technologies.   
14.2.22 Research shows that a Euro NCAP 5* rated car has a 68% lower risk of fatal injury and a 
23% lower rate of serious injury than 2 star rated cars.142  Around 75% of these EU new 
vehicles are 5* rated.  Euro NCAP informed the review that 72% of new cars sold for the 
nine months to September 2017 in the UK are Euro NCAP 5* rated. 
14.2.23 Various vehicle safety experts saw Euro NCAP as the most significant influence on vehicle 
safety in Europe, but in a context which also involves a minimum level of regulation in 
areas where the car industry is less willing to act.  Euro NCAP results show signs of recent 
progress on pedestrian protection on new cars, but only as legislative deadlines have 
grown closer143.  
14.2.24 The DfT has been a Member of the Euro NCAP board since it was established but it does 
not engage regularly in the technical working groups nor has made a similar financial 
contribution to other governmental partners in recent years.  UK experts expressed 
concern about the lack of full UK and involvement and evidence provision.  While the 
Board comprises only governmental and non-industry members in the interests of 
preserving an impartial approach, it was noted that Euro NCAP’s testing programme is 
funded increasingly by industry’s desire to have their vehicles Euro NCAP rated. 
 
Public procurement and vehicle safety 
14.2.25 New procurement and fleet measures are also foreseen in the British Road Safety 
Statement.  The Government Buying Service is currently reviewing procurement policies 
and the DfT has included a new requirement for vehicle purchase to include a minimum 
mandatory Euro NCAP star rating and a minimum mandatory Euro NCAP pedestrian score 
at thresholds to be defined.  A consultation on the star rating to be specified is expected 
in Summer 2018.   The vehicle rental and leasing sector, vehicle safety experts and road 
safety organisations recommend that a Euro NCAP 5 star rating is specified in this policy 
                                                          
142 Kullgren A, Lie, A, Tingvall C (2010).  Comparison between Euro NCAP test results and real-world crash data, 
Traffic Injury prevention, 2-1- Dec 11(6): 587-93) 
143 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Advisory Groups, Associations 
and Charities; Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
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which would provide a significant reduction in fatal and crash injury risk amongst car 
occupants compared with lower star ratings. 
14.2.26 Road safety organisations, the vehicle and rental and leasing sector and vehicle safety 
researchers are keen to see Government leading by example on vehicle safety 
management by setting out procurement requirements which include 5* Euro NCAP 
ratings.  The rapid turnover of new vehicles into the used vehicle fleet to allow new safety 
technologies into the market assists road safety.   
14.2.27 Countries such as Sweden and cities such as London have used public procurement to 
fast-track proven and available safety technologies either in advance of legislative lead-
times or where legislative standardisation is not available.  Sweden targets an increase in 
the proportion of new passenger cars with the highest Euro NCAP score to be 80% by 
2020, noting that this contribution would represent the highest potential safety 
performance over and above any other indicator. Highways England plans to review and 
revise its hire car policy to ensure all hire vehicles meet a minimum 5* Euro NCAP rating 
as part of its new Health and Safety Strategy.  
14.2.28 One vehicle rental and leasing industry organisation has set its own target that by 2020, 
50% of all cars leased will be of Euro NCAP 5* standard. Around half of the fleet and road 
haulage organisations surveyed in this review require Euro NCAP 5* for all cars purchased 
or used by the company.  Additionally, most reported that their clients did not set specific 
safety requirements in procuring services.  The specification of Euro NCAP 5* was hardly 
evident amongst police forces and local authorities who took part in this review.    
14.2.29 Public procurement policies have also been used to promote the safety of heavy vehicles. 
In response to the relatively large numbers of cyclists killed in collision with heavy 
vehicles, predominantly construction related, TfL has introduced series of requirements 
for contractors. These include specific vehicle based measures, restrictions on use of the 
vehicles and a roll-down of requirements to sub-contractors.  
 
Financial incentives for safe vehicles 
14.2.30 A few contributors to the review would like to see the Treasury providing incentives to 
encourage attention to safety in vehicle purchasing.  While the big blue-chip companies 
are asking for Euro NCAP 5 *, incentives are needed for the rest of the market. 
 
Industry initiatives  
14.2.31 One example of industry initiative is provided by the motorcycle industry, which has been 
targeting the increased fitment of automatic headlights-on technology as well as anti-lock 
braking systems, which are now mandatory on all new motorcycles of 125cc and above.  
14.2.32 Another example is provided by the insurance sector, which offer an incentive based 
initiative targeting young drivers through in-vehicle monitoring.  This shows promise but 
requires transparent evaluation.  Further examples include a reduction in premiums for 
cars equipped with Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB). 
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Vehicle safety research and crash injury investigation  
14.2.33 The UK’s contribution to the evidence base for vehicle safety measures has been noted 
above.  Previous crashworthiness standards have been heavily influenced by UK 
contributions to research, both alone and in collaboration with other EU Member States. 
Since 2010, the available funds have been reduced and the DfT research budget for 
vehicle safety is now 50% of that available in 2007. This represents an important 
restriction on UK capacity to support independent research on the development of future 
vehicle safety measures and ensure they are effective under UK conditions. In contrast, 
the UK is heavily investing in industry-led research into connected and automated vehicles 
(CAV) with around £200 million committed to establish CAV test beds and support 
research and development activities.  
14.2.34 An exception is the continued DfT support to the Road Accident In-Depth Study (RAIDS), 
which gathers detailed and valuable information about the causes of serious and fatal 
collisions and the operation of vehicle safety systems. Nevertheless, as mentioned 
previously in Section 9.2, reduced funding has resulted in sample sizes that are too small 
to generate much useful information and these need to be increased144.  Significant 
shortfall was also reported in UK evaluation studies of recent technologies and there is 
generally no information available as to the impact on serious and fatal injuries. These are 
not well covered by conventional methods based on RAIDS or STATS19 since the relevant 
vehicles are rare within the vehicle fleet and safety equipment is frequently optional. New 
methods are required to provide the feedback that future policies will need.  
14.2.35 Several vehicle safety experts expressed the view that all road fatalities could be 
investigated by using ‘an independent eye’ on every police investigation which, together 
with coroners’ data, would yield much useful data.  The road collision investigation 
branch, the need for which has been promoted by the Transport Safety Commission and 
the subject of a recent DfT/PACTS workshop, was thought by several to be fine in 
principle. However, they noted that the previously mentioned route based on existing 
data and Safe System principles would generate a lot of useful information on the safety 
performance of vehicles as long as each report was analysed by independent experts145. 
14.2.36 The procurement of vehicle safety research is reported to have become a challenge since 
the introduction of the HE SPATS frameworks. The framework is structured around the 
greatest needs, which are predominantly for professional services related to highways 
construction and operation. Supply chains, led by large consultancies, have been 
established to provide all of the research and consultancy needs. These may be effective 
for the majority of research needs, however specialist groups with the skills for vehicle 
safety research and development perceive that they are not well recognised and often 
only able to make a marginal input to research programmes. Universities, in particular, 
are effectively excluded from leading these research programmes despite the available 
knowledge and skills base in specialist areas of vehicle safety. Finally, officials reported 
that considerable staff resources are needed to initiate any contract and up to six months 
may be needed for approval, even for urgent contracts146.  
 
                                                          
144 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Academic Institutions 
145 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Advisory Groups, Associations 
and Charities; and Academic Institutions 
146 See Appendix B, Research and Development: Central Government Departments/Agencies 
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Automation and vehicle safety 
14.2.37 The British Road Safety Statement identifies driverless cars as having a huge potential to 
improve road safety. The promotion of automated vehicles is a key component of the 
country’s Industrial Strategy and also future vehicle safety. Society of Automotive 
Engineers (SAE) Level 1 systems such as Advanced Emergency Braking or Electronic 
Stability Control are able to control the vehicle in a manner that humans are unable to 
and have been shown to produce substantial safety benefits and avoid crashes of all 
severities. However, there is no experience to date of SAE level 3 systems or above in 
open traffic.  
14.2.38 While the long-term anticipation of perfect vehicles in a perfect traffic environment offers 
the aspirational possibility of zero fatalities, experts consider that there are several 
considerable obstacles to be overcome:  
 
1. There are no existing regulatory vehicle safety standards that require a minimum 
level of performance of the automated systems, although one addressing 
automatic steering functions is under development.  Without these standards, the 
systems are effectively barred from the market and potential safety benefits will 
not be realised.  
 
2. There is a considerable concern that Level 3 systems may introduce new risks. 
These systems exhibit conditional autonomy and are autonomous in some 
situations, but human controlled in others. The transition between machine and 
human drivers requires the humans to be effectively monitoring the vehicle and 
driving situation and to be capable of taking control at short notice. This transfer of 
control does not occur with conventional vehicles and it introduces a new crash risk 
that is as yet unsolved. 
 
3. There will be a long transition phase as more increasingly autonomous vehicles are 
introduced to the vehicle fleet. For many years highly automated and unautomated 
vehicles will be running together. Without large scale trials of autonomous systems, 
it is not known how this will affect overall traffic risks, for example a system that 
limits speed to the speed limit may give benefits once a threshold penetration has 
been reached. On the other hand, pedestrians and other vulnerable road users may 
have expectations of vehicle functionality that are not there and may take new 
risks. 
 
4. The roadmap for automation may not be the same as one that applied the 
technologies for maximum road casualty reduction. For example, the recently 
revised European Road Transport Research Advisory Council (ERTRAC) roadmap 
highlights the future development of highway automation and parking support 
technologies.147 While these may be progressive steps towards high automation 
they are not the technologies that would be selected if the objective were to reduce 
fatal and seriously injured casualties. One factor is the high proportion of 
vulnerable road users who are killed, sometimes without involving a car.  The rental 
and insurance sectors would like to see the government setting out the transition 
process between the different levels of automation so that this can be better and 
more closely managed. A government White Paper could clearly set out the path.   
                                                          
147 http://www.ertrac.org/uploads/documentsearch/id48/ERTRAC_Automated_Driving_2017.pdf 
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5. Finally, humans are generally very good at driving despite risk-taking behaviours 
connected with youth, inexperience, speeding, alcohol and common error.  In the 
UK, there are typically 256 million kilometres driven on average for every road 
traffic fatality and 1 million kilometres for every injury crash involving the general 
driving population. This level of safety is well beyond that of current vehicle 
systems, yet it needs to be surpassed if autonomous systems are to reduce 
casualties to the very low levels the public expects. 
14.2.39 Given the constraints listed above, research experts are sceptical about the emphasis 
placed on the safety value of automation, as found in the British Road Safety Statement, 
at least within a 15-year timescale.  Those consulted as part of the review were concerned 
that this focus was misplaced and with a missing focus on death and serious injury 
prevention. Furthermore, there appears to be no plan or roadmap that would enable DfT 
to steer the development of autonomous systems towards those that could give the 
greatest casualty reduction, particularly in the absence of research funding to establish 
the evidence base.   
14.2.40 A clear finding from the review based on information received and views expressed in 
meetings with government officials and vehicle safety experts is that the current emphasis 
on creating a market for automated vehicles is unhelpfully dominating the policy and 
research agenda. It has diverted existing capacity for vehicle safety issues needed to 
address safety in the short to medium term. 
14.2.41 In March 2018, the government announced a review of driving laws in preparation for 
self-driving vehicles148. 
BREXIT and international trade deals 
14.2.42 There is concern amongst vehicle safety experts and road safety organisations consulted 
for this review about the arrangements post-BREXIT149.  The transition from a transparent, 
EU type approval scheme for vehicle safety to a global decision-making forum presented 
by UN ECE is seen by some as high risk.  In addition, the possibility of mutual recognition 
schemes for whole vehicle type approval in international trade deals is causing great 
concern.  Mutual recognition of whole vehicle type approval based on regulation 
standards with the United States, for example, would mean imports of vehicles without 
pedestrian protection and inferior front and side impact protection.   
  
                                                          
148 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-to-review-driving-laws-in-preparation-for-self-driving-
vehicles (accessed March 2018) 
149 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Business and Industry; and 
Academic Institutions 
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14.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
14.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for safe vehicles is provided in Table 18. 
Table 18. Strengths and weaknesses of Safe Vehicles 
Strengths 
 The UK has a made a strong contribution 
to international vehicle safety standards, 
Euro NCAP and the vehicle safety 
evidence-base. 
  The need for vehicle safety requirements 
in public procurement is adopted in 
national policy.  
 At city level, London leads in the inclusion 
of vehicle safety requirements in public 
procurement policies. 
 There is strong vehicle safety research 
capacity in Britain which needs to be 
maintained. 
 Insurance sector initiatives providing 
incentives via in-vehicle monitoring hold 
promise. 
Weaknesses 
 The current focus of international vehicle 
policy work emphasises market driven 
approaches and futurist intervention for 
connected and autonomous vehicles. 
 At policy level, vehicle safety measures are 
not prioritised for their casualty reduction 
value. 
 Targets for improved vehicle safety are not 
set, as in some other countries. 
 Creating a market for automated vehicles is 
unhelpfully dominating the policy and 
research agenda reducing the capacity for 
attention to be given to other key issues.  
 Once strong, UK-supported vehicle safety 
research and crash injury investigation is 
too limited. 
 National guidance is lacking on Safe 
Vehicles within a Safe System approach. 
 
14.4 Recommendations 
14.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention safe vehicles. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
14.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Promote vehicle safety technologies such as Intelligent Speed Adaptation, 
Autonomous Emergency Braking for Pedestrians and improvements in key crash 
tests for front, side and pedestrian protection, in regulation, consumer information 
and procurement policies. 
 Restore the previous priority given to vehicle safety policy and research in DfT 
vehicles activity and research procurement. 
 Embrace the opportunities presented by the current reviews of EU vehicle safety 
legislation to promote mandatory measures which save most lives and prevent 
serious injuries in road crashes. 
 Engage fully in Euro NCAP technical activities and provide equal financial resource 
to that provided by other governmental board partners. 
 Set and monitor national targets to improve vehicle safety quality to Euro NCAP 5* 
in the new car fleet.  
 In coordination with the Government Buying Service, announce measures to 
include Euro NCAP 5* rating (including 60% pass of pedestrian tests), motorcycle 
anti-lock braking systems, Intelligent Speed Assistance, Euro NCAP 5, pedestrian 
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advanced emergency braking systems and seat belt reminders in all seating 
positions in the public procurement of transport services across government.  
  Strengthen national policy leadership on the operational safety of commercial 
vehicles and review the safety of commercial vehicles operating standards. 
 Extend the RAIDS crash investigation programme so it is large enough to inform 
new policy and monitor new technologies in cars and review if further data 
requirements are needed in STATS 19. 
 Review research procurement procedures and protocols to ensure that urgent 
research needs can be addressed by the appropriate expertise. 
 Publish a road map for the safety management of increasing and mixed automation 
levels of connected and autonomous vehicles. 
 Allay wide concerns about the safety quality of vehicle type approval post BREXIT 
and in international trade deals. 
 
Local government 
14.4.3 Local authorities should: 
 Consider safe vehicle requirements such as Intelligent Speed Assistance, Euro NCAP 
5*, anti-lock braking in motorcycles, pedestrian automotive emergency braking 
systems and seat belt reminders in all seating positions in the public procurement 
of transport services.  
 
Professional sector and civil society 
14.4.4 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Advocate more action on demonstrably effective vehicle safety measures and 
closely monitor international developments. 
 
Business and industry 
14.4.5 Business and industry should: 
 Allow transparent evaluation of insurance sector in-vehicle initiatives to reduce 
young driver risk through telematic applications for wider roll-out, ongoing and as 
an extension to the Driver2020 research. 
 Advance national fitment beyond legislative lead times of promising vehicle safety 
technologies.  
Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention in products and services 
for safe vehicles. 
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15. SAFE ROAD USE 
15.1 Classification 
15.1.1 Safe Road Use concerns the standards and compliance regimes for the licensing and 
disqualification of driver and riders and the key safety rules, education and compliance 
regimes designed to prevent and mitigate fatal and serious injury risk. The aim is for road 
users to have the knowledge, capability, capacity and willingness to use roads and vehicles 
safely such that if crashes occur, they do not lead to death and serious injury.  
15.2 Main Findings 
 
Introduction 
15.2.1 In a Safe System approach there is particular emphasis on creating a self-explaining and 
forgiving road environment, which creates the conditions for safe use by all by better 
accommodating human error and taking account of human tolerance to injury. There is 
recognition that human error will not be eliminated through safe use behavioural 
measures alone. 
 
 
Human error in perspective 
 We can occasionally make mistakes that have serious consequences. Most driving decisions 
are correct but sometimes decisions can be wrong, involve a mistake, an error of judgement 
or a missed signal.        
 30% of serious road crashes are caused by deliberate offences and risk-taking behaviour. 
 The majority of serious road crashes result from simple errors of perception or judgement 
by otherwise compliant users. 
 
Andrew Morris, Professor of Human Factors, Loughborough University Design School, Safe System Principles, The Safe 
System Approach: Managing for Better Road Safety Results Short Course. 
 
15.2.2 At the same time, road users are expected to comply with road traffic law and regulations 
and share responsibility within Safe System, assisted by a national framework for 
standards of road use; education about key responsibilities, rights and rules for safe road 
use to improve knowledge and attitudes; and combined publicity and enforcement 
frameworks to assist compliance and improve safety behaviours. 
 
Road user standards 
15.2.3 The UK shares responsibility for driver licensing regimes with the European Union. 
Harmonised rules govern free movement and set broad conditions of entry (licensing) and 
exit (disqualification) of motorised vehicle use to driving allowing flexibility for national 
enhancements. 
15.2.4 The general view amongst the road safety community in Britain is that the national 
licensing and testing framework, led by the DfT and its agencies (the Driver and Vehicle 
Standards Agency and Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency) was in reasonable shape but 
could be improved. It was also observed that the UK’s approach to driving standards is 
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quite liberal and mindful of minimising burdens on road user mobility, employment 
opportunities and lack of public transport etc. However, several key issues and concerns 
have been highlighted in engagement with organisations and safety experts as part of this 
review, which continue to feature in national debate. These included the need for changes 
to motorcycle licensing and the introduction of graduated driver licensing (GDL)150. 
 
Young driver/rider standards 
15.2.5 Young adults, aged 16 (for riders and 17 for drivers) to 24 years bear the highest risk of 
fatal and serious injury, regardless of mode.  The greatest risk is identified as within the 
first two years of driving and riding and within this period the first six months to a year of 
driving is the period of highest risk.151  Some progress is reported. The Driver and Vehicle 
Standards Agency cited recent work by TRL which has shown that young driver crash rates 
in the first six months of driving fell amongst a cohort of drivers from 1 in 5 to 1 in 10.  
However, the researchers point out that the reason for the decreases might be related to 
improvements on vehicle safety or other factors and not necessarily to any improvement 
in the driving test. 152 
15.2.6 The following changes to the driving test took place on 4th December 2017: 
 
 the independent driving part will increase from 10 to 20 minutes; 
 most candidates will be asked to follow directions from a sat nav; 
 reversing manoeuvres will change; and 
 a vehicle safety question will have to be answered whilst driving. 
15.2.7 While thought of as useful changes, some experts and practitioners from local authorities 
doubted whether these could be justified on safety grounds without supporting evidence 
in terms of their potential for death and serious injury prevention153.  
15.2.8 In addition, learner drivers will be allowed to take motorway driving lessons with an 
approved driving instructor in a car with dual controls from 2018. 
15.2.9 As more than one professional consulted as part of the review observed, there has been 
a huge amount of focus on young driver and rider education and training with often very 
limited success. The Driver2020 research programme, which is generally considered 
useful by those professionals who commented upon it154, is currently evaluating a variety 
of voluntary behavioural change interventions which include: 
 
 Parental engagement in managing post‐test driving in specific risky situations; 
 Increasing the amount and breadth of pre‐test on‐road experience; 
 Utilising technology to manage driver behaviour post‐test; 
 Training hazard perception skills (post‐test); and 
                                                          
150 See Appendix B, Safe Road Use: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Advisory Groups, Associations 
and Charities; Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
151 Wells, P., Tong, S., Sexton, B., Grayson, G., Jones, E. (2008, May). Department for Transport, Road Safety 
Research Report No. 81. 
152 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/evaluation-of-the-impact-of-the-new-driving-test 
153 See Appendix B, Safe Road Use: Central Government Departments/Agencies; and Local Government 
154 See Appendix B, Safe Road Use: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Business and Industry; and 
Academic Institutions 
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 Educational intervention (the only one of these without any previous evidence 
base). 
15.2.10 At the same time, independent road safety experts and the insurance sector consulted as 
part of the review are largely agreed that the licensing framework itself provides the 
obvious means of better managing initial exposure to risk through graduated licensing 
schemes.  A research review by the country’s leading behavioural scientists concluded 
that while provision of pre-driver education and training is widespread, evidence of 
effectiveness is absent. Conversely, evidence of the effectiveness of Graduated Driver 
Licensing (GDL) from countries where it has been implemented is strong and 
consistent. 155  This system includes measures such as specific restrictions on night time 
driving, the carrying of passengers, and lower blood-alcohol limits for newly qualified 
drivers. This review recommended that a British licensing system be based on a full GDL 
system.  Practical problems such as the lack of alternative public transport in rural areas 
in overseas schemes are addressed by carefully prescribed exemptions in other 
jurisdictions implementing GDL. Northern Ireland have announced that they will shortly 
introduce a Graduated Driver Licensing scheme with specific provisions which, in 
representing typical conditions for the United Kingdom can serve as a highly useful pilot 
and deserving of fully evaluation. 
15.2.11 An urgent safety management issue raised by policymakers and practitioners, and the 
subject of recent government consultation, relates to the lack of restriction on provisional 
motorcycle licences as long as Compulsory Basic Training is repeated every two years.  
Historically, the duration of licences was restricted in the interest of managing exposure 
to risk, but 1980s legislation was changed in the 1990s. Provisional motorcycle licence 
holders (like provisional car licence holders) fall outside of the New Driver Act which 
provides that full licence holders (motorcycle or car) accruing 6 or more penalty points 
within 2 years of passing their test lose their licence.  Provisional licence holders still face 
the threat of prosecution but the automatic loss of licence does not apply until 12 points 
have accrued.    This also means that provisional motorcycle licence holders already at 
high risk due to youth, inexperience and use of high-risk vehicle will face a lower threat of 
licence loss than licensed users. 
  
Older drivers 
15.2.12 Older drivers have fewer casualties than many younger groups but have relatively high 
death rates per kilometre driven. Their fragility is an important factor. As people have 
healthier life styles and better medical treatment, they live longer and should be capable 
of driving safely for longer. The Road Safety Foundation has produced an evidence-based 
national strategy for older drivers with the aim of improving the framework, advice, self-
help and technology available to support the fast-growing number of older drivers leading 
longer and healthier lives.156  Many aspects of the strategy are covered in this review in 
terms of safe roads and roadsides, safe speeds and safe vehicles which better address 
common error and physical vulnerability.  In relation to driving standards, the review 
                                                          
155 Kinnear N, Lloyd L, Helman S, Husband P, Scoons J, Jones S, Stradling S., McKenna F, and Broughton J (2013).  
Novice drivers: evidence review and evaluation – pre‐driver education and training, graduated driver licensing, 
and the New Drivers Act. PPR673, TRL, Crowthorne. 
 
156 Road Safety Foundation (2012). Supporting Safe Driving Into Old Age - A National Older Driver Strategy, 
Basingstoke. 
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recommended that the automatic requirement for drivers to notify the DVLA at age 70 of 
any medical condition that may affect safe driving should be raised to 75. In addition, the 
DVLA should require evidence of an eyesight test at age 75. The DVLA, insurers and others 
should encourage vision checks every two years, particularly from age 60. 
 
HGV operator standards 
15.2.13 The DfT has responsibility for national policy on vehicle roadworthiness, operator 
licensing and procurement schemes. This includes enforcement functions policy, foreign 
vehicles, driver hours, loading and maintenance. The DVSA has responsibility for the 
operation, enforcement and monitoring of vehicle and operator licensing including driving 
tests, roadside checks of commercial drivers and their vehicles, enforcement of drivers’ 
hours regulations, and supporting the Traffic Commissioners to license and monitor 
freight vehicle operating companies.  Requirements can also be set out at lower levels of 
government for standards of operation within a jurisdiction. 
15.2.14 A variety of issues were raised during the review concerning operator licensing.  Some of 
those consulted pointed to issues concerning operators from overseas in terms of 
emissions, tachographs and driving times, road weights, vehicle integrity and the ability 
to impound vehicles. Others celebrated the lead from authorities such as TfL in 
introducing various safety schemes and requirements. Others pointed to concerns about 
a devolved policymaking approach in this area from central government on heavy goods 
vehicle safety leading to different sets of requirements across the country which are 
difficult for operators to manage and that there would be benefits from a uniform national 
approach. 
 
Community engagement on Safe System 
15.2.15 The Safe System approach is based on the notion that instead of bearing the ultimate 
responsibility for road safety hazards, road users have rights and should be able to 
participate in road traffic without risking death and serious injury.  Safe System also 
involves broad community engagement based on challenging public views about what are 
acceptable levels of safety.  Towards Zero is often a more accessible vision for community 
engagement than Safe System which, in view of the technical complexities, is more usually 
directed at road safety professional activity.  
 
 
Engaging the community in Victoria, Australia 
Community engagement has been carried out in Victoria, Australia in support of its Towards Zero 
strategy.  Phase 1 of the communication concept was centred on the theme that no one wants their 
family to become the victim of a road crash. This helped raise awareness of the fact that everyone 
who dies in a road crash is someone’s relative and that there is no person who will not be missed. 
The second phase focused on what a safe road system can look like and how it can protect people 
when mistakes occur.  See campaigns at: 
https://www.tac.vic.gov.au/road-safety/tac-campaigns/tac-latest-campaigns/towards-zero 
 
15.2.16 Towns and cities in the UK are starting to approach Safe System at professional level, but 
no example was evident of such explicit community engagement at national level on the 
Safe System goal towards zero deaths and serious injuries. 
 
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 138 /173  
 
Key safety behaviour rules and their compliance 
15.2.17 National and international organisations highlight (in published reports and via the 
consultation for this review) a number of key safety rules which are directly related to 
reducing the number and risk of death and serious injury.  These include rules on 
speeding, impairment by alcohol and drugs, as well as fatigue (for which there is no 
reliable safety performance indicator, and which is not discussed here but in the section 
on Safe Work Travel), seat belt and child restraint use, helmet use and the use of 
distracting devices such as in-car telephones while driving.157 158 
15.2.18 Current compliance levels indicate that road users need more assistance to comply with 
important rules. Key measures include in-vehicle devices (See Safe Vehicles for driver 
assistance technologies), safety engineering and speed management e.g. self-enforcing 
20 mph limits (See Safe Roads and Roadsides, Safe Speeds) and publicity and police 
enforcement.  Research indicates that levels and certainty of enforcement actions are 
more important than the severity of penalties.159 
15.2.19 While media campaigns can help gain public understanding and acceptance of 
engineering and enforcement measures, a recent review by one of the organisation 
contributing to the review notes that mass media campaign delivery alone shows little 
associated change in behaviour, and may even have a detrimental effect. On the other 
hand, a combination of publicity and high visibility enforcement that requires active 
coordination across sectors can have a very positive effect in preventing death and serious 
injury.   
15.2.20 In this review, just over half of road safety officers who responded to a survey report that 
publicity and enforcement is fully or mostly coordinated for excess alcohol, seat belt and 
child restraint use, in-car telephone use by drivers and fatigue management.  Just over a 
third reported that publicity and enforcement for such behaviours were partially 
coordinated. Road safety officers report that while the THINK! calendar is provided in 
advance, the lead time is often insufficient, with ministers only clearing messaging around 
two weeks before.  The view was also expressed that while the National Police Chiefs’ 
Council have a month by month calendar which they try and work with, there is generally 
little traction in terms of messaging and little opportunity for evaluation.   
15.2.21 At the same time, there is great concern amongst all parts of the road safety community 
about current levels of police enforcement which, alongside education, training and 
publicity effort has been severely reduced160.  As mentioned previously, the National 
Police Chiefs' Council reports that traffic officer numbers have reduced further by around 
36% from 5,500 to 3,500 since 2010.   
15.2.22 While speed enforcement has become mostly automated, other offences require a highly 
visible police presence to deter potential offending, which many professionals perceive 
                                                          
157 Peden M, Scurfield R, Sleet D, Mohan D, Hyder A, Jarawan E and Mathers C eds. (2004). World Report on  
    Road Traffic Injury Prevention, World Health Organization and World Bank, Geneva. 
158 OECD/ITF (2016). Zero Road deaths and serious injuries:Leading the paradigm shift to a Safe System,  
    Paris. 
159 Fosdick T, Campsall D, and Owen R, Road Safety Analysis Ltd (2016) UK Road Safety – Seizing the  
    Opportunities, Safer Road Users, PACTS, London. 
160 See Appendix B, Safe Road Use: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local Government; Advisory 
Groups, Associations and Charities; and Emergency Services 
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to be a thing of the past.  It is difficult to ascertain how far this is explained by budget cuts 
and how far by operational decisions for policing, but it is likely to be a combination of 
both.  Senior levels of the police service have expressed a strong desire for better focus 
on policing key road safety rules161. 
 
Speeding 
15.2.23 See Safe Speeds section. 
 
Impairment by alcohol, drugs and fatigue 
 
Drinking and driving 
15.2.24 Policymakers and practitioners in Britain have worked to achieve significant reductions in 
drinking and driving deaths over the last few decades, most notably following the 
introduction of the legal limit, improvements in enforcement tools and when publicity 
and enforcements have combined.  Achieving a perceived high risk of being caught is a 
major factor in preventing drink-driving. Fear of disqualification from driving is also 
identified by research as being an important deterrent. 162  No research data in recent 
years is available to indicate levels of drivers’ perception of the risk of detection.  
15.2.25 The DfT reports that there has been no significant change in the number of excess alcohol 
deaths since 2010 whilst the number of serious injuries involving a drink driver increased 
by 9% in 2015.  Excess alcohol deaths account for around 11% of all road deaths. 
15.2.26 General driving population: The current blood alcohol limit of 80mg of alcohol to 100ml 
of blood is out of alignment with good practice. The World Health Organisation cites that 
a limit of 50 mg/100mg is the highest that can be supported by the evidence base for the 
general driving population.163 The evidence case has been made often and by many 
organisations for lowering the blood alcohol limit from 80mg/100ml to 50mg/100ml and 
opinion surveys have been consistent in supporting a reduction.164   Response to the North 
Review indicated that a lowering of the limits is very widely and strongly supported by 
road safety professionals, accompanied by high visibility roadside policing, while opposed 
by the alcohol industry.165  A recent poll showed 77% of people favoured a 50mg/100ml 
limit. Lowering the limit in England and Wales to 50mg of alcohol per 100ml of blood could 
potentially avoid 25 deaths and 95 serious injury casualties each year.166 The stated 
government view is that enforcing the current law is a better strategy than reducing the 
blood alcohol limit, although it will wait to see the impact of the introduction of a lower 
limit of 50mg/100ml in Scotland.  
15.2.27 Young and novice drivers are at increased risk of having a road traffic crash when under 
the influence of alcohol compared to older and more experienced drivers. The World 
Health Organisation notes that the number of crashes involving young people can be 
                                                          
161 See Appendix B, Safe Road Use: Emergency Services 
162 Corbett, C. and Simon, F. 1992.  Unlawful driving behavior: A criminological perspective'.  Contractor Report 
301. Crowthorne: TRL. 
163 Peden M, Scurfield R, Sleet D, Mohan D, Hyder A, Jarawan E and Mathers C eds. (2004). World Report on 
Road Traffic Injury Prevention, World Health Organization and World Bank, Geneva. 
164 Tunbridge R, Harrison K (2017) Fifty years of the breathalyser-where now for drink driving? PACTS, London.  
165 North, Sir Peter (2010). Report of the Review of Drink and Drug Driving Law, DfT, London. 
166   Allsop R E (2015). Saving Lives by Lowering the Legal Drink-Drive Limit, University College London. 
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reduced by as much as 24% by laws that establish a lower blood alcohol concentration 
(20 mg/100ml) for young or novice drivers. Many jurisdictions have zero tolerance for 
young drivers.  
15.2.28 In December 2016 the THINK! campaign aimed to deter men aged 17 to 34 from ‘having 
a second drink’.  While this was a research-based strategy, it was widely criticised by 
safety professionals for undermining the traditional, simple “Don’t drink and drive” 
message and was seen as especially unhelpful by the authorities in Scotland where a lower 
limit applies.164 
15.2.29 The British Road Safety Statement makes no proposals on levels of drink‐drive 
enforcement.  Home Office Figures indicate that the number of breath tests undertaken 
by the police has declined substantially in recent years.  Around 600,000 breath tests are 
carried out each year by police forces in England and Wales. This increased to 815,000 in 
2009 but fell to 520,000 by 2015 – the lowest total in the past 15 years. In 2016, the 
number of drivers stopped by the police in the summer drink driving campaign more than 
halved compared with 2013.  The number of breath tests administered in Great Britain 
annually is far lower than in other European countries such as Sweden which conducts 
over three times as many tests for a population over five times smaller. France and Spain 
conduct eighteen and ten times as many breath tests respectively. 164 
15.2.30 Type approval for evidential roadside breath testing equipment to facilitate enforcement 
which was provided for by legislation in 2005 is long overdue and represents a major 
regulatory failure by the Home Office.  The National Police Chiefs’ Council would like to 
see mobile evidential breath testing instruments (MEBTI) available for the police in the 
UK. 
15.2.31 The role of alcohol interlocks is discussed in Safe Vehicles.  Alcohol interlocks require the 
driver to take a breath test before the vehicle will start and is used in rehabilitation 
programmes and increasingly overseas in public and commercial transport operations. 
 
Drugs and driving 
15.2.32 It is illegal to drive if impaired by drugs. New legislation on drugs and driving came into 
force in 2015 which makes it illegal to drive with a specified drug in the body above a 
specified limit, including legal and illegal drugs. The police can carry out a ‘field 
impairment assessment’ if they suspect drug use and can use a roadside drug kit to screen 
for cannabis and cocaine. The DfT has provided specific funding (£1,000,000) for drug 
drive enforcement by the police and plans to consult on a High-Risk Offenders scheme for 
drug-drivers. 
 
Fatigue management 
15.2.33 Drivers’ hours are covered by EU legislation. 
15.2.34 See Safe Work Travel. 
 
Seat belt and child restraint use 
15.2.35 According to the World Health Organisation, wearing a seat-belt can reduce fatalities 
among front-seat occupants by up to 50% and among rear-seat car occupants by up to 
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75%.  Car seat use reduces the risk of death for infants (aged <1 year) by 71%; and for 
toddlers (aged 1–4 years) by 54% in passenger vehicles.  Booster seat use reduces the risk 
of serious injury by 45% for children aged 4–8 years when compared with seat belt use 
alone.167 
15.2.36 The next seat belt survey is expected to be published in Summer 2018.  The last British 
seat belt use survey was carried out in 2014.168 Seat belt wearing rates were found to be 
lower for passengers than for drivers.  In England and Scotland, 97% of all front seat 
passengers and 91% of all rear seat passengers were observed using seat belts or child 
restraints compared with 98% for drivers.  On the face of it, these wearing levels for car 
occupants seem high, but there is scope to reach possible 99% levels, as indicated by 
international research.  Sweden, for example, with a 96% baseline in 2010 is targeting 
99% use by 2020 with a potential number of 40 lives saved representing around 18% of 
the total targeted fatality reduction.  Furthermore, crash injury research indicates that 
around 28% of fatally and seriously occupants do not wear seat belts at the time of the 
crash.169  The effective role played by in-vehicle seat belt reminders in increasing seat belt 
use in the front and rear is covered in the Safe Vehicles section. 
15.2.37 Data provided by the National Chief Police Chiefs Council indicates that the level of seat 
belt offences has reduced by 67% since 2010.  Such a large reduction is not consistent 
with seat belt use trends over this period (front seat use was 95% in 2009 increasing to 
97% in 2014 and rear seat use was 91% in 2014 compared with 89% in 2009) and reflects 
a substantial reduction in police enforcement activity.  
 
Helmet use 
15.2.38 The World Health Organisation states that the correct wearing of a quality-standard 
motorcycle helmet can reduce the risk of death by almost 40% and the risk of severe injury 
by over 70%.   Motorcycle helmet use surveys are no longer carried out periodically. Levels 
of motorcycle and moped helmet use are expected to be high, but this needs to be 
surveyed. The increasing availability of low speed two-wheeled motorised vehicles for use 
on the road as well as farm vehicles which can achieve higher speeds than previously merit 
new and possibly regulatory attention. The SHARP motorcycle helmet consumer 
information programme run by the DfT is identified as international good practice and 
deserves national promotion and encouragement in safe travel policies and mechanisms 
for incentives.  According to a recent, comprehensive meta-analysis of studies, helmets 
for cyclists can reduce serious and fatal head injury by around two thirds.  (65% reduction 
in in death and a 69% reduction on serious head injury.)170 Two out three permanent head 
                                                          
167  WHO (2016).  Discussion paper on global road safety performance indicators, (August 2016), Geneva  
168 Department for Transport (2014). Seatbelt and mobile phone use surveys: 2014, London. 
169 Frampton, R.J., Lenard, J. The Potential for Further Development of Passive Safety. Annals of Advances in 
Automotive Medicine. 2009 Oct; 53: 51 - 60. 
170 Olivier J and P Creighton, 2016: Bicycle helmets ad helmet use: a systematic review and metanalysis: In  
   International Journal of Epidemiology. 
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injuries could be avoided through their use.171  In an in-depth Swedish study, 71 %  did not 
use a helmet and of these 43 percent would have survived with it. 172 
15.2.39 While a sensitive issue amongst cyclists, concerned that having to wearing a helmet might 
discourage people from cycling, cycle helmet use is considered to be international good 
practice in implementing a Safe System approach in countries such as Sweden and the 
Australian States. High risks are associated with head injury, particularly to children and 
in some countries cycle helmet use is a mandatory requirement for use for children.  The 
DfT does not carry out national surveys of use. There is no national consumer information 
cycle helmet scheme. 
 
In-vehicle telephone use 
15.2.40 Use of a mobile phone while driving is estimated to present the risk of crash involvement 
which is four times higher than for a driver who is not using a phone. This risk appears to 
be similar for both hand-held and hands-free phones since cognitive distraction that is an 
issue and not only the physical distraction associated with holding the phone. Research 
indicates that text messaging appears to have an even more severe impact on driving 
behaviour and crash risk.  Studies show that in-car telephone conversations while driving 
can impair drivers more than listening to the radio or talking to passengers. Use of a 
mobile phone while driving is widespread amongst young novice drivers and adds to the 
problems experienced by this group who already have a higher crash risk.173   
15.2.41 The last compliance surveys were carried out in 2014 and the results of new surveys are 
expected to be published in summer 2018.  The proportion of car drivers observed using 
a hand-held mobile phone in England in 2014 (1.5%) was relatively unchanged from the 
1.4%observed in 2009, when the previous survey was carried out.  Against the background 
of diminished levels of traffic policing, concerns have been expressed about mobile phone 
enforcement which, unlike speed enforcement, needs to be undertaken by police officers 
on the road, rather than through automated means.   
15.3 Equestrian Rider Safety 
15.3.1 Concern was also expressed during the review about the need to improve the safety of 
horse riding. In 2016 STATS 19 data, 113 riders were reported to the police as injured on 
the road, 30 of them seriously. This is an increase of nearly 40% when compared with 
2015.  The majority of serious injuries are however, off road.  In November 2010 the 
British Horse Society (BHS) introduced a new website through which horse riders and 
carriage drivers could report incidents and accidents. Since this date 2,510 incidents 
involving horses on the road have been reported to the BHS through their incident 
reporting system. 222 horses died at the scene, or as a result of their injuries, and 38 riders 
have died. Lower speed limits and speeds on rural roads where horse riding is common as 
well as improved visibility is recommended by the British Horse Society. 
                                                          
171 Rizzi, M, Stigson H, Krafft M. 2013). Cyclist injuries leading to permanent medical impairment in Sweden  
    and the effect of bicycle helmets. Int. IRCOBI Conf. on the Biomechanics of Injury, 2013 Gothenburg,  
    Sweden. 
172 Kullgren, A., M. Rizzi, H. Stigson, A. Ydenius and J. Strandroth. 2017. The potential of vehicle and road  
    infrastructure interventions in fatal pedestrian and bicyclist accidents on Swedish rural roads –what can  
    in-depth studies tell us? 25th ESV Conference, 2017 Detroit. Paper number 17-0284 
173  DaCoTA (2012) Car telephone use while driving, Deliverable 4.8b of the EC FP7 project DaCoTA 
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15.4 Strengths and Weaknesses 
15.4.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for safe road use is provided in Table 19. 
Table 19. Strengths and weaknesses of Safe Road Use 
Strengths 
 Britain has a generally comprehensive 
framework for driver licensing and testing. 
 Britain has a long tradition in coordinated 
publicity and enforcement activity and 
local community engagement on road 
safety. 
 The non-governmental sector is active in 
promoting improvements in driver 
standards and police enforcement. 
 Safety partnerships at local level - which 
include coordinating publicity and 
enforcement activity - are well established, 
but not universal. 
 A large amount of research on Safe Road 
Use and young driver behaviour is carried 
out and there is good national capacity. 
 Some surveys on safe behaviours are 
carried out. 
 There is annual reporting of traffic 
offences. 
 Local authority work on safe road use is 
strongly supported by Road Safety GB. 
 Local authority guidance has been 
developed by the RAC Foundation.  
 The SHARP programme for consumer 
information on motorcycle helmets is 
available for wide use. 
  
 
 
Weaknesses 
 Driving licensing standards do not fully 
address the needs of high-risk young drivers 
and riders. 
 Important gaps in the driver licensing 
framework are evident which could be 
addressed by GDL.  
 A lack of national leadership on the operation 
of heavy goods vehicle safety requirements is 
evident. 
 Reduced levels of combined publicity and 
police enforcement are reported.  
 Education, publicity and traffic policing levels 
in police forces and local authorities have 
been severely reduced following national 
budget cuts and local decision-making (see 
also Funding & Resource Allocation Section 
7.2). 
 Policing of key road safety rules by non-
automated means is generally weak and is a 
key concern of the road safety community.  
 Safe System principles are not yet being 
generally adopted in local education, training 
and publicity work.  
 Safe System principles are not yet being 
generally adopted in the variety of traffic 
policing priorities applied in different forces. 
 Safe road use needs within a Safe System 
approach (in addition to that provided by 
other Safe System elements) through 
improved road user standards and assisting 
compliance with key road safety rules 
requires national guidance. 
 Surveys of safe behaviours are too limited. 
 Research-based findings are insufficiently 
well-heeded in national public and private 
sector policies on Safe road use. 
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15.5 Recommendations 
15.5.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention safe road use. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
15.5.2 The DfT should: 
 Review how safe road use can be supported within a Safe System approach (in 
addition to that provided by other Safe System elements) through improved road 
user standards and assisting compliance with key road safety rules. 
 Ensure that driver licensing standards better address the needs of high-risk young 
drivers and riders and older drivers by: 
 Monitoring graduated driver licensing developments in Northern Ireland to 
inform decision on implementing in Britain, together with review of the 
evidence around impact of non-licence based young driver interventions 
generated by the Driver2020 research and overseas research findings. 
 Revising provisions concerned with penalty points earned by offending 
learner motorcyclist licences as highlighted in the recent DfT consultation. 
 Reviewing age requirements for the renewal of driver licences and 
accompanying provisions as recommended by the Older Drivers Task Force.   
 Lower the blood alcohol limit to 50mg/100ml for the general driving population 
which could produce identified reductions of at least 120 deaths and serious 
injuries in alcohol-related road collisions, and in line with current public opinion 
survey evidence and internationally identified good practice.  
 Review the safety of commercial vehicle operating standards. 
 Carry out THINK! campaigns across a wide range of media, coordinated with police 
enforcement effort, to promote Towards Zero and secure better compliance with 
key road safety rules.  
 Commission research into public perception of the risk of being detected for key 
road safety offences, e.g. excess alcohol and speed. 
15.5.3 The Ministry of Justice should: 
 Review speed offence prosecution thresholds against international best practice. 
15.5.4 The Home Office should: 
 Support police enforcement of safety rules through finance and equipment, 
especially evidential roadside breath testing equipment, and national guidance. 
15.5.5 The police should: 
 Upgrade the priority given to high visibility enforcement in policing strategy and 
increase activity. 
 Ensure understanding of Safe System principles for Safe Road Use in determining 
priorities.  
 Review speed offence prosecution thresholds against international best practice.  
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15.5.6 Public Health England should: 
 Play a highly visible role in drawing community attention to the fatal and serious 
injury risks associated with different types of road use as part of its injury 
prevention policy. 
 Play a highly visible role in supporting evidence-based intervention for safe road 
use. 
 
Local government  
15.5.7 Local authorities should: 
 Devise community engagement strategies with the Safe System goal towards the 
ultimate prevention of deaths and serious injuries. 
 Ensure capacity and budget for the publicity work of road safety officers to ensure 
combined publicity and enforcement of key road safety rules.  
 Ensure an evidence-based approach to determining priorities for safe road use. 
 Adopt Safe System principles in local education, training and publicity work.  
 
Professional sector and civil society 
15.5.8 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Promote demonstrably effective intervention in advocacy to government and 
industry. 
 Assist in the development of guidance on Safe System approach. 
 
Business and industry 
15.5.9 Business and industry should: 
 Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention on safe road use in 
products and services. 
  
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 146 /173  
 
16. POST-CRASH CARE 
16.1 Classification 
16.1.1 Post-Crash Care concerns the rescue, treatment and rehabilitation of crash victims. The 
aim is for efficient emergency notification, fast transport of qualified medical personnel, 
correct diagnosis at the scene, stabilisation of the patient, prompt transport to point of 
treatment, quality emergency room and trauma care, and extensive rehabilitation 
services.  The aim is to reduce the severity if injury and its consequences should a crash 
injury occur.   
16.2 Main Findings 
 
Introduction 
16.2.1 Both at national and international levels, it is evident that despite its acknowledged 
importance, post-crash care has had the least attention as a specific intervention in road 
safety strategy.  However, a focus on the prevention of serious and fatal injury requires 
efforts to reduce the consequences of injury once it has occurred and post-crash care 
research indicates large scope for doing so.174 
16.2.2 The appropriate management of road casualties following a crash is a crucial determinant 
of the chance and quality of survival.  Research indicates that about 50% of deaths from 
road traffic collisions occur within minutes at the scene or in transit and before arrival at 
hospital. For those patients who are taken to hospital, some deaths occur within the first 
4 hours after the crash (15%) but the majority occur after 4 hours (35%).175  As the World 
Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention176 underlined, there is not so much a “golden 
hour” in which interventions have to take place as there is rather a chain of opportunities 
for intervening across a longer timescale. 
16.2.3 Effective post-crash care reduces the consequences of injury by efficient emergency 
notification, fast transport of qualified medical personnel, correct diagnosis at the scene, 
stabilization of the patient, prompt transport to point of treatment, quality emergency 
room and trauma care, and rehabilitation services.  The quicker a patient has access to 
the emergency medical system, the greater the chances of surviving and making a full 
recovery. Research indicates that reducing the time between road crash occurrence and 
the arrival of emergency medical services from 25 to 15 minutes could reduce deaths by 
one third.177 
16.2.4 Research has indicated that the prevention of trauma - unspecific, extensive, and life-
threatening injury - should be treated within ten minutes, and more extensive medical 
care should be provided within one hour, preferably at a specially equipped trauma 
                                                          
174https://ec.europa.eu/transport/road_safety/sites/roadsafety/files/ersosynthesis2016-summary-
postimpactcare5_en.pdf 
175  Buylaert W ed. (1999) Reducing injuries from post-impact care. ETSC, Brussels.  
176 Peden M, Scurfield R, Sleet D, Mohan D, Hyder A, Jarawan E and Mathers C eds. (2004). World Report on   
    Road Traffic Injury Prevention, World Health Organization and World Bank, Geneva. 
177  Sánchez-Mangas R, García-Ferrer A, De Juan A, Arroyo A M (2010). The probability of death in road  
     traffic accidents. How important is a quick medical response? Accident Analysis and Prevention 42(2010)  
     1048). 
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centre. 178 When not treated with timely and adequate response, trauma may lead to 
incapacitating injuries or death. Less serious injuries and injuries that lead to immediate 
death are to a lesser degree dependent on immediate treatment. 
16.2.5 There is general acknowledgement by policymakers and safety experts that more is 
needed in this area for road safety strategy in view of potential to reduce consequences 
of injuries and long-term rehabilitation costs179.    
16.2.6 One disappointing aspect of this review is the difficulties encountered with engaging with 
policymakers in Public Health England as well as National Health England.  No meetings 
were held with either organisation. 
 
Emergency medical response 
16.2.7 No national information is available to indicate the efficiency of emergency medical 
response to serious and fatal road collisions.   
16.2.8 The Department of Health (DoH) requires that the ambulance service reaches 75% of 
category A (life-threatening) calls within eight minutes. If onward transport is required a 
suitable vehicle should arrive on the scene within 19 minutes.180  Monitoring of response 
since May 2011 is presented in Figure 5 which indicates the increasing challenge to meet 
targets. 181  
                                                          
178 Champion, H. R. (2005). New tools to reduce deaths and disabilities by improving emergency care. DoT,     US  
Paper Number 05-0191. 
179 See Appendix B, Post-Crash Care: Central Government Departments/Agencies; Local Government; Advisory 
Groups; Associations and Charities; and Emergency Services 
180 Department of Health (2015) July 2015 Handbook to the NHS Constitution has Ambulance response time 
standards, p. 34 , www.gov.uk/government/publications/supplements-to-the-nhs-constitution-for-england. 
181 Department of Health (2017). Statistical Note: Sept 2017 Ambulance Quality Indicators (AQI). 
https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ambulance-quality-indicators/ambulance-quality-
indicators-data-2017-18/ accessed on 30.11.17.  
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Figure 5. Category A emergency response within eight minutes as a percentage of all calls resulting in an 
emergency response 
 
Source: NHS England, 2017  
16.2.9 NHS England reports that there has been a steady decline in the number of Category A 
calls attended within eight minutes over the past few years as shown in Figure 4.  In 
particular, there was a substantial decrease in performance from March 2014 to 
December 2014, although some of the change around this period was driven by London 
Ambulance Service (see the below chart 'How has the proportion of category A (red 1 and 
2) calls attended within 8 minutes varied by commissioning region?'). Subsequent to this, 
there was some improvement, but this number fell again from May 2015. The national 
target of reaching 75% of Category A calls within eight minutes has not been met for 32 
consecutive months.182 
16.2.10 NHS England has been working with the Association of Ambulance Chief Executives and 
the College of Paramedics to implement the recommendations of the Ambulance 
Response Programme by October 2017: 
 
 The ambulance service uses a variety of means of providing initial emergency 
medical response. This includes aggressive treatment at the roadside from specially 
trained paramedics and critical care paramedics; use of different responders, such 
as air ambulance and, more recently, specially trained trauma doctors who go to 
the scene of injury to stabilise patients ahead of them being transferred to specialist 
care providers.  
 Paramedics have only been recognised in the last 20 years and are specially trained 
and meet qualification standards.  They work independently and do not require a 
doctor’s approval before undertaking certain assessments. In urban areas, it was 
reported that the use of two-wheeled motor vehicles by paramedics can reduce 
journey time and improve response rates. 
 Air ambulances usually have a consultant level doctor, experienced in trauma care, 
and a specialist paramedic.  They have a faster response time and may be able to 
deliver more aggressive treatment which may increase survivability. 
                                                          
182 https://www.england.nhs.uk/statistics/statistical-work-areas/ambulance-quality-indicators/ accessed on 
30,11,17. 
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 First-aid training for the general driving population was noted as being an 
ineffective measure and is not recommended by the World Health Organisation as 
an effective intervention. 
 
First responder training  
16.2.11 Current good national practice is that police who attend collisions are all trained in first 
aid and police vehicles carry emergency equipment, e.g. defibrillators. 
16.2.12 Some rural ambulance services offer an advanced emergency care course to some 
operational staff in the fire service due to their own stretched resources, and in the 
knowledge that the fire service is often first to the scene of a road collision. Courses cover 
emergency care theory and practical sessions with training on how to recognise the 
fundamental mechanisms of crashes and what happens to the human body and the ability 
to identify advanced signs and symptoms, e.g. internal bleeding. Some fire crews are 
therefore now trained to carry spinal boards, neck collars, pelvic straps and defibrillators 
to aid immobilisation and emergency medical care183. 
16.2.13 Driving instruction bodies train their members, who are often on the roads all-day, every 
day, in first responder first-aid so they can offer roadside assistance for a variety of 
different circumstances.  
 
E-call  
16.2.14 A new in-vehicle development is eCall, which aims to alert and advance emergency 
medical systems support in the event of crash. The system provides an automated 
message to the emergency services following a road crash which includes the precise 
crash location of the vehicle.  As one road safety organisation highlighted, the potential 
of eCall to improve post-crash care is identified and deserved to be accelerated into the 
market.184185  The eCall system will be fitted to all new EU-registered cars from April 2018.  
There is concern by some that this system will divert emergency vehicles to sites where 
they are not needed or which do not need to be prioritised186.  
 
Trauma care 
16.2.15 Major trauma is the main cause of death for people under the age of 45 and is a major 
cause of debilitating long-term injuries.  Road traffic collisions are the second lead cause 
of major trauma (after falls) and twice as common in urban areas as in rural areas. 187 188 
  
                                                          
183 See Appendix B, Post-Crash Care: Emergency Services 
184 See Appendix B, Post-Crash Care: Business and Industry; and Academic Institutions 
185 http://www.roadsafetyobservatory.com/Evidence/Details/11498 
186 See Appendix B, Safe Vehicles: Emergency Services 
187 Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN), (2017) November 2017, BRAKE, London 
188 University Hospital Southampton, NHS Trust 
http://www.uhs.nhs.uk/OurServices/Emergencymedicine/Majortraumacentre/Majortraumacentre.aspx 
accessed on 30.11.17. 
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Major trauma care and road traffic injury  
 
A recent study shows that one in five (20%) patients admitted to trauma centres were involved in 
road crashes in 2016.  Last year, 11,486 road users – the equivalent of 31 a day – were admitted to 
trauma centres in England and Wales with life-threatening injuries. 
 
The regions with the highest proportion of road collision trauma patients were the Thames Valley 
(25%), North West London (23%), the West Midlands (23%), the East Midlands (22%) and East 
England (22%). 
Of the 75,820 road crash victims admitted to trauma centres during the last decade young people 
(aged 16-25 year) are the most affected age group, accounting for more than one in five (21%) road 
traffic trauma admissions, including the largest group of vehicle passenger (32%), motorcycle (27%) 
and driver (21%) admissions. In the past decade, 5,657 children (under the age of 16) were admitted 
to a trauma centre following a road crash, making up seven per cent of all admissions; almost a third 
(32%) of these were admitted with serious head injury. Children also comprise the biggest age group 
for pedestrian casualties, accounting for nearly one in six (17%) trauma admissions.  
 
According to the analysis, motorcyclists comprise the largest proportion of admissions (25%), 
followed by drivers (23%), pedestrians (21%), cyclists (16%) and vehicle passengers (12%). 
 
Due to the severity of many road traffic collisions, almost a quarter (24%) of trauma patients go 
straight to intensive care following a crash. In terms of road user type, almost a third (32%) of 
pedestrians, and almost a quarter (24%) of cyclists, suffer serious head injuries, while over a quarter 
(28%) of drivers suffer severe chest injuries. Almost two in five (39%) motorcyclists are admitted 
with serious injury to their arms or legs. Five per cent of all admissions in 2016 later died from the 
injuries sustained. 
 
Source: Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN), (2017) November 2017, BRAKE, London 
16.2.16 In 2010, the National Audit Office (NAO) issued a report which concluded that care for 
patients who have suffered major trauma, for example following a road accident or a fall, 
has not significantly improved in the last 20 years despite numerous reports identifying 
poor practice and services are not being delivered efficiently or effectively. 189 Survival 
rates vary significantly from hospital to hospital with a range from five unexpected 
survivors to eight unexpected deaths per 100 trauma patients reflecting the variable 
quality of care. The NAO estimated that 450 to 600 lives could be saved each year in 
England if major trauma care was managed more effectively. 
16.2.17 The current system of major regional trauma centres and trauma units in hospitals has 
developed within the last 10 years. This development was based on international 
research, originally from the US and then Germany, providing evidence that regional 
major trauma centres are more effective for life preservation than local hospital care, 
even if they are situated further away than local hospitals.  One study found that 
                                                          
189 National Audit Office (2010). Major trauma care in England. ISBN: 9780102963472 
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regionalisation of care to specialist trauma centres reduced mortality by 25% and length 
of stay by 4 days. 190 
16.2.18 Several contributors to this review noted that improvements in trauma care have made a 
real contribution to reducing deaths and that trauma care standards now compare 
favourably with international good practice. The introduction of regional major trauma 
centres is reported to have led to better recovery and outcome data than local hospitals.  
South Wales is the only region in England and Wales without a network191. 
16.2.19 The importance of the post-crash care strategy was underlined by the TARN organisation, 
below, as was the need to carry out further research to quantity the contribution which 
could be made to the prevention of death and disabling injury in road collisions. 
 
 
Role of Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN)  
 
The Trauma Audit & Research Network (TARN) is a collaboration of hospitals from all over England, 
Wales, Ireland and other parts of Europe which supports a group of staff on a non-profit making 
basis; based at the University of Manchester, Hope Hospital, Salford. The Trauma Network has been 
operating since 1989 and in 1997 became self-funding. The TARN database is the largest trauma 
database in Europe with more than 200,000 cases including over 22,000 paediatric patients and 
provides research-based recommendations which have led to major changes in trauma care. 
 
16.2.20 In order to improve understanding of post-crash care as a road safety strategy, two 
research needs are identified. These include 1) research on the contribution of post-crash 
care to reduce death and serious injury and 2) to ascertain the cost of long-term care of 
permanent impairment resulting from road traffic injury. 
16.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
16.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses of post-crash care is provided in Table 20. 
Table 20. Strengths and weaknesses of Post-Crash Care 
 
Strengths 
 Post-crash care is a proven means of 
reducing the consequences of injury.  
 Significant changes in major trauma centre 
organisation have taken place since 2010.   
 Emergency medical system response to 
major trauma is targeted and monitored. 
 
Weaknesses 
 Post-crash care is not embedded in road 
safety strategies. 
 The quantitative contribution of post-
crash care to preventing death and 
mitigating the consequences of serious 
road traffic injury in Britain is not 
researched.  
                                                          
190 MacKenzie E J, Rivara F P, Jurkovich G J, Avery B, Nathens M D, Frey K P, Brian L H, Egleston M P P, Salkever, 
D S, and Scharfstein D. (2006) A National Evaluation of the Effect of Trauma-Centre Care on Mortality. The 
New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 354:366-378, January 26th, 2006 
191 See Appendix B, Post-Crash Care: Local Government; Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; and 
Emergency Services 
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 Continuing improvement in standards of 
emergency medical care and training is 
reported. 
 First responder training is offered in 
several sectors. 
 Automatic emergency notification in the 
form of the eCall system will be fitted to 
new cars in 2018. 
 Emergency medical system response to 
major trauma is not meeting annual 
targets. 
 Ambulance resource is overstretched. 
 Hospital accident and emergency service 
are under pressure and provide 
inconsistent outcomes regionally. 
 
16.4 Recommendations 
16.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention post-crash care. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
16.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Include post-crash care in road safety strategy to improve survivability and reduce 
permanent impairment resulting from road collisions. 
 Review the potential and specific contribution of emergency medical system 
response, trauma care and long-term rehabilitation of crash victims to reduce 
death and disability.  
16.4.3 The Department of Health and National Health England should: 
 Engage fully in national and local efforts to prevent and reduce death and serious 
injury, which is a leading cause of death for school children and young adults. 
 Address regional variations in emergency medical response times. 
 Report on the effectiveness of major trauma care in preventing death and serious 
injury following road crashes. 
 Commission research on the cost of long-term care resulting from permanent 
impairment from road traffic injury. 
16.4.4 Public Health England should: 
 Recognise that road traffic injury is a major cause of premature death and 
disablement in their Strategic Plan and include road safety as an area for action. 
16.4.5 The Ambulance Service should: 
 Review policies for deployment to ensure that response time targets are met. 
 
Local government 
16.4.6 Local authorities should: 
 Actively include post-crash care as a key road safety strategy in a Safe System 
approach. 
 Work with the local health sector to identify local improvements in post-crash care. 
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Professional sector and civil society 
16.4.7 Professional sector and civil society should: 
 Actively include post-crash care as a key road safety strategy in a Safe System 
approach and work with lead agency to assemble, research relevant information to 
support it. 
 
Business and industry 
16.4.8 Business and industry should: 
 Actively include post-crash care as a key work-related road safety strategy in a Safe 
System approach and work with lead agency to assemble, research relevant 
information to support it. 
 Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention in products and services 
for post-crash care.  
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 154 /173  
 
17. SAFE AND HEALTHY MODES 
17.1 Classification 
17.1.1 Safe and Healthy Modes concerns the promotion of and access to safer modes as well as 
the road safety needs associated with increasing use of higher risk (due to users’ 
vulnerability), but otherwise healthy, road user modes such as walking and cycling.  
17.2 Main findings 
 
Encouraging choice of safe modes 
17.2.1 While different travel modes are promoted for different reasons, there is a substantial 
difference in levels of fatal crash injury risk between different modes of travel.    
17.2.2 Rail is the safest land travel mode, followed by bus and coach travel. While there were 
five passenger fatalities on railways192 in 2016, there have been no fatal train collisions or 
derailments in the UK since 2008. The fatality risks per billion passenger miles of travelling 
by car, although relatively low compared with more vulnerable modes, are 5 times higher 
than by bus travel.  At the other end of the injury risk spectrum, the fatality risks of 
travelling by motorcycle are 52 times higher than by car, 3.5 times higher than by bicycle 
and almost 3 times higher than by foot. 193   
17.2.3 If public transport is considered as part of a trip, then safe access to public transport by 
pedestrians is a key consideration, including issues of accessibility for older pedestrians 
and users with a disability.  Many road safety officers reported that the use of public 
transport was promoted to some degree within their local authority’s road safety policy.  
Just over one third of those who responded to a survey as part of this review reported 
that they specified safety requirements in the public procurement of public transport 
services, within their local authority194. 
17.2.4 The value of the use of protective equipment such as helmets, particularly for children, 
was noted in an earlier section (15.2).  While some activity is reported, cycle helmet use 
for children is not widely promoted at national level. 
 
Delivering safe active travel 
17.2.5 Consistent with the delivery of sustainable transport policies, and the promotion of 
healthy lifestyles and sustainable communities, there has been substantial new activity in 
recent years to promote active travel. This represents a significant political response to 
public demand for greater equity between motorised and non-motorised modes, in a 
short period of time, including mayoral support in London and elsewhere, the rollout of 
the Bikeablity programme, new funding, the development of a new national cycling and 
walking investment strategy and the recently established cycling safety review. 
                                                          
192 excluding light rail, tram and underground 
193 Department for Transport (2016) Reported road casualties in Great Britain 2016: Chart 2: Casualty and fatality 
rates per billion passenger miles by road user type: GB 2016 
194 See Appendix B, Safe and Healthy Modes: Local Government 
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17.2.6 Given the greater vulnerability of pedestrians and cyclists to the risk of death and serious 
injury, new attention to the planning and design of safe environments in line with Safe 
System principles is urgently needed, to avoid the adverse side effects of increases in 
walking and cycling on casualty risk. The long-term public health benefits of walking and 
cycling in terms of reducing obesity, a range of diseases where exercise has beneficial 
effects and reducing pollution are large.  However, there are dangers in downplaying   
actual risks in favour of focus on perceived risk of premature death and serious injury 
before these benefits can be realised. These aspects raise important ethical issues for 
policymakers and practitioners.  When wider issues of health and environment are 
considered the balance between motorised road transport (excluding motorcycling) and 
walking and cycling risk shifts if the road environment is planned with the safety of 
vulnerable modes as an objective. 
17.2.7 An international comparison published in 2016 indicates that UK safety record for 
pedestrians and cyclists does not compare well with the leading road safety performers.  
The UK had an average of 6.8 pedestrian deaths per million people in 2013, compared 
with 5.8 in Denmark, 5.1 in Sweden, 3.7 in Norway and 3.6 in the Netherlands. The UK’s 
higher pedestrian fatality rate is not explained by higher levels of walking in Britain.  The 
proportions of pedestrian deaths who are children and who are elderly are greater in the 
UK than on average across the EU. The UK has a substantially larger proportion of road 
deaths who are children than Sweden has. IN EU countries, only Poland and Slovakia have 
proportionally more elderly pedestrian deaths than the UK. Per unit distance travelled, 
pedal cyclists in Britain are at approximately twice the level of risk of being killed than is 
the case in the Netherlands and Denmark where cycling is far more common. Cycling 
levels in Sweden and Norway are far more similar to those in Britain, yet the cycling 
fatality rates in both these countries are again much lower than that in Britain.195196   
17.2.8 The risks of road death and serious injury to school age children as vulnerable road users 
far exceeds the level of harm from most other sources of danger in public focus.  
 
National cycling and walking investment strategy 
17.2.9 A new strategy was introduced in April 2017 setting out ambitious goals for increases in 
cycling and walking.197  Whilst there are specific, measurable targets set for increasing 
cycling and walking, and an unspecified goal for improving the safety of cyclists, there are 
no targets for increasing the safety of pedestrians198.  
 
 
Cycling and walking investment strategy ambition:197 
 
“Objectives to 2020 
We will:  
                                                          
195 Lawton B and Fordham C (2016).  Published Project Report PPR796 for PACTS: Understanding the Strengths 
and Weaknesses of Britain’s Road Safety Performance, Crowthorne, Berks. 
196 See also Appendix B, Safe and Healthy Modes: Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities; and Business 
and Industry 
197 Department for Transport (2017). Cycling and walking investment strategy. HMSO, London 
198 See Appendix B, Safe and Healthy Modes: Central Government Departments/Agencies 
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 Increase cycling activity, where cycling activity is measured as the estimated total number 
of cycle stages made. 
 Increase walking activity, where walking activity is measured as the total number of walking 
stages per person. 
 Reduce the rate of cyclists killed or seriously injured on England’s roads, measured as the 
number of fatalities and serious injuries per billion miles cycled. 
 Increase the percentage of children aged 5 to 10 that usually walk to school. 
 
Objectives and targets to 2025  
We aim to: 
 Double cycling, where cycling activity is measured as the estimated total number of cycle 
stages made each year, from 0.8 billion stages in 2013 to 1.6 billion stages in 2025, and will 
work towards developing the evidence base over the next year.  
 Increase walking activity, where walking activity is measured as the total number of walking 
stages per person per year, to 300 stages per person per year in 2025, and will work 
towards developing the evidence base over the next year. 
 Increase the percentage of children aged 5 to 10 that usually walk to school from 49% in 
2014 to 55% in 2025.” 
 
A new expert committee will be responsible for reporting to the Minister for Cycling and Walking 
on the ongoing delivery of the Investment Strategy and monitoring progress against the objectives 
in the first phase of the Strategy and beyond.  The Investment Strategy also set out funding 
mechanisms in support of implementation, although without new investment beyond previous 
announcements (See Section on Funding).  
 
17.2.10 While no mention is made of the Safe System approach in the DfT’s Cycling and Walking 
investment strategy, one of three objectives to 2040, Better Safety - A safe and reliable 
way to travel for short journeys, aspires to ensuring:   
 
 Streets where cyclists and walkers feel they belong, and are safe; 
 Better connected communities; 
 Safer traffic speeds, with lower speed limits where appropriate to the local area; 
and 
 Cycle training opportunities for all children. 
17.2.11 The Strategy also states that through their Local Plans and planning decisions, local 
planning authorities should ensure developments where practical:  
 
 Give priority to pedestrian and cycle movements, and have access to high quality 
public transport facilities; 
 Create safe and secure layouts which minimise conflicts between traffic and cyclists 
or pedestrians; and 
 Site key facilities such as primary schools and local shops within walking distance of 
most properties, particularly within large-scale developments. 
17.2.12 In September 2017, the DfT announced an urgent review into cycle safety, following a 
series of high profile incidents involving cyclists. The review will look at whether a new 
offence equivalent to causing death by careless or dangerous driving should be introduced 
for cyclists (informed by an independent legal expert’s report, which was subsequently 
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published in March 2018199), as well as wider issues of improvements for cycling road 
safety issues.  It will involve a range of road safety and cycling organisations, as well as the 
general public and will consider different ways in which safety can be further improved 
between cyclists, pedestrians and motorists.200 Responding to stakeholder 
recommendations that the review should be widened to consider pedestrian safety, in 
March 2018, the DfT published a Call for Evidence on Cycling and Walking Safety.  This 
supports the ambition in the Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy to make cycling and 
walking the natural choice for shorter journeys, or as part of a longer journey.201  This 
document highlights that the DfT will be considering infrastructure and traffic signs, the 
laws and rules of the road, training, educating road users, vehicles and equipment and as 
well as attitudes and public perceptions in the work to identify ways to improve cyclist 
and pedestrian safety. 
17.2.13 Local road safety professionals and safety research experts noted that the large 
investments in cycling infrastructure being implemented in towns and cities are highly 
useful as is the integration of cycling safety into public health202.   However, they point to 
the existence of gaps between sustainable travel and casualty reduction in terms of 
national ambition and implementation.  Furthermore, while pedestrians are at greater 
risk of death and serious injury than cyclists, walking is currently seen as the ‘poor cousin’ 
in policy announcements.  At the same time, many road safety managers reported that 
an active travel policy to encourage walking and cycling had been established or they were 
in the process of doing so.  It was also reported that new measures were being introduced 
simultaneously to address the safety of walking and cycling.  
17.2.14 Cycling organisations and safety experts who contributed to the review pointed to the 
need for review of design standards for cycling, noting that existing guidance on separated 
facilities was over ten years old.  There is wide support for lower speed limits and 
improved compliance in urban areas used by cyclists and pedestrians. However, several 
authorities are working to a policy of continuing to implement lower speed limits using 
traffic calming measures, such as chicanes and road humps.  Many professionals are 
awaiting the results of DfT’s research on the use of 20mph limits without self-enforcing 
provisions.   Another risk for cyclists and pedestrians, evident in police data, is the high 
non-compliance of motor vehicle drivers with 30mph speed limits in urban areas with 54% 
of car drivers, 52% of light van drivers and 44% of heavy good vehicle rivers exceeding the 
limit203. 
17.2.15 Vehicle safety experts point to the value of the autonomous emergency braking directed 
at improving the safety of pedestrians and to voluntary overridable intelligent speed 
assistance (ISA) in improving pedestrian and cycling safety. See Safe Vehicles section.  In 
London, a focus on vehicle aspects of HGV and bus safety derives from HGV involvement 
                                                          
199 Cycle Safety Review – Independent Legal Report. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cycle-
safety-review 
200 Department for Transport and Jesse Norman, Press Notice, 21st September 2017. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-launches-urgent-review-into-cycle-safety 
201 Call for Evidence Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy: Safety Review 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/686419/cwis-safety-review-call-for-
evidence.pdf 
202 See Appendix B, Safe and Healthy Modes: Local Government; Advisory Groups; Associations and Charities; 
Business and Industry 
203 Data provided by National Police Chiefs’ Council 
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in 25% of pedestrian fatalities and 38% of cyclist fatalities, despite contributing only 4% 
of the miles driven in London. Buses are four times more likely to be involved in a fatal or 
serious collision with a pedestrian than would be expected for their share of traffic.204 
17.2.16 London requires ISA to be fitted to all public transport buses and requires key safety 
requirements in allowing access of heavy goods vehicles.  
17.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
17.3.1 A summary of the strengths and weakness for safe and healthy modes is provided in Table 
21. 
Table 21. Strengths and weaknesses of Safe and Healthy Modes 
Strengths 
 A national cycling and walking investment 
strategy has been produced.  
 New national policy on cycling and walking 
safety is being developed and coordinated 
with Ministerial leadership (in September 
2017 the Minister announced a review into 
cycle safety). 
 Local plans for walking and cycling are 
being encouraged and promoted. 
 Ring-fenced investment in cycling including 
the provision of facilities has been made in 
recent years.  
 London and other cities are targeting 
improvements in the safety of cycling and 
walking. 
 London’s street matrix model noted in 
Section 12.2 provides a useful framework 
for integrating the safety needs of 
pedestrians and cyclists. 
 Research is being carried out on 20mph 
limits. 
 
Weaknesses 
 Britain’s safety record for pedestrians and 
cyclists does not compare well to the leading 
road safety performers internationally. 
 While specific quantitative targets have been 
set to increase walking and cycling, they have 
not been set for reducing the numbers of 
deaths and serious injuries for pedestrians 
and cyclists. 
 While a quantitative objective has been set to 
reduce the rate of death and serious injury 
for cyclists, the level of ambition is not 
specified and there is no similar provision for 
pedestrians. 
 The risks of road death and serious injury to 
school age children far exceeds the level of 
harm from most other sources of danger in 
public focus.  
 Compliance with urban speed limits is poor. 
 Urban design standards require updating. 
 Cycle helmet use for children is not widely 
promoted at national level. 
 Government general advice to remove road 
humps as an anti-pollution measure is 
unhelpful. (See Safe Speeds Section 13.2.4). 
                                                          
204 Matson L (2016). London’s road safety priorities – the role of safer vehicles. Presentation to PACTS Safer 
Vehicles Conference http://www.pacts.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/PACTS-Conference-Lilli-Matson-
June-2016-FINALv1.pm accessed on 30.11.17. 
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17.4 Recommendations 
17.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention safe and healthy 
modes. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
17.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Encourage modal shift in support of environmental, safety and health objectives by 
promoting the use of the safest modes, e.g. rail, bus and coach travel and the 
healthiest modes of walking and cycling. 
 Support walking and cycling with safety improvements to address risks of serious 
and fatal injury risks associated with cycling and walking which are lower than for 
motorcycling but appreciably higher than those travelling by car or public transport.  
 Ensure scope of the current cycle safety strategy review to includes all Safe System 
intervention strategies. 
 Substantially upgrade the priority given to the safety of pedestrians which 
compares poorly internationally. 
 Establish measurable safety performance indicators which relate to the prevention 
of death and serious injury to pedestrians and cyclists. 
 Carry out a national review of urban design standards with pedestrian and cyclists 
in mind and align with Safe System principles. 
 Support demonstration projects applying innovative Safe System treatments. 
 Consider extending the Safety Helmet Assessment and Rating Programme (SHARP) 
scheme to include bicycle helmets. 
 
Local government  
 
17.4.3 Local authorities should: 
 Review the urban street classification and align with Safe System principles. 
 Ensure that there is safe access to public transport taking into account the needs of 
elderly and disabled people. 
 Improve compliance with urban speed limits, which is poor (see recommendations 
under safe speeds). 
 Ensure capacity for effective community pedestrian safety initiatives. 
 
Professional sector and civil society 
17.4.4 The professional sector and civil society should: 
 Provide guidance on speed hump design for local authorities. 
 
Business and industry 
17.4.5 Business and industry should: 
 Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention in products and services 
for Safe and Healthy Modes. 
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18. SAFE WORK TRAVEL 
18.1 Classification 
18.1.1 Safe Work Travel concerns planned, systematic safety management of activity at the site 
of work, for work journeys on the road, and for commuter journeys to and from work, to 
reduce the risk of death and serious injury in road collisions. This involves publicly or 
privately owned or leased motor vehicles as well as travel by bicycle or on foot. About 
30% of deaths and serious injuries occur in the course of work, not including travel to and 
from work. 
18.2 Main Findings 
 
Introduction 
18.2.1 Road deaths at work, according to the national definition205, are the leading cause of all 
deaths in the workplace, contributing at least 30% and 22% of serious injuries.206  The size 
of the problem is under-estimated due to uncertainty as to the accuracy of journey 
purpose data in the national road crash injury data system, the lack of any requirement 
for employers to record work-related road traffic injury in the national occupational 
health and safety database, and lack of monitoring and evaluation of work-related road 
safety intervention at company and national levels.  There are indications that other road 
users are nearly five times more likely to be killed than the driver.   Work-related driving 
represents at least twice the injury burden of general work-related activity.207  
18.2.2 However, as reported for many countries active in road safety, organisational 
management to improve road safety is less than evident in the mainstream of current 
occupational health and safety programmes in Britain. 208  The scope for achieving better 
results through a better focus on results and improved safety quality of activity is large.  
Work-related road safety is identified as an area deserving increased national focus by 
central and local government, national experts, road safety organisations and by the 
business sector.    
                                                          
205  According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 2014) the management of occupational road risk applies 
to ’any employer with employees who drive, or ride a motorcycle or bicycle at work, as well as self-employed 
people. It also applies to those using their own vehicle for a work-related journey.’  The scope used in 
international standards works also includes commuting to and from work. 
206 Helman S, Christie N, Ward H, Grayson G, Delmonte E and R Hutchins (2014), Strategic review of the 
management of occupational road risk, Prepared for RoSPA, Birmingham.  
207  Christie N, Ward H and S Helman (2017.)  The changing nature of driving for work and questions for safety 
policy and practice. A paper for PACTS and the Transport Safety Commission’s Work-related Road Safety 
Forum, May 2017. 
208  International Standards Organisation (2016) Small M and J Breen. Start-up Guide to ISO 39001: Road Traffic 
Safety Management Systems, ISO, Geneva. 
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Current activities by organisations 
18.2.3 While of variable quality 209, a large amount of work-related road safety activity is carried 
out by a wide variety of organisations.   
18.2.4 The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents has had long-term involvement in 
creating awareness about what employers can do through and establishing networking 
such as the Occupational Road Safety Alliance.   
18.2.5 Driving for Better Business campaigns to raise awareness of the importance of work-
related road safety in the business community and public sector by using advocates drawn 
from these communities to promote the business benefits of managing it effectively.  The 
Transport Safety Commission has established a work-related Road Safety Forum 
comprising the DfT, HSE and a range of organisations and experts concerned with work-
related road safety with the aim of brining key partners together, achieving better 
understanding of the problem and identifying useful next steps. 
18.2.6 BSI has engaged very actively in the international development of BS: ISO 39001 (2012) 
which set out a new Road Traffic Safety Management System standard with requirements 
and guidance for use. The standard “provides a tool to help organisations reduce, and 
ultimately eliminate, the incidence and risk of death and serious injury related to road 
traffic crashes”. 
18.2.7 The ISO standard aligns with international good practice on road safety management 
systems and is based on the Safe System approach, including the requirement that top 
management adopts the long-term Safe System goal. It encourages the setting of road 
safety performance framework.  A Start Up guide has been prepared to help organisations 
adopt the standard into ‘family’ of management system standards.210  Japan is the global 
leader in the number of organisations certified to ISO 39001 currently totalling 162.  
Strong promotion of this standard by BSI, government and the non-governmental sector 
is not evident yet in the United Kingdom with under 10 companies currently certified.   
18.2.8 A range of activities have been recommended, and meetings hosted by advisory groups 
have brought together key actors to explore how a more effective response to work 
related road death and serious injury can be delivered. 
18.2.9 TfL has also set out requirements as well as encouraged vehicle safety-related 
improvements by operators of freight transport who want access to London’s roads.  The 
voluntary Fleet Operator Recognition Scheme (FORS) has been used in the haulage 
industry since 2011 to promote safety, efficiency and environmental best practice, 
awarding companies Bronze, Silver or Gold accreditations depending on the standard 
achieved.  TfL is also working closely with the motorcycle delivery and courier industry to 
explore the expansion of the existing scheme to include those companies which use 
motorcycles in London.  This is largely focused on providing training intervention in the 
                                                          
209  Christie N, Ward H and S Helman (2017.)  The changing nature of driving for work and questions for safety 
policy and practice. A paper for PACTS and the Transport Safety Commission’s Work-related Road Safety 
Forum, May 2017 
210 International Standards Organisation (2017). Start Up Guide to ISO 39001, Geneva.  
   
 
 
   
Road Safety Management Capacity Review 105990/12  
Final Report 17/05/2018 Page 162 /173  
 
current scope, but has the potential to encourage demonstrably effective measures such 
as the fitment of anti-lock braking systems for two-wheeled motor vehicles.  
18.2.10 Highways England has a Health and Safety Plan211, but it has not adopted BS ISO 39001 
which it sees as too onerous. Its aim for the future is “no one should be harmed when 
travelling or working on the Strategic Road Network”.  The target for the Traffic Officer 
Service accident frequency rate is for a reduction of 52% by 2018 and a further 16% by 
2020 based on 2014/15.  Highways England is engaged with the Driving for Better Business 
Programme Campaign. However, there is some concern as to whether Highways England 
is taking into account Safe System principles when trialling increases in the speed limit 
from 50mph to 60mph at various sections of motorways. The aim is to see if the speed 
limit can be increased in roadworks without putting people at risk.  A Safe System 
approach would require assessing the protective qualities of the road and roadside before 
setting or changing a speed limit. 
18.2.11 Local authorities are also engaging actively in work-related road safety though several 
road safety managers who contributed to the review reported that this work has been 
hampered by the loss of the Road Safety Grant.  About half of local authorities 
contributing to the review have adopted Safe Travel policies, but these are still rare at 
public sector level in central government. 
 
Research review: current activity 
18.2.12 Recent research reflects on the safety quality of current approaches and delivery and 
make a series of recommendations. 212  Apart from a lack of adequate reporting of work-
related road injuries and a detailed understanding of the risks involved, researchers 
conclude that there is a weak regulatory framework around work related driving. For 
example, there is no investigator for work-related road collisions nor requirement to 
report within an occupational health and safety framework. In some cases (for example 
van drivers not requiring an operator licence), there is no need to demonstrate 
competence. While corporate manslaughter legislation is in place, it is barely used for 
cases involving work-related road collisions and injuries.  Few interventions are evaluated. 
The research review concludes that there is the need for: 
 
 More leadership and follow through on work-related road safety on the part of the 
HSE and the DfT and the top management of organisations;   
 A better national regulatory framework to address safety elements of current work 
practices;   
 HSE to require new reporting requirements to RIDDOR 213 when someone has been 
injured on the roads whilst using the road for work or when someone driving or 
riding for work injures a member of the public;  
 Checks on data quality in STATS19;  
 Better understanding of the risks involved through more research;  
 Promotion of known risks;  
 Evaluation of work-related road safety intervention; and 
                                                          
211https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/624552/Health_and_Safet
y_five_year_plan_May_17.pdf accessed on 30.11.17 
212 Christie N, Ward H and Helman S (2017.)  The changing nature of driving for work and questions for safety 
policy and practice. A paper for PACTS and the Transport Safety Commission’s Work-related Road Safety 
Forum, May 2017. 
213  RIDDOR (Reportable Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations) database.  
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 Adoption of BSI ISO 39001 standard for organisations on road traffic safety 
management systems. 207 
 
National policy 
18.2.13 The national policy framework for work-related road safety is led by the DfT in 
cooperation with the HSE.  Additional, specific legislation to the wide range of road traffic 
regulation includes the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, in 
which senior management can be prosecuted for any gross negligence towards the safety 
of its employees.  The EU Directive 89/391/EEC also sets out employers' duty of care. 
18.2.14 At the end of 2015, with the aim of encouraging better occupational road safety, fleet 
management and procurement was set out as an objective in the British Road Safety 
Statement.  The DfT will evaluate existing safer driving for work schemes to understand 
what works, specifically looking at the role of:  
 
 Telematics products; 
 Company reporting on collision rates; 
 Effective employee intoxication policies; 
 Procurement of safer vehicles; 
 Good practice relating to vehicle design and driver training; and 
 Driving techniques and behaviours which are not only safer but also more fuel 
efficient. 
18.2.15 One key action for introduction in the short term is identified in the Statement. The DfT 
notes that procuring vehicles with modern safety features not only benefits the safety of 
the people who drive them for work. It also accelerates the rate at which these safer 
vehicles enter the second-hand car market.  Actions for the short term involve increasing 
consumer awareness of the Euro NCAP star rating system for vehicle safety and exploring 
additional options for incentivising the consumer uptake of safer vehicles.  In addition, 
the aim is to improve the safety of the national vehicle fleet, including by updating the 
Government Buying Standards which is seen by vehicle safety experts and the leasing 
sector as being particularly useful.  The DfT has identified the vehicle leasing sector as a 
key collaborator ‘as it accounts for one tenth of cars and up to one quarter of Heavy Goods 
Vehicles (HGVs) on our roads’.  A representative of the sector believes that the current 
biggest opportunity (being missed) is safety management of the government’s grey fleet. 
18.3 Strengths and Weaknesses 
18.3.1 A summary of strengths and weaknesses for safe work travel is provided in Table 22. 
Table 22. Strengths and weaknesses of Safe Work Travel 
Strengths 
 New national policy for work-related 
road safety is foreseen in the British 
Road Safety Statement. 
 Highways England has a Health and 
Safety Plan. 
 Transport for London is actively 
encouraging safe work travel. 
Weaknesses 
 While the lead cause of death at work, work-
related road safety has not been a priority in 
occupational health and safety policy and 
management in Britain. 
 National and local governmental leadership 
and agency coordination has been missing. 
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 The UK has been actively involved in 
developing a recent ISO standard on 
road traffic safety management systems 
for organisations.  
 A Work-Related Road Safety Forum has 
been set up by the Transport Safety 
Commission. 
 Some but not all local authorities have 
adopted safe travel policies. 
 Business sector networks exist to 
increase awareness of the importance of 
work-related road safety. 
 
 Much activity lacks an evidence base. 
 Lack of activity to ensure drivers and riders 
are aware of risks. 
 Data reporting mechanisms are insufficient, 
as is available, national research on work -
related road safety. 
 BSI: ISO 39001 is not widely promoted, nor is 
much in use by organisations in Britain.  
18.4 Recommendations 
18.4.1 This section provides the key recommendations for the intervention safe work travel. 
 
Central government and its agencies 
18.4.2 The DfT should: 
 Work with the HSE to provide governmental leadership and better coordination 
with the national road safety strategy for effective work-related road safety activity 
in Britain. 
 Conduct a research programme to extend the evidence base for effective national 
work-related road safety. 
 Review the reporting of ‘journey purpose’ in STATS19 data in the STATS19 review 
(see also Monitoring and Evaluation Section 9.2.4). 
 Encourage the adoption of BSI: ISO 39001 Road Traffic Safety Management System 
Standard through public procurement policies and other incentives, following a 
review of how greater take up can be encouraged. 
 Support local authority work-related road safety activity.  
 Establish a Safe Travel Policy for government services taking Safe System principles 
into account. 
18.4.3 The Health and Safety Executive should:  
 Upgrade priority given to work-related road safety which is the leading cause of 
death at work and ensure that it is in the mainstream of occupational health and 
safety policy. 
 Require reporting of work-related road collisions to RIDDOR when someone has 
been injured on the roads whilst using the road for work, or when someone driving 
or riding for work injures a member of the public (see also monitoring and 
evaluation).  
 Carry out an awareness-raising programme amongst occupational drivers and 
riders to highlight the risk of death and serious injury to other road users. 
 Address the work-related road safety needs posed by the so-called ‘gig’ economy.   
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Local government 
18.4.4 Local authorities should: 
 Engage with local employers on work-related road safety. 
 Encourage the adoption of BSI: ISO 39001 Road Traffic Safety Management System 
Standards through public procurement policies and other incentives. 
 Establish a Safe Travel Policy for local government services taking Safe System 
principles into account. 
 
Professional sector and civil society 
18.4.5 The professional sector and civil society should: 
 Promote BSI: ISO 39001 for take up by organisations. 
 Contribute to the developing evidence base for work-related road safety. 
 
Business and industry 
18.4.6 Business and industry should: 
 Promote BSI: ISO 39001 to employers. 
 Create a road safety management system for the organisation. 
 Promote better recording of employee injury in work related driving. 
 Ensure that intervention is monitored for effectiveness. 
 Adopt BSI: ISO 39001 in their organisations in line with international good practice. 
 Promote and provide demonstrably effective intervention in products and services 
for Safe and Work Travel. 
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SECTION 4: RESULTS 
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19. RESULTS 
19.1 Classification  
19.1.1 The final element of the road safety management system concerns the specification of 
the desired results and their expression as targets in terms of final outcomes, 
intermediate outcomes, and outputs.214   
19.1.2 Targets define the desired safety performance endorsed by governments at all levels, 
stakeholders and the community. The level of safety is ultimately determined by the 
quality of the delivered interventions, which in turn are determined by the quality of the 
country’s institutional management functions. Good practice countries set quantitative 
outcome and intermediate outcome targets to achieve their desired results focus. They 
can also set related quantitative output targets in line with the targeted outcomes.”  215  
19.1.3 In the absence of national road safety targets, a summary of current road safety outcomes 
for final outcomes, intermediate outcomes and institutional outputs are presented in 
tables in the next section.  Detailed information is available in Road Casualties Great 
Britain 2017 and other governmental statistical reports. 
 
Final outcomes 
19.1.4 Final outcomes represent the social cost and value of prevention, fatalities and serious 
injuries in road crashes presented in numbers and also in terms of rates per inhabitants, 
vehicle and volume of travel.  Final outcomes in a Safe System approach are expressed as 
the long-term Safe System goal for the future safety of the road traffic system to eliminate 
death and serious injury supported by interim quantitative targets to reduce the numbers 
of deaths and serious injuries 
 
Intermediate outcomes 
19.1.5 Intermediate outcomes are linked to improvements in final outcomes and provide a closer 
means of assessing the underlying level of safety, rather than relying on relatively rare 
instances of crashes or injuries. Typical intermediate outcomes or safety performance 
indicators include average vehicle speeds, levels of excess speed, the proportion of excess 
alcohol in fatal and serious injury crashes, seat belt wearing rates, helmet-wearing rates, 
the safety rating of the road network, the safety rating of the vehicle fleet and emergency 
medical response.   
 
Institutional outputs 
19.1.6 Outputs represent physical deliverables that seek improvements in intermediate and final 
outcomes which can also be measured, targeted and monitored. Typical measures include 
kilometres or miles of engineering safety improvements, the number of police 
                                                          
214 Bliss T (2004). Implementing the Recommendations of the World Report on Road Traffic Injury Prevention, 
Transport Note No. TN-1, World Bank, Washington DC. 
215 Global Road Safety Facility (2009) Bliss T and Breen J. Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety 
Management Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe 
System Projects. World Bank, Washington DC. 
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enforcement operations required to reduce average traffic speeds and other 
intermediate outcomes and the number of vehicle safety inspections, or alternatively they 
can correspond to milestones showing a specific task has been completed. 
19.2 Key outcome and output indicators 
 
Main final outcome results: GB 2016 or 2015 
 Total road deaths – 1792 
 Total serious injuries – 24,101 
 MAIS 3+ serious injuries 4,692* 
 Road deaths per million population – 28 
 Serious injuries per million population-378 
 Between 2006 and 2016 deaths fell by 44% and serious injuries by 16%** 
 Total cost of fatal and serious road traffic accidents-£8,639 million 
 45% of deaths and 37% of serious injuries were amongst car occupants 
 18% of those killed and 23% of those seriously injured were motorcyclists. 
 25% of those killed and 21% of seriously injured were pedestrians 
  6% of deaths and 14% of serious injuries were amongst cyclists  
 22% of vehicle occupant deaths were in single vehicle crashes 
 51% of deaths occurred on non-built-up roads and 5% on motorways.  
 44% of deaths were on built-up roads 
 Excess speed reported as a contributory factor in 22% of fatal and 14% of serious injuries 
 22% of motor vehicle occupants who were killed were not wearing a seat belt*  
 
* 2015 
** Changes in severity reporting systems for a large number of police forces in 2016 mean that 
serious injury figures are not comparable with earlier years. 2006-2015 change in number of serious 
injuries was 22% 
 
Main intermediate road safety outcomes GB – different years 
 98.2% of drivers, 96.7% of front seat passengers and 90.6% of rear seat passengers were 
observed using seat belts in 2014 survey in England and Scotland. 
 46% of cars, 47% of light commercial vehicles and 1% of articulated HGVs exceeded the speed 
limit on motorways in 2016. 
 8% of cars and 24% of HGVs exceeded the speed limit on 60mph single carriageways in 2016. 
 53% of cars, 56% of LGVs and 43% of HGVs exceeded the speed limit on 30mph roads in 2016. 
 14% of deaths in 2015 involved a driver over the legal blood alcohol limit. 
 1.5% of car drivers were observed in 2014 using a hand-held mobile phone. 
 72% of new cars sold to September 2017 are Euro NCAP 5* rated. 
 An early iRAP star rating using a 1*-4* star rating of the strategic road network in 2010 
indicated that: * 
 50% of all motorways are rated 4* and 50% are 3*. 
 20% of dual c/way A roads are rated 4* and 78% are 3*. 
 62% of single c/way A roads are rated 2*, most of the rest are 3*. 
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 Emergency response target of 75% of category A calls being reached in 8 minutes is an 
increasing challenge with rates in 2016-2017 generally between 60 and 70%. 
 
* latest figures using revised iRAP rating 1*-5* are not yet published. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Selected institutional road safety enforcement outputs 
 There were 590,260 convictions for motoring offences in England and Wales in 2016 of which 
46% were driving offences.  
 Causing death or serious injury accounted for 0.3% of driving offences, drink-driving 14%, 
speeding 62%, dangerous driving 1%, and mobile phone use 4%.  
 Vehicle insurance, registration and excise licence offences accounted for a third of all 
motoring offences.  
 There were 520,000 roadside screening breath tests in England and Wales in 2015 of which 
12% were positive or refused. 
 In 2015 in England and Wales 1,016,827 fixed penalty notices were issued, 78% for speeding. 
 There were 59,021 reported seat belt offences in 2015 representing 67% reduction on the 
2010 level.  
 DVSA carried out 58,909 mechanical checks on vehicles in 2015/16 resulting in 34.6% 
prohibitions, and 42,643 drivers’ hours checks resulting in 6.2% prohibitions. 
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SECTION 5: CONCLUSIONS 
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20. CONCLUSIONS 
20.1.1 Britain is one of the global leaders in road safety and has achieved its results over decades 
by means of a systematic, planned, research-based response to road safety problems. 
Notwithstanding the good progress achieved, and as in most other countries active in 
road safety, there is widespread concern about current road safety results amongst the 
road safety community in Britain.  This review has found strong support for more 
ambitious activity to address the large scope for preventing avoidable death and serious 
injury in road crashes.  . 
20.1.2 In 2016, 1792 people lost their lives on British roads, the highest total since 2011.  The 
trend in road fatalities has been broadly flat since 2010. There was a 5% drop in UK 
fatalities compared to 17% for the EU average in the period between 2010 and 2015.  A 
further 24,101 crash victims were seriously injured. Road traffic injury represents a 
leading national cause of major trauma and for some age groups, a leading, if not lead 
cause of death when compared to all other causes. Research-based forecasts indicate that 
unless more effective action is taken, 350,000 people will be killed or seriously injured in 
Britain between 2010 and 2030216.  Apart from this human cost, the societal value of 
prevention of the 3.5 casualties of all severities is estimated to be around £160 billion. 
The large scope for preventing avoidable human tragedy is evident and is not being 
sufficiently addressed. 
20.1.3 The context for road safety is constantly changing and is set to change in ever more 
fundamental ways by 2030.  The roll-out of known, effective safety measures is essential 
to address the increasing risks from trends in choice of active travel modes and the need 
to address the safe mobility of an ageing population. The introduction of new 
technologies such as driverless cars will need careful planning and anticipation of possible 
risks such that the potential road safety benefits are realised. 
20.1.4 The government has embarked upon an ambitious long-term course in adopting the Safe 
System approach in line with international best practice.  Most professionals view Safe 
System as a sound approach which involves the extension and deepening of current 
practice.  The Highways England strategic framework; the strategic work in some cities, 
and the recent launch of Safer Roads Fund are widely cited as highly promising.  At the 
same time, Safe System is not yet fully launched or promoted, nor is there sufficient 
understanding across the sectors of what this means for their road safety work in Britain. 
This review makes a variety of recommendations, summarised in the preceding sections, 
to address this.  
20.1.5 In any country or jurisdiction, the context for road safety activity is highly complex (given 
its multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary nature), and careful leadership is a critical success 
factor.  Bold leadership and further steps by the national lead agency for road safety, the 
DfT, are sought. 
20.1.6 In Britain, the complexity of this road safety context has increased in recent years, both 
due to new developments in localism and greatly reduced budgets, as well as some falling 
away from successful past practice. This is evident in many sectors and is the cause of 
widespread concern by practitioners and professionals, including policymakers.  There is 
national consensus amongst those with everyday responsibilities for road safety that the 
                                                          
216 Mitchell C G B and R E Allsop (2014). Projections of road casualties in Great Britain to 2030, PACTS, London 
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priority given to road safety has been slipping for some years into unknown territory and 
that the momentum and rate of progress in casualty reduction seen in previous decades 
has been lost.  Continued fragmentation and dilution of established effective practice is a 
threat to future road safety performance.   
20.1.7 The principal conclusion of this review is that the absence of a national road safety 
performance framework is impeding progress.  It is clear that this has been a major factor 
in the marked reduction in priority and observable recession in results-focused road 
safety activity in virtually every sector, and in both national and local government.  
20.1.8 Over a two-decade period up to 2010 a carefully derived strategic national safety policy 
framework and quantified casualty reduction targets provided focus for national and local 
activity and substantial reductions in deaths and serious injuries in road crashes were 
achieved.  
20.1.9 It is widely reported that the absence of national quantitative targets to reduce death and 
serious injury since 2010 has contributed to a different focus from, or reduced focus on, 
death and serious injury prevention and reduction in important policy areas. While 
localism is cited nationally as being the primary reason for the withdrawal of targets, road 
safety professionals (across many sectors, including local government) are not convinced, 
observing that locally relevant targets are set in many other areas, e.g. housing, other 
areas of public health, motor vehicle emissions and walking and cycling.   
20.1.10 Professionals have reported problems with retaining a road safety priority, or in some 
cases even the function itself, in local authority policymaking and investments. Problems 
are evident in the low priority now given to enforcing key road safety rules.  Above all, a 
lack of a rationale for joint working was reported within departments, across central 
government, with and within local authorities and across the wider road safety 
profession.  The lessening involvement of key agencies with core responsibilities at 
national and local level is challenging meaningful shared road safety responsibilities in key 
sectors.  Current activity, in general, remains highly fragmented and lacks focus.    
20.1.11 The relationship between setting quantified road safety targets and achievement of the 
reduction of death and serious injuries in road collisions is well established in research 
findings.  International organisations working with road safety see target-setting as a 
global success story.  Successful application of a Safe System approach requires a Safe 
System performance framework. This comprises the setting of an explicit long-term goal 
towards the ultimate prevention of death and serious injury, and interim measurable 
targets to reduce deaths and serious injuries.  These must be underpinned by a range of 
supporting, targeted, measurable outcomes and outputs which are directly linked to the 
prevention of death and serious injury. As noted in global guidance on road safety 
management provided by the World Bank, national goals and quantified objectives are 
the essential foundation stone in support of achieving better results.  In their absence, 
the focus and rationale for all other institutional delivery functions (i.e. coordination, 
funding and resource allocation, legislation, promotion, monitoring and evaluation, 
research and development and knowledge transfer) lack cohesion. 
20.1.12 A further conclusion reached in this review, is the lack of appropriate investment in 
results-focused, evidenced-based road safety activity which has influenced the amount 
and quality of road safety work. In many areas, including policing and health and local 
authority work, this has been severely reduced.  Alongside the setting of goals and 
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quantitative targets, more financial resource is required to improve joint working, 
innovation and efficiency in delivery.  It is clear that the current level of spending is not 
commensurate with the current value of prevention and that there are many 
opportunities for large returns on investment presented by a wide variety of systematic, 
demonstrably effective interventions. The long-term Safe System approach involves 
working towards the prevention of serious and fatal crash injury risk for as long as it takes 
to achieve it acceptably and affordably. Safe System treatments in The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Norway and elsewhere have so far shown good ratios of benefits to cost and 
have proved to be publicly acceptable.  Large, potential returns in investment for the 
British road network have been identified. 
20.1.13 Britain has taken a bold next step in addressing the need for results focused road safety 
management by adopting Safe System in the British Road Safety Statement.  In order to 
make a success of this and to prevent the substantial avoidable tragedies experienced 
daily on UK roads this report concludes that critical success factors will be: 
 Strong ministerial leadership; 
 A planned, systematic, accountable approach to road safety management with 
clear roles and responsibilities; 
 The adoption of a national long-term goal towards the ultimate prevention of death 
and serious injury; and 
 The adoption of national interim quantitative targets to 2030 to reduce death and 
serious injury, supported by a set of related safety performance objectives to foster 
closer management, more efficient delivery and use of public resource to achieve 
better results. 
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Appendix A: The Path to Safe System & Identified Best 
Practice 
 
1. THE PATH TO SAFE SYSTEM AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
RESULTS FOCUS1 
1.1.1 Progressive shifts in road safety management thinking and practices in high-income 
countries have been evident. Since the 1950s there have been four significant phases of 
development, which have become progressively more ambitious in terms of the results 
desired. 
1.1.2 Phase 1 – Focus on driver interventions. In the 1950s and 60s safety management was 
generally characterised by dispersed, uncoordinated, and insufficiently resourced 
institutional units performing isolated single functions (Trinca et al., 1988). Road safety 
policies placed considerable emphasis on the driver by establishing legislative rules and 
penalties and expecting subsequent changes in behaviour, supported by information and 
publicity. It was argued that since human error contributed mostly to crash causation it 
could be addressed most effectively by educating and training the road user to behave 
better. Placing the onus of blame on the road traffic victim acted as a major impediment 
to the appropriate authorities fully embracing their responsibilities for a safer road traffic 
system (Rumar, 1999). 
1.1.3 Phase 2 – Focus on system-wide interventions. In the 1970s and 1980s, these earlier 
approaches gave way to strategies which recognised the need for a systems approach to 
intervention. Dr William Haddon, an American epidemiologist, developed a systematic 
framework for road safety based on the disease model which encompassed 
infrastructure, vehicles and users in the pre-crash, in-crash and post-crash stages 
(Haddon, 1968). Central to this framework was the emphasis on effectively managing the 
exchange of kinetic energy in a crash which leads to injury to ensure that the thresholds 
of human tolerances to injury were not exceeded. The focus of policy broadened from an 
emphasis on the driver in the pre-crash phase to also include in-crash protection (both for 
roadsides and vehicles) and post-crash care. This broadened it to a system-wide approach 
to intervention and the complex interaction of factors which influence injury outcomes. 
It underpinned a major shift in road safety practice which took several decades to evolve. 
However, the focus remained at the level of systematic intervention and did not directly 
address the institutional management functions producing these interventions or the 
results that were desired from them. 
1.1.4 Phase 3 – Focus on system-wide interventions, targeted results and institutional 
leadership. By the early 1990s good practice countries were using action focused plans 
with numerical outcome targets to be achieved with broad packages of system-wide 
measures based on monitoring and evaluation. Ongoing monitoring established that 
growing motorisation need not inevitably lead to increases in death rates but could be 
reversed by continuous and planned investment in improving the quality of the traffic 
system. The United Kingdom, for example, halved its death rate (per 100 000 head of 
population) between 1972 and 1999 despite a doubling in motorised vehicles. Key 
institutional management functions were also becoming more effective. Institutional 
leadership roles were identified, inter-governmental coordination processes were 
                                                          
1 OECD (2008), Towards Zero: Ambitious Road Safety Targets and the Safe System Approach 
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created and funding and resource allocation mechanisms and processes were becoming 
better aligned with the results required. Developments in Australasian jurisdictions (e.g. 
Victoria and New Zealand) further enhanced institutional management functions 
concerning results focus, multi-sectoral coordination, delivery partnerships, and funding 
mechanisms (WHO, 2004; Bliss, 2004; Wegman et al., 2006; Trinca et al., 1988). 
Accountability arrangements were enhanced by the use of target hierarchies linking 
institutional outputs with intermediate and final outcomes to coordinate and integrate 
multi-sectoral activities. This phase laid the foundation for much of today’s activity and 
reflects the state of development found in many higher performing countries. 
1.1.5 Phase 4 – Focus on system-wide interventions, long-term elimination of deaths and 
serious injuries and shared responsibility. By the late 1990s, two of the best performing 
countries had determined that improving upon the ambitious targets that had already 
been set would require rethinking of interventions and institutional arrangements. The 
Dutch Sustainable Safety (Wegman et al., 1997 and 2008) and Swedish Vision Zero 
(Tingvall, 1995; Committee of inquiry into road traffic responsibility, 2000) strategies re-
defined the level of ambition and set a goal to make the road system intrinsically safe. The 
implications of this level of ambition are currently being worked through in the countries 
concerned and elsewhere. These strategies recognise that speed management is central 
and have re-focused attention on road and vehicle design and related protective features. 
The ‘blame the victim’ culture is superseded by ‘blaming the traffic system’ which throws 
the spotlight on operator accountability. These examples of Safe System approaches have 
influenced strategies in Norway, Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Australia and the UK. 
1.1.6 Today the growing view is that road safety is a system-wide and shared multi-sectoral 
responsibility which is becoming increasingly ambitious in terms of its results focus. 
Sustaining the level of ambition now evident in high-income countries requires a road 
safety management system based on effective institutional management functions that 
can deliver evidence-based interventions to achieve desired results. Achievement of the 
ultimate goal of eliminating death and serious injury will require continued application of 
good practice developed in the third phase of targeted programmes coupled with 
innovative solutions which are yet to be determined based on well-established safety 
principles. 
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2. SAFE SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION2 
2.1.1 In identified, effective practice in implementing the Safe System approach:  
 More ambitious, accountable safety performance is targeted for the long-term and 
interim. 
 Interim targets are not seen as acceptable performance levels but on a path 
towards zero. 
 ‘Measuring to manage’ takes place with a sharper focus on operational targets 
using a range of validated evaluation tools, e.g. iRAP and Euro NCAP. 
 Research and statistical analysis underpins the safety performance framework. 
 Leadership by example is evident as well as creating a market for safety. 
 Highly-focused, coordinated partnerships assist delivery. 
 Affordable, evidence-based activity includes demonstrably effective new 
technologies. 
 Innovation is evident, where standards are clearly deficient, based on well-
established safety principles. 
 Business cases are enhanced by aligning with other sectors for co-benefits of 
activity. 
 A variety of guidance are available to assist knowledge transfer and embed Safe 
System. 
 Funded demonstration projects help in getting started. 
 
 
                                                          
2 Loughborough University Design School and Jeanne Breen Consulting (2017) Short Course: The Safe System 
Approach: Managing for better road safety results, Overview of Safe System. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
 The overall approach to the Road Safety Management Capacity Review (RSMCR) required 
engagement with a wide range of stakeholders across the road safety partnership to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of current road safety management capacity 
and how to overcome any weaknesses.   
 Key stakeholders, as well as those involved in the delivery or management of road safety 
on the ground, were engaged with using a wide range of approaches. 
 This Appendix, compiled by SYSTRA, provides: 
 A summary of the stakeholder engagement process and those consulted with; and 
 The views and perceptions expressed during the engagement process.   
 It should be noted that the views and opinions reported are those of stakeholders and 
survey respondents, and are not necessarily factually correct.  All views are reported, and 
an indication as to whether specific views are widespread, is provided where possible. 
1.2 Key Stakeholder Engagement 
 Methods of engagement for key stakeholders included face to face meetings with 
individuals and small groups, telephone interviews, and a larger workshop with plenary 
sessions and break out groups.   
 In total, 56 of the stakeholder organisations who were invited to take part in the review 
accepted, and were engaged with using these methods.  The organisations who were 
engaged with, in addition to how they have been grouped for reporting purposes, are 
outlined below. 
Central Government Departments/Agencies 
 Department for Transport (DfT; including separate meetings with Road User 
Licensing, Insurance and Safety, International Vehicle Standards, Freight Licensing, 
Active Accessible Travel, Road User Standards and a number of other divisions) 
 Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) 
 Home Office (HO) 
 Highways England (HE) 
 Health and Safety Executive (HSE)  
 Office of Rail and Road (ORR) 
 Scottish Government  
 Welsh Assembly Government 
 Northern Ireland Assembly 
 
Local Government representatives 
 
 
 Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport (ADEPT) 
 Cambridgeshire County Council 
 Derbyshire County Council 
 Kent County Council 
 Transport for London (TfL) 
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 The Local Government Technical Advisers Group (TAG) 
 
Advisory group, associations and charities 
 
 20s plenty 
 British Cycling 
 British Motorcyclists Federation 
 British Vehicle Rental and Leasing Association (BVRLA) 
 Child Accident Prevention Trust (CAPT) 
 Cycling UK 
 European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) 
 European Transport Safety Council (ETSC) 
 I AM RoadSmart 
 The Institute of Traffic Accident Investigators (ITAI) 
 Motorcycle Industry Association (MCIA) 
 Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety (PACTS) 
 RAC Motoring Services 
 Road Safety Analysis 
 Road Safety Foundation 
 Road Safety GB 
 Road Safety Trust 
 RoadPeace 
 Roadsafe 
 Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) 
 Transport Focus 
 
Business and industry representatives 
 
 Association of British Insurers (ABI) 
 Association of Car Fleet Operators (ACFO) 
 British Standards Institution (BSI) 
 Chartered Institution of Highways and Transportation (CIHT) 
 Driving Instructor Association (DIA) 
 Freight Transport Association (FTA) 
 Institute of Car Fleet Management (ICFM) 
 Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) 
 The Road Haulage Association (RHA) 
 
Emergency service representatives 
 
 Association Ambulance Chief Executives (AACE) 
 Cumbria Fire and Rescue 
 Dorset Police Force 
 Merseyside Police Force 
 National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) 
 National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) 
 Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN) 
 
Academic institutions and consultancies 
 
 Cranfield University 
 Institute for Transport Studies, University of Leeds (ITS Leeds) 
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 Loughborough University 
 Nottingham University 
 RAC Foundation  
 Transport Research Laboratory (TRL) 
 University College London (UCL) 
1.3 On-line Survey Respondents 
 
1.3.1 To increase the range of organisations engaged with as part of the RSMCR, online surveys 
were distributed to five different types of organisation involved in the delivery of road 
safety or with road safety responsibilities.  Links to relevant on-line questionnaires were 
sent out by relevant umbrella bodies. Questionnaires for each organisation type were 
carefully tailored to address the specific remit of the organisation type in the road safety 
agenda.   
 The type of respondent, the organisation through which the survey was distributed, the 
number of people distributed to, and the number of responses received, are provided in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Survey Respondents, Organisation of Distribution 
RESPONDENT 
TYPE 
ORGANISATION RESPONSIBLE FOR 
DISTRIBUTION AND NUMBER 
DISTRIBUTED TO 
NUMBER OF 
RESPONSES 
RECEIVED 
Road Safety 
Officers (RSOs)  
Road Safety GB 
(Circulated to 732 RSOs) 
33 
Local Authority 
Representatives 
ADEPT 
(Circulated to 227 Local Authority 
Representatives and 13 Local Enterprise 
Partnership representatives on the 
ADEPT database) 
24 
Road Haulage 
Company Managers 
Road Haulage Association 
(Circulated to 7000 road haulage 
companies on the Road Haulage 
Association database) 
4 
Fleet Managers 
Association of Car Fleet Operators 
(Circulated to 383 fleet managers on the 
Association of Car Fleet Operators 
database) 
17 
Police Force 
Representative 
National Police Chiefs’ Council 
(Circulated to 43 police forces) 
12 
Ambulance Trust 
Representatives 
Association of Ambulance Chief 
Executives 
(Circulated to 10 ambulance trusts) 
1 
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 Due to the small sample size in each of the surveys outlined in Table 1, findings are 
provided as number of respondents rather than percentages throughout the report.   
 There was only one response to the survey distributed to ambulance trusts.  This response 
has been amalgamated into the key stakeholder views to protect anonymity. 
1.4 Appendix Structure 
 This Appendix is structured as follows: 
 Chapters 2-8 provide views and perceptions relating to Institutional Management 
Functions; and 
 Chapter 9-15 provide views and perceptions relating to Interventions.  
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2. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: RESULTS FOCUS 
2.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Roles and leadership 
2.1.1 The DfT is perceived by central government departments and agencies as the lead agency 
for road safety.  The Road Safety Standards and Services Directorate within the DfT takes 
the lead on road safety policy and co-ordination of road safety strategy.   Many other 
Directorates within the DfT and other government departments and agencies have 
specific lead responsibilities for the carrying out of road safety intervention, e.g. Highways 
England for the strategic road network.  It was acknowledged that achieving an effective 
structure between departments, divisions and agencies is hard, but that differing roles 
within these are fairly well defined, and overall work reasonably well together.  
Results and Prioritisation 
2.1.2 It was noted that UK KSI figures are still strong compared to many other countries, and 
that the reduction in KSIs is levelling off globally.  But, at the same time, there was concern 
that KSIs are now beginning to creep up and that the UK road safety performance record 
is slipping behind that of Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.  
2.1.3 Some central government and agency stakeholders share the view that whilst ‘user 
experience’ on the roads is currently a key issue, road safety is not given adequate priority, 
and this is exemplified by the fact that there is currently no manifesto commitment on 
improving road safety.  The previous manifesto commitment on improving road safety 
was considered very helpful for road safety engagement and implementation, and 
securing funding in the Autumn Statement.  
2.1.4 There is a general perception that there is currently a lack of shared goals and objectives 
between divisions and agencies, and a reduction in results focus and systematic 
prioritisation of measures to reduce the overall level of KSIs at lead agency level compared 
to previous years.  Instead it is considered that there is more focus on all outcomes from 
road collisions, and that priorities are more transient.   
2.1.5 Areas perceived by some to be the current focus include young drivers, older drivers, rural 
roads, automated vehicles and emissions.  Areas perceived to currently be less prioritised 
than they used to be are vehicle safety (with discussions around which EU GSR/PSR 
measures would be acceptable or appropriate for the UK only beginning to take place 
now), motorcycle safety, pedestrian safety and child safety, and many felt that these areas 
should still be higher priority that they are at.   
2.1.6 Some agencies consider that the apparent lack of prioritisation of road safety at the lead 
agency level has gone hand in hand with a lessening priority of road safety at a local 
authority level, including activity in policing and emergency services.   
 Many stakeholders considered that it is necessary for the DfT to have a more strategic 
focus on activities which will have the biggest impact.  
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Target setting 
2.1.8 There is widespread awareness that whilst target setting is widespread in many public 
policy areas (including a reduction in the rate of cycling KSIs in the Cycling and Walking 
Investment Strategy; and 11 road safety KPIs in the Highways England 2015-2020 Road 
Investments Strategy including targets for reduction of KSIs on the strategic road 
network), there are no longer road safety targets for KSIs set by the DfT.   
2.1.9 Many stakeholders suggested that the lack of targets leads to a lack of road safety priority, 
funding, proactive activity and targets in other agencies such as policing, the fire service, 
DVSA, local authorities and health.  Other consequences noted were: 
 A reduction in focus on road safety outcomes by Ministers; 
 It encourages activity over too wide an area, rather than concentrating on a welfare 
based analysis of where action most needed; and 
 Lack of road safety in the Home Office policing strategy. 
2.1.10 However, in defence of the lack of targets it was noted that: 
 The British Road Safety Statement is considered in central government as the main 
driver of delivery, and has intermediate commitments that success can be 
measured by, with examples including: legislation to allow learners on motorways 
in dual control cars, with an ADI, the increase in mobile phone penalty points, and 
the Safer Roads Fund;  
 Government is publicly held to account for road safety results through stakeholder, 
media and political pressure; and 
 Work needs to take place to see where the biggest difference can be made without 
targets. 
2.1.11 In addition to lack of target setting by the lead agency there is also a perception that road 
safety is inward looking with little attention paid to international goals and targets such 
as the Global Sustainable Development Goal targets and EU targets. 
Safe System 
2.1.12 Those more informed about the British Road Safety Statement are familiar with the Safe 
System approach and consider that embracing it in work streams is encouraged at a higher 
level.  However, it is widely acknowledged that in these early days of implementation, 
there are gaps in understanding, and awareness and change in approach at all levels is 
slow, both in central government and at local authority level. 
2.1.13 Some bodies were cited as better at adopting Safe System, including Highways England.  
Local authorities were cited as adopting the Safe System approach less well.  It was 
considered that the bigger budgets and bigger network of Highways England made 
adoption of this approach easier.  It was also suggested that the Safe System approach 
could be better promoted to local authorities by both DfT and Highways England, with 
more indication of the most effective activities to support it. 
2.1.14 Concern was expressed by one stakeholder that adopting Safe System means the focus is 
on KSIs rather than reducing injuries of all severities, and equally that whilst Towards Zero 
is considered positively, Vision Zero seems defeatist.   
2.1.15 The Safer Roads Fund was mentioned by two stakeholders as being important in 
developing and embedding Safe System capacity and understanding.  It has highlighted 
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the gap between expectations and what is being delivered by local authorities in practice. 
Whilst it is early days in terms of capacity building, there is considered to be a change in 
perception and approach in activity in some local authorities.  Stakeholders hope that 
successful approaches can be rolled out.   
2.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Responsibilities 
2.2.1 The distribution of road safety responsibilities is described as varied and complex at a local 
level.  
2.2.2 Many at a local level perceive DfT as not taking an adequate leadership role in road safety 
and would like to see them take a stronger national leadership role, setting a long-term 
goal, national KSI targets, providing consistency of approach, issuing green papers and 
rolling out best practice.  The lack of targets was perceived to affect all aspects 
institutional delivery. 
Target setting 
2.2.3 The increase in localism, and the absence of national targets and the safety performance 
monitoring associated with targets, is considered to have had a big impact on the priority 
given to road safety at a local level, and with this, a decrease in funding.  This is seen as 
becoming increasingly important as road safety outcomes worsen, especially amongst 
young drivers, and increasingly related to drink and drug related driving offences. 
2.2.4 Stakeholders argued that targets put pressure on politicians, at a local level, to get 
involved in decision making processes and engage in the bidding process to receive road-
safety funding. Without targets local authorities no longer secure funding. 
“Government shot themselves in the foot big time when they removed the targets... 
when the government axed the targets, the local authorities, straight away, said ‘well 
don’t bother us with that, there’s no money there’… there was a view at a local level 
that you don’t need to waste time, you have limited resources anyway so don’t worry 
about reporting accident information.” 
(Local authority representative) 
2.2.5 Some local authorities, TfL and city authorities have set their own KSI reduction targets 
but it is considered that the majority have not.  Even where local targets exist, 
stakeholders feel that this does not negate the negative impact of lack of national target 
setting.  Examples targets for KSI reductions include overall KSIs, and separate targets for 
children, motorcycle casualties, occupational road risk, cyclists, pedestrians, drink-driving, 
drunk-driving and young drivers.  TfL also have bus specific targets and a Vision Zero for 
KSI by 2041 and are now looking for new metrics for a performance framework for 
activities supporting these targets (intermediate outcomes).  
Safe System 
2.2.6 In general stakeholders feel that a holistic Safe System approach is not generally 
understood or evident in local authority road safety activity.  However, there is some 
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evidence of local authorities pursing the Safe System approach, including through Safer 
Road Fund iRAP activity.  In addition, there is considered to be a shift in funding from 
education, training and publicity, to engineering projects. 
2.2.7 A perceived barrier to Safe System implementation is the lack of change in regulations, 
legislation and guidance to enable road engineers to adopt the new approach, in 
particular the Construction and Design Management Regulations which do not enable 
engineers to remove risk. 
 “If they [government] had actually looked at the legislation and regulations that road 
networks are designed under, and reviewed those, this [Safe Systems] would be a huge 
success.” 
   (Local authority representative) 
 Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Thirty-three RSOs responded to questions on results focus in the online survey. 
Responsibility for road safety 
 Thirty-one RSOs indicated where the responsibility for road safety sits within their local 
authority.  In summary, it sits in the following departments: 
 22 in the Highways Department; 
 5 in Transport Planning;  
 1 in Public Health; and 
 3 in other or multiple local authority departments, with the ‘other’ including: 
 Infrastructure and Facilities Teams; 
 Traffic, Safety and Network Management Teams; 
 Fire and Rescue Service;  
 Road Safety and Sustainable Travel; and 
 Data Analysis Team. 
 There was a high level of agreement with the statement ‘there is a clear focal point with 
responsibility for road safety’: 
 14 totally agreed; 
 14 most agreed;  
 5 partially agreed; and 
 0 disagreed. 
 Often, RSOs suggested that the responsibility for road safety was divided between 
multiple local authority departments, and that responsibility could be decided by the local 
authority itself or by higher-level agencies.  There was some concern that responsibilities 
were clear internally but were not clear to the general public. 
2.2.12 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘the authority is formally held to account 
for their road safety performance’, were: 
 
 7 totally agreed; 
 6 mostly agreed; 
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 11 partially agreed; 
 6 disagreed; and 
 3 did not know. 
 Accountability practices cited included annual performance reports provided for internal 
management, the combined authority, and the public. There was some concern by those 
who were not aware of accountability practices that attention was not given to local 
authority performance. 
Road Safety Priority/Strategy 
 RSOs reported many priorities for road safety intervention in their local authorities. These 
were: 
 Casualty reduction, with specific focus on vulnerable road users, namely young and 
older drivers, motorcyclists, pedal cyclists, pedestrians and those driving for work; 
 Engineering projects, particularly, the completion of road safety audits and highway 
improvements, with a focus on rural roads, speed reduction (e.g. 20mph zones), 
cycle infrastructure and accident hotspots; 
 Tackling inappropriate behaviour, such as speeding, drink and drug driving, careless 
and dangerous driving, seatbelt non-compliance and mobile phone use through 
targeted behavioural change programmes, enforcement and re-training and 
working with the police and local community to conduct these; 
 Increasing knowledge, analysis and intelligence; and 
 Providing safer travel education, particularly to young children, learner and young 
drivers, with a focus on safe, sustainable methods (e.g. Bikeability). 
 Methods for identifying priorities for road safety intervention included: 
 Community concern; 
 The priorities of third party delivery groups; 
 Road safety research undertaken in other parts of the UK; 
 Statistical analysis undertaken by the local authority, including cost benefit analysis 
and forecast and audit of casualties (including assessing where collisions occur, the 
number of collisions occurring within the area, who was involved, the speed they 
were travelling and where the route originates).  One form of data cited was 
STATS19.  Detailed statistical analysis of this kind was said to be dependent on staff 
resource; 
 Local strategy, which is usually based on statistical analysis.  For instance, Local 
Transport Plans, Mayors Transport Strategy and Partnership Strategies; and 
 National initiatives, for instance, working in line with the NPCC calendar, or Central 
Government priorities, such as Vision Zero and casualty reduction outside of 
schools.  However, there was some concern that national initiatives can sometimes 
reduce resource for local priorities, which can make it difficult to reach any local 
targets set. 
2.2.16 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘road safety is a key policy area’, were: 
 
 29 totally agreed; 
 6 mostly agreed; 
 15 partially agreed; and 
 3 disagreed. 
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2.2.17 Some of those who disagreed indicated that road safety was only addressed due to 
statutory duties and partnership strategy.  Reasons cited for partial agreement were 
reduced staff resource, skill and experience, and greater prioritisation being given to 
education and social work. 
2.2.18 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘there is a strategy for addressing KSIs’ 
were: 
 11 totally; 
 12 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
 Reasons cited for partial agreement or disagreement were lack of clarity on how to reduce 
KSIs, with particular reference to Education, Training and Publicity (ETP), and current 
development of strategies, for instance, to reflect the Safe System approach or align road 
safety with public health. 
2.2.20 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘there are safety performance indicators 
which are causally related to KSIs’, were reported by RSOs: 
 
 10 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 12 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 Of those who did have safety performance indicators, causally related to KSIs, they were 
believed to correspond to transport network management and higher strategies, such as 
the Mayor’s Transport Strategy.  There was some concern that indicators were not 
considered beyond immediate team members and that submission of these to 
government was a stretch on resource, especially when raw data was already available. 
2.2.22 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘safety performance indicators, which 
are causally related to KSIs, are monitored’, were also reported by RSOs: 
 
 11 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
 Of those whose local authority did monitor safety performance indicators, causally 
related to KSIs, there was some concern that indicators were not considered beyond 
immediate team members and that national targets should be reintroduced. 
2.2.24 Asked about the statement there are long-term goals and targets for preventing KSIs 
within this authority’: 
 
 9 totally agreed; 
 17 mostly agreed; 
 3 partially agreed; and 
 4 disagreed. 
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2.2.25 Of those who were aware of long-term goals and targets, most targets were set regionally 
and required an update for upcoming years.  Some RSOs suggested that a lack of long-
term goals and targets was decided in order to reflect the absence of national targets.  
Other RSOs cited concern for the lack of national targets, suggesting that this practice did 
not reflect international best practice or the Safe System approach and did not provide a 
common goal for road safety stakeholders, or offer a level of accountability. 
2.2.26 Asked about the statement ‘there are interim goals and targets for preventing KSIs within 
this authority’: 
 
 10 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 10 partially agreed; 
 4 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.2.27 RSOs whose local authorities do not have interim goals or targets suggested that a lack of 
targets was decided in order to reflect the absence of national targets.  Again, RSOs cited 
concern about the lack of national targets, suggesting that this practice did not reflect 
international best practice or the Safe System approach and did not provide a common 
goal for road safety stakeholders, or offer a level of accountability. 
British Road Safety Statement 
2.2.28 Differing levels of agreement were found with the statement, ‘road safety activity is 
tailored in response to the British Road Safety Statement (BRSS)’ in that:  
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 5 mostly agreed; 
 16 partially agreed; 
 9 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.2.29 Of those who did tailor their road safety activity in response to the BRSS, it was suggested 
that this was a result of following of higher strategies, such as the Mayor’s Transport 
Strategy.  Reasons cited by those who did not tailor their road safety activity in response 
to the BRSS related to lack of awareness and lack of applicability of the BRSS at a local 
level, or to pre-existing suitability of road safety activity. 
Safe System Approach 
2.2.30 Asked about the statement, ‘the Safe System goal and strategy is being adopted by our 
authority’: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 13 partially agreed; 
 7 disagreed; and 
 4 did not know. 
2.2.31 Reasons cited by those who believed their local authority did not totally adopt the Safe 
System approach, include: 
 
 16/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 Difficulty trying to encourage change, especially with a lack of resource; 
 Difficulty with emphasis on capital resource requirements, especially when road 
safety capital is nil budgeted; 
 Adoption of certain aspects, such as Vision Zero, but not all aspects; and 
 Pre-existing suitability of road safety goal and strategy, already representing the 
same core pillars as Safe System. 
2.2.32 Similarly, differing levels of agreement with the statement, ‘there are processes in place 
locally to ensure awareness and understanding of the Safe System approach’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 6 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; 
 13 disagreed; and 
 4 did not know. 
2.2.33 Even in local authorities where it was believed that awareness and understanding of the 
Safe System approach is present, there was some concern from RSOs that awareness and 
understanding will still not lead to its adoption.  It was considered that the approach 
needs greater adaptation to be applicable to areas where there is larger use of sustainable 
than unsustainable transport methods, such as cities.  Concerns raised include: 
 
 Low level of awareness of the Safe System approach, especially in devolved 
authorities and in organisations other than independent agencies and Highways 
England; 
 The radical changes required by local authorities to implement the Safe System 
approach; 
 Scarce DfT communication in general; and 
 The ability to deliver all Safe System elements, especially with the disconnect 
between the current rate of human design and transport and highway 
advancement. 
 Asked about the statement: ‘there are processes in place nationally to ensure awareness 
and understanding of the Safe System approach’: 
 
 0 totally agreed; 
 9 mostly agreed; 
 11 partially agreed; 
 7 disagreed; and 
 5 did not know. 
 Concerns raised were the same issues as for the previous statement. 
 Asked to explain any barriers faced in implementing the Safe System approach in their 
local authority, 21 RSOs provided a response.  In particular a large cultural change was 
thought to be necessary, with acknowledgement of: 
 Lack of resource, especially staff with expertise and knowledge on the Safe System 
approach and policies, design standards and strategies based on Safe System 
principles; 
 Lack of acknowledgement of the Safe System approach and its value; 
 Lack of funding needed for Safe System project investments; 
 Physical constraints to road layout; 
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 Limited control over rider/driver standards; 
 The extensive timescale needed to embed a Safe System approach; and 
 A lack of coordination and communication between road safety partners on their 
priorities. 
2.2.37 RSOs suggested that barriers to embedding/further embedding Safe System within local 
authorities could be overcome through the following processes: 
 
 Increasing funding to allow for Safe System project investment; 
 Enhancing the priority given to Safe System, with central government taking the 
lead and sending directives to local authority Chief Executives; 
 Improving coordination, possibly through central government lead, to establish 
common goals and reduce silo working; 
 Introducing clear national targets, with supporting guidance and scrutiny;  
 Developing a EuroRAP-style assessment for local roads, to identify investment 
potential and outcomes, in terms of casualty reduction; 
 Supplying more information on Safe System and how it can be applied in practical 
terms; 
 Providing staff training; and 
 Reviewing the value of Safe System approaches against current road safety 
processes. 
National Targets 
2.2.38 Asked to comment on the statement ‘a national long-term goal for prevention of KSI 
would benefit road safety activity and priority in my authority’: 
 
 19   strongly agreed 
 9   agreed; 
 2     disagreed; 
 0     strongly disagreed; and 
 3     did not know. 
2.2.39 Of those who reported agreement with the statement, there was a common belief that a 
national long-term goal for KSI prevention would benefit local authorities through: 
 
 Creating a collective priority focus and aim to work towards, with the hope that this 
would increase resource locally; 
 Allowing for clearer prioritisation of tasks, which would allocate resource more 
efficiently; and 
 Placing UK practice in line with international best practice. 
2.2.40 There was some concern from RSOs that national long-term goals for KSI prevention 
would only be effective if the following were also considered: 
 
 Creation of clear accountability; 
 Increased resource and funding to achieve targets, therefore not decreasing moral; 
and  
 The effectiveness of monitoring, with a focus on increasing the accuracy of STATS19 
data. 
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2.2.41 As with the long-term target, RSOs commonly reported agreement with the statement, 
‘interim national numerical targets for reducing KSI would benefit road safety activity and 
prioritisation in my authority’ in that: 
 
 16 strongly agreed; 
 9 agreed; 
 5 disagreed; 
 1 strongly disagreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
2.2.42 The benefits and concerns relating to interim targets mirror those reported under long-
term targets, other than the following additional concerns and comments about interim 
targets: 
 
 Tailoring of targets to local issues is key, in order to make them realistic; 
 Inclusion of vulnerable road users and KSI contributing factors within targets is 
required; 
 Difficulty may come with analysis; and  
 Problems may occur with the implementation of the new CRASH recording system. 
 
Barriers to achieving road safety results 
2.2.43 The majority of RSOs (28) described some kind of barriers which they faced in 
implementing road safety activity in their local authorities. These were included: 
 
 Lack of time, resource, funding and expertise, both within local authorities and 
within external partners (e.g. lack of resource in the police reducing support of local 
authority enforcement interventions). There was some concern that this would 
make long-term projects and the integration of Safe System difficult; 
 Outsourcing reducing specialist professional expertise; 
 Pressure and lack of understanding from senior management and elected 
members; 
 Public perceptions and behaviours, with some RSOs citing difficulty with the ‘war 
on the motorist’ perception; 
 Unrealistic expectations of road safety interventions; 
 Reducing the dominance of motor traffic; 
 Slow acceptance of environmental changes and changes in road user behaviours; 
 A lack of appreciation for all road user groups; 
 Difficulties evidencing the impact of education, training and publicity; 
 Lack of coordination of road safety activity creating duplications in initiatives; and 
 Lack of priority for road safety activity both within central government (where 
other areas, such as social care, are prioritised), within schools (where road safety 
is not on the national curriculum) and within local authorities and partner 
organisations (where road safety engineering is often prioritised over education, 
training and publicity). 
2.2.44 RSOs suggested that barriers to implementing road safety activity could be overcome 
through the following processes: 
 
 Increasing time, resource and funding from DfT and/or Highways England to local 
authorities to improve the standards of road safety engineering and education, 
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training and publicity, with the suggestion that increased funding could come from 
increased congestion charging; 
 Improving the priority given to road safety and encouraging support from senior 
management and politicians; 
 Reviewing driver and rider standards, training and ability; 
 Introducing clear national targets, interim and long-term, with supporting guidance 
and scrutiny to allow for appropriate funding allocation;  
 Advancing coordination in local delivery plans, government departments (e.g. DfT, 
Department for Health and the Home Office) and road safety partners (e.g. local 
authorities, the police service and the fire and rescue service) to ensure that road 
safety is appropriately prioritised and delivered by all locally, regionally and 
nationally; and 
 Increasing awareness of local authority services, aims, outcomes and value.  
 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty four local authority representatives responded to questions on results focus in 
the online survey. 
Responsibility for road safety 
2.2.46 Local authority representatives indicated that the responsibility for road safety sits in the 
following departments: 
 15 in Highways Department; 
 3 in Transport Planning; 
 2 in Public Health; and 
 4 reported in other or multiple local authority departments, or an external body,  
including: 
 Communities, Economy and Transport Department; 
 Commissioning into Operational delivery; 
 Education, Training and Awareness teams within the Fire and Rescue Service; 
and 
 Divided between Highways, Transport Planning, the Fire Service and/or 
Public Health. 
2.2.47 There was a high level of agreement with the statement ‘there is a clear focal point with 
responsibility for road safety at elected representative level’: 
 
 11   totally agreed; 
 8   mostly agreed;  
 4   partially agreed; and 
 1     disagreed. 
2.2.48 Often, local authority representatives suggested that the responsibility for road safety 
was given to a cabinet member for road safety, the environment, transport, public health, 
communities or highways.  Those that disagreed suggested that there was not a clear focal 
point of responsibility at elected representative level, or within their local authority, and 
delegation of road safety responsibility between Highways and Public Health was cited as 
a cause for this concern.  
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 There was a high level of agreement with the statement ‘there is a clear focal point with 
responsibility for road safety at officer level’: 
 17   totally agreed; 
 6   mostly agreed;  
 1    partially agreed; and 
 0     disagreed. 
2.2.50 Often, local authority representatives suggested that there were clear leading officers for 
road safety education, engineering and enforcement projects.  These officers were either 
within the local authority, as part of a dedicated road safety team or across multiple 
authority departments such as Public Health and Highways, or within a higher-level 
agency, such as a Road Safety Partnership. One representative suggested that a transition 
to the latter was currently being undertaken.  There was some concern that delegation of 
road safety responsibility between Highways and Public Health created an unclear focal 
point with responsibility for road safety at officer level. 
2.2.51 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘the authority is formally held to account 
for their road safety performance’, were: 
 
 8   totally agreed 
 5   mostly agreed; 
 7   partially agreed; 
 3   disagreed; and 
 1     did not know. 
 Of those who were aware of accountability practices, most involved a political process of 
reporting to either the cabinet or directorate within the local authority or the road safety 
partnership, and regular reviews by corporate services scrutiny.   
Road Safety Priority/Strategy 
2.2.53 Local authority representatives reported a number of priorities for road safety 
intervention in their local authorities. These were: 
 
 Casualty reduction, with specific focus on vulnerable road users, namely children, 
young and older drivers, motorcyclists, pedal cyclists, pedestrians and those driving 
for work, with one local authority adopting Vision Zero; 
 Engineering projects, particularly with a focus on speed reduction (e.g. 20mph 
zones) and accident hotspots; 
 Tackling inappropriate behaviour, such as speeding, drink and drug driving, carless 
and dangerous driving and loss of control through education and re-training (ETP); 
 Addressing road safety in deprived areas; and 
 Delivering the Safe System approach. 
2.2.54 Local authority representatives also reported a number of different methods for 
identifying priorities for road safety intervention in their local authorities.  These were: 
 
 Community concern raised through complaints and local consultations; 
 Statistical analysis, cost benefit analysis, forecast and audit of casualties and routes, 
assessing where collisions occur, the number of collisions occurring within the area 
and who was involved.  Forms of data cited were CRASH and STATS19; 
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 Local strategy, which is usually based on statistical analysis.  For instance, Mayors 
Transport Strategy and Partnership Strategies; 
 Political agenda; 
 Benchmarking against other local authorities; 
 Alignment with Public Health; 
 Evidence on effectiveness and perceptions of the effectiveness of road safety 
education, training and publicity, with some local authorities prioritising the 
intervention based on the number of people reached and trained and the lasting 
behavioural change; and 
 National campaigns. 
2.2.55 There was some concern regarding the amount of time and resource needed for such 
prioritisation approaches. 
2.2.56 One local authority representative suggested that their prioritisation approach was 
reactive, rather than proactive. 
2.2.57 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘road safety is a key policy area’, were: 
 
 13 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 2 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
2.2.58 Of those who did consider road safety a key policy area, road safety was addressed within 
Public Health, Sustainable Transport and Community Safety policies and Local Transport 
Plans.  One local authority was currently developing new policies and local transport 
strategies to address road safety.  There was some concern about the effects of reduced 
staff resource, skill and experience to identify road safety as a key policy area. 
2.2.59 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘there is a strategy for addressing KSIs’ 
were: 
 12 totally agreed;  
 9 mostly agreed; 
 3 partially agreed; and 
 0 disagreed. 
2.2.60 Strategies often formed part of a local or road safety partnership delivery plan and 
included analysis and assessment of sites and routes for the identification of collision 
location, and behavioural change interventions. 
2.2.61 A small number of local authority representatives reported that their local authority was 
currently reviewing their road safety strategy. 
2.2.62 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘there are safety performance indicators 
which are causally related to KSIs’, were reported by local authority representatives: 
 
 13 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 5 partially agreed; and 
 4 disagreed. 
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2.2.63 Of those who did have safety performance indicators, causally related to KSIs, they were 
believed to correspond to local transport plans, funding available, education, engineering 
and enforcement and road safety partnership priorities.  There was some concern that 
indicators were difficult to decide, especially when attempting to align them with road 
safety partnership priorities, which may be set across local authority borders. 
2.2.64 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘safety performance indicators, which 
are causally related to KSIs, are monitored’, were also reported by local authority 
representatives: 
 
 13 totally agreed; 
 4 mostly agreed; 
 3  partially agreed; and 
 4 disagreed. 
2.2.65 Asked about the statement ‘there are long-term goals and targets for preventing KSIs 
within this authority’: 
 
 11 totally agreed; 
 5  mostly agreed; 
 7 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
2.2.66 Of those who were aware of long-term goals and targets, most targets were set until 2020 
or currently under development.  One local authority respondent stated that there targets 
for 2020 were aligned with Vision Zero. 
2.2.67 Asked about the statement ‘there are interim goals and targets for preventing KSIs within 
this authority’: 
 
 10 totally agreed; 
 5  mostly agreed; 
 7 partially agreed; and 
 2 disagreed. 
2.2.68 Local authority representatives suggested that interim targets were set annually within 
their local authority, with an aim to reach the long-term targets set out in strategies and 
delivery plans.  
British Road Safety Statement 
2.2.69 Differing levels of agreement were found with the statement, ‘road safety activity is 
tailored in response to the British Road Safety Statement (BRSS)’:  
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 5 mostly agreed; 
 10 partially agreed; 
 4 disagreed; and 
 4 did not know. 
 Of those who did tailor their road safety activity in response to the BRSS, it was suggested 
that this was due to compliance with government advice and Safe System principles.  Few 
local authority representatives suggested that road safety activity had not been tailored 
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to the BRSS because road safety strategy was currently under review, lack of applicability 
of the BRSS at a local level and lack of resource. 
Safe System Approach 
2.2.71 Asked about the statement, ‘the Safe System goal and strategy is being adopted by our 
authority’: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 4 mostly agreed; 
 8 partially agreed; 
 8 disagreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
2.2.72 Many reasons were cited by those who believed their local authority did not totally adopt 
the Safe System approach, including: 
 
 Difficulty implementing the approach on established rural roads in comparison to 
new and truck roads; 
 Lack of resource to prioritise adoption of the approach; 
 Lack of awareness of Safe System principles; 
 Adopting the approach in principle but not in action; and 
 Pre-existing suitability of road safety goal and strategy, already representing the 
same core pillars as Safe System. 
2.2.73 Similarly, differing levels of agreement with the statement, ‘there are processes in place 
locally to ensure awareness and understanding of the Safe System approach’: 
 
 2 totally agreed 
 4 mostly agreed; 
 6 partially agreed; 
 11 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.2.74 Even in local authorities where it was believed that awareness and understanding of the 
Safe System approach is present, there was some concern from local authority 
representatives that awareness and understanding could still be improved, with many 
representatives also suggesting that their local authority was currently reviewing their 
road safety strategy to encompass Safe System and improve awareness. 
 Asked about the statement: ‘there are processes in place nationally to ensure awareness 
and understanding of the Safe System approach’: 
 
 0 totally agreed; 
 6 mostly agreed; 
 11 partially agreed; 
 5 disagreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
2.2.76 There was some concern for: 
 
 The differing levels of awareness of the Safe System approach in road safety 
engineering and education; 
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 The lack of understanding and guidance around Safe System principles; and 
 The variety in application of Safe System principles, nationally and locally, and the 
ability to deliver Safe System principles in rural authorities, with long lengths of 
historic tree-lined roads. 
2.2.77 Just over two thirds (16) of local authority representatives described barriers which they 
face in implementing the Safe System approach, with the remaining third reporting that 
they do not.  Barriers raised included: 
 
 Lack of resource, especially staff with expertise, understanding and knowledge on 
the Safe System approach; 
 Lack of support for the Safe System approach and its value across the local authority 
and from senior staff; 
 Lack of funding needed for Safe System project investments; 
 Physical constraints to road layout, especially with rural roads; 
 Conflicts with local political priorities, such as the political acceptance of rural speed 
limits; and 
 A lack of clarity on local authority relevance. 
2.2.78 Local authority representatives suggested that barriers to embedding/further embedding 
Safe System within local authorities could be overcome through the following processes: 
 
 Increasing funding, with suggestions of ring-fenced road safety grants for road 
maintenance and roads policing; 
 Increasing resource, with suggestions of a dedicated road safety interventions 
team, more traffic officers and improved staff training on Safe System approaches; 
 Enhancing the priority given to Safe System, with central government taking the 
lead and providing examples of best practice and clear national guidance on Safe 
System application at a local level.  One local authority respondent suggested that 
this could be provided within the engineering design manual for roads and bridges; 
 A formal adoption of technology, providing greater freedom in its use, with an 
example being enforcement technology; 
 Proving greater freedom to local authorities in their use of surplus income;  
 A national TV ad campaign; and 
 Changes to driver licensing. 
National Targets 
2.2.79 Asked to comment on the statement ‘a national long-term goal for prevention of KSI 
would benefit road safety activity and priority in my authority’: 
 
 11 strongly agreed; 
 11 agreed; and 
 2 disagreed. 
2.2.80 Of those who reported agreement with the statement, there was a common belief that a 
national long-term goal for KSI prevention would benefit local authorities through: 
 
 Creating a collective priority focus and aim to work toward, with the hope that this 
would increase long-term resource locally; 
 Allowing for clearer prioritisation of road safety in local decision making due to the 
creation of statutory obligations; 
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 Creating greater awareness of local authority activities and allowing for 
benchmarking between local authorities; 
 Providing national commitment and support from central government for road 
safety activities; 
 Ensuring consistency in local authority approach; 
 Producing accountability; and 
 Placing UK practice in line with international best practice. 
2.2.81 There was some concern from local authority representatives that national long-term 
goals for KSI prevention would only be effective if the following were also considered: 
 
 Creation of interim targets; 
 Realistic achievability of targets; 
 Local authorities overall strategic goals; 
 Sanctions to local authorities for non-compliance and an awareness that reduced 
resource may lead to compliance with statutory obligations only; 
 Increased funding to achieve targets; and  
 The coordination between children’s services, public health and road safety in the 
delivery of road safety interventions. 
2.2.82 As with the long-term target, local authority representatives commonly reported 
agreement with the statement ‘interim national numerical targets for reducing KSI would 
benefit road safety activity and prioritisation in my authority’: 
 
 8 strongly agreed; 
 11 agreed; 
 4 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.2.83 Of those who reported agreement with the statement, there was a common belief that 
national interim targets for KSI reduction would benefit local authorities through: 
 
 Creating a collective priority focus and aim to work toward, with the hope that this 
would increase funding locally; 
 Allowing for clearer prioritisation of road safety in local decision making due to the 
creation of statutory obligations; 
 Creating greater awareness of local authority activities and allowing for 
benchmarking between local authorities; and 
 Providing national commitment and support from central government for road 
safety activities. 
2.2.84 There was some concern from local authority representatives that national interim 
targets for KSI reduction would only be effective if the following were also considered: 
 
 Increased resource and funding to achieve targets, possibly ring-fenced; 
 Tailoring of targets to local strategy, traffic numbers, volumes and the road network 
(rural or urban) in order to make them realistic; 
 Sanctions to local authorities for non-compliance and an awareness that reduced 
resource may lead to compliance with statutory obligations only; 
 Short-term fluctuations in KSI statistics and investment in road safety interventions 
will influence ability to meet interim targets; and  
 The size of the local authority, with small local authorities, with low KSI baseline 
finding it harder to reduce KSI frequency. 
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Barriers to achieving road safety results 
 Just over two thirds of local authority representatives reported barriers which they face 
in implementing road safety activity. These included: 
 Lack of time, resource, funding and expertise, both within local authorities and 
within external partners, for instance, lack of resource in the police reducing 
support of roads policing. There was some concern that lack of time, resource, 
funding and expertise makes long-term projects, staff retention and attraction of 
experienced and skilled staff difficult; 
 Lack of political support, viewing road safety as a priority; 
 Public perceptions; 
 Lack of interest from other organisations; 
 Too much funding emphasis on expensive major schemes, with few long-term 
benefits; 
 Difficulties evidencing the impact of education, engineering and enforcement; 
 Difficulty making decisions in road safety partnerships, as organisations do not 
always want to take responsibility for an action or decision; 
 Lack of guidance on the Safe System approach; and 
 Lack of support and clear direction for national initiatives from central government, 
with corresponding lack of training and funding. 
2.2.86 Local authority representatives suggested that barriers to implementing road safety 
activity could be overcome through the following processes: 
 
 Increasing resource and funding for the development and implementation of road 
safety initiatives, with the suggestion that funding could be non-competitive and 
ring-fenced, as was the case with Road Safety Grants; 
 Improving the awareness and priority given to road safety, with better 
dissemination of guidance from central government; 
 Reviewing driver licensing, introducing graduated driver licensing, re-tests and the 
removal of the self-certification on fitness to drive; 
 Improving understanding and use of data and evidence; 
 Increasing support from road safety stakeholders and emergency medical services; 
 A review of local authority strategy and delivery; 
 Working in line with the Safe System approach; 
 Changing public perceptions of road safety, shifting the tacit acceptance of road 
traffic accidents; 
 Having a focus on smaller, more local schemes; and 
 Introducing clear targets to allow for appropriate funding allocation.  
2.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Target Setting 
2.3.1 Many representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities noted that it is 
difficult to achieve substantial improvements without targets set by government and the 
associated attention to measurement of performance against targets and evidence base. 
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2.3.2 Representatives suggested that by not setting targets the DfT is not taking on its 
responsibility with regards to road safety.  It was suggested that at a wider government 
level policymaking ideology holds belief in less regulation and the perception of safety 
regulation as ‘red tape’ reflected in road safety policymaking. 
“You could say that without a target government has abrogated its responsibility for 
leadership.  What I think the target enabled everybody to do was pull together in the 
same direction.”  
(Advisory group, association and charity representative) 
2.3.3 Reasons given by representatives as to why government should set targets include: 
 The loss of national targets has influenced local funding because, without targets 
to meet, there is no national benchmark in which to form a rationale within local 
government as to why road safety funding should have more priority than other 
societal concerns.  This lack of national steer therefore allows decision-makers an 
excuse not to invest; 
 Lack of targets means those delivering road safety lose focus – they concentrate on 
high profile cheap and easy activities that are visible, rather than activities which 
have the most significant effect on casualties; 
 There is a perception by some that KSI targets are needed in order to benchmark 
England/UK against the rest of the world; 
 It is currently unclear why KSIs have risen after consistent years of decline, and 
some voiced the opinion that the lack of targets may be responsible; and 
 A top-down approach of setting targets at a lead agency level concentrates the 
mind on achieving results and has had positive impacts in other areas, such as fire 
deaths. 
2.3.4 Some stakeholders expressed the view that the delivery bodies responsible for achieving 
road safety targets should be the ones to decide which activities they need to deliver to 
achieve the required results. 
2.3.5 The contrast in approach between the DfT and HE was discussed by some representatives.  
Whilst HE set targets and are perceived to promote road safety, DfT were perceived to 
not do either. 
2.3.6 Whilst stakeholders considered that overall responsibility for setting road safety targets 
should fall within DfT and sit with the Minister for Road Safety, they noted that the MoJ 
and HO also have a role in the setting of targets. 
 In addition to a desire for national targets and long term goals to reduce death and serious 
injury, and for some stakeholders, to prevent death and serious injury, representatives 
also highlighted some specific other targets which they would like to see, including: 
 Country-wide targets for the uptake of Euro NCAP 5-star vehicles; 
 A national metric for the safety performance of the network; and 
 A target for safety performance of the major road network. 
2.3.8 There is also a desire to see safety performance indicators e.g. compliance with 30mph 
limits and the numbers of people cycling; indicators that roads are safer. 
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2.3.9 General priorities for target setting and performance indicators highlighted by 
representatives include: 
 Vulnerable road user safety, particularly with note of the ageing population and 
cyclists, acknowledging the target for increasing cycling uptake; 
 Distraction issues; 
 HGV cab design and vision areas; and 
 Cross modal lessons on fatigue.   
Safe System 
2.3.10 Whilst many advisory group/charity/association representatives are aware of Safe 
System, and for some it underpins all activity, it was acknowledged that those outside the 
road safety profession are not so aware. 
2.3.11 Within some areas of the country, notably London, and across different organisations, the 
term ‘Vision Zero’ is more prominent than Safe System.  For some it does not mean the 
same thing as Safe System, but is considered to mean zero danger. Other terminology 
used and preferred by some organisations includes the ‘road danger reduction’ principle. 
2.3.12 Perceived barriers to the successful delivery of Safe System include: 
 Financial – if there were no financial barriers it would be “possible to re-design 
every road so it was the safest possible design that man knew about” and allocate 
more resources, such as traffic police; 
 Social – legislation banning certain road user behaviour would assist the Safe 
System goals, however it would not be socially acceptable, for instance banning the 
use of motorcycles and banning the use of hands-free devices; and 
 Understanding – there is a lack of common understanding of what Safe System is 
and what it stands for, including by those responsible for the delivery of road safety; 
Awareness – there are technological advancements which are fundamental 
applications of Safe System, such as, Electronic Stability Control (ESC) and 
Autonomous Emergency Breaking (AEB), which are not widely implemented as part 
of Safe System, due to lack of awareness. 
2.3.13 Representatives of advisory groups/charities/associations acknowledged that local 
authorities face a number of difficulties when looking to adopt Safe System.  Challenges 
that they perceived local authorities to face in implementing Safe System include: 
 Not fully understanding what Safe System is; 
 Not having control over all things affecting road safety, within Safe System; and 
 Funding priorities that are based on the whim of the council and derived opinion, 
rather than science-based evidence and interventions. 
Lead Agency and Safe System 
2.3.14 Whilst there was acknowledgement by some representatives that there is a commitment 
at government level to a Safe System approach, particularly by DfT and Highways England, 
a number of barriers at lead agency level were identified: 
 Some perceive DfT as not giving sufficient leadership in guiding and advising local 
government, including failing to provide them with the tools to implement Safe 
System.  For instance, the design guidance for building a cycle lane has not been 
updated for 10 years (despite progress in Dutch-style cycle lanes in London); 
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 Regulations in The Highway Code are limited in terms of transport mode and have 
not kept up with the desire for more sustainable transport methods so there are 
no guidelines on developing road infrastructure which meets the needs of all road 
users without reducing traffic capacity for motor vehicles; 
 Safe System is not perceived to be promoted at a national level because it is a big 
step away from the past in terms of road design, police response to collisions and 
court responses; and 
 Whilst a commitment to Safe System has been made in the BRSS, no KPIs were 
identified.  KPIs raised of interest include: KSIs of young drivers, KPIs on levels of 
compliance, and KPIs on how effectiveness of interventions are monitored. 
2.3.15 Some representatives suggested that it is more achievable for Highways England to 
implement Safe System than local authorities, because they have more control over the 
system.  Ways in which Highways England are perceived as adopting Safe System include: 
 Basing road safety delivery plans on the Safe System approach, although 
stakeholders felt this was in early stages; 
 The ability to remove a lot of the vulnerable road users from the system e.g. by not 
allowing animal transport, some motorcycles, learner drivers, bikes or pedestrians 
on certain road types; and  
 Control over speed, velocity and the direction of vehicles.  Dual carriageway 
highways are a solution to reducing head-on collisions, white lines and barriers in 
the centre of the road also reduce head on collisions, which is another aspect of 
Safe System that Highways England can implement easier than local authorities 
because “they have the legal position, authority and money”. 
2.3.16 It was noted by some representatives of advisory groups/charities/associations that 
government does not have the sole capacity or responsibility to deliver Safe System 
because successful implementation is a shared responsibility across all areas of industry 
and all organisations involved (both public and private sector).  Despite this, it was still 
considered the responsibility of government to lead and encourage Safe System and 
facilitate implementation. 
2.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Target Setting 
2.4.1 Representatives from business and industry membership organisations do not set targets 
for their members.  There is an expectation that members set their own internal targets, 
or look to achieve government-led targets, and that assistance in meeting these targets is 
offered through professional support.  Some organisations set targets for the take up of 
EuroNCAP 5* cars in rental policies. 
“We are just a training organisation, accommodating best practice, it’s not about goals 
or targets, we are trying to change hearts and minds around best practice.”  
(Business and industry representative) 
2.4.2 Barriers identified by business and industry representatives to setting targets for their 
members to meet include: 
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 Whilst membership organisations can help to ensure that members are aware of 
what ‘good’ looks like, it does not mean they are able to deliver ‘good’ because 
other priorities may get in the way; and 
 Sometimes the most effective intervention is not always completed or considered, 
by members, for a number of reasons, e.g. local authority members may struggle 
with conflicting political priorities. 
Lead Agency: Target Setting 
2.4.3 Business and industry representatives raised some concerns regarding government led 
targets.  These include: 
 KSI targets could detract from wider road safety impacts, and this may prevent 
wider action; and 
 Metrics used to measure targets are not necessarily a true reflection of what they 
are measuring, which can make achievement of targets misleading. 
Safe System 
2.4.4 There were mixed levels of awareness of Safe System, with some having no awareness at 
all.   
“If that [Safe System] is something that is being broadcast from safety media it is not 
getting to us.”  
(Business and industry representative) 
2.4.5 Of those representatives not aware, once explained to them, many felt that they followed 
the principles of the Safe System approach and were supportive of any approach that 
improves road safety and leads to a reduction in KSIs. 
2.4.6 Two stakeholders showed an awareness of ‘Vision Zero’. 
2.4.7 Some business and industry representatives suggested that awareness of Safe System in 
local authorities is low, with authorities having more significant political pressures on 
budget and resources. 
Lead Agency: Safe System 
2.4.8 Some business and industry representatives felt that Safe System is promoted, to an 
extent, within Highways England, however this is limited to some areas of Highways 
England and does not appear to be discussed by project managers and designers.  
Additionally, they commented that whilst leadership and commitment is being shown by 
Highways England, the majority of KSIs do not occur on roads they are responsible for. 
2.4.9 Additionally, some business and industry representatives felt that the safety of Highways 
England networks and local networks is inconsistent, in terms of Safe System, and this 
should not be the case, given that users travel across the different networks, without the 
knowledge that they are transferring from one to the other.     
2.4.10 At government level, some representatives argued that the role of road safety in public 
health must be recognised as KSIs have a significant impact on health and social care 
provision.  One representative noted that ‘road safety’, within a public health remit, 
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should acknowledged all the different uses of the road, for example, monitoring, in urban 
areas, the number of people who slip, trip and fall on inadequate pavements.  There was 
a perception that whilst local authorities have a public health remit, it will require a 
fundamental shift in approach for road safety to be considered within this remit. 
“Government should recognise that the highways network has a key role in public 
health, full stop…I’m not sure that it is seen as that…when we look at the words we use, 
‘road safety’ continues to promote a way of thinking about the issue, actually we should 
talk about ‘public health on local highway networks’.”  
(Business and industry representative) 
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
 Seventeen fleet managers responded to questions on results focus in the online survey.  
(Note: these findings are also relevant to the Institutional Management Function ‘Safe 
Work Travel’).  Of 17 fleet managers: 
Responsibility for road safety 
 15 agreed/strongly agreed that their organisation has a clear focal point with 
responsibility for road safety, 2 disagreed. 
 
Road Safety Priority/Strategy 
 
 14 agreed /strongly agreed that the top management of their organisation takes an 
active interest in road safety, 3 disagreed/strongly disagreed; and 
 13 agreed/strongly agreed that road safety is a key policy area for their 
organisation, 4 disagreed. 
 
British Road Safety Statement 
 
 11 agreed/strongly agreed that their organisation tailors road safety activity in 
response to the British Road Safety Statement, 3 disagreed and 3 did not know. 
 
Safe System Approach 
 
 10 agreed/strongly agreed that their organisation is adopting the Safe System goal 
and strategy, whilst 3 disagreed and 3 did not know. 
 
National Targets 
 
 15 agreed/strongly agreed that a long-term national goal for the prevention of 
people killed and seriously injured on the roads would benefit road safety activity 
and priority in their organisation, 1 did not agree and 1 did not know; and 
 12 agreed/strongly agreed that interim targets would benefit road safety activity 
and prioritisation in their organisations, 3 did not agree and 1 did not know. 
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Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
 Four road haulage managers responded to questions on results focus in the online survey. 
(These findings are also relevant to the Institutional Management Function ‘Safe Work 
Travel’).  Of the four road haulage managers: 
Responsibility for road safety 
 All 4 respondents agreed that their organisations had a clear focal point with 
responsibility for road safety. 
Road Safety Priority/Strategy 
 All 4 agreed/strongly agreed that top management takes an active interest in road 
safety; and 
 3 agreed that road safety is a key policy area in their organisation, with 1 did not. 
British Road Safety Statement 
 2 disagreed/strongly disagreed that road safety activity in their organisation was 
tailored in response to the British Road Safety Statement, whilst 2 did not know. 
Safe System Approach 
 2 agreed that the Safe System goal and strategy was being adopted by their 
organisation; 1 did not agree and 1 did not know.  
National Targets 
 3 agreed/strongly agreed that a national long-term goal for the prevention of KSI’s 
would benefit road safety activity and priority in their organisation, 1 did not know; 
and 
 1 agreed that interim national targets for reducing KSI’s would benefit road safety 
activity and priority in their organisation, 2 disagreed and 1 did not know. 
2.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Priorities 
2.5.1 Whilst the key road safety priority of the ambulance and fire service is post-crash care, 
and for the police it is enforcement, education of safe road use and safe speeds is also 
high on the agenda of all three services.  Many services work in partnership with each 
other, local authorities and charitable organisations to devise and deliver education and 
training to change driver and pedestrian behaviour, and in some areas this is specifically 
part of an action plan to tackle local KSI reduction targets. Sometimes education and 
training is prioritised to tackle specific road user groups (e.g. young drivers, elderly drivers, 
pedestrians, two wheeled road users) or specific issues (e.g. rural roads).   
2.5.2 Emergency services also work with local authorities to: 
 Advise on new engineering proposals relating to safe roads and roadsides; and 
 To refine data packages and business processes to improve efficiency of reporting 
RTAs to county councils.  
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 Target setting 
2.5.3 Emergency services are used to operating with response time targets.  In the ambulance 
service these are related to clinical needs rather than type of incident (e.g. road 
accidents), and they are set by Department of Health.   
2.5.4 Some fire services set targets relating to the number of schools in which they will deliver 
road safety education.  Other fire services work towards KSI targets for road traffic 
accidents, set by the County Council. 
 Police and Road Safety Strategic Partnerships currently set their own KSI targets in some 
areas, and this is set alongside the roles of different partners within the groups and action 
plans.  The police consider there is a need for a clearer, more results-focused approach to 
road safety with a safety performance framework. At present, it is considered that each 
police force has different priorities.   
 Emergency services personnel consulted indicated that the setting of national targets for 
KSIs would benefit outcomes.  
Safe system 
2.5.7 There was little awareness of the British Road Safety Statement (2015) or of the Safe 
System approach, or its promotion, within the ambulance, fire and police services 
consulted, at both national and local levels.  However once explained, emergency services 
commented that Safe System was integral to their operation, even if it is not recognised 
under this name.  An example is interactions of the fire service with county council 
colleagues that look at engineering solutions for accident hotspots.  However, all 
emergency services also consider education, for instance, road safety awareness training 
and driving offender retraining, as integral to the overall approach of achieving safe roads. 
2.5.8 Barriers to the implementation of the Safe System approach include lack of time and 
resource; and lack of influence over safe road use and safe vehicles, despite work with 
partners on these interventions.  In order to overcome these barriers and help further 
embed the Safe System approach, the following solutions were suggested: 
 An investment in dedicated resources to allow time for the promotion of the 
approach; and 
 A national directive outlining the implementation of road risk initiatives. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Twelve police force representatives (from different police forces) responded to questions 
on results focus in the online survey.   
Responsibility for road safety 
2.5.10 Police force representatives identified the responsibility for road safety as being within 
the following units/roles, within their police force: 
 
 Uniformed Policing Units, such as Roads Policing and Specialist Operations Units; 
 Superintendent; 
 Assistant Chief Commissioner; 
 Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and strategic lead; 
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 Inspectors, specialising in roads; and 
 Casualty Reduction Officers. 
2.5.11 One police force representative suggested that responsibility for road safety was also 
given to organisations external to the police, such as Highways Authorities. 
2.5.12 Asked whether ‘there is a clear focal point with responsibility for road safety at officer 
level’ in their police force: 
 
 5 totally agreed; 
 5 mostly agreed; and 
 2 partially agreed.   
 Of those who totally agreed, a few police force representatives suggested that 
responsibility for road safety was given to a dedicated road policing team, including road 
safety and education officers.  those who mostly agreed, showed some concern that those 
responsible for road safety also had other competing responsibilities.  Additionally, one 
representative suggested that focal points for road safety were less clear in collaborative 
police forces, where there are multiple PCC offices and partnerships involved. 
Road Safety Priority/Strategy 
2.5.14 Police force representatives reported many different priorities for road safety 
intervention within their force. These were: 
 
 KSI reduction and investigation; 
 Enforcement (pursue, prevent, prepare, protect) of the Fatal 5: Speed, anti-social 
behaviour and inappropriate and inconsiderate driving, drink and drug driving, seat 
belt use and misuse of mobile phones, using police and community resource; and 
 Safeguarding vulnerable people, for instance, through road safety education for 
younger and older drivers. 
2.5.15 Police force representatives reported many different methods for identifying priorities for 
road safety intervention in their forces. These were: 
 
 Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) and force strategy; 
 Analysis of collision data, with some police forces specifying KSI statistics, to 
identify threat, harm and risk to road users, with the suggestion from one force that 
this was to be improved; 
 Partnership strategy, with one representative showing concern for the lack of 
strategic working across road safety partners to determine local priorities; 
 Resource; 
 Partnership education, enforcement, engineering and encouragement (EEEE) 
activity; 
 National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC), European Traffic Police Network (TIPSOL) 
and National Roads Policing Intelligence Forum (NRPIF) Calendars; and 
 Public concern. 
2.5.16 Asked about whether ‘road safety is a key enforcement area’ in their force: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 5  partially agreed; and 
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 1 disagreed. 
 Of those who did not totally or mostly consider road safety a key enforcement area, road 
safety was enforced by roads policing units and specialist constables.  There was some 
concern that reductions in roads policing resource, and competing priorities, had made 
enforcement of roads safety challenging. 
2.5.18 Levels of reported agreement with the statement that ‘there is a clear strategic plan to 
reduce road deaths through enforcement’ were: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed; 
 6 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
 Plans were seen to be based on PCC strategy, the THINK campaign, TIPSOL and NRPIF 
calendars, and crime reduction plans. 
2.5.20 Asked whether ‘road traffic enforcement is seen as a means of tackling criminal activity’ 
in their force: 
 3 totally agreed; 
 3 mostly agree; and 
 6 partially agreed. 
2.5.21 One representative who partially agreed suggested that such activity was sporadic, and 
another suggested that resource restrictions within Highways and Transport units have 
led to a prioritisation in KSI reduction over the tackling of general criminal activity on the 
roads. 
2.5.22 In response to the statement ‘enforcement of Road Traffic Offences inform tactical patrol 
plans for Roads Policing Officers’:  
 4 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 5 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
2.5.23 As to whether ‘enforcement of Road Traffic Offences inform tactical patrol plans for Local 
Policing Officers’ in their force: 
 3 partially agreed; 
 7  disagreed; and 
 2   did not know. 
2.5.24 It was noted that enforcement of Road Traffic Offences mainly informed the tactical patrol 
plans for special constabulary and was not a local policing priority. 
2.5.25 Asked whether ‘there is a strategy for addressing KSIs’ in their force: 
 6 totally agreed; 
 3 partially agreed; 
 2 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
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2.5.26 Police strategies often supported strategies of local county councils, road safety 
partnerships and PCC.  One representative reported that their police force was currently 
reviewing their road safety strategy. 
2.5.27 Asked whether ‘there are safety performance indicators which have a direct relationship 
to KSI prevention/reduction’: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 5 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 3 did not know. 
2.5.28 One representative suggested that such safety performance indicators, within the police, 
corresponded to county council safety performance indicators.  Additionally, 3 
respondents reported that safety performance indicators, causally related to KSIs, are not 
present in their police force, with 1 suggesting that performance indicators were replaced 
by a qualitative framework.  There was some concern that indicators were monitored but 
needed to be better managed. 
 Asked whether ‘safety performance indicators causally related to KSIs are monitored’: 
 2 totally agreed; 
 4 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 3 did not know. 
 There was some concern that indicators were monitored but needed to be better 
managed. 
2.5.31 Asked whether ‘there is a long-term goal for preventing KSIs within this police force’: 
 6 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed; 
 3 partially agreed; 
 1 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.5.32 One representative explained that long term goals and targets were underpinned by PCC 
strategy and another suggested that their strategy was currently being re-written to 
accommodate long-term objectives. 
2.5.33 Similarly, police force representatives commonly reported that, ‘there are interim goals 
and targets for preventing KSIs within this police force’: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 3 partially agreed; 
 2 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.5.34 There was some disagreement on the value of targets, with one representative suggesting 
that their force did not have a targets culture and another suggesting that their strategy 
was currently being re-written to accommodate interim objectives.  There was some 
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concern for the possible level of commitment to interim targets, especially with current 
resource levels. 
2.5.35 Asked whether: ‘the police force is formally held to account for their road safety 
performance’: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 3 mostly agreed; 
 1 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
2.5.36 Reported accountability practices included scrutiny by the PCC and governance board.   
2.5.37 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘Road safety is a priority shared across 
the police force’ were reported: 
 2 totally agreed; 
 0 mostly agreed; 
 5 partially agreed; 
 4  disagreed; and 
 1  did not know. 
2.5.38 Of those who did suggest that road safety was a shared priority, it was mainly seen to be 
shared in a road policing capacity and undertaken by Road Policing Officers, PCSOs and 
Special Constables. 
2.5.39 Asked whether ‘road safety is solely owned by roads policing officers’: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 1 partially agreed; and 
 3  disagreed. 
2.5.40 Road safety was also seen to be owned by partner agencies, PCSOs and Special 
Constables.  One representative suggested that limited capacity within road policing units 
meant that road safety was only dealt with through the management of fatal and serious 
road collisions. 
British Road Safety Statement 
2.5.41 Eight of the twelve police force representatives reported that they were not at all aware 
of the British Road Safety Statement (2015) (BRSS) prior to the survey, with the remainder 
only moderately or somewhat aware.  Of those who were aware, one suggested that their 
forces road safety activity was mostly tailored to the BRSS and two suggested that it was 
partially tailored to it, and one said it was not at all tailored to the BRSS. 
Safe System Approach 
2.5.42 Seven of the twelve police force representatives reported that they were not at all aware 
of the Safe System approach.  Of those who were aware, only one described themselves 
as extremely aware, the others said they were slightly or moderately aware. 
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2.5.43 Asked (of the 5 who were aware of Safe System), whether, ‘the Safe System goal and 
strategy is being adopted by our police force’, responses were: 
 1 totally agreed;   
 1 mostly agreed; 
 2 partially agreed; and 
 1  did not know. 
2.5.44 Similarly, asked (of the 5 who were aware of Safe System), whether ‘there are processes 
in place locally to ensure awareness and understanding of the Safe System approach’: 
 1 mostly agreed; 
 3 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
2.5.45 Asked (of the 5 who were aware of Safe System), whether ‘there are processes in place 
nationally to ensure awareness and understanding of the Safe System approach’ 
respondents answered: 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 2 partially agreed; and 
 1  did not know. 
2.5.46 Police force representatives who were aware of the Safe System approach reported the 
following barriers for its implementation: 
 
 Lack of understanding and direction from senior management; 
 Lack of awareness in general; 
 Competing priorities; 
 Insufficient focus, within the approach, on police accountability in road safety; 
 Lack of ring-fenced funding to support implementation and delivery; 
 Difficulties with strategic coordination, especially for collaborated police services, 
who have multiple road safety teams, partnerships and PCC’s; and 
 Lack of national imperative. 
2.5.47 Police force representatives, who were aware of the Safe System approach reported the 
following would help embed/further embed Safe System, within their police force: 
 
 Improved understanding of the polices’ role in Safe System delivery, with guidance 
provided to multi-agencies.  This could be in video or PowerPoint format; 
 Home Office endorsement; 
 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary scrutiny of the approach; 
 Increased PCC awareness; 
 Ring-fenced investment into Roads Policing; 
 Full integration and collaboration by collaborated police services and partnerships, 
with alignment in Safe System priority across all forces; and 
 Development of national analytical capability. 
 
 National Targets 
2.5.48 All 12 respondents agreed with the statement ‘a national long-term goal for prevention 
of KSI would benefit road safety activity and priority in my police force’, 8 of whom strongly 
agreed. 
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2.5.49 Asked whether they agreed with the statement, ‘interim national numerical targets for 
reducing KSI would benefit road safety activity and prioritisation in my police force’: 
 4    strongly agreed; 
 5    agreed; 
 2    disagreed; and 
 1    strongly disagreed. 
2.5.50 Of those who reported agreement with the statement, 1 representative suggested that 
interim national targets for reducing KSI would encourage proactive working.  There was 
some concern from representatives that national interim targets for KSI reduction would 
be ineffective because: 
 
 They would be impossible to achieve in the current resource environment; 
 Causes of KSI are different in different locations; and 
 They would introduce conflicts in with other policing priorities. 
 
Barriers to achieving road safety results 
2.5.51 Police representatives reported a number of barriers in implementing road safety activity 
in their forces. These were: 
 
 Competing policing demand and priority, meaning roads policing staff are 
frequently deployed in other areas and other areas are often prioritised over roads 
policing, for instance, cyber-crime, terrorism, adult and child abuse, vulnerability 
and fraud; 
 Lack of time, resource and funding due to competing priorities; 
 Conflict between PCC and public expectations; 
 Lack of investment by partners; 
 Lack of support from senior management; and  
 Lack of national lead or direction. 
2.5.52 Police force representatives suggested that barriers to implementing road safety activity 
could be overcome through the following processes: 
 
 Increasing resource and funding, possibly ring-fenced, for road policing and road 
safety partnerships.  One representative suggesting that more freedom should be 
provided over the retention of traffic offence penalty charges and diversionary 
courses, in order to directly fund roads policing and partnership activity; 
 Increasing the priority given to roads policing, with recognition of the importance 
of safe roads and casualty reduction; 
 Acknowledgement of common goals and statutory responsibilities with road safety 
partners in other organisations; 
 The creation of a voluntary enforcement authority, like PCSOs; and 
 Clear requirements set out for police responsibility in road safety, with the 
introduction of key performance indicators, audits and inspection.  One 
representative suggested that compliance could be monitored by the Home Office 
through Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary scrutiny.  
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2.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Priorities and targets 
2.6.1 There was concern amongst representatives that whilst the British Road Safety Statement 
is ‘not terrible’ it is not what many expected as it is not a new strategy and is therefore 
limited in scope regarding intervention.  In particular there is no follow-through with 
specified, targeted action.  
2.6.2 There was some concern amongst academic representatives that alongside the change in 
approach away from goal and target-setting and delivery frameworks and towards 
localism, the UK has not engaged, despite ‘signing up’ to global SDGs and EU fatality 
targets and long-term goals, and UK KSIs are on the rise.  It was recognised by some, 
however, that in addition to lack of targets and reduced funding, the plateauing or rise of 
KSIs may in part be as a result of changes in demographics and GDP, and reduced 
resources leading to reduced delivery capacity at national and local levels.  There is also 
concern that there is lack of DfT capacity in road safety in addition to a lack of ministerial 
support and leadership. 
 There is an overarching view amongst academics that goal and target setting and KPIs are 
integral to successful outcomes for road safety, at a national and local level, and that the 
DfT should follow organisations such as Highways England, TfL, devolved administrations 
and some (albeit few) local authorities in setting KSI reduction targets.  Most believe that 
a long-term aspiration goal for the ultimate prevention of death and serious injury is 
needed, though a few reject the Vision Zero concept as they consider that it is 
unobtainable.   Some consider that the term Towards Zero is more acceptable than Vision 
Zero. 
2.6.4 Some felt that results would be better achieved under a number circumstances, including: 
 If targets are supported by comprehensive safety performance framework with a 
timeframe and indicators to provide a focus and unifying element in road safety 
practice, and evidence-based activity to manage compliance with speed, seat belt 
use, helmet use, reduce distraction, 5* Euro NCAP, 4 and 5 * Euro iRAP; 
 With more synthesis of current information to assist in prioritisation, i.e. pointing 
to where next gains can be made; 
 With merging of districts to get better economies of scale for road safety delivery; 
 With a U-turn to the current lack of focus on speed management; 
 With more focus on accident prevention by addressing inherent risks in the system; 
 If priorities were set by considering behaviours that need to be better addressed, 
for example speeding, mobile phone use, and distracted driving; 
 If targets were set in line with the Safe System approach, but keeping them simple; 
 If targets were set at a national level, but also broken down by region to allow 
problem/risk areas to be highlighted; and 
 If specific targets existed for driving to work – which they identified as a problem 
area in road safety. 
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Safe System 
2.6.5 Many academics considered Safe System to be an aspirational long-term goal for UK road 
safety policy but one that is not currently adopted.  They feel that there is little evidence 
of both understanding of or implementation of Safe System particularly at a local level.   
2.6.6 Whilst there is some support for the overarching aims of Safe System, and the need to 
look at the bigger picture rather than things in isolation, there is also concern that: 
 There is a lack of understanding of Safe System because it is a complicated set of 
systems that make up the whole strategy; 
 Different interpretations of Safe System are being applied;  
 Some professionals do not understand the evidence base for Safe System; 
 There is a lack of capacity in local authorities to access and address the Safe System 
approach; and 
 It is too complicated to adopt because it is too big with too many people involved:  
government bodies, regulators, individuals, transport planners, NGOs, parents, 
vehicle manufacturers, etc. 
2.6.7 Some considered that Safe System is broad and includes compliance with safety 
legislation and user standards, and that the behavioural side relating to direct approaches 
with users is the least well-evidenced element of road safety. They suggested a simpler 
approach; rather than tackle Safe System as a whole, with all stakeholders, work should 
be undertaken with those who have a specific impact on that particular system e.g. work 
with police, individuals and vehicle manufacturers to tackle mobile phone use (i.e. ensure 
phones are switched off as soon as a car moves). This neglects some specific but very 
important influences, e.g. we need to better educate parents about the dangers of lone 
driving after passing your driving test, and we need to better educate fleet managers of 
SMEs. 
  
 42/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: 
COORDINATION 
3.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Coordination within DfT, and between DfT and Agencies 
3.1.1 The Road User Licensing, Insurance and Safety division (RULIS) provide the internal 
coordination around the British Road Safety Statement (BRSS), meeting every two 
months.  Coordination between most, but not all, DfT divisions and RULIS is considered to 
be good by DfT representatives.  However, coordination between different sections 
within RULIS sections is considered less good, with more engagement considered 
required, and there is a desire for this to improve.  
3.1.2 The primary function of the Road Safety Delivery Group (RSDG) is to deliver on the BRSS, 
reflecting different legislative competences, but its remit is wider than this in terms of 
information and knowledge sharing within DfT and its agencies.  There was some concern 
raised that whilst the RSDG is a good tool for knowledge sharing, it does not perform as a 
delivery partnership in terms of decision making. 
3.1.3 More recent coordination and project collaborations on road safety issues have occurred 
between DfT and the Driver Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA), who are represented on 
the Road Safety Delivery Group. The DVSA also participates in the Motorists Forum for 
updates on industry occurrences.  There is considered to be good coordination between 
DVSA and RULIS and between DVSA and Highways England (HE). 
3.1.4 The relationship between DfT and Highways England (HE) is considered good, with HE 
represented on the Road Safety Delivery Group. However, there was some desire 
expressed for more HE involvement on specific road safety issues, for instance, trailer 
safety issues and speed management.   
Interdepartmental Coordination 
3.1.5 There are no formal channels or forums through which different government 
departments engage with each other on road safety.  Rather, engagement is reported to 
occur on a topic by topic basis, when considered necessary, and to address specific issues 
set out in the BRSS.  However, such interdepartmental engagement is not consistent, and 
an example cited of where it did not take place was removal of road humps in an air 
quality policy statement, added without DfT consultation.   
3.1.6 The Home Office (HO) was referenced multiple times as being a key department which 
the DfT should engage with about road safety issues, but this process was cited as being 
difficult, with the Home Office proving difficult to engage with, except on a few policy 
areas such as mobile phone use and on the national crash injury reporting system.   
Contact between DfT and HO is on a case-by-case basis, and the HO has contact with DfT 
PLO on policing matters or policy officials on policy matters.  The HO are not members of 
the RSDG.  Coordination between the DfT and the police comes mainly via the National 
Police Chief’s Council; there were mixed views on police cooperation within the DfT. 
3.1.7 Various members of the DfT expressed a desire for road safety to be on the 
interdepartmental agenda and cited interdepartmental coordination as a key area for 
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improvement.  In addition to the Home Office, there is also a desire for closer coordination 
between the DfT and the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), Department of Health (DoH) and 
Department for Education (DfE) relating to road safety. 
Coordination between DfT/Agencies and Local Authorities 
3.1.8 The Road Safety Delivery Board is a forum of the partners who deliver road safety on the 
ground (the police, local authorities, Highways England, the fire and rescue service, DVSA 
and devolved administrations), hosted by the DfT.  The objective of the Board is to identify 
and share best practice, and identify and tackle obstacles to delivery.  It acts as the key 
method of engagement with Local Authorities (LAs), and there are mixed views of how 
successful it is, with some desire expressed for more partnerships to be formed at local 
levels. 
3.1.9 Some DfT and agency stakeholders expressed the view that the lack of a national safety 
performance framework makes coordination with Local Authorities (LAs) more 
challenging. 
3.1.10 However, the Safer Roads Fund is considered an important factor in improving 
engagement with LAs, in addition to putting a focus on internal DfT engagement. 
Other Coordination 
3.1.11 DfT representatives consider that HE coordinates with each of its seven regions through 
Regional Road Safety Coordinators, and they assist regions in meeting targets and 
developing action plans.  
3.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Road Safety Partnerships 
3.2.1 Many County Councils manage Road Safety Partnerships, coordinating different bodies 
that may include: police force; fire and rescue; hospitals; trauma centres; HE; Public 
Health England (PHE); victim associations; and park authorities.  Local Government 
stakeholders noted that police forces are increasingly managing safety camera 
partnerships. 
3.2.2 Despite these partnerships, there is a desire from some councils for more coordination 
between councils and the emergency services, who note that road safety is not always 
considered a priority for the emergency services, or the funding is not available for road 
safety enforcement. 
3.2.3 Whilst partnerships exist at a local authority level, there appears to be little or no 
coordination between the different local authorities. 
Regional Coordination 
3.2.4 Local Authorities consulted view the Highways England Regional Coordinators positively 
and indicated that they offer them constructive support.  However, they acknowledged 
some problems between the local and strategic road network. 
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Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Thirty one RSOs responded to questions on coordination in the online survey. 
3.2.6 RSOs indicated that responsibility for road safety activity in their local authorities is either 
given to an individual road safety team or is dispersed between different departments.  In 
the latter case, road safety is dispersed between a combination of road safety teams, 
highways, public health, engineers and school crossing patrol teams.  Dispersed road 
safety activity is often coordinated through regular interdepartmental meetings and 
communication.  The success of this coordination depends upon the quality of 
interdepartmental relationships, with many local authorities suggesting that these 
relationships are good.  Additionally, within some local authorities, RSOs explained that 
road safety activity is governed by a coordinating body, such as a road safety partnership 
or casualty reduction forum. These coordination practices allow for the sharing of 
programmes, resources (such as road safety audits, reports), ideas and priorities.  
Priorities are often based on internal reporting, areas of deprivation, collision data and 
local concern. 
3.2.7 Asked about linkages with central government agencies and regional partnerships on road 
safety, some RSOs cited linkages with DfT and Highways England.  However, they 
recognised that these linkages are limited, with many declaring very little or no direct 
contact with central government agencies. Regional linkages are more common, with 
many RSOs citing links with: 
 
 Regional road safety and casualty reduction councils and partnerships, such as safety 
camera partnerships and regional collision reduction forums; 
 Regional Transport Executives; 
 Other RSOs and county councils; and 
 Emergency services, most notably the fire and rescue and the police services. 
 Linkages with road safety agencies, associations and charities were also cited, including: 
 Road Safety GB; 
 Road Safety Scotland; 
 RoSPA; 
 Child Accident Prevention Trust; 
 TISPOL; 
 BRAKE; and 
 IAM Road Smart. 
 All RSOs agreed somewhat with the statement ‘road safety activity is well coordinated 
and communicated within the local authority’. Specifically: 
 6  totally agreed; 
 18 mostly agreed; and 
 7 partially agreed. 
 Reasons cited for poorer coordination were difficult partnership working with emergency 
services, staff changes and the independent nature of some local authority audits. 
3.2.11 Asked about the statement ‘the authority works with other organisations locally to 
achieve road safety results’: 
 10 totally agreed; 
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 15 mostly agreed; and 
 6 partially agreed. 
 RSOs generally reported that their local authorities work with national networks/ 
organisations to achieve road safety results.  Specifically: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 14 mostly agreed; 
 11 partially agreed; and 
 2 disagreed. 
 The most commonly cited linkage with national networks and organisations was with 
Road Safety GB.  Additionally, one local authority noted difficulties with working with 
national networks and organisations, specifically the delivery of good and timely data 
from the police. 
 Asked about the statement ‘road safety in the authority is being aligned with other 
governmental policies and Sustainable Development Goals to achieve co-benefits and 
build business cases’: 
 4  totally agreed; 
 9  mostly agreed; 
 12  partially agreed; 
 4 disagreed; and 
 2  did not know. 
3.2.15 The most commonly reported alignments were with public health and active and 
sustainable travel, with one RSO citing the importance of air quality. Reasons for partial 
alignment were resource effort required to make links and develop common themes and 
lack of consideration for road safety by other local authority departments. 
3.2.16 Formal road safety partnerships were only present in around half (58%) of local 
authorities who took part in the RSO survey.  Reasons for not having a formal road safety 
partnership were: 
 Having a more general community safety partnership instead;  
 Being a small local authority; and 
 Lack of funding. 
3.2.17 Many RSOs suggested that joint working could be strengthened, on a national and local 
basis, through the introduction of coordination bodies. Suggested bodies were: 
 Regional; managed by Highways England or DfT, with communication linkages 
between local authority road safety, education and engineering, the police service, 
the fire and rescue service, the NHS, industry and communication with the 
Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport 
(ADEPT); 
 Road Safety Beacon Councils; and 
 Already formed road safety partnerships, with some RSOs suggesting each local 
authority should form one, with linkages to active travel and road engineers seen 
as important. 
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3.2.18 Additionally, RSOs suggested that joint working could be strengthened through the 
following processes, some of which would be possible through the establishment of a 
coordinating body: 
 The setting of joint targets; 
 The sharing of policies and strategy, with clear guidance on roles and 
responsibilities; 
 The strategic allocation of funding to road safety activities; 
 The dissemination of road safety best practice and guidance to partner 
organisations from a coordination body; 
 The encouragement of coordination between local authorities and emergency 
services; 
 Transparent communication; 
 Promotion of evidence-based research; and 
 Better communication between DfT and local authorities. 
3.2.19 A number of RSOs also cited the importance of professional training, suggesting it should 
be recognised as essential when employing and appropriately funded.  
3.2.20 Other organisations that RSOs reported working with include:  
 Local Highway Authorities; 
 Schools and academic Institutions; 
 Her Majesty’s Naval Service; 
 Car manufacturers; 
 Transport consultancies;  
 Industry associations, including insurance companies; and 
 Driving and cycle instructors. 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
3.2.21 Twenty four local authority representatives responded to questions on coordination in 
the online survey.  Respondents reported working with the following organisations: 
 Central government departments, such as the Department for Transport (DfT), 
DVSA and Highways England; 
 Neighbouring County Councils; 
 Regionalised transport agencies, such as Transport for London (TfL) and Transport 
for Greater Manchester (TfGM); 
 Local Highway Authorities; 
 National Road Safety Organisations, such as Road Safety GB, RoSPA, IAM and 
BRAKE; 
 Regional Road Safety Partnerships; 
 Community groups, including community speed watch groups and voluntary 
emergency services; 
 Schools and academic Institutions; 
 The police service; 
 The fire and rescue service; 
 The National Health Service (NHS) including trauma centres and Ambulance 
Services; 
 Royal Air Force; 
 Transport consultancies;  
 Industry associations and companies; 
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 Driving and cycle Instructors; 
 Local businesses; and 
 Bike scheme providers.   
3.2.22 The local authority survey responses indicated that the responsibility for road safety 
activity in local authorities is either given to an individual road safety team or is dispersed 
between different departments.  In the latter case, road safety is dispersed between a 
combination of road safety teams, highways, traffic and transport, public health, 
sustainable travel, engineers, education and contract and programmes management 
teams.  Dispersed road safety activity is often coordinated through regular 
interdepartmental meetings and communication.  It was reported by local authority 
representatives that the success of this coordination depends upon the quality of 
interdepartmental relationships, with many local authorities having appropriate 
management and departmental structures to support these.   
3.2.23 Additionally, within some local authorities, respondents explained that road safety 
activity is governed by a coordinating body, such as a road safety partnership.  These 
coordination practices allow for the sharing of strategies and policies, with external road 
safety partners such as the police service, fire and rescue service, ambulance service, 
neighbouring authorities, schools and academic institutions, trading standards and safety 
camera operators. 
3.2.24 Asked about linkages with central government agencies and regional partnerships on road 
safety, some local authority representatives cited linkages with DfT.  However, it was 
broadly recognised that these linkages are limited, with many declaring linkages in terms 
of funding, such as the Safer Roads Fund.  Regional linkages are more common, with many 
local authority representatives citing links with: 
 Regional road safety and casualty reduction councils and partnerships, such as 
safety camera partnerships and regional collision reduction forums, usually 
including a regional HE representative; 
 Regional engineering groups and partnerships; 
 Regional Road Safety GB forums, with links to DfT; 
 The Association of Directors of Environment, Economy, Planning and Transport 
(ADEPT); 
 Regional Transport Executives, such as TfL; and 
 Other/neighbouring county councils. 
 Local authority representatives were generally positive in response to the statement that 
‘road safety activity is well coordinated and communicated within the local authority’: 
 6 totally agreed; 
 14 mostly agreed; and 
 4 partially agreed. 
3.2.26 Many local authorities suggested that coordination was continually being developed, with 
one respondent suggesting that a road safety interventions package was being developed 
in order to clearly outline colleagues responsibilities and projects.  Barriers to 
coordination cited were: 
 Lack of staff resource; 
 Poor communication with partners; 
 Diverging approaches to road safety between partners; and 
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 Silo working, with partners attempting activities alone and not reporting back on 
this. 
3.2.27 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘the authority works with other 
organisations locally to achieve road safety results’ were: 
 9 totally agreed; 
 10 mostly agreed; and 
 5 partially agreed. 
3.2.28 Many local authority representatives indicated the importance of local partnerships 
between local authorities, district councils, the police service, the fire and rescue service, 
Public Health, local communities and businesses, industry associations and companies 
and schools. 
 Asked about the statement ‘the authority works with national networks/organisations to 
achieve road safety results’: 
 3 totally agreed; 
 11 mostly agreed; 
 8  partially agreed; and 
 2 disagreed. 
3.2.30 Cited linkages national include links to Road Safety GB, RoSPA, ADEPT, Road Safety 
Foundation, PACTS, HE, DfT, and Military and road user associations such as motorcycle 
safety groups.  Two local authority representatives reported that their local authority had 
no national network/organisation links.  
 Local authority representatives reported differing levels of agreement with the statement 
‘road safety in the authority is being aligned with other governmental policies and 
Sustainable Development Goals to achieve co-benefits and build business’: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 11  mostly agreed; 
 8  partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 The most commonly reported alignments were with public health, active and sustainable 
travel and occupational health and safety.  Many respondents suggested that such 
alignments were currently being established. 
3.2.33 The local authority representatives indicated that formal road safety partnerships were 
present in three quarters of local authorities.  One respondent suggested that an informal 
partnership existed in their local authority and another had some concern for the 
effectiveness of road safety partnerships, citing a lack of training and ambition as causes 
of this concern. 
3.2.34 Local authority representatives suggested that joint working could be strengthened, on a 
national and local basis, through the following processes: 
 The sharing of best practice through networking events and guest representatives 
at road safety partnership meetings; 
 The allocation of funding to incentivise regional working; 
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 The clarification of local roles and priorities, with the provision of clear advice and 
guidance; 
 A focus on what is being achieved and why; 
 Leadership and facilitation by an external body, such as DfT, HE, RSS, an 
independent leader or a road safety partnership. However, there was some 
concern that road safety partnerships are not always effective; 
 The implementation of national targets; and 
 Better data sharing locally, for instance, the sharing of TARN data. 
3.2.35 A number of respondents noted that local and regional joint working seems to be 
effective, however, there was some disparity in views on national joint working, with 
some reporting that national joint working is less clear than local and regional joint 
working.  
3.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Coordination between Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
3.3.1 There appears to be a lot of interaction, including informal partnerships, between 
different organisations that have a road safety remit.  However, there were concerns that 
the informal nature of partnerships may mean that they have a limited life-span as they 
rely on individual relationships. 
3.3.2 Coordination is considered particularly key by organisations with similar remits when 
approaching government, to ensure that a consistent message is presented. 
Coordination with Government 
3.3.3 Organisations that are represented on the Road Safety Delivery Group (RSDG) felt that its 
main focus was knowledge sharing, and suggested that it would be desirable to have more 
of a focus on road safety delivery. 
Coordination with the Private Sector 
3.3.4 There were a number of linkages between advisory groups, associations and charities and 
the private sector, with some organisations coordinating partnerships between public and 
private sector for road safety delivery.  For instance, one organisation cited linkages with 
public health and business.  
Views on Lead Agency Coordination 
3.3.5 There is a perceived lack of road safety coordination at national, regional and local level.  
At national level, there is perceived to be a lack of coordination between the DfT, MoJ and 
HO, in addition to a lack of coordination between the enforcement bodies: DVLA, DVSA, 
the police, HSE, local authorities and partnerships, in addition to health and post-crash 
care, and work-related road safety.  Advisory groups, associations and charities consulted 
are unclear as to whether the agencies have the same road safety objectives, and they 
perceived that they do not appear to coordinate activities to meet a common goal. 
3.3.6 An example cited of the lack of coordination at government level is the Road Safety 
Minister announcing a consultation on dangerous cycling, when the MoJ has just finished 
a wider consultation on driving offences, leading to frustration for all.  It is also not clear 
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why DfT is leading on this when MoJ led on the wider consultation on driving offences and 
penalties relating to causing death or serious injury. 
3.3.7 At regional level, stakeholders noted that large partnerships are made up of different 
parties who have different objectives and responsibilities, with no one specific taking 
responsibility and no clear objectives/priorities, therefore progress is not made.  They feel 
that the lack of set targets does not help as it makes it harder to set common objectives. 
3.3.8 They also noted that the separate police forces are not adequately co-ordinated and that 
whilst having separate police forces will not change, there needs to be better stronger 
national lead with regards to enforcement. 
3.3.9 At local authority level, localism is considered a demonstration of government abdicating 
its leadership role.  This results in local authorities working in silos, with each having to 
design their own standards to adhere to, this results in examples such as a lack of national 
standards for cycle infrastructure. 
3.3.10 Stakeholders suggested that to improve coordination of road safety activities to produce 
a Safe System, government should coordinate more with private sector organisations to 
understand what does and does not work, such as engaging with fleet companies on 
drivers behind purchasing decisions.  
3.3.11 Examples of positive coordination led by government cited include: 
 The THINK! campaign and TISPOL (European Traffic Police Network); and 
 Justice for Vulnerable Road User Working Group, which brought together police, 
MoJ, HO, CPS, DfT and road user charities (which has not met for many years). 
3.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Business and Industry Communication with Members 
3.4.1 Membership organisations use a variety of channels to communicate road safety 
messages with their members.  Examples of these communication channels include: 
 Newsfeeds on websites; 
 Web articles; 
 Video content; 
 Training manuals; 
 Forums for knowledge exchange; 
 Conferences, seminars and briefings; 
 Training, development and education programmes/courses; 
 Emails/e-bulletins; 
 Magazines; and 
 Industry meetings. 
3.4.2 Through these channels, a wide range of road safety messages are delivered, including: 
 Updates on vehicle safety technology; 
 Promotion of Road Safety Week; 
 Legislation changes; 
 Safe road use advice; 
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 Road safety initiatives; 
 Safety standards for autonomous vehicles; 
 Best practice in road safety engineering; and 
 Updates from DfT and DVSA. 
Coordination between Business/Industry Groups 
3.4.3 There are a number of linkages across different business/industry organisations.  
Initiatives tend to comprise of knowledge sharing activities, and range from online 
content sharing between organisations to attending/presenting at conferences run by 
other organisations. 
3.4.4 There is also a level of coordination, in terms of knowledge sharing, between 
business/industry and academic institutions. 
Communication between Business/Industry and Government 
3.4.5 Business and industry groups cited communicating with a range of government bodies 
and its agencies on road safety issues including: DfT Road Safety Delivery Group; Highways 
England; and DVSA.  Such groups cited examples of: 
 Providing technical responses to road safety consultations; 
 Sitting on road safety panels as specialist advisors; 
 Facilitating discussion between government and industry, e.g. with vehicle 
manufacturers; and 
 Coordinating with Local Authorities to provide professional support when road 
safety interventions are being considered. 
 
Lead Agency Communication 
3.4.6 Some business and industry representatives noted that whilst they might coordinate with 
DfT on other issues, road safety was not an issue ever proactively raised by DfT and not 
considered something coordinated by DfT. 
3.4.7 Business and industry representatives considered that DfT coordination needs to improve 
with local authorities.  They felt that devolution of power to local areas has resulted in a 
breakdown of trust of the DfT and causes localised effects.  For example, in London there 
are specific rules surrounding cyclist safety for HGVs, which causes confusion for road 
users, who must follow different rules in different areas.  They also noted that local 
government decisions can often be party-political and influenced by local pressures and 
therefore not go through stringent government processes.  They suggested that DfT 
should therefore be playing a more active role in identifying what “good” looks like, and 
signposting to an evidence base for local authority use and to feed new evidence into 
design manuals. 
3.4.8 Other areas where more DfT coordination was considered important include: 
 DfT coordination with vehicle manufacturers – businesses and industry 
stakeholders indicated that vehicle manufacturers are often absent from the room 
during discussions, and they felt this will become more problematic with 
autonomous vehicles; and 
 DfT coordination with corporate fleets.  
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“I don’t think they interface at all with corporate fleets and understand what happens 
in that corporate space. I think they should start speaking with industry bodies a bit 
more, start to think about output, make a plan of action about what they are going to 
do to improve road safety, be more aggressive with their opinions around best 
practice.” 
(Business and industry representative) 
3.4.9 Whilst DfT was considered the lead government department for road safety, business and 
industry stakeholders noted that efforts need to be coordinated across government, and 
that a change in language may assist these efforts. 
“When we look at the words we use, ‘road safety’ continues to promote a way of 
thinking about the issue, actually we should talk about ‘public health on local highway 
networks… DfT is the lead government department for this policy but it needs to be 
government across the piece.” 
(Business and industry representative) 
3.4.10 Some business and industry representatives noted that DfT has improved in terms of 
coordinating research conducted amongst stakeholders as DfT’s awareness of the 
research had increased. 
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
 Seventeen fleet managers responded to questions on coordination in the online survey. 
Of these: 
 12 agreed that road safety activity is well co-ordinated within their organisation, 4 
did not agree and 1 did not know; and 
 8 agreed that their organisation to has good linkages with central government 
agencies, and regional and local partnerships regarding road safety, 6 did not agree 
and 3 did not know. 
Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
 Three road haulage managers responded to questions on coordination in the online 
survey.  Of these: 
 3 agreed that road safety activity is well co-ordinated within their organisation, 1 
did not agree; and 
 3 disagreed that their organisation to has good linkages with central government 
agencies, and regional and local partnerships regarding road safety, 1 did not know. 
3.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Coordination within emergency services 
3.5.1 Internal road safety events organised by/for the fire service include annual practitioner 
days and seminars.  Some fire services have road safety strategic leads who take 
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responsibility for coordinated road safety activity internally and with external partners. 
3.5.2 National police activity is coordinated by a campaign calendar with themed months and 
weeks, which corresponds with the THINK! Calendar.   
3.5.3 Road safety activities within the ambulance service can be coordinated by internal, 
dedicated Accident Reduction Officers and in-trust driver training and staff training. 
Coordination between emergency services and external organisations 
3.5.4 In some regions, the emergency services, with other agencies, coordinate road safety 
activity through road safety partnerships.  These may include road safety discussions, 
putting together joint strategies to address problems and the provision of resource. 
3.5.5 There are a number of initiatives that integrate the police and fire services on matters of 
road safety.  In some regions, non-compliant driver courses are delivered jointly, including 
speed awareness courses.  Other educational initiatives targeted at wider levels are also 
delivered jointly in some areas. 
3.5.6 Ambulance trusts participate in the National Accident Reduction Group, which consists of 
all other Ambulance Trusts and motor insurers and brokers to reduce the number of 
accidents involving ambulances. 
3.5.7 Other external organisations coordinated with by emergency services include: 
 Armed Forces; 
 Public bodies; 
 Local Authority; 
 Highways Agency; 
 Coroners; 
 Government Agencies; 
 Private organisations; 
 Charities; and 
 Public groups. 
Road Safety Communication with the Public 
3.5.8 Methods of communicating road safety messages with the public by police and fire 
services include: 
 Social media campaigns; 
 Radio advertisements; 
 Newsletters; 
 Booklets; 
 Events at schools; 
 Presentations in hospital waiting rooms; and 
 Vehicle activated signs. 
Barriers to Coordination 
3.5.9 An example cited of poor coordination, within the health service, is the handover of 
patients to the hospital/A&E department – with least critical patients having to remain 
within the ambulance until space becomes available within the hospital, meaning delays 
for ambulances that cannot be released. 
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3.5.10 Also, there is limited coordination between the emergency services in terms of the patient 
data journey.  Whilst road trauma patient data is collected within hospitals, this is not 
integrated with ambulance data.  The data is also not coordinated with fire service data, 
despite the fire service often being the first to the scene of a road collision.  Whilst 
previous attempts have been made to combine STATS19 data with patient data, this has 
also been met with many barriers, such as differences between police and medical 
language. 
3.5.11 Additionally, a barrier to road safety coordination identified by a police force is the lack 
of priority given to road safety, which is often dependent on the individual priorities of 
police and crime commissioners (PCC). 
3.5.12 There were concerns raised that roles in coordination need to be better defined, in order 
to ensure each service delivers in the area of their expertise, rather than according to 
availability of resource. 
3.5.13 Suggestions for strengthening coordination, on a national and local basis include: 
 Developing a closer partnership with Road Casualty Reduction Officers, within the 
ambulance service, and other key stakeholders;  
 Improvements to resources and time to progress more effectively; 
 Dedicated meeting with partners; 
 Development of a single points of contact; and 
 Improvements to consistency. 
Lead Agency Communication 
3.5.14 Some emergency representatives noted that they would like more coordination with DfT, 
and would like direct communication with DfT in order to transfer knowledge.  
3.5.15 Other suggestions to improve DfT coordination include: 
 A DfT-led newsletter/website which outlines and coordinated best practice in 
education and enforcement, including sharing success stories; 
 DfT influence to coordinate the integration of EMS data with TARN data; and 
 DfT coordination in order to overcome competitiveness within the industry to 
promote knowledge sharing. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Twelve police force representatives responded to questions on coordination in the online 
survey.  Between them they reported regularly working with the following organisations 
relating to road safety: 
 Central government departments, such as the Department for Transport (DfT), 
DVSA, DVLA, DGSA, HMRC, Highways England, UK Border Agency, Environment 
Agency, Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS); 
 Members of Parliament; 
 Neighbouring County Councils; 
 Regionalised Transport agencies, such as Transport for London (TfL); 
 Local Highway Authorities; 
 National Road Safety Organisations, such as RoSPA, BRAKE, THINK, Road Safety 
Wales and BikeSafe; 
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 International Road Safety Organisations, such as the European Traffic Police 
Network (TISPOL); 
 Emergency Services, such as the police service, the fire and rescue service and the 
ambulance service; 
 The National Health Service (NHS).  However, one respondent bemoaned the lack 
of engagement from health partners:  
 “Complete lack of engagement from Health partners. This is non-existent.  No join 
up nationally on this so how can we expect local initiatives to deliver?”; 
 Local authority public health departments; 
 Schools and academic institutions; 
 Regional road safety partnerships; 
 Local businesses; 
 Media outlets; 
 Motor Insurers Bureau; 
 Other charitable organisations, such as British Horse Society; 
 Local community schemes, such as Community Speed Watch (CSW); 
 Cycling associations; 
 Trading Standards; and 
 Fuel testing organisations. 
3.5.17 The police force representatives provided insight into a range of methods used to co-
ordinate activity with different parts of their force.  Road safety is often co-ordinated 
through tasking processes and briefing teams, whereby departmental leads discuss 
priorities and threats, to ensure police resources are deployed effectively.  Operational 
orders are also developed to decide where resources should be deployed.  Co-ordination 
is also achieved through technology, including the use of email, Twitter, and force web 
sites.  Whilst some forces had specialist positions, such as Casualty Reduction Officers, 
Single Points of Contact (SPOCS), or a dedicated Special Constabulary Roads Safety 
Education team, others bemoaned the lack of support that road police receive, or the 
current lack of co-ordination in their force.  As an example, one respondent mentioned 
that their co-ordination was only achieved by knowing certain individuals and asking 
favours. Many police officers cited the use of campaigns (both nationally and locally) and 
the formation of partnerships with authorities and other emergency services, such as the 
95 Alive Campaign in North Yorkshire.  One respondent referred to Section 22a of the 
National Police Collaboration Agreement, in which different police forces work co-
operatively.  Road Police also work with other units to disrupt gang behaviour by using 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) and applying Traffic Legislation.  
 A range of examples where road traffic enforcement activity has been overlaid with other 
initiatives were provided by police force representatives.  These examples include: 
 Multi-Agency enforcement, such as: 
 Operation Trivium, which targets cross-border criminality, seeking to deny 
criminals the use of the roads in their criminal operations; and 
 Initiatives to target immigration offences, unregistered/untaxed vehicles, 
unsafe vehicles and non-compliant vehicles.  For instance, Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods Operations. 
 Working with local authorities to encourage active travel, promoting benefits such 
as improved health and reduced pollution; and 
 Taxi Enforcement. 
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 Asked whether they considered ‘road safety activity is well co-ordinated and 
communicated within their police force’, responses were: 
 2   totally agreed; 
 1   mostly agreed; 
 8   partially agreed; and 
 1   disagreed. 
 Asked whether ‘the police force works with other organisations locally to achieve road 
safety results’, responses were: 
 4   totally agreed; 
 4   mostly agreed; and 
 4   partially agreed. 
3.5.21 Asked whether ‘the police force works with national networks/organisations to achieve 
road safety results’, responses were as follows: 
 3   totally agreed; 
 2   mostly agreed; and 
 7   partially agreed. 
 Finally, when asked whether ‘road safety in the police force is being aligned with other 
national policies and Sustainable Development Goals to achieve co-benefits and build 
business cases’, responses were: 
 0   totally agreed; 
 2   mostly agreed; 
 2   partially agreed; 
 6   disagreed; and 
 2   did not know. 
3.5.23 All but one of the 12 police force representative reported having a formal road safety 
partnership within their area.  For the representative whose force did not belong to a 
formal road safety partnership, there had been a formal road safety partnership 
previously, but it had been disbanded. 
3.5.24 A range of suggestions for strengthening work with other road safety partners were 
proposed by the police force representatives.  These were as follows: 
 Increase the level of funding for road safety policing activities and partnerships – 
“Some local authorities have seen road safety activity almost disappear through 
austerity”; 
 Align partners’ strategies to create ‘Best Practice’ guidance; 
 Have a national dedicated Chief Police Officer whose job is entirely dedicated to 
Road Safety; 
 Utilise all resources by getting agencies to deliver free training to each other; and 
 Undertake more focused ‘intelligence-based’ work. 
3.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Coordination between Stakeholder Groups 
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3.6.1 Poor coordination was considered a barrier to the delivery of road safety by some 
academic institutions, who referred to insufficient cross-expert discussion and 
competitiveness preventing knowledge sharing within academia. 
3.6.2 Suggestions for improving coordination include: 
 Stakeholder management groups, where different members focus on different 
aspects of Safe System; 
 Research findings to be coordinated by a cross government agency; and 
 A road safety research advisory board for external experts to contribute ideas on 
research priorities. 
Lead Agency Coordination 
3.6.3 Academic institution representatives noted that DfT should be responsible for 
coordinating road safety, and that individual organisations are unable to implement road 
safety alone. 
3.6.4 Representatives were aware of some DfT communication with a range of stakeholders, 
however noted that they had not seen any evidence of sharing/coordination delivery 
strategies, and that this is essential to implement a Safe System.  The establishment of 
new regional frameworks/coordination bodies was suggested. 
3.6.5 Concern was also raised around UK coordination and insufficient engagement with EU 
vehicle safety working groups. 
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4. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: LEGISLATION 
4.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
4.1.1 Central government departments and agencies explained that the responsibility for 
legislation on driving offences is shared between the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the DfT, 
but which department takes responsibility for different elements is not always clear.  In 
general, it is considered that initiative for legislation comes mainly from the DfT, 
particularly for lower level offences. The MoJ is perceived to take responsibility for more 
serious breaches of the law that result in sentencing rather than fixed penalties; for 
ensuring that the fixed penalty regime does not impose fines greater than would be given 
in court; and for advising the DfT on changes to penalties and offences, for example on: 
 Recent changes to penalties for mobile phone use whilst driving;   
 Whether or not to merge dangerous and careless driving offences; and 
 Length of disqualification and the introduction of lifetime bans. 
4.1.2 Central government department and agency representatives considered that some 
legislation applies to the whole of Great Britain whilst some, including speed limits and 
drink-drive limits, are devolved.  Some recent legislative changes in devolved 
administrations were noted, including changes relating to Graduated Driver Licensing in 
Northern Ireland (2018), and new arrangements relating to roadside alcohol breath tests 
at the roadside and blood alcohol concentration limit in Scotland. 
4.1.3 The Sentencing Council was described as an independent body that promotes greater 
consistency in sentencing whilst maintaining the independence of the judiciary.   
4.1.4 There is a general view in central government and the agencies that current legislation 
relating to road safety is mainly ‘fit for purpose’.  Examples include the Health and Safety 
Work Acts 1974, which, whilst being 40 years old, is still considered fit for purpose due to 
the goal setting structure - benchmarks are agreed and set and case law updates/defines 
duties.  
4.1.5 However, whilst current legislation is mainly considered to be appropriate, many 
commented that there is sometimes a problem with lack of awareness of legislation (for 
example load security legislation); that it is not always well enough understood; and that 
it is not always well enough enforced (for example the police do not have adequate 
resources for road policing). 
4.1.6 There was also a widespread view that there is limited or no opportunities for any new 
road safety legislation at present because BREXIT is taking up all available resources to 
consider new legislation, and BREXIT issues need to be addressed before new legislation 
is considered.  Exceptions noted were: 
 Recent legislative changes resulting in a stricter penalty regime for disqualified 
drivers causing death by dangerous driving; 
 Recent legislative changes ensuring that the length of disqualification from driving 
takes into account the length of custodial sentences; 
 Legislative work currently underway to mandate the Euro NCAP 65% 5 star 
pedestrian protection threshold in the provision of transport services for all 
government departments; and  
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 Legislative development currently taking place on self-steering of automated 
vehicles (although no conclusion has been reached on legislating for crash 
protection standards on non-European Community Whole Vehicle Type Approval 
vehicles).   
4.1.7 Whilst some expressed a desire for a similar legislative environment post BREXIT, 
including retaining unified licence rules and standards, and EU Whole Vehicle Type 
Approval, there is also recognition by some that BREXIT will provide an opportunity in the 
future to look beyond European legislation and will allow for more creativity. 
4.1.8 Some areas where future legislation changes were desired by at least some from central 
government departments/agencies include: 
 Consideration of new driving offences and penalties relating to causing death or 
serious injury by careless driving, as opposed to existing legislation which only 
addresses causing death by dangerous driving.  This new driving offence, and its 
associated penalties, were consulted on in 2016, with the MoJ concluding that the 
offence will be introduced; 
 Increased legislation to enhance pedestrian and cyclist safety; 
 Increased legislation around cycling, with a view to legislating for death by 
dangerous cycling (which is being considered as part of the cycle safety review); 
and 
 Management of the physical state of vehicles i.e. the poor condition of vehicles due 
to age and wear and tear. 
4.1.9 More specific legislative changes desired by at least some from central government 
departments/agencies include: 
 Restrictions on provisional licences for motorcycle riders such that if they get 6 
points within 2-3 years, their provisional licence is withdrawn;  
 Introduction of theory tests before provisional licences for motorcycle riders are 
given; and 
 Road safety education forming part of Personal, Social, Health and Economic (PSHE) 
education on the national school curriculum. 
4.1.10 Potential legislative changes which were a cause for concern by some includes potential 
changes to EU rules on graduated access to motorcycles, as it was considered this may 
potentially deter riders from taking tests. 
4.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
4.2.1 Local government representatives highlighted that current legislation and regulations 
were developed alongside a general understanding that it is road users that make roads 
unsafe.  The Safe System approach, in which it is considered that it is the road and 
roadside environment that makes roads unsafe, has been developed more recently, 
without changes to regulations, legislation and guidance for road engineers to reflect this. 
4.2.2 Risk and safety assessments, supported by the safety audit, highlight inherent danger in 
roads and thus support the Safe System approach.  The Construction and Design 
Management (CDM) regulations put a responsibility on designers to remove risks 
identified by an independent risk assessment safety audit.  Whilst this highlights risks, 
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local government representatives considered that these risks cannot be removed because 
the design manuals (which they reported were designed for the strategic road network 
and not the local road network) are outdated. They reported that engineers are not 
prepared to step outside of these design manuals, due to liability issues. 
“[Engineers] are put in a very awkward position because, in one breath they are reading 
the Road Safety Statement, but at the same time, they are looking at their design 
manuals and saying well, ‘actually I can’t because the design manuals say it’s got to be 
x, y and z… If they [government] had actually looked at the legislation and regulations 
that road networks are designed under, and reviewed those, this [Safe System] would 
be a huge success”  
(Local authority representative) 
4.2.3 They therefore consider that whilst most legislation relating to road safety is fit for 
purpose, the underpinning design manuals require updating for the current local road 
network. 
4.2.4 Other views expressed by a few or less local authority representatives were that: 
 DfT should take a stronger lead on legislative matters, particularly in the area of 
vehicle safety and driver licensing;  
 Cyclist accountability should be captured through legislation; and  
 Graduated driving licences should be introduced. 
 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Thirty one RSOs responded to questions on legislation in the online survey. 
 There were high levels of agreement with the statement ‘current legislation is appropriate 
to enable the local authority to deliver effective road safety interventions’: 
 24 totally or mostly agreed; 
 5 partially agreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
 Of those RSOs who suggested that legislation was mostly or partially appropriate, 
suggested issues were: 
 The room for interpretation with terminology, which has been seen to lead to the 
lowest permissible level of road safety activity, without breaching statutory 
responsibility;  
 Statutory responsibility of all organisations in the delivery of road safety is unclear; 
and 
 The criminalisation of moving traffic offences, which do not include parking 
violations, equipment violations or paperwork violations, relating to vehicle 
insurance and registration, as this does not allow for local authority input, in all 
cases. 
4.2.8 RSOs suggested many legislative changes at a national level, which would help deliver 
road safety locally (not all of which address the issues cited above), including: 
 Making road safety education part of the national school curriculum;  
 61/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 Introducing Graduated Driving Licenses; 
 Allowing 16 year olds to ride two-wheelers in excess of 50cc; 
 Introducing driver re-testing for all ages; 
 Introducing mandatory eye sight tests for older drivers; 
 Introducing national and local road safety targets; 
 Decriminalising moving traffic offences; 
 Improvements to drink-drive laws by reducing the legal alcohol limit to bring the 
UK more in line with global best practice; 
 Restricting mobile phone use and in-car infotainment systems; 
 Realignment of careless/dangerous driving and careless/dangerous cycling 
legislation; 
 Legislation considering the whole cost of road-safety education and allowing for 
the re-investment of NDORs and safety camera surplus; 
 Legislation committing to and outlining ring-fenced funding for road safety; 
 Legislation outlining cycling standards regulations, as well as vehicle standards 
regulations, ensuring all vehicles are equipped with systems suggested by Euro 
NCAP; and 
 More comprehensive legislation on work related travel.  
4.2.9  Despite the changes suggested, there was some concern that legislation cannot be 
changed in isolation, and that there needs to be an awareness that legislation aimed at 
punishing drivers creates contempt toward authorities. 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty four local authority representatives responded to questions on legislation in the 
online survey. 
 There were high levels of agreement with the statement ‘Current legislation is appropriate 
to enable the local authority to deliver effective road safety interventions’: 
 20  totally or mostly agreed; 
 3  partially agreed; and 
 1  did not know. 
4.2.12 Existing legislation, such as the Road Traffic Act (1988) was recognised as critical, however 
there was some concern over Section 39, which outlines local authorities’ statutory duties 
for road safety, with a few local authority representatives suggesting that this section 
does not quantify statutory duties and therefore does not make funding of statutory 
duties imperative.  Additional comments suggested that targets may have an impact on 
legislation and that legislation is not the only limiting factor in the delivery of road safety 
interventions, with funding and resource also cited. 
4.2.13 Local authority representatives suggested many legislative changes at a national level, 
which would help deliver road safety locally, namely: 
 Making road safety education part of the national school curriculum;  
 Introducing Graduated Driving Licenses; 
 Introducing driver retesting for all ages; 
 Removing self-certification on fitness-to-drive; 
 Introducing road safety targets; 
 Setting of national indicators which reflect national priority outcomes for local 
authorities and act as performance management markers; 
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 Improvements to drink drive laws by reducing the legal alcohol limit to bring the UK 
more in line with global best practice; 
 Changing national speed limit to 50mph on rural roads; 
 Legislation giving pedestrians and cyclists priority on side roads; 
 Improvements to the Traffic Management Act to improve enforcement of moving 
traffic offences, with reference to technological enforcement; 
 Changes to the Road Traffic Regulation Act to allow for School Keep Clear markings 
to be enforceable by Civil Enforcement Officers and the police through the 
implementation of the correct signage, without the need for a Traffic Regulation 
Order; 
 Removal of the requirement to inform the Secretary of State for Transport of any 
changes to pedestrian crossings; 
 Legislation for the re-investment of NDORS and road traffic offences surplus; 
 Legislation committing to, and outlining, ring-fenced funding and resource for road 
safety; 
 Legislation outlining vehicle safety standards regulations; and 
 The amalgamation of legislation relating to road safety, public health and safe 
school travel (Education and Inspections Act). 
4.2.14 There was some concern that changes to legislation would lead to greater local power, 
which would further decrease consistency of road safety at a local level.  
4.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
4.3.1 There was some concern about future watering down of legislation post BREXIT, alongside 
a recognition that there may also be opportunities for the UK to develop new regulations 
and legislation more quickly when there is no longer a need to go through the EU. A 
number of organisations have taken a lead in reviewing current legislation. 
4.3.2 Whilst there is a general feeling that current legislation is fit for purpose and unlikely to 
change whilst the focus is on BREXIT, some specific changes are considered necessary or 
desirable, as follows: 
 A review of the Road Traffic Act (1988) and subsequent road safety legislation, 
which is currently part of various Home Office and Ministry of Justice bills, to bring 
the many bits of legislation together (such as the Health and Safety Work Act 1974 
and London Transport Act 1984); 
 More guidelines and enforcement around the Health and Safety at Work Act, and 
a review to make convictions more achievable; 
 Consistency and clarity in laws relating to causing death and serious injury by 
dangerous driving and laws relating to causing death and serious injury by careless 
driving, with stakeholders suggesting that there is inconsistency in laws relating to 
death and serious injury and overlap in the definitions of careless and dangerous; 
 More speeding legislation to support the Safe System approach, for example 
mandatory speed limiters in all vehicles (ISA) and road speed limits which align 
better; 
 More support from government regarding the 20mph speed limit, limiting the 
processes required to get it through local authorities and more enforcement to 
back it up; 
 More clarity around Vehicle Safety Regulations which are set internationally and 
are poorly understood; 
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 Changes to the Highway Code to make it more applicable to sustainable modes of 
transport, such as clarity over right of way for cyclists; 
 Legislation around the design of lorries and buses to improve sight lines to help 
vulnerable road users; 
 Mandatory practice on motorbikes without ABS prior to taking a motorbike test; 
 Guidelines on developing road infrastructure which meets the needs of all road 
users without reducing traffic capacity for motor vehicles, including design 
guidance for building cycle lanes; 
 A legal way of marking a cycle lanes across the mouth of a junction to make the 
priority more clear; 
 Mandatory appointment of a cabinet lead for road safety within local authorities; 
 Legislation to make eye sight tests and an online test of the highway code 
compulsory at a certain age in order to keep your licence; and 
 A change in driver training and tests so people know how to use technology in cars 
(e.g. use Satnav) and know how to park cars without sensors.  
4.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
4.4.1 Whilst some business and industry representatives view current legislation (including the 
Road Traffic Act) and safety standards as generally adequate as they stand, others 
consider that there is a need for more legislation and changes in regulations. 
4.4.2 There is a hope and expectation that safety standards will not be reduced during BREXIT, 
or diluted during subsequent trade agreements, and many expressed that if they were, 
this would have negative consequences on road safety standards. 
4.4.3 Business and industry stakeholders noted that national safety requirements relating to 
safe work travel, compliance with regulations for businesses, and penalties for 
noncompliance, need to be set out more clearly.  A number of suggestions for 
improvements to legislation and regulations relating to safe work travel were highlighted 
by business and industry representatives.  In summary, these were as follows: 
 Road accidents involving people travelling to/from and for work should all be within 
the remit of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE).   There should not be differences 
in legislation for safety whilst driving at work and whilst driving to/from work – both 
should be under corporate responsibility and involve prosecution of employers for 
wrong doing; 
 Licensing requirements for HGVs require additional driver training, but this is not 
required from a corporate perspective, making the obligation unclear. However, 
legislation relating to corporate manslaughter usually encourages individuals to 
“embrace their obligations properly”.  A better definition on additional training as 
a requirement for workplace driving is required;  
 There is a perceived level of ambiguity, from a corporate fleet perspective, around 
what employees are obligated to do in relation to safe work travel requirements, 
and guidelines would be welcomed around fleet policy to address this.  In addition, 
changes are desired to make driving license checks in the corporate market 
mandatory (and provided free of charge by the DVLA to encourage compliance), 
and to make employers responsible for ensuring vehicles are serviced, insured, 
have an MOT and have regular tyre and fluid level checks; and 
 There is concern that those in the road haulage industry will not get accredited with 
the Fleet Operator Recognition Scheme (FORS) (a voluntary accreditation scheme 
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that promotes best practice for commercial vehicle operators) or the Construction 
Logistics and Cyclist Safety Standard (CLOCS), which aim to increase awareness of 
surroundings and vulnerable road users, unless it is mandatory for them to do so.  
Mandatory FORS and CLOCS accreditation is required before entering 
building/construction sites and areas in London. There was a belief that this could 
be mandated nationally, through HSE. 
4.4.4 Some business and industry representatives expressed a desire for regulation relating to 
technical standards for vehicles to be done at a UN ECE level.  However, suggestions for 
changes to legislation and regulations around vehicle safety include: 
 Legislation is required to make added safety features tax free to the consumer;  
 Legislation is required to increase the number of mandatory safety features in new 
vehicles (although global regulations are an acknowledged barrier to this);  
 Legislation around mandatory safety features on HGVs should be uniform 
throughout the country.  Stakeholders considered that local standard-setting e.g. 
in London’s ‘Safer Lorry Scheme’ (under which only lorries with certain safety 
equipment fitted will be allowed on London's roads) leads to lack of uniformity and 
a confused national picture, especially for operators.  They suggested that 
government leadership is required to set national safety requirements in this 
respect; and 
 Regulation is required at an international level for autonomous vehicles that will 
act as a framework to pick up individual bits of legislation e.g. methods for detecting 
driver drowsiness and distraction, eye-tracking software, lane guidance systems. 
There is a Global Forum for Road Traffic Safety looking at these regulation 
requirements.  Business and Industry representatives suggested that the DfT will 
also need to develop a code of practice for autonomous vehicles on UK roads and 
they are currently working with various parties on this. 
4.4.5 Business and industry representatives applauded changes to allow learner drivers 
experience and exposure on the motorway network pre-test with an Approved Driving 
Instructor (ADI), as was strengthening of ADI training by DVSA.  Further changes which 
some would like to see in relation to learning to drive included: 
 A consistent curriculum for learning to drive with mandatory modules, e.g. night 
driving, bad weather driving, learning on country lanes and carrying passengers (if 
the Government will not legislate to enforce this other approaches could be used, 
e.g. insurance premium discounts and policy restrictions relative to driver 
behaviour using telematics); 
 A mandatory number of hours with an ADI when learning to drive; and 
 A longer learning to drive process with real life driving experience, as seen in 
Northern Ireland. 
4.4.6 It was considered that umbrella bodies for all road user groups should be consulted on 
any potential legislation changes which may affect them, for example changes to the 
Highway Code relating to cyclists’ priority at left hand turns and changes implemented by 
local authorities. 
4.4.7 Despite suggesting changes to legislation, some business and industry representatives 
acknowledged that change to legislation alone will not improve road safety outcomes and 
that education and the know-how to comply with new regulation and legislation is key. 
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
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 Seventeen fleet managers responded to questions on legislation in the online survey. Of 
these: 
 12 agreed/strongly agreed that current legislation is appropriate to enable their 
organisations to deliver effective road safety interventions; 4 did not agree and 1 
did not know.  
Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
 Four road haulage managers responded to questions on legislation in the online survey 
and all four agreed/strongly agreed that current legislation is appropriate to enable their 
organisations to deliver effective road safety. 
4.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
4.5.1 Emergency service representatives welcomed the opportunity to be informed and 
involved in early consultation and discussion on proposed legislative changes relating to 
road safety through involvement with the Road Safety Delivery group. 
4.5.2 Whilst some consider that current legislation enables the implementation of the 
Government’s British Road Safety Statement, the majority highlighted legislation which 
they considered outdated and in need of change.  Such changes include: 
 Changes to regulations around learning to drive to make practice on private roads 
prior to being allowed on public roads, and lessons on motorways, mandatory; 
 Graduated driver licences to restrict new drivers, for example the age/number of 
passengers they can take and alcohol levels (although some emergency service 
stakeholders were not in favour of this and preferred better education aimed at 
increasing awareness of road safety, whilst addressing the psychological elements 
of driver behaviour, such as peer pressure); 
 Regular driving assessments for senior road users (some police forces run a 
voluntary ‘Drive Safer for Longer’ scheme to fill this gap); 
 An overall review of legislation to close loopholes which prevent conviction or 
reduce sentences, and make interpretation easier for lay people. Loopholes have 
crept in as legislation is incrementally added to;   
 Legislative support to allow members of the public to commit an offence (e.g. 
contravene a red light) to allow for safe progression of an emergency vehicle; and 
 Change to the Road Traffic Act to increase the amount of time allowed to get to 
court from six months to longer (because administration/chasing usually takes up 
a large amount of this time, and police resources are limited.  This currently means 
some offences will never be penalised and a lot of cases will be lost). 
“It’s great to have legislation, but you’ve got to be able to have the end product to be 
able to deliver it… by the time you’ve relayed all the information and got all the 
information you need to be able to take that person to court you’re on such a tight 
timescale that a lot of cases get lost.”  
(Emergency service representative)  
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4.5.3 Legislation which enforces hospitals to provide TARN with data, and allows TARN to 
interrogate data at a patient level, was considered valuable. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Twelve police force representatives responded to questions on legislation in the online 
survey. 
4.5.5 Eleven of the twelve police force representatives who responded to the survey believe 
that current legislation is totally or mostly appropriate to enable the police force to deliver 
effective road safety activity.  One partially agreed with this sentiment.   
4.5.6 Six police force representatives offered suggestions for legislative changes which would 
help them deliver road safety locally.  Suggestions made include: 
 Reduce the drink drive limit – from 80mg to 50mg of alcohol; 
 Retest older drivers; 
 Tighten mobile phone legislation, with the DfT offering greater support for mobile 
phone diversion courses; 
 Crack down on cycling offences, with robust fines and sentencing; 
 Create a national infrastructure force / body to enforce compliance on the strategic 
road network; and 
 Ring fence funding for roads policing / road safety. 
 Of the six police forces who suggested these legislative changes, half suggested that 
legislation alone would will not improve road safety outcomes and that other factors are 
also important.  Namely:  
 More resources to support legislation; 
 More resources to deliver enforcement; and  
 Local government and police policies need to be reviewed to allow for closer 
working practices. 
4.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
4.6.1 Whilst there was acknowledgement that current legislation broadly allows for the 
implementation of the British Road Safety Statement, there was a concern that 
enforcement is absent or limited due to the large reduction in traffic policing and heavy 
reliance on camera technology which only detects certain behaviours (e.g. speeding) and 
ignores others (e.g. phone use). 
4.6.2 Areas of legislation highlighted as not meeting current requirements were: 
 The current drink drive limit, reported to be higher than all other European 
countries, apart from Malta; and 
 The lack of any graduated driver licence requirements, in particular relating to 
reducing alcohol limits for young drivers. 
4.6.3 Concern was raised regarding a perceived lack of enthusiasm for regulation of vehicle 
safety. 
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5. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: FUNDING & 
RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
5.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 There is widespread acknowledgement across the Department for Transport (DfT) and its 
agencies of a lack of road safety funding and resources.  However, response were more 
positive regarding ring-fenced for road safety initiatives, including The Safer Roads Fund, 
and one of the five ring-fenced funds within the Road Investment Strategy (RIS 1) for the 
delivery of road safety initiatives, with a focus on single-carriageway A roads. 
 Factors identified as having an impact on levels of funding and resource allocation for road 
safety include the United Kingdom’s exit of the European Union, and mayoral resistance 
to ring-fencing funds. 
 Specific areas raised as having been impacted by the lack of funding and resource include 
the reduction in traffic police officers and reduced capacity for vehicle safety research. 
5.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Whilst local authorities welcome the Safer Roads Fund there is still wide-spread concern 
regarding the lack of available funding and resources for road safety, with councils citing 
a large reduction in available funding.  Local authority stakeholders considered the 
current lack of resource to be an impediment to road safety progress as it has led to a 
reduction in road safety activity delivered by councils, including ETP and safe work travel. 
 Some councils spend funding generated by speed awareness courses and National Driver 
Offenders Rehabilitation Scheme (NDORS) on road safety activities.  However, there is 
concern that the funding generated from NDORS is vulnerable and may not be able to be 
used in this way in the future (see Section 4.2). 
 Other comments made by local authorities on road safety funding and resourcing include: 
 The prioritisation of resources by councils is not always based on cost-benefit 
analysis - other benefits are considered over safety benefits; 
 There is a desire to shift towards a steady long-term funding approach, directly 
linked to asset and network management strategies; 
 There is a desire to ensure that Major Road Network funding is not at the cost of 
existing road funding, e.g. National Road Fund; 
 There is a desire for the Safer Roads Fund to be extended and not to be 
competitive1, as it means the planning process is too short for implementation; and 
 Targets and funding are considered intrinsically linked, because when targets are in 
place there is pressure on local politicians, which encourages them to be engaged 
in the bidding process to receive road safety funding. 
 
                                                          
1 Please note, the fund was not competitive but targeted; local authorities with eligible roads were invited to bid.  
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Lead Agency Funding Streams 
 Comments made by local government representatives on road safety funding from DfT 
include: 
 Severe cuts over the last decade have had a large adverse impact on road safety 
work; 
 Road safety activity needs ring-fencing; and 
 There is a perception that funding to local authorities will be lost if it is not possible 
to see a return, however because no targets are set it is not possible to see a return. 
 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Thirty one RSOs responded to questions on funding in the online survey. 
 Just over half of RSOs (17) reported having DfT funding available for the delivery of road 
safety interventions.  These funding schemes included: 
 
 The Safer Roads Fund; 
 The Local Access Fund; 
 Local Transport Plans; 
 Sustainable Transport Grants; and 
 Bikeability. 
 The majority of RSOs (25) reported receiving no funding from the health sector for the 
delivery of road safety interventions.  Of the small minority that did receive funding (6), 
they thought that the funding came from the public health budget and addressed: 
 
 The promotion of 20mph; 
 The promotion of walking and cycling; 
 Improvements to air quality; and 
 Reduction in childhood injury.  
 The majority of RSOs (27) reported receiving no funding from other central government 
departments for the delivery of road safety interventions.  Of those that did receive 
funding (4), they thought funding came from local government bodies responsible for 
delivering transport schemes. Specific schemes cited included: 
 
 The Road Safety Framework Fund; and 
 Air Quality Grants to reduce idling outside schools. 
 The majority of RSOs (29) reported receiving funding from local authorities for the 
delivery of road safety interventions.  Funding was reported to come from: 
 
 Local authority capital and, revenue and funding; 
 Local Transport Plans; 
 Local Highways; 
 Local Public Health Budget; and 
 Local Road Safety Schemes Budget. 
 The majority of RSOs (25) reported receiving no funding from trusts and charitable 
sources for the delivery of road safety interventions.  Of the minority that did receive 
funding (6), sources included: 
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 Sus trans’, Cycling, Walking and Safer Streets Fund; 
 The Police services’, Safer Communities Fund; 
 Road Safety GB; 
 Local Football Clubs; and 
 Road Safety Trust. 
 Only a small minority of RSOs (2) were aware that their local authority receives funding 
from the Insurance Sector for specific road safety interventions projects.  Most (29) 
reported receiving no funding from the insurance sector for roads safety interventions. 
 Again, only the minority of RSOs (2) were aware that their local authority receives funding 
from the Industry Sector for road safety intervention projects, specifying that this was for 
support in ETP events.  Most (29) reported receiving no funding from the Industry Sector 
for road safety interventions.   
 No RSOs considered their local authority received funding from Crowd Funding for the 
delivery of road safety interventions.  
 Just under a third of RSOs (9) were aware that their local authority did receive funding 
from ‘other’ sources. These included: 
 
 NDORs Surplus; 
 Funding by organisations in receipt of commercialised road safety services, for 
instance data and analytics; 
 Police services, with an awareness that this was only short-term; 
 Safety Camera enforcement; 
 Local Enterprise Partnerships; and 
 Sponsorship. 
 The majority (25) of RSOs reported decreases in road safety funding in the last 5 years, 
with a smaller minority (2) suggesting increases and the remainder (4) suggesting that 
funding had stayed the same.  The percentage decrease reported by RSOs is outlined in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Percentage decrease of funding in the last 5 years 
PERCENTAGE DECREASE RESPONSE 
0-10% decrease 0 
11-20% decrease 6 
21-40% decrease 6 
41-60% decrease 5 
61-80% decrease 4 
81-100% decrease 1 
 Only 2 RSOs reported increases, with one estimating the increase to be 25%. 
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 The reported estimates of the proportion of funding allocated to road safety which is 
ultimately and solely used for road safety is outlined in Table 3. 
Table 3. Proportion of funding allocated to road safety actually used for purpose of road safety 
PROPORTION OF FUNDING RESPONSE 
0-25%  2 
26-69%  0 
70-100%  22 
 The reported estimates of the proportion of staff time allocated to road safety which is 
ultimately spent on road safety tasks and activities is outlined in Table 4. 
Table 4. Proportion of time allocated to road safety task actually spent on road safety tasks 
PROPORTION OF TIME RESPONSE 
0-25%  2 
26-69%  2 
70-100%  23 
 RSOs reported differing levels of agreement with the statement, ‘Investment in evidence-
based road safety activity within the local authority is secure’: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 11 partially agreed; 
 7 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 The most commonly reported difficulty in securing investment in evidence-based activity 
was budgetary constraint. Additionally, there was some belief that non-evidence based 
practices were also funded. 
 RSOs reported differing levels of agreement with the statement, ‘Budgetary pressures 
have reduced the priority given to road safety more than other local authority activities’: 
 6 totally agreed; 
 10 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
 Education and Social Services were reported as areas prioritised over road safety in local 
authorities.  Some RSOs reported a total removal of roads departments and removal of 
discretionary capital funding for casualty reduction schemes. 
 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘The number of staff to deliver road 
safety interventions is sufficient’ were: 
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 2 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; and 
 17 disagreed. 
 RSOs reported differing levels of agreement with the statement, ‘The skills and 
capabilities of staff to deliver road safety interventions is sufficient’: 
 6 totally agreed; 
 11 mostly agreed 
 5 partially agreed; 
 7 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 Staff skills and capabilities were identified as particularly important in road safety 
education and engineering. Difficulties identified were: 
 Difficulty finding staff; and 
 Lack of resource for training and development, although CPD was cited as 
important. 
 RSOs explained many ways in which local authorities had been seeking to increase 
efficiency and make better use of available financial and human resources.  These were: 
 
 Enhanced partnership working; 
 Greater collaboration with the police service;  
 Better software for analysis; 
 Attempting to conduct schemes simultaneously;  
 Outsourcing of delivery or the development of self-service delivery, however, this 
was viewed with contempt by some RSOs who believe that this leads to job cuts; 
 Community engagement; 
 Reviewing delivery, trends and scheme rationale, to ensure that hotspots are 
targeted and delivery is effective; and  
 Finding additional and new revenue funding schemes. 
 A few RSOs suggested that local authorities were not seeking to increase efficiency and 
make better use of available resources, or could not do this, due to limited resources in 
the first instance.  
 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Over three quarters of local authority representatives (20) reported having DfT funding 
available for the delivery of road safety interventions.  These funding schemes included: 
 
 The Safer Roads Fund; 
 Highways Funds; 
 The Local Access Fund; 
 National Productivity Fund; 
 Local Transport Plans; 
 Sustainable Transport Grants/Funds; and 
 Bikeability. 
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 Three quarters of local authority representatives (18) reported receiving no funding from 
the health sector for the delivery of road safety interventions.  Of those who did receive 
funding (6) from the health sector, funding was made through a Public Health grant.  One 
local authority respondent suggested that health sector funding was often discussed 
within their local authority, however, no specific funding had been developed to date. 
 The majority of local authority representatives (23) reported receiving no funding from 
other Central government departments for the delivery of road safety interventions. 
 The majority of local authority representatives (22) reported receiving funding from local 
authorities for the delivery of road safety interventions.  Funding was reported to come 
from: 
 
 Local Authority capital, revenue and funding; 
 Local Transport Plans; 
 Local Highways; and 
 Local Road Safety Schemes Budget, with specific reference to casualty reduction 
and road safety ETP. 
 The large majority of local authority representatives (21) reported receiving no funding 
from trusts and charitable sources for the delivery of road safety interventions.  Of the 
small minority that did receive funding (3), sources were regional road safety partners, 
including the Safer Roads Foundation. 
 Almost all local authority representatives (23) reported receiving no funding from the 
insurance sector for the delivery of road safety interventions.  A minority were aware that 
their local authority did receive funding from the insurance sector for young drivers 
events (1). 
 No local authority representatives thought that their authority received funding from 
either the industry sector or crowd funding for the delivery of road safety interventions. 
 One third of local authority representatives (8) were aware that their local authority did 
receive funding from ‘other’ sources. These included: 
 NDORs Surplus; 
 Road Safety Foundation; 
 TfL; 
 Police Services and Police and Crime Commissioners; 
 Safety Camera enforcement; and 
 Local Road Safety Partnerships. 
 Over three quarters (19) of local authority representatives reported decreases in road 
safety funding in the last 5 years, with a smaller minority (1) suggesting increases and the 
remainder (4) suggesting that funding had stayed the same. 
5.2.37 Of those local authority representatives who reported decreases in road safety funding in 
the last 5 years, the following amounts are reported in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Percentage decrease of funding in the last 5 years 
PERCENTAGE DECREASE RESPONSE 
0-10% decrease 0 
11-20% decrease 2 
21-40% decrease 5 
41-60% decrease 6 
61-80% decrease 3 
81-100% decrease 2 
 One local authority representative reported a 25% increase in funding. 
 The reported estimates for the proportion of funding allocated to road safety which is 
ultimately and solely used for road safety are outlined in Table 6. 
Table 6. Proportion of funding allocated to road safety actually used for this purpose 
PROPORTION OF FUNDING RESPONSE 
0-25%  1 
26-69%  1 
70-100%  19 
 The reported estimates of the proportion of staff time allocated to road safety which is 
ultimately spent on road safety tasks and activities is outlined in Table 7. 
Table 7. Proportion of time allocated to road safety tasks actually spent on road safety tasks 
PROPORTION OF TIME RESPONSE 
0-25%  2 
26-69%  4 
70-100%  19 
 Local authority representatives reported differing levels of agreement with the 
statement, ‘investment in evidence-based road safety activity within the local authority is 
secure’: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 10 mostly agreed; 
 6 partially agreed; and 
 4 disagreed. 
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 The most commonly reported difficulty in securing investment in evidence-based activity 
was budgetary and resource constraint.  
 Asked about the statement ‘budgetary pressures have reduced the priority given to road 
safety more than other local authority activities’: 
 5 totally agreed; 
 12 partially agreed; 
 5 disagreed; and 
 2  did not know. 
 Maintenance and statutory duties were reported as areas prioritised over road safety in 
local authorities.  Some local authority representatives reported a total removal of road 
safety and road improvements budgets, with reliance on partnership and grant funding. 
 Asked about the statement ‘the number of staff to deliver road safety interventions is 
sufficient’: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 10 partially agreed; and 
 11 disagreed. 
 Asked about the statement ‘the skills and capabilities of staff to deliver road safety 
interventions is sufficient’: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 13 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
 There was some concern that skill and capability would be lost due to reduced staff, 
increased vacancies and underqualified and inexperienced recruits.  Increases in funding 
and ongoing training and continuing professional development (CPD) were thought to be 
solutions to such concerns. 
 Local authority representatives explained many ways in which local authorities had been 
seeking to increase efficiency and make better use of available financial and human 
resources, most of which came under a Smarter Working policy.  These were: 
 
 Enhanced partnership working to share best practice and resources between local 
authority, regional authority, police services and fire and rescue services and 
coordinate the delivery of road safety campaigns; 
 Greater collaboration with other authority departments, such as central admin, 
road safety ETP, engineering, maintenance and traffic management to share 
funding, resource, skills and knowledge and make road safety changes through 
their projects;  
 Investing in better systems, equipment, data and technology, including the use of 
social media; 
 Taking an evidence-based approach;  
 Recruiting temporary staff; 
 Capitalising staff time; 
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 Reviewing delivery, trends and schemes, to ensure that unnecessary work and 
duplication can be avoided and priorities and functions are clear; and  
 Finding additional and new revenue funding schemes to reinvest in road safety 
services, for instance, charging schools for road safety education. 
 A few local authority representatives suggested that local authorities were not seeking to 
increase efficiency and make better use of available resources, or could not do this, due 
to limited resources in the first instance.  
5.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 The Safer Roads Fund and its application are viewed very positively, and this change in 
approach is generally applauded.  However, some suggested the way of funding is a 
missed opportunity to more actively promote Safe System; and it was perceived by 
representatives that some local authorities have concerns regarding revenue expenditure 
on maintenance important for implementing Safe System. 
 Other comments made on road safety funding and resourcing include: 
 The loss of the Road Safety Grant in 2009 created shortfalls, particularly regarding 
investment in ‘soft measures’; 
 Concern was raised over NDORS funding, especially in partnerships where local 
authorities are contributing the most; and 
 Road safety funding should be explicit and ring-fenced. 
 Many representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities argued that funding 
for road safety was not at a suitable level, and that KSIs are increasing because of this. 
 Whilst DfT was considered the provider of financial resource it was noted that they are 
not fully responsible for road safety delivery. 
 Representatives acknowledged that whilst the Safer Roads Fund provides a sizeable 
incentive to improve the safety of roads, not all local authorities were enthusiastic due to 
concerns about revenue expenditure on maintenance. 
 There were a number of concerns raised about the responsibility of local authorities to 
determine the level of funding assigned to road safety.   These included: 
 The more DfT cascades money the less likely it will be ring fenced for road safety 
and go to other areas like social care, especially if road safety is not seen as a 
particular problem by that local authority; 
 In the past, when DfT handed out grants for specific road safety activities or 
improvements, and provided road safety guidance, there were more specialists 
undertaking road safety education.  Since funding has devolved to local 
government there is less funding for road safety, and so RSOs can only make token 
efforts in road safety education which are less effective; and 
 Initiatives are implemented because of political leadership and local authority 
pressures and are not based on evidence. 
 Other comments made by representatives on the role of DfT in road safety funding 
include: 
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 Funding that is available and spent on road safety initiatives is not always spent 
appropriately, with too many knee-jerk reactions, “politics driving spending, so the 
spending is not being driven by evidence”. 
 In future grant funding allocations should be framed in the context of Safe System, 
and it DfT’s responsibility to do this; 
 Ring-fenced funding for road safety should be restored; and 
 Promotional activities should be funded centrally to ensure they happen, for 
instance the production of leaflets for parents in nurseries about safe car seats. 
5.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Business and industry representatives suggested that funding levels for road safety are 
insufficient, resulting in inadequate resourcing and therefore a reduction in road safety 
activity.  Comments made on road safety funding in business and industry included: 
 Additional safety training for HGV drivers would be taken up if funding for 
additional training was provided; 
 Better use of road safety funding needs to be made in order to get more successful 
outcomes – those delivering road safety activities are not necessarily the most 
qualified; and 
 For manufacturers safety design is a big cost. 
 Business and industry representatives also noted insufficient funding for road safety in 
local government, with an awareness that entire road-safety teams have been disbanded 
in some local authorities, stopping all road-safety activity including road-safety audits, 
improvement/development schemes, casualty reduction schemes, ETP for children, local 
publicity campaigns, and support for casualty reduction based speed enforcement.  There 
was a suggestion that allowing local authorities to make decisions on spending, means 
that limited resources are allocated on a populist basis, rather than prioritising safety. 
 Comments made by business representatives on DfT’s role in funding include: 
 DfT is doing as well as to be expected with a limited budget; 
 Local authority road safety funding needs to be ring-fenced; 
 There should be incentives to encourage attention to safety in vehicle purchasing; 
and 
 Funding could be a lot more stringent if monitoring and evaluation of projects was 
required. 
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
 Seventeen fleet manager responded to questions on funding in the online survey.  Of 
these: 
 10 agreed/strongly agreed that the number of staff to deliver road safety 
interventions in their organisation is sufficient and 7 disagreed/strongly disagreed;  
 9 agreed/strongly agreed that the skills and capabilities of staff to deliver road 
safety interventions is sufficient in their organisation, 7 disagreed/strongly 
disagreed and 1 did not know. 
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Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
 Four road haulage managers responded to questions on funding in the online survey.  Of 
these: 
 3 agreed that the number of staff to deliver road safety interventions is sufficient 
and 1 disagreed; and 
 All 4 agreed that the skills and capabilities of staff to deliver road safety 
interventions is sufficient in their organisation. 
5.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 There were a number of road safety funding sources cited by the emergency services, 
including.   
 Government and agency grants; 
 NHS trusts budget; 
 Precepts from council tax; 
 NDORS and independent driver awareness scheme courses; 
 Local Authority budgets; and 
 County Council budgets. 
 Funding source was reported to vary by region for the fire service as the level of funding 
provided for road safety varies depending on how autonomous the fire service is from the 
local authority and whether the local authority has its own road safety team, or not.   
 The police, ambulance and fire services all expressed reduced and stretched budgets with 
regards to road safety, leading to stretched resources.  They consider the application 
process for grants to be a barrier to accessing the funds, due to the limited staff resources 
– without the staff to apply for the grants the funding is not provided and more staff 
cannot be hired. 
 Impacts cited as resulting from lack of funding for road safety included: 
 Reduction in road safety education, training and publicity, including in school, for 
older drivers and for the public more generally; 
 Reduction in post-crash care interventions; 
 Reduction in front-line police officers; and 
 Lack of priority given to road safety if, for example, crime issues need addressing. 
 Suggestions given for overcoming the funding barriers included: 
 Levies on motor or insurance industries, used to fund road safety activity; 
 Increasing the number of community support volunteers (however currently there 
are inadequate numbers of staff to support those that want to volunteer); and 
 Appropriate allocation of funding to the services that are best placed to deliver 
specific road safety interventions. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Twelve police force representatives responded to questions on funding in the online 
survey. 
 78/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 Whilst 10 representatives cited that they received funding from the police, and 5 cited the 
Home Office, other sources (each cited by less than 5 representatives) were: 
 DfT; 
 Other central government departments; 
 NDORS course surplus; 
 Local authority budget; 
 Local road safety partnership budget; 
 Insurance sector; 
 Crowd funding; 
 Health sector; 
 Trusts/charitable sources; and 
 EU project funding. 
 One police force representative suggested that a lack of time and resource makes access 
to funding difficult. 
 Reported changes to road safety funding over the last 5 years were as follows: 
 None reported an increase in funding; 
 3 reported that funding had stayed the same; and 
 9 reported a decrease in funding. 
 Most who reported a decrease did not know the exact percentage that funding had 
decreased by.  However, of those who did provide an estimate, their responses ranged 
between a 20% and 50% reduction, and over 50% reduction in funding. 
 Whilst seven police force representatives did not know the proportion of funding 
allocated to road safety which is ultimately used solely for road safety, five provided an 
estimate.  These estimates ranged from 80-100%.  
 Estimates of the proportion of staff time allocated to road safety, ultimately used on road 
safety activities and tasks is outlined in Table 8. 
Table 8. Proportion of time allocated to road safety tasks actually spent on road safety tasks 
PROPORTION OF TIME RESPONSE 
0-25%  4 
26-69%  0 
70-100%  4 
Did now know 4 
5.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Academic institutions pointed to a lack of government funding for research and 
development in road safety and noted that road safety is often seen as the poor cousin to 
other national issues, which are difficult to prioritise funding for. 
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 Funding sources that were cited include: 
 EU HORIZON research programme; 
 Innovate UK; 
 UK car industry led consortium; and 
 Road Safety Trust. 
 Other comments made on road safety research funding include: 
 Funding for group projects increasingly comes from the private sector; 
 As a multi-disciplinary subject, it becomes increasingly difficult to see where road 
safety research sits in the funding landscape; and 
 Government procurement of road safety activity, namely the HE SPATs framework, 
makes it difficult to ensure continuity of road safety research capacity. 
 Other comments made on road safety funding include: 
 Government priority appears to be funding on rail, rather than road; 
 Targets are required in order to make strong business cases for road safety funding; 
 The UK is more systematic than others in terms of conducting economic appraisals 
of road safety initiatives; and 
 Focus for road safety funding should not be solely on the strategic road network, 
as other roads have higher risks of death and serious injury. 
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6. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: PROMOTION 
6.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
6.1.1 Central government departments and agencies consider the THINK! campaign, run by the 
Department for Transport (DfT), to be the main channel through which road safety 
messages are promoted by government, and through which both national and local 
messages are delivered.  There are tie-ins with the THINK! campaign across DfT divisions. 
6.1.2 Recently the THINK! campaign has been seeking to target road safety promotion more 
intelligently, with a narrower range of campaigns, for example using an innovative 
Snapchat filter to mimic the effect of drug use, with the aim of engaging teenagers. 
6.1.3 Some DfT divisions also tie in with the police operations calendar (itself coordinated with 
TISPOL, the European Traffic Police Network), or police-led road safety campaigns. 
6.1.4 Other comments made relating to government promotion of road safety include: 
 There is activity at local government level to promote cycling; 
 There is interest in promoting DfT road safety activity internationally, for example 
through road safety conferences; 
 Promotion occurs through road safety interventions; and 
 Approach to vehicle safety as a strategy has been reactive, rather than proactive, 
which has led to little promotion of vehicle safety. 
6.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
6.2.1 Some local government representatives noted that road safety is promoted across 
agencies within local government. 
6.2.2  Other comments relating to local government promotion of road safety include: 
 Promotion of road safety activity is often tied-in with police calendars and 
campaigns;   
 Interventions themselves act as road safety promotion; 
 Promotion of safety engineering could be improved at local authority level, in 
comparison with promotion in other areas of road safety; and 
 There is growing use of social media to promote road safety. 
 Comments made by local government representatives on the DfT’s role in road safety 
promotion include: 
 The THINK! campaign requires better organisation; 
 DfT are not appearing to be proactive with road safety; 
 There are no centralised campaigns for local authorities to run; and 
 No guidance is provided on how to promote Safe System within local authorities. 
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Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Thirty RSOs responded to questions on promotion in the online survey. 
6.2.5 RSOs reported that road safety was promoted across local authorities and locally using 
the following methods: 
 
 Social media; 
 Newsletters, particularly within schools; 
 Face to face engagement, education and events, particularly within schools; 
 Outsourcing to community groups and third parties; 
 Publication of data and reports; 
 The council website; 
 Through a Road Safety Partnership; 
 In broadcast and print media; 
 At the roadside or bus-back posters and signs; and 
 Word-of-mouth. 
6.2.6 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘road safety is well promoted across the 
local authority’, were reported by RSOs: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 10 mostly agreed; 
 11 partially agreed; 
 6 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
6.2.7 Asked about the statement ‘road safety is well promoted by the local authority to external 
stakeholders and the public’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 9 mostly agreed; 
 13 partially agreed; 
 6 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
6.2.8 It was recognised that promotion could be improved, especially with increased human 
resource. 
6.2.9 When considering the statement ‘the Safe System approach is promoted by the local 
authority locally – to professionals, policymakers and the community’: 
 
 0 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 8 partially agreed; 
 15 disagreed; and 
 5 did not know. 
6.2.10 Many RSOs suggested that the Safe System approach was to be integrated into their local 
authority strategy or was already reflected in local authority practices. 
6.2.11 RSOs suggested that road safety promotion could be improved through the following 
processes: 
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 Greater time, resource and funding, especially for road safety education campaigns 
within schools; 
 Increasing the priority given to road safety and encouraging support from senior 
management and politicians; 
 Better use of media, for instance, targeted advertising campaigns and social media 
development; 
 Creation of self-help resource for local authorities; and 
 Greater coordination between local authorities and the police and fire and rescue 
service, with the suggestion that road safety promotion activities should be devised 
at a national or regional level and sold to delivery bodies to implement. This would 
reduce development costs. 
 Asked whether ‘the national lead agency for road safety (the DfT) carries out its lead 
agency functions effectively’: 
 
 0 totally agreed; 
 28 mostly or partially agreed; 
 3  disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 Those who agreed cited DfT’s effectiveness in: 
 
 Recognition of lack of funding; 
 Communication and publication of initiatives, recently; and 
 Decentralisation processes, which have improved public services, reduced 
bureaucracy and increased funding control. 
 However, there was some concern around: 
 
 The disconnect between national and local delivery and priorities, which means 
local authorities are not closely aligned with DfT; 
 The lack of coordination by DfT between parties with an interest in road safety, 
such as local authorities and the fire service; 
 The lack of priority given to road safety in government policy; 
 The lack of experience and interest of DfT staff; and 
 Decentralisation processes, which have created a silo mentality in local 
government, producing variability in performance, low prioritisation and reduction 
in resource. 
 In some cases, other agencies, such as local transport bodies, were seen and reported as 
the lead agency for road safety. 
 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty three local authority representatives responded to questions on promotion in the 
online survey. 
6.2.17 Generally, local authority representatives reported that road safety was promoted across 
local authorities and locally using the following methods: 
 
 Social media; 
 Newsletters; 
 83/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 Face to face engagement, education, cycle and pedestrian training and events, 
particularly within schools; 
 E-learning; 
 Publication of data and reports; 
 The council website; 
 Through a Road Safety Partnership; 
 In broadcast and print media; 
 Through internal magazines and intranets; 
 Using posters and signs; and 
 National road safety calendar campaigns. 
6.2.18 There was some concern from local authority representatives that a lack of resource acted 
as a hindrance to the promotion of road safety. 
6.2.19 Differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘road safety is well promoted across the 
local authority’ were reported by local authority representatives: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 11 mostly agreed; 
 10 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
6.2.20 Similar levels of agreement with the statement ‘road safety is well promoted by the local 
authority to external stakeholders and the public’ were reported: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 11 mostly agreed; 
 7 partially agreed; and 
 3 disagreed. 
6.2.21 Road Safety promotion was often cited as the responsibility of road safety partnerships.  
It was recognised that promotion could be improved, especially with increased funding 
and resource. 
6.2.22 When asked about the statement ‘The Safe System approach is promoted by the local 
authority locally – to professionals, policymakers and the community’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed; 
 8 partially agreed; and 
 13 disagreed. 
6.2.23 A number of local authority representatives suggested that the Safe System approach was 
planned to be integrated and then promoted by their authority or road safety partnership, 
however, there was some concern about the lack of understanding and guidance 
surrounding Safe System principles and how they should be promoted.  
6.2.24 local authority representatives suggested that road safety promotion could be improved 
through the following processes: 
 
 Greater time, resource and funding, with the development of dedicated road safety 
teams, and road safety communications and data staff; 
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 Increasing the priority given to road safety and encouraging support from 
partnership members; 
 Better use of social media; 
 Improved website; 
 Better education, engineering and enforcement integration; 
 The use of national advertising campaigns; 
 Improved legislation; 
 The introduction of targets; 
 Clear leadership, direction and support; and 
 Greater coordination between local authorities and the health sector, police and 
the fire and rescue services. 
 Levels of reported agreement with the statement ‘the national lead agency for road safety 
(the DfT) carries out its lead agency functions effectively’ were: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 6 mostly agreed; 
 14 partially agreed; 
 2 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 Positive examples provided of DfT carrying out the lead agency function effectively 
included: 
 THINK! campaign; 
 National road safety campaign calendar; 
 National advertising; 
 Safer Roads Fund; 
 Promotion of iRAP systems; 
 Production of data; and 
 Road Safety Newsletter. 
 Across all respondents, regardless of level of agreement, there was concern about: 
 The disconnect between national and local delivery and priorities, which means 
local authorities are not an extension of DfT; 
 Poor communication and circulation of knowledge by DfT; 
 Poor attendance and direct feedback from DfT staff at regional road safety 
meetings; and 
 Lack of guidance and research on road safety interventions. 
 In some cases, other agencies, such as Road Safety GB, the National Fire Chiefs Council 
(NFCC) and the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC), were cited as having a lead agency 
role. 
6.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
6.3.1 Some advisory groups promote road safety, including safe roads and roadsides and Safe 
System, to Ministers, policymakers and practitioners, in presentations and guidelines. 
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 As with other stakeholders, representatives of advisory groups also share the view that 
road safety is promoted through interventions. 
 Comments made by representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities on the 
DfT’s role in road safety promotion include: 
 DfT does not appear to be championing the Safe System approach; 
 Awareness of penalties needs to be raised centrally, so people know they will be 
caught for bad behaviour on the roads; 
 DfT could do more to promote good practice within organisations and businesses 
e.g. with professional application of road safety innovation;  
 DfT should run centrally organised road safety campaigns;  
 The national lead is not setting a good example, for example Chris Grayling did not 
mention road safety once during his speech at the Conservative party conference 
(2017), and therefore it is not prioritised further down the line; and 
 The THINK! campaign is excellent at promoting responsible road use; it is effective 
and well understood but does not have as much funding as it used to. 
6.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
6.4.1 Business and industry membership organisations cited a number of different methods by 
which they promote road safety to their members.  These include: 
 Promoting road safety through compliance guidance and membership policies; 
 Promoting ‘best practice’ on other factors which incorporate elements of road 
safety, including: reducing costs, improving efficiency, funding sources, supply 
chain practices, accident management, environmental responsibility, and 
management responsibility; 
 Advocating autonomous/connected vehicles to increase road safety; and 
 Running forums promoting safety standards for autonomous vehicles and 
encouraging development on international regulation. 
 Representatives of business and industry generally considered that the DfT does not 
promote road safety, with the exception of providing information on the number of 
people killed and seriously injured in road traffic accidents.  However, some 
representatives suggested that the DfT does promote road safety, but that the onus is on 
individual organisations to find it.  Some representatives also made positive comments on 
the THINK! campaign. 
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
6.4.3 Seventeen fleet company representatives responded to questions on promotion in the 
online survey.  Of these: 
 13 agreed/strongly agreed that road safety is well promoted across their 
organisation, 4 did not; and 
 9 agreed/strongly agreed that road safety is well promoted by their organisation to 
external stakeholders and the public, and 8 disagreed/strongly disagreed. 
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Road Haulage Company Survey Findings  
6.4.4 Four road haulage representatives responded to questions on promotion in the online 
survey and all 4 agreed/strongly agreed that road safety is well promoted across their 
organisation. 
 2 agreed that road safety is well promoted by their organisation to external 
stakeholders and the public, and 2 disagreed. 
6.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
6.5.1 Emergency service representatives cited the importance of promoting road safety 
through interventions. 
6.5.2 Other channels through which road safety is promoted by emergency services include:  
 Social media; 
 Radio adverts; 
 Newsletters; 
 Promotional booklets/leaflets;  
 Events; 
 Dedicated Accident Reduction Officer in post; 
 Vehicle Risk Management Group; 
 Driver Training School; 
 Operational links with partners for road safety; and 
 National Accident Reduction Group which consists of all Ambulance Trusts and 
motor insurers and brokers. 
6.5.3 Suggestions made for strengthening promotion of road safety include: 
 Dedicated meeting with partners; 
 Development of a single point of contact; and 
 Improvements to consistency of approach. 
 Whilst some emergency services consider that road safety is promoted well by the DfT 
through the THINK! campaign, a few are uncertain as to how DfT promotes road safety, 
and consider that DfT only partially carries out its lead agency function in promotion 
effectively. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Eleven police force representatives responded to questions on promotion in the online 
survey. 
6.5.6 A variety of methods were reported by police force representatives to promote road 
safety, including: 
 
 Via Local Authorities; 
 Through technology (Email, Social Media); 
 National campaigns; 
 Local Road Safety Partnerships; 
 Internal Communications (SPOC’s, Magazines, Intranet); 
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 Through traditional media (e.g. press interviews); 
 Presentations to interested parties; 
 Visible activity on the roads; 
 Education programmes (Schools, Vulnerable groups); and 
 PCC Office. 
6.5.7 When asked for their level of agreement with the statement, ‘road safety is well promoted 
across the police force’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 3 mostly agreed; 
 6 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
6.5.8 When asked whether ‘road safety is well promoted by the police force to external 
stakeholders and the public’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 6 mostly agreed; and 
 4 partially agreed. 
 Respondents who were aware of the Safe System approach were asked whether their 
force promotes Safe System locally to professionals, policymakers and the community: 
 1 mostly agreed; 
 2 partially agreed; and 
 2 disagreed. 
6.5.10 Suggestions offered to improve the promotion of road safety included: 
 
 Increasing resources and funding;  
 Increasing ‘visibility of policing’; 
 Using media and communication channels; 
 Aligning road safety strategies with partners and PCC offices; and 
 Changing the emphasis of promotion materials (e.g. more people killed on the 
roads than victims of homicide, extra emphasis on road safety). 
6.5.11 However, one respondent felt differently, stating:  
“I don't think the promotion is the issue, its simply the time available to commit to it 
given the competing priorities and excessive demand elsewhere such as response and 
investigations policing”.  
(Police force representative) 
 Levels of reported agreement with the statement, ‘the national lead agency for road 
safety (the DfT) carries out its lead agency functions effectively’ were: 
 1 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed 
 8 partially agreed; and 
 2 did not know. 
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 The DfT was seen: 
 As providing a lack of national imperative; 
 To have limited interaction; and 
 More effective as an engineering lead than as an enforcement and education lead. 
6.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
6.6.1 Academic institutions do not consider themselves to have a specific role in the promotion 
of road safety. 
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7. INSTITUTIONAL MANGEMENT FUNCTION: MONITORING 
AND EVALUATION 
7.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
7.1.1 STATS19 is considered the key source of data for monitoring trends in road collisions, 
including the types of vehicles involved, the road environment and casualties.  
Shortcomings of the STATS19 system were identified by some central government 
department and agency representatives (for example under reporting of journey 
purpose), and some consider there is over-reliance on the data for understanding crashes, 
their causes and outcomes.  A review of STATS19 is scheduled, however those involved 
consider that it may need input from those that have worked with the data for longer. 
7.1.2 Other sources of data used by DfT and its agencies for monitoring and evaluating include: 
 Workforce injury statistics; 
 National Institute of Liaison Officers (NILOs) projection/forecast data; 
 iRAP system, which is being rolled out in local authorities, although difficulties have 
been identified; and 
 Traffic volume data. 
7.1.3 Comments made by government and agency representatives, relating to road safety data 
collection, include: 
 There is no systematic compilation, storage and analysis of the range of data 
needed to inform road safety and a Safe System approach; 
 Data analysis that does occur can be reactive due to limited capacity; 
 Various surveys are carried out, such as examining mobile phone use and seat belt 
use, however the data is held by different divisions or government departments in 
a siloed manner, and more joint survey working across the UK should be conducted 
on performance indicators; 
 The mix of national crash reporting databases and methodologies is of concern, 
although this is considered resolvable; 
 There is a lot of data available across government, however too little analysis is 
conducted on it and collision data fails to inform policy decisions;  
 Data is published too long after collection making it difficult to get interest when 
the figures are released late into the year;  
 There is uncertainty from some as to whether DfT has the tools to understand why 
collisions and injuries are occurring, despite a good evidence base; and 
 There is support for RAIDS collision investigation work, with the acknowledgement 
that smaller samples and less funding limit scope and analysis. 
7.1.4 There is support for the Collision Recording And Sharing project (CRASH) across DfT, 
although it was acknowledged that it is currently experiencing transitional problems and 
has only been taken up by around half of police forces.  DfT and agency representatives 
reported that CRASH will move to DfT ownership who will supply it free of charge to all 
police forces.  Local authorities will also have access to non-personal data. 
7.1.5 There were mixed views regarding the setup of a separate Collision Investigation Branch 
or enhanced investigation arrangements, with many divisions having an open mind to its 
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possibility.  The importance of understanding the function of any new arrangement rather 
than its structure was underlined. 
 DfT and agency representatives noted that a road death investigation process is being set 
up by Highways England, which will look to assess clusters of damage in order to identify 
infrastructure problems before injury occurs.  They also noted that an evaluation of the 
Safer Roads Funds process and outcomes has been commissioned.  However, there is 
concern that there is no overarching programme to: 
 Develop an evidence base for future priorities, for example defining data needs to 
implement a Safe System approach; 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of interventions; 
 Undertake cost-benefit analysis; and  
 Understanding how modern technologies are used in the real-world and how they 
modify road user behaviour. 
7.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
7.2.1 Local government representatives highlighted limited measurement and monitoring of 
road safety as an issue.  They considered there to be a lack of routine monitoring of key 
safety issues beyond KSIs, such as compliance with speed limits and seat belt use.  Lack of 
monitoring of partners’ activities, for instance the fire service, was also highlighted as a 
concern.   
7.2.2 Monitoring and evaluation that does occur at local authority level includes safety auditing 
for road safety engineering schemes, and road user analysis to identify groups at 
particular risk.  Representatives noted that evaluating the effectiveness of engineering 
schemes is easier than monitoring the effectiveness of behavioural change projects, 
however behaviour change is important and not impossible to measure with appropriate 
time and funding. 
7.2.3 Some local government representatives felt that the introduction of the CRASH project 
was positive, however, a number of concerns were raised. These included: 
 The project has been poorly executed and improvements do not occur quickly 
enough, for instance the latest update is 18 months overdue; 
 Data accuracy is poor, particularly in relation to location; 
 The roll out of hand-held devices for police will not improve accuracy as there will 
be less consistency in the data entry process; and 
 The implementation of CRASH has led to, or is expected to lead to a 20% increase 
in reported KSIs. 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings  
 Twenty eight RSOs responded to the questions on monitoring and evaluation in the online 
survey.   
7.2.5 RSOs reported differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘regular surveys are 
carried out locally to measure performance’: 
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 1 totally agreed; 
 3  mostly agreed; 
 11  partially agreed; 
 7  disagreed; and 
 6  did not know. 
 Commonly conducted surveys were safety ratings of roads and user compliance.  There 
was some concern that although emergency medical response times were measured, the 
data was not shared with local authorities.  
7.2.7 RSOs reported differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘systematic measurement 
and evaluation of local interventions, to prevent KSIs, are undertaken locally’: 
 
 7  totally agreed; 
 5  mostly agreed; 
 11  partially agreed; and 
 5  disagreed. 
7.2.8 One RSO suggested that evaluation is conducted annually and another suggested that this 
was often the responsibility of analysts.  Additionally, one RSO suggested that evaluation 
relied on resource availability and the assistance of academics, with a concern from 
another that less evaluation is carried out for interventions delivered by external partners.  
7.2.9 Asked about the statement ‘regular performance reviews are conducted to assess 
progress and guide improvement locally’: 
 
 4  totally agreed; 
 5  mostly agreed; 
 9  partially agreed; 
 9  disagreed (with the suggestion that performance management is not 
prioritised due to the absence of national and local targets); and 
 1 did not know. 
7.2.10 Asked about the statement ‘surveys and other research exploring public attitudes to road 
safety are conducted locally’: 
 
 
 3  totally agreed; 
 2  mostly agreed; 
 11  partially agreed; 
 11  disagreed; and 
 1  did not know. 
7.2.11 Some of those who disagreed suggested that this was due to lack of resource.  There was 
some recognition for national survey initiatives, such as the annual National Highways and 
Transportation Network (NHT) Survey. 
7.2.12 Asked to consider the statement ‘national databases and surveys support local activity’: 
 
 4  totally agreed; 
 7  mostly agreed; 
 12  partially agreed; 
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 4  disagreed; and 
 1  did not know. 
 There was some suggestion that local authorities rely on and use third party surveys, data 
sets and intelligence, and a recommendation that STATS19 could be improved. 
 RSOs suggested that monitoring and evaluation of road safety interventions could be 
improved through the following processes: 
 Greater time, resource and funding for data measurement, collation, analysis, 
monitoring and reporting; 
 Ability to conduct longitudinal monitoring, through increased resource and funding; 
 Increasing the priority given to monitoring and evaluation, particularly for certain 
road safety interventions, such as education, training and publicity; 
 Better data quality and data collection training, namely for STATS19 and missing 
data; 
 A better understanding of the data needed to inform the Safe System approach; 
and 
 Greater coordination and harmonisation of local authorities, police, health/ 
hospitals, insurance and fire and rescue service data. One RSO suggested that their 
local authority was attempting to harmonise police and local authority data by 
creating a cloud-based collision mapping database. 
Local Authority Survey Findings  
 Twenty three local authority representatives responded to questions on monitoring and 
evaluation in the online survey. 
7.2.16 Asked to consider the statement, ‘regular surveys are carried out locally to measure 
performance’: 
 
 0 totally agreed; 
 4 mostly agreed; 
 12 partially agreed; 
 1 disagreed; and 
 6 did not know. 
7.2.17 Commonly conducted surveys included the monitoring of casualties, road safety ratings 
and length analysis, and regular scheme effectiveness evaluations, including evaluations 
of education, training and publicity outcomes.  
7.2.18 Most local authorities at least partially agreed with the statement, ‘systematic 
measurement and evaluation of local interventions, to prevent KSIs, are undertaken 
locally’: 
 
 6 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed 
 9 partially agreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
7.2.19 Of those who do conduct systematic measurements and evaluations, the evaluation of 
routes and collision sites, usually conducted annually as part of scheme monitoring 
processes, was reported.  There was some concern that evaluation relied upon 
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intervention value.  A number of local authority representatives suggested that systematic 
measurement and evaluation of interventions may be conducted in the future.  
 Asked about the statement, ‘regular performance reviews are conducted to assess 
progress and guide improvement locally’: 
 4 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 10 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
7.2.21 There was some suggestion that more performance reviews, to assess progress and guide 
improvement locally, were planned for the future. 
7.2.22 Local authority representatives reported differing levels of agreement with the statement 
‘surveys and other research exploring public attitudes to road safety are conducted 
locally’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 8 partially agreed; 
 5 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
7.2.23 There was some suggestion that surveys exploring public attitudes to road safety were 
being conducted locally by Road Safety Partnerships.  
7.2.24 Asked to consider the statement ‘national databases and surveys support local activity’: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 10 mostly agreed; 
 9 partially agreed; and 
 2 disagreed. 
7.2.25 Some representatives reported that local authority engineers use third party data sets 
such as STATS19, and indicated that the use of such national databases and surveys was 
something planned for the future. 
7.2.26 Local authority representatives suggested that monitoring and evaluation of road safety 
interventions could be improved through the following processes: 
 
 Greater time, resource and funding for data measurement, collation, analysis, 
monitoring and reporting, with the suggestion that academics be involved; 
 Increasing the priority given to monitoring and evaluation; 
 Improving evaluation of behavioural change techniques, such as education, training 
and publicity; 
 Better data collection and reporting for STATS19 data; and 
 Greater coordination across road safety partners to ensure all partners adopt 
common methodologies and approaches. 
7.2.27 There was some concern that monitoring and evaluation may always be challenging, due 
to difficulties with evidencing lives saved and collisions avoided. 
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7.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
7.3.1 Representatives from advisory groups, associations and charities raised a wide range of 
points relating to monitoring and evaluation of road safety.  These include: 
 There is concern surrounding the delay in access to STATS19 data from 2016, and 
on major staffing changes within the DfT’s statistics division which may have caused 
this; 
 They considered there to be a strong case for a Road Collision Investigation Branch 
as there is a need for a broader focus on fatal and serious collision injuries (rather 
than on establishing blame), more rigorous data collection, and more rigorous 
fatality investigation; 
 There is a need for the collection of data on indicators that support a Safe System 
approach, linked to the prevention of death and serious injury; 
 The impact of ‘input measures’, put in place to address road safety, should be 
evaluated, e.g. the impact of investment in infrastructure, and the impact of 
increases in number of police officers on the road; 
 The focus on road safety monitoring and evaluation is on negative outcomes, rather 
than celebrating the high levels of safety compliance; 
 There is uncertainty as to how the change in serious injury definition at EU level is 
being handled; 
 The publishing of risk maps, showing the rates of KSIs on Britain’s roads over 
consecutive data periods, is supported;  
 Evaluation of educational initiatives is considered poor, in part because it is difficult 
and requires longitudinal studies, however it is still considered worthwhile and 
necessary; and 
 Lack of funding is considered to have resulted in less collision investigation and 
inability to take action when the need is identified. 
7.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
7.4.1 Little monitoring of road safety processes or outcomes within business and industry was 
reported by representatives. Monitoring undertaken that is connected to road safety 
includes: 
 Insurance industry premium statistics – this could be used to inform road safety but 
is mainly fed to government as an indicator of industry performance; and 
 Checks that vehicles are compliant with safety legislation. 
7.4.2 Suggestions made for improving monitoring and evaluation include: 
 Harmonising international (European and United Nations) collision data; and 
 Recording the effectiveness of active safety features, e.g. recording when a collision 
has been avoided because automatic breaking was triggered.  This could be used to 
gain public acceptance and therefore increased uptake of safety features. 
7.4.3 Some business and industry representatives suggested that the DfT does not undertake 
enough monitoring and evaluation of their road safety activities.  It was also suggested 
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that DfT should be more aware of what monitoring and evaluation other organisations 
are doing to avoid replication of government work. 
7.4.4 Business and industry representatives suggested that monitoring and evaluation 
undertaken by Highways England is effective, as upon entering into a project with them 
organisations are made aware of the reporting mechanisms, project goals, and ‘critical 
friends’ who are engaged in monitoring and auditing their services. 
Fleet Company Survey Findings  
 Seventeen fleet company managers responded to questions on monitoring and 
evaluation in the online survey.  Of these, within their organisations: 
 13 systematically collect information on road safety incidents, accidents and 
injuries involving the organisation;  
 12 routinely monitoring driver compliance with rules for speed, alcohol, use of 
drugs, seat belts and in-vehicle telephone use whilst driving; 
 10 monitor safety performance indicators; 
 9 set safety performance indicators; 
 9 use telematics to monitor driving performance; 
 8 regularly conduct road safety management performance reviews to assess 
progress and guide improvement within their organisation; 
 5 have long term goals and interim targets for preventing KSIs; 
 4 have a strategy for addressing the number of KSI’s in road traffic accidents; 
 3 indicated national databases and surveys support their activity; and 
 None have adopted BSI ISO 39001 for road traffic safety management systems.   
Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
7.4.6 Four road haulage company managers were asked questions on monitoring and 
evaluation in the online survey.  Of these: 
 3 monitoring safety performance indicators;  
 3 systematically collect information on road safety incidents, accidents and injuries 
involving the organisation; 
 3 routinely monitoring driver compliance with rules for speed, alcohol, use of drugs, 
seat belts and in-vehicle telephone use whilst driving; 
 2 use telematics to monitor driving performance; and 
 1 regularly conducts road safety management performance reviews to assess 
progress and guide improvement within their organisation. 
 The following initiatives were not adopted by any of the organisations: 
 
 A strategy for addressing the number of KSIs in road traffic accidents; 
 The setting of safety performance indicators; 
 The setting of long-term goals and interim targets for preventing KSIs; 
 The adoption of ISO 39001; and 
 The use of national databases and surveys to support the activity of the 
organisation. 
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7.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
7.5.1 Representatives of the emergency services cited the following forms of monitoring and 
evaluation within their own and other organisations: 
 Ambulance response times are monitored; 
 Clinical outcomes are recorded, including KSIs; 
 KSI statistics and trends are monitored by area, including correlation between KSIs 
and driver attitude, road infrastructure and signage; 
 Education performance indicators are recorded, e.g. the number of road safety 
education sessions delivered; 
 Post-crash monitoring is undertaken through the incident recording system which 
archives what type of crash has happened, if there were any injuries and what these 
were, and the emergency service response; 
 Where a road collision is identified as needing trauma care, data recorded includes: 
vehicle type, location in the vehicle (front or back), seatbelts use, helmet use for 
motorbike users, and time taken for the ambulance to arrive (or time from 999 call 
if difficult to ascertain). 
 Internal feedback sessions are given as part of road safety partnerships; 
 Subscriptions from various other organisations, such as the Institute of Traffic 
Accident Investigators Periodical, provide valuable information on monitoring and 
evaluation; 
 The effectiveness of driver awareness courses are measured using self-reported 
questionnaires; and 
 Questionnaires are used to understand views on signage specially for motorcycles. 
 They highlighted evaluation of road safety education initiatives as an important area for 
improvement, although it was acknowledged that it difficult to ascertain which education 
initiatives have been effective. 
7.5.3 There was support expressed for CRASH, whilst recognising initial problems with its 
implementation.   It was considered that the process of DfT taking control of CRASH will 
encourage more police forces to adopt it. 
Police Force Survey Findings  
7.5.4 Eleven police force representatives responded to questions on monitoring and evaluation 
in the online survey. 
7.5.5 When asked whether ‘regular surveys are carried out locally to measure performance’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed;  
 3 partially agreed; 
 1 disagreed; and 
 5 did not know. 
7.5.6 Additionally, a broad range of responses were obtained from police force representatives 
with regards to the statement ‘regular performance reviews are conducted to assess 
progress and guide improvement locally’: 
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 1 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed;  
 4 partially agreed; 
 1 disagreed; and 
 4 did not know. 
 Finally, differing levels of agreement were reported by police force representatives for 
the statement, ‘national databases and surveys support police enforcement activity’: 
 0 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed;  
 4 partially agreed; 
 3 disagreed; and 
 3 did not know. 
7.5.8 A further comment was made by one respondent, who suggested that despite the data 
analysis undertaken by police sub-units, there was little guidance from regional or 
national databases.   
 Some representatives offered suggestions for how monitoring and evaluation could be 
improved within their police force.  Their responses were as follows: 
 Increase analytical capacity; 
 Implement a Casualty Reduction Team; and 
 Performance indicators are required (as evaluation cannot take place without 
them). 
7.5.10 One representative made a positive comment regarding the current monitoring and 
evaluation strategy within their police force: “It is currently very good with bi monthly 
meetings to review enforcement plans”. 
7.5.11 For monitoring of speed interventions in particular, six police force representatives 
offered estimated proportions for speed awareness course attendance, versus penalty 
points acceptance.  These ranged from 55% to 80%. 
7.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
7.6.1 Academic representatives identified a number of areas where monitoring and evaluation 
is needed, or where it could be improved.  These included: 
 A systematic evaluation of the safety of new vehicle technology is required; 
 All fatalities should be investigated independently and by combining police 
investigation data and coroner data; 
 Improved and systematic monitoring of safety performance indicators is required, 
including seat belt compliance, mobile phone use and road quality; 
 Opportunities afforded by electronic data recorders fitted in vehicles needs to be 
explored for better understanding of collision data and the operation of vehicle 
systems;  
 There is a need for combined transport and health sector data; 
 More data on safety performance indicators are needed; 
 Better work-related road safety data is needed; 
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 More exposure data is required than is provided in the National Travel Survey; 
 There is value of increased disaggregation of risk-exposure measures; and 
 The sample sizes of the RAIDS collision investigation data are too small to generate 
useable information, and could be extended. 
7.6.2 A number of comments were made with regard to STATS19: 
 There were concerns over the delay in STATS19 data for 2016; 
 There was a general concern over the quality of data provided; 
 Data on contributory factors were highlight as problematic, since they are based on 
intuitive and flawed understandings of collision causation, especially around loss of 
control and speed factors; 
 There was concern that the accuracy of journey purpose reporting is not verified; 
 It was suggested that STATS19 needs to take electronic systems and GPS into 
account to improve efficiency; 
 The inclusion of driving license numbers was suggested as it was considered helpful 
for user standard and compliance research; and 
 Better location mapping, severity coding and junction crash coding was also 
suggested. 
 The general consensus amongst the academic institution representatives is that a 
Collision Investigation Branch, whilst fine in principle, would not be necessary if the above 
suggestions for improvements took place. 
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8. INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT FUNCTION: RESEARCH & 
DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Within the Department for Transport (DfT) both the research budget and research 
strategy are managed centrally.  There is considered to be a much-restrained budget in 
comparison with previous years (reported to be less than 50% of the total research budget 
10 years ago). 
 The RULIS branch drives road safety research and has an annual budget of £2million, with 
the main type of research project relating to evaluation or filling evidence gaps.  
Researchers working within RULIS procure and manage RULIS research. 
 Road safety research that is currently being undertaken by DfT, cited by government 
departments and agencies, includes: 
 Driver 2020: Young driver research (largest current research project), coordinated 
by TRL, testing five interventions to reduce young driver collision risk. 
 Pre-test hazard perception training; 
 Pre-test log-books for learners, where hours of driving are recorded; 
 Post-test checkpoints - a voluntary agreement between parent and driver 
about when to drive, e.g. driving at night and length of driving experience. 
An on-line log book is kept; 
 The use of telematics post-test, with ideas around feedback and incentives 
being explored; and 
 Pre-test educational intervention with young learner drivers, as opposed to 
with schoolchildren. 
 Research relating to features that affect vulnerable road user safety, e.g. 20mph 
limits, motorcycle protective airbag jackets; and 
 An evaluation of the Safer Roads Fund. 
 Previous research studies that have been undertaken by DfT or its agencies, cited by 
central government departments and agencies, include: 
 Research into fatal crashes on the road network; and 
 Research to establish any correlation between those involved in less serious driving 
offences, and those later causing death by dangerous driving, in order to identify 
likely offenders (no relationship was found). 
 The process of procuring research was identified as a difficulty by government 
representatives.  Specifically, the SPATS framework was described as having a limited 
number of organisations on the framework and a large case needs to be built if a 
procurement route, other than a framework, is needed.  Additionally, procurement of 
research using SPATS can require considerable staff resources, and can take up to six 
months to let an otherwise urgent contract.  However, it was also noted that ‘lower value’ 
work can be procured differently through call-off contracts.   
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 Difficulties and deficiencies relating to research and development of road safety activities, 
identified by central government and agency representatives, include the following: 
 A review of road safety research needs to meet Safe System needs has not been 
carried out; 
 There is no formal external expert advisory committee to advise on priorities for 
road safety research;  
 Whilst there are links between DfT divisions, engagement on road safety research 
is not systematic. 
 There is limited engagement with international bodies, such as OECD, due to time 
and financial constraints; 
 There is inadequate involvement of devolved authorities in UK road safety research 
strategy and project definition; 
 There are concerns and restrictions in relation to data sharing, with stakeholders 
citing difficulty with sharing with the DVLA; 
 There is concern about reliance on DfT road safety statistics to monitor 
performance in KSIs because a number of police forces have changed how they 
collect data, thus creating inconsistencies – hence data predictions and calculations 
for KSIs cannot be accurate; 
 There are difficulties in undertaking research to analyse casualty data in order to 
identify the effect of interventions.  This is because deaths may have decreased due 
to better vehicles and medical care rather than any legislative changes and 
resultant behaviour changes; and 
 There is a lack of data and research on the involvement of vehicles in KSI accidents 
with advanced technologies in crashes, and research on perception of being caught 
breaking the law compared with the actual risk of being caught. 
 The Road Safety Observatory and EU SafetyCube project are seen by many as key 
disseminators or road safety research.  Some interviewees indicated some concerns 
around the quality of the Road Safety Observatory in terms of the way evidence synthesis 
published on it are produced.  However, they acknowledged ensuring a systematic 
methodology is used requires those with experience in evidence reviews to conduct the 
synthesis, which would likely involve increased funding, and that funding would also be 
required to keep the Observatory up to date. 
8.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Local authority representatives felt that national guidance is needed on Safe System 
implementation, as national guidance is highly important in a localism context, where 
there is a lot of pressure to respond to local demands which are unrelated to KSI priorities.  
This national guidance should be easy to follow, with one local authority suggesting that 
recent Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions Guidance (2016), which prescribe 
the designs and conditions of traffic signs on or near roads, were difficult to follow. 
 Representatives also highlighted difficulties with knowledge transfer opportunities 
including: 
 Attending conferences e.g. TRAFFEX, is done as part of annual leave as time cannot 
be obtained for personal development; and 
 Knowledge transfer within local authorities on education, training and publicity 
(ETP) was previously considered good due to the network of road safety officers, 
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however this is no longer the case due to the lack of road safety education/training 
personnel within local authorities. 
 Local authority representatives identified consultants and university research committees 
as sources of reliable research findings. 
 Some local government representatives feel that DfT should be the home for national 
evidence and road safety guidance, and therefore should be a leading commissioner and 
coordinator of road safety research. 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Twenty eight RSOs responded to the questions on research and development in the online 
survey.   
 RSOs reported differing levels of agreement with the statement ‘central government 
research supports us with advice, standards and demonstration projects’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 15 partially agreed; and 
 5 disagreed. 
 There was some concern that the number of demonstration projects is decreasing, 
despite DfT’s welcome commitment to generating intelligence, and that there was a lack 
of resource to implement DfT advice, standards and demonstration projects. 
 Asked about the statement ‘central government provides sufficient advice and 
information to help us with road safety delivery’: 
 
 1 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 15 partially agreed; and 
 5 disagreed. 
 There was some concern that research based advice is lacking, especially for behavioural 
change initiatives, and that there is a disconnect between what is known to work and 
what is offered centrally and locally. 
 Asked to consider the statement ‘lessons and effective practice from national and 
international work are shared within the local authority’: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 12 partially agreed; and 
 5 disagreed. 
 Some RSOs commented that lessons and effective practice from national and 
international work were only available to those who proactively search for it, on 
databases such as the Road Safety Observatory, and, there should be an active 
dissemination to local authorities instead. 
 A few RSOs reported that the level of knowledge transfer and research distribution, within 
their local authority, was suitable, citing the importance of Road Safety GB in this role. 
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 RSOs suggested local and national knowledge transfer and research distribution could be 
improved through the following processes: 
 
 Greater time, resource and funding; 
 Regular communication, including partnership working;  
 Creation of a distribution body, responsible for sharing, promoting and encouraging 
best practice, relevant to local problems, and aiding those most distant from it. 
There was some suggestion that this may fall within the remit of former Road Safety 
Beacon Councils; and 
 Ongoing development and integration of knowledge databases, such as Road 
Safety GB’s Knowledge Centre and the Road Safety Observatory.  RSOs encouraged 
the use of these databases and welcomed the development of an engineer’s 
equivalent.  RSOs also sought dissemination from these databases, in the form of 
newsletters outlining best practice.  
 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty three local authority representatives responded to the questions on research and 
development in the online survey.   
 Local authority representatives reported differing levels of agreement with the statement 
‘central government research supports us with advice, standards and demonstration 
projects’: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 7 mostly agreed; 
 14 partially agreed; and 
 0 disagreed. 
 There mention that some demonstration projects require further evaluation and 
investment, especially in the area of Safe System.  Additionally, there was recognition of 
a lack of knowledge, time and resource to access and implement central government 
advice, standards and demonstration projects. 
 Asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘central government provides 
sufficient advice and information to help us with road safety delivery’: 
 
 2 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
 12 partially agreed; and 
 1 disagreed. 
 Local authority representatives regarded the THINK! campaigns as informative, however, 
they felt concerned that decreased direct communication from central government to 
local authorities would cause barriers for the dissemination of central government advice 
and information, and that best practice guidance was lacking for road safety delivery for 
younger drivers. 
 There was reasonable agreement with the statement ‘Lessons and effective practice from 
national and international work are shared within the local authority’: 
 
 0 totally agreed; 
 8 mostly agreed; 
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 12 partially agreed; 
 2 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 There was some suggestion that this knowledge transfer could be improved through 
direct communication from central government to local authorities, making effective 
practice easily identifiable. 
 Generally, local authority representatives suggested knowledge transfer and research 
distribution, within their local authorities, could be improved through the following 
processes: 
 Greater time; 
 Greater resource, with the suggestion of the development of a dedicated research 
and data team; 
 Improved local priority given to road safety; 
 Staff mentoring and training; 
 A wider understanding of work completed and ongoing, through improvements to 
the website and the development of shared resources; and 
 The integration of the Safe System approach, through amalgamating road safety in 
local Highway Departments. 
 A few local authority representatives reported that the level of knowledge transfer and 
research distribution, within their local authority, was suitable. 
 It was suggested that national knowledge transfer and research distribution could be 
improved through the following processes: 
 
 Legislative changes to develop a fully integrated strategy; 
 Regional and national workshops, networking, seminars and meetings with experts 
to share knowledge for free and develop guidance and understanding of road safety 
approaches, such as Safe System;  
 Improved national priority given to road safety and Safe System; 
 Monitoring of road safety reports and publications to ensure that they are of high 
quality before being shared; 
 Creation of a distribution body, possibly DfT, Road Safety Foundation, CIHT or the 
Institution of Civil Engineers, responsible for sharing, promoting and encouraging 
best practice and innovation through monthly/quarterly bulletins, advising on what 
has and hasn’t worked and why; and 
 Creation of a central, integrated knowledge database, possibly hosted by the DfT 
website, such as Road Safety GB’s Knowledge Centre and the Road Safety 
Observatory. Local authority representatives encouraged the use of these 
databases.  RSOs also sought dissemination from these databases, in the form of 
newsletters outlining best practice.  
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8.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Knowledge Transfer 
 Some representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities suggested that 
opportunities for research dissemination and good practice knowledge sharing could be 
improved.  Comments made on knowledge transfer practice included: 
 Whilst individual centres and universities conduct a lot of research it is not well 
brought together into a central place; 
 Research findings are hard to locate, including government research; 
 UK does not share research findings with other international bodies, including Euro 
NCAP members, OECD or UNECE; 
 European research findings should be shared with local authorities; 
 The competitiveness in academia needs to be overcome in order to improve 
knowledge sharing; 
 There has been a reduction in take-up of training (engineering and other topics) by 
local authorities, thus limiting knowledge sharing; 
 DfT no longer disseminates good practice; and 
 Safe System is going to require a long process of knowledge transfer. 
 Some representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities were aware of the 
Road Safety Observatory – a repository for road safety research reviewed by an 
independent panel.  Whilst the idea was considered very positively, representatives found 
the Observatory less useful in practice as research and commentary published are either 
out of date or too high level to be practicable.  Stakeholders suggested that additional 
funding and support was required to maintain the Observatory.  The Road Safety 
Knowledge Centre was also referenced, however as a signposting mechanism, rather than 
providing commentary on the quality of the evidence. 
 Some expressed frustration that despite large amounts of money being spent on 
developing an evidence base, policymaking is then not necessarily evidence based itself.  
Research Areas 
 Whilst some representatives suggested there is enough research on road safety, others 
suggested that more research is required in particular areas.  These include: 
 Young driver interventions, particularly surrounding the training and qualifications 
system to enable young drivers to have the freedom of driving whilst reducing risk2;  
 Vehicle design for older drivers;  
 More consistent and better quality data on why crashes occur; and 
 Automated cars and safety, particularly in the transitional period, covering 
licensing, testing, and responsibilities in relation to regulations. 
 They suggested that a road safety research strategy or advisory board would be beneficial 
in assisting DfT determine national research priorities. 
                                                          
2 N.B. respondents did not mention the current Driver 2020 research which seeks to explore the effectiveness 
of non-licence based interventions on reducing young driver collision risk. 
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8.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Most business and industry stakeholders engaged with look for evidence based research 
in road safety areas that fall under their remit.   
 Some felt that research led by DfT has improved over the last few years with more focus 
on identified good practice and research evaluation. 
“The tide is turning… the overwhelming view is more research, more pre-evaluation, 
more post-evaluation, DfT are completely behind that. I am quite enthusiastic about 
their approach at the moment.”  
(Business and industry representative) 
 Gaps identified in road safety research included: 
 The impact of external factors on collisions e.g. poor road conditions, markings; 
 The effectiveness of current practical driver training versus alternative models; and 
 Understanding of the causes of each individual crash and what percentage of 
incidents are a result of human error. 
 There were mixed views with regards to knowledge transfer with some awareness of the 
Road Safety Observatory and Road Safety Knowledge Centre.  Issues raised included: 
 Concern that there are some areas of replication in terms of knowledge transfer 
and that the Road Safety Observatory and Road Safety Knowledge Centre are 
playing the same role; 
 Knowledge transfer can be complicated by different sources of funding and 
therefore resistance to share findings; 
 The outdated nature of the evidence base means defining ‘good’ is not clear.  The 
Road Safety Observatory defines ‘good’ to an extent but the amount of evidence 
and conflicting views held by road safety professionals makes definition unclear.  In 
particular there is no central repository of what ‘good’ means in terms of highway 
design; and 
 Evidence that has been identified as ‘good’ is hard to locate. 
8.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Some emergency service representatives identified areas where they are conducting their 
own research, including collaborations with universities.  Research is being undertaken on 
mobile phone use when driving, drink and drug driving, and on younger and older drivers. 
 There are a number of areas where emergency service representatives consider road 
safety research is required or could be improved.  These include: 
 There is no research available on perceived versus actual risk of being detected for 
a range of offences; 
 There is no best practice information on speed prosecution thresholds; 
 106/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 There is heavy reliance on STATS19 data, however the data has recently been 
delayed, meaning up-to-date data sources are not available; 
 Incidents that are not reported to the police are not provided in the STATS19 data, 
leading to some types of road collisions being underreported; and 
 Attempts have been made by emergency medical services to bring leading 
psychologists together to gain a better understanding of ‘opinions’ and data but 
the coordination failed. 
 Knowledge transfer across emergency services is coordinated by local authorities in some 
regions, and through strategic groups in others.  Comments relating to the need for 
improvement in knowledge transfer, made by emergency service representatives, 
include: 
 Knowledge transfer across the country is uncoordinated, with different regions 
identifying their own priorities, rather than identifying good practice approaches 
consistently;  
 There is no road safety knowledge transfer or promotion of initiatives to and within 
ambulance services, with the suggestion that this could be improved through the 
introduction of specific meetings with key stakeholders; 
 Different data systems cannot be integrated with each other to provide a joined up 
picture of road collision results from all emergency services; and 
 It is difficult to locate the research required. 
 Some emergency service representatives suggested that it would be helpful for DfT to 
identify and then share best practice through a forum, and to encourage knowledge 
sharing. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Eleven police force representatives responded to the questions on research and 
development in the online survey.   
 Asked whether ‘Central government research supports their police force with advice 
standards and demonstration projects’: 
 0 totally agreed; 
 1 mostly agreed;  
 5 partially agreed; 
 2 disagreed; and 
 3 did not know. 
 Asked whether ‘Central government provides sufficient advice and information to help 
their police force with road safety activity (including enforcement)’:   
 0 totally agreed; 
 2 mostly agreed;  
 5 partially agreed; 
 2 disagreed; 
 2 did not know. 
 There was reasonable consensus about the statement ‘Lessons and effective practice from 
national and international work are shared within the police force’: 
 0 totally agreed; 
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 2 mostly agreed;  
 7 partially agreed; 
 1 disagreed; and 
 1 did not know. 
 A total of 4 police force representatives provided responses when asked how the sharing 
of information on relevant road safety evidence could be improved within their police 
force.  Suggestions were: 
 
 Create a central national repository for roads policing; and 
 Provide analytical support, similar to the structure and process in place for other 
crime. 
 In terms of improving the sharing of road safety evidence on a national scale, police force 
representatives made the following propositions: 
 
 Make better use of the Police Online Knowledge Area (POLKA)/National Road 
Policing Intelligence Forum (NRPIF); 
 Create a central national repository for roads policing; and 
 Ensure that forces have nominally responsible casualty reduction officers. 
8.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Barriers to successful knowledge transfer identified by representatives of academic 
institutions include: 
 The quality of the Road Safety Observatory material is an issue – it is difficult to use 
and does not stand up academically, although a review is underway; 
 Research is often funded by private sector commercial organisations and therefore 
knowledge is not publicly shared; 
 Whilst BREXIT is not yet affecting invitations to be part of EU-wide research 
proposals it may do in future; 
 There is a lack of synthesis of research findings; 
 There is a lack of guidance on best practice; and 
 There is a lack of identification of priorities for road safety research from research 
experts. 
 Areas identified by academic institutions as requiring more research include: 
 Driver distraction and fatigue, as more in-vehicle functions become available for 
driver use; 
 Safety related research on autonomous vehicles e.g. research on how will they be 
used and misused, over trust of the system, crash protective elements etc.; 
 New safety interventions, particularly in relation to vehicle safety; and 
 Data requirements for active travel policy - which could be collected within 
STATS19, e.g. for pedestrian accidents (pedestrian falls on the pavement are at least 
comparable to numbers being fatally and serious injured on the highway), cycle 
only accidents, and multiple cycle accidents. 
 Representatives of academic institutions raised some concerns with research 
procurement.  These include: 
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 The current procurement process favours large consultancies within a framework 
which means that specialist activity can be limited or excluded; 
 The SPATS framework for research procurement is problematic as it is limited to 
five organisations and their subcontractors; and 
 Often, government agencies do not have any idea of the competence of the 
organisations tendering.  
 Concerns raised regarding DfT’s role in research and development include: 
 With regular changes internally in research staff there is a loss of developing 
expertise; 
 There is little or no consultation with external experts on safety research priorities; 
 There is a need for a national road safety research programme over 10 years to 
build Safe System capacity and knowledge; 
 There is insufficient attention to the evidence base in policymaking; and 
 Training budgets at central and local government levels and funds to attend 
conferences and workshops have been reduced in recent years, this together with 
staff reductions and staff turnover results in limits to current road safety 
knowledge. 
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9. INTERVENTION: SAFE ROADS & ROADSIDES 
9.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
9.1.1 Government representatives expressed how the Safer Roads Fund is driving investment 
in road safety engineering. 
9.1.2 They noted that on the strategic network, single carriageway A roads have been 
identified, using the iRAP star-rating exercise, as the most dangerous type of road, due to 
head-on collision and run-off risk.  Infrastructure changes on these roads are therefore a 
focus. 
9.1.3 Other infrastructure mechanisms noted as being examined at present include: self-
healing roads, plastic roads, pothole repair system, smart street lighting connectivity 
issues, and AV-needs.  Lane-keeping assistance (an in-vehicle safety device on the EU 
vehicles agenda) is not yet being considered from an infrastructure point of view. 
9.1.4 Other comments made by government representatives relating to safe roads and 
roadsides include: 
 There is no guidance on Safe System implementation for infrastructure as yet; and 
 Local authorities have programmes to boost walking and cycling, with a focus on 
cycling infrastructure. 
9.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
9.2.1 Representatives noted that high/medium KSI risk sections of roads are not systematically 
prioritised for treatments in most local authorities, but rather KSI sites themselves are 
prioritised.  They also noted that there is little evidence of a Safe System approach being 
implemented or being integrated into mainstream engineering e.g. asset management.  
However, some local government representatives noted that participation in the Safer 
Roads Fund scheme is focussing attention on proactive treatments, although it was also 
recognised to be a challenging process.  Additionally, the establishment of the national 
Major Road Network is viewed positively by some representatives. 
9.2.2 Some local government representatives referred to the iRAP risk mapping.  Whilst the 
ratings were considered to help put the focus on routes needing safety attention, 
representatives were concerned about excessive recommendations and lack of clarity 
regarding applicability in UK conditions. 
9.2.3 Many representatives noted that road safety funding has declined dramatically over the 
years, with road safety budget being used to support maintenance activity in some 
instances. 
9.2.4 Requests were made by local government representatives for clearer guidance with more 
consistent standards in relation to: 
 Road signage and signage strategy that focusses on decluttering; and 
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 Road sign lighting and potential to remove external illumination (because car 
beams are adequate lighting if the signs are made of the right reflective material). 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Twenty seven RSOs responded to the questions on safe roads and roadsides in the online 
survey.   
9.2.6 When RSOs were asked about the extent to which there is a programme of safety 
engineering treatments being carried out on local roads: 
 19 reported totally or mostly; 
 4 suggested such a programme is partially being carried out; 
 2 reported no such programme is being carried out; and  
 1 did not know. 
9.2.7 Of the 6 RSOs who stated a partial or no programme of safety engineering treatments is 
being carried out on local roads: 
 3  indicated it is likely or planned for the future; 
 1  reported it is unlikely or not planned for the future; and 
 2  did not know. 
9.2.8 When RSOs were questioned about whether there is a proactive treatment of roads with 
identified risk: 
 15 of RSOs reported totally or mostly; 
 7 suggested this is being carried out partially; 
 4 stated this is not being undertaken at all; and  
 1 did not know. 
9.2.9 Of the 11 RSOs who cited partial engagement in proactive treatment of roads with 
identified risk or no engagement at all: 
 8  suggested it is likely or planned for the future; 
 1  stated it is unlikely or not planned for the future; and 
 2  did not know.  
9.2.10 In response to being asked if priorities for safety engineering treatments are identified 
using Safe System principles: 
 8 of RSOs stated totally or mostly; 
 6 reported partial implementation of these principles; 
 9 suggested not at all; and  
 4 did not know. 
9.2.11 Of the 15 RSOs who cited partial priority identification with Safe System principles or no 
priority identification with Safe System principles at all: 
 8  reported this is likely or planned for the future; 
 3  suggested this is unlikely or not planned for the future; and 
 4  did not know. 
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Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty three local authority representatives responded to the questions on safe roads 
and roadsides in the online survey.   
9.2.13 When local authority representatives were asked about the extent to which there is a 
programme of safety engineering treatments being carried out on local roads: 
 21  of local authority representatives stated totally or mostly; and 
 2  suggested such a programme is partially being carried out. 
 Of the two representatives who cited partial engagement in safety engineering 
treatments: 
 1  suggested this is likely or planned for the future; and 
 1  did not know whether this is planned for the future, or not.  
9.2.15 When questioned about whether there is a proactive treatment of roads with identified 
risk: 
 17  of representatives reported totally or mostly; 
 4  stated this is being carried out partially; and 
 1 suggested not at all. 
9.2.16 Of the four representatives who cited partial engagement in proactive treatment of roads 
with identified risk, or no engagement at all: 
 1  indicated this is likely or planned for the future; and 
 3  did not know. 
9.2.17 In response to being asked if priorities for safety engineering treatments are identified 
using Safe System principles: 
 5 of stated totally or mostly; 
 10 reported partial implementation of these principles; 
 6 suggested not at all; and  
 1  did not know. 
9.2.18 Of the 16 representatives who cited partial priority identification with Safe System 
principles or no priority identification with Safe System principles at all: 
 3  reported this is likely or planned for the future; 
 2  suggested this is unlikely or not planned for the future; and 
 11  did not know. 
9.2.19 Asked if Safe System principles are being embedded into the mainstream of highway 
engineering processes and practice: 
 3 stated this is totally or mostly the case; 
 12 indicated partial implementation of these principles; 
 6 said not at all; and 
 1 did not know.  
9.2.20 Of the 187 representatives who cited partial or no embedding of Safe System principles 
into their mainstream highways and engineering processes and practice: 
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 6  indicated this is likely or planned for the future; 
 4  suggested this is unlikely or not planned for the future;  
 7  did not know; and 
 1  did not respond. 
9.2.21 In response to being asked whether longer term benefits of safety engineering treatments 
are accounted for in project appraisals and investments: 
 10 reported totally or mostly; 
 7 indicated this is partially the case; 
 3 suggested this does not happen at all; and 
 2 did not know. 
9.2.22 Of the 10 representatives who cited longer term benefits of safety engineering treatments 
are partially or not at all accounted for in project appraisals and investments: 
 4  indicated this is likely or planned for the future; 
 4  indicated this is likely or planned for the future; 
 2  suggested this is unlikely or not planned for the future;  
 2  did not know; and 
 2  did not respond. 
9.2.23 Lastly, representatives were asked if their local authority uses iRAP risk mapping and star 
rating in their prioritisation of road safety engineering work: 
 4 reported partial implementation of such processes; 
 16 stated they do not use these systems at all; and 
 2 did not know.  
9.2.24 Of the 20 who cited partially or not at all using iRAP risk mapping and star rating in their 
prioritisation of road safety engineering work: 
 4  indicated this was likely or planned for the future; 
 9  suggested this was unlikely or not planned for the future;  
 6  did not know; and  
 1  did not respond. 
9.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
9.3.1 Some representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities indicated that the 
establishment of the national Major Road Network, to be funded by vehicle licensing fees, 
was a positive step and they were keen to see investment beyond the Strategic Road 
Network since the Major Road Network is twice the size.  Additionally, several noted that 
a range of goals and targets should be adopted, as they have for the Strategic Road 
Network. 
9.3.2 Representatives of advisory groups, associations and charities raised a number of 
concerns relating to safe roads and roadsides. These include: 
 There is a lack of strategic thinking and long-term planning by local authorities for 
local roads; 
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 There is a shortage of resources for route treatments outside the Safer Roads Fund 
and too much concentration on low-cost schemes; 
 A proliferation of road signs, providing a mass of information, not all of which is 
relevant, means drivers focus on the signs and not the road; 
 The piecemeal nature of some development makes strategic vision for safe areas 
for children to play unrealistic in many cases; 
 Short term reactive funding by local authorities for road safety posts (RSOs on 18 
month posts) and pot hole funds leads to an overall decline in standards for safe 
roads; and 
 Lack of lighting on roads negatively impacts motorbikes and cyclists in particular. 
9.3.3 Initiatives promoted by representatives include: 
 Junctions priority clarity for cyclists, including cyclist left-turn priority; 
 Segregation between cyclists and motor traffic; 
 Advanced green lights for cyclists – get a head start on traffic and clear out of 
danger area where drivers may not be able to see you; 
 Lobbying for reduction in motor vehicles through road user charging, and roll out 
of new technology in public transport, such as bus Intelligent Speed Assistance 
(ISA) trials; and 
 Prioritising improvements to existing roads rather than new construction, e.g. 
better road surface quality, which impacts on road safety. 
9.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
9.4.1 Representatives of business and industry noted the importance of good road and roadside 
design for road safety.   However, there were concerns that a Safe System approach is not 
prioritised by designers in road and roadside design, due to lack of awareness. 
9.4.2 Business and industry representatives suggested that rather than, as per the iRAP scheme, 
defining high-priority routes by the number of KSIs the DfT should consider prioritising 
routes based on: 
 The best casualty reduction per pound spent; and 
 An acknowledgement that the recording of KSIs does not include recognition of 
driver factors such as health and lack of control (e.g. heart attacks, diabetic comas, 
asleep at the wheel), which are not factors of the road and cannot be improved 
with engineering/infrastructure changes. 
 They felt that technical knowledge of road and roadside design at a local authority level 
was limited, with very few occurrences of local authorities referring to safer roadsides, 
with the exception of route schemes on DfT high priority routes where DfT has provided 
funding.   
9.4.4 Some business and industry representatives highlighted their contribution to good road 
design through guidance publications.  These included: 
 Responses to requests from engaged local authorities for policies on passive safety, 
road design and prioritisation; and 
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 Publications for site developers (often off main strategic routes) examining safe 
road design for HGVs, e.g. turning circles (where incorrect design can mean vehicles 
rolling over even at low speeds), parking areas and layouts. 
9.4.5 Another comment made by business and industry representatives is that the introduction 
of connected roads is perceived to have potential for a big impact on road safety.  In terms 
of road design, the quality of white lines on roads is considered very important, both for 
drivers, but also for car cameras to enable autonomous systems to work effectively. 
9.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
9.5.1 Whilst representatives of the emergency services noted that they are not directly involved 
in road design, they were interested in being consulted in the future.  Points raised by 
representatives include: 
 Data on collision frequency in different road environments could be provided in 
order for this to be taken into account during road design; 
 Road humps have been introduced without emergency service consultation – these 
slow down response time and can mean difficulty in transit.  A preferred option 
would be road pinching methods, with staggered road use; and 
 Yet to be convinced by the effectiveness of smart motorways in reducing KSIs, 
which they considered provide an unsafe environment for emergency services to 
work in and to make access for emergency services more difficult. 
9.5.2 Some emergency services do have some input into the road design phase, examples cited 
include: 
 Highlighting areas with increased accident and KSI activity to county engineers, 
such as harsh corners and dangerous tree placement; 
 Inputting views on junction and roundabout design; and 
 Highlighting the impact of road design on vulnerable road users. 
9.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
 Several researchers referred to the need to adopt Safe System road hierarchies and 
speeds and stressed the importance of safe roadsides to prevent run-offs. They believed 
that these were receiving too little attention in current network management planning. 
9.6.2 Representatives of academic institutions identified a number of areas where they 
considered more research was necessary.  These include: 
 How human factors interact with road design, for example road design can slow 
people down by adding curves at the end of long, fast roads; 
 How boredom can be alleviated in monotonous driving conditions, including better 
provisions for breaks; 
 The impact of road width relative to speed; 
 The impact of road signage on driver behaviour, including consideration of whether 
there are too many road signs, whether road signs are in the way, and whether the 
vehicle can communicate with the driver better than road signs; and 
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 20 mph limits without self-enforcing measures. 
9.6.3 Other comments made by academic representatives on safe roads and roadsides include: 
 Most national research and evidence comes from the 1960s and is outdated; and 
 The new ringfenced money for major road improvements is not statutory and could 
be diverted because no actual sum has been allocated. 
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10. INTERVENTION: SAFE SPEEDS 
10.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Speed Priority 
10.1.1 Central Government Departments and agencies consider that safe speed interventions 
are generally not a priority within DfT.  They cited cultural views around speeding 
acceptability and speed enforcement as barriers to giving the intervention priority.  
10.1.2 The responsibility for safe speed interventions is seen to fall within Local Authorities, as 
part of the Localism Act 2011.  Central government departments and agencies suggest 
that local authorities have the ability to set speed limits and implement enforcement 
infrastructure, namely speed cameras.  Additionally, fleet managers are seen to have a 
key role in safe speeds interventions, with most monitoring fleet driving speeds through 
the use of telematics technology.  The DfT encourages this practice.   
Safe Speed Enforcement 
10.1.3 DfT does not hold data on speed enforcement measures, and therefore data is not 
available to them on speed camera compliance.  However, they do measure compliance 
with speed limits in normal, free-flowing traffic.  There is a general view that speed limit 
compliance is improving. 
10.1.4 Speed enforcement infrastructure, namely cameras, is seen as the responsibility of local 
authorities and Highways England, at local and network levels.  Speed cameras are 
considered to be the ‘last-resort’ option on the national network, with no further plans to 
increase their numbers, and a preference for variable and average speed limits. 
10.1.5 Limited police resource is seen to have an impact on the police responsibility for speed 
enforcement, with heavier reliance on camera-only enforcement becoming increasingly 
common.  Ring-fenced speed enforcement funds, provided by the Home Office, were seen 
to have value, however, operational priorities create difficulties.  
10.1.6 It is believed that relaxed public attitudes to speeding and an increased antagonism to 
speed cameras, act as barriers to safe speed compliance. 
10.2 Local Government  
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Speed Priority/Strategy 
10.2.1 One local authority suggested that safe speed interventions are outlined in local authority 
and partnership strategies, in order to aid local policy and decision making.  The 
development of such strategies is believed to be based upon casualty data, therefore 
interventions usually prioritise specific road user groups and priority routes. 
Safe Speed Enforcement 
10.2.2 The success of Safety Camera Partnerships is acknowledged by local government 
stakeholders, however: 
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 There is a recognition that some camera sites have been abandoned; 
 There is national variability in their use; and 
 Reviews of safety camera development, hours of enforcement and performance 
are not conducted by all local authorities (although one local authority stakeholder 
publishes safety camera data on their website, and provides it to local government 
advisory bodies). 
10.2.3 Many local government stakeholders suggested that cameras are being systematically 
digitalised. 
10.2.4 Without safety camera or active road policing enforcement, lack of self-enforcement of 
20mph limits is a considered to be a problem though DfT research is expected to throw 
further light on this issue. 
Safe Speed Limits 
10.2.5 Speed limit risk assessment reviews are supported by local government advisory groups 
and have resulted in the lowering of speed limits from 60mph to 50mph in most local 
authorities, with some considering further reduction to 40mph, but acknowledging an 
increased risk of overtaking.  Despite such results, some local authorities view speed limit 
risk assessment reviews as questionable. 
10.2.6 As well as reductions in speed on faster routes, local authorities reported the adoption of 
20mph speed limits in urban areas.  
10.2.7 Many local authorities recognised public pressures on speed limit setting, with one local 
authority suggesting that it receives multiple requests from residents for speed limit 
changes.  Another local authority suggested that such requests are usually for 
unenforceable lower limits, and these are usually ignored. 
Safe Speed Education 
10.2.8 Safe speed awareness course levies are managed by local road safety partnerships and 
conducted by roads policing units. 
Speed Calming Measures 
10.2.9 Multiple local government stakeholders reported that speed humps are being removed, 
with an acknowledgement of the economic cost of doing so. 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Twenty seven RSOs responded to the questions on safe speeds in the online survey.   
10.2.11 RSOs were asked whether they consider local speed limits and their enforcement to be 
aligned with safe system principles: 
 10 suggested they were totally or mostly aligned;  
 3 stated they were partially aligned; 
 7 reported not at all aligned; and 
 7 did not know. 
10.2.12 Of the 10 RSOs who cited partial alignment with Safe System principles for their 
implementation of local speed limits and speed enforcement, or no alignment at all: 
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 2 indicated this is likely or is planned for the future; 
 4 reported this is unlikely or is not planned for the future; and 
 4 did not know. 
10.2.13 In response to being asked if speed enforcement on different roads is coordinated with 
publicity to achieve a deterrent effect: 
 8 of RSOs stated this is totally or mostly the case; 
 6 suggested this is partially true; 
 11 indicated that this is not the case; and 
 2 did not know.  
 Of the 17 RSOs who cited partial coordination of speed enforcement and publicity, or no 
coordination at all: 
 6 indicated this is likely or is planned for the future; 
 7 reported this is unlikely or is not planned for the future; and 
 4 did not know. 
10.2.15 RSOs were subsequently asked if data is available on speed limit compliance, average 
speeds and the number of hours of speed camera enforcement: 
 13 indicated this data is totally or mostly available; 
 6 reported partial availability of such data; 
 5 stated this data is not at all available; and 
 3 did not know.  
10.2.16 Of the 11 RSOs who cited partial availability of data on speed limit compliance, average 
speeds and the number of hours of speed camera enforcement, or no availability at all: 
 4 suggested this is likely or is planned for the future; and 
 7 reported this is unlikely or is not planned for the future.  
10.2.17 With regards to whether 20mph zones and/or 20mph limits are widely implemented: 
 8 of RSOs suggested these are totally or mostly implemented; 
 14 indicated partial implementation of such restrictions; 
 3 reported no deployment of such zones and/or limits; and 
 2% did not know.  
10.2.18 Of the 17 RSOs who cited partial implementation of 20mph zones or speed limits, or no 
implementation at all: 
 4 indicated this is likely or is planned for the future; 
 5 reported this is unlikely or is not planned for the future; and 
 8 did not know. 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty two local authority representatives responded to the questions on safe speeds in 
the online survey.   
10.2.20 Local authority representatives were asked whether they consider local speed limits and 
their enforcement to be aligned with safe system principles: 
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 6 suggested they were totally or mostly aligned;  
 8 stated they were partially aligned; 
 6 reported they were not at all aligned; and 
 2 did not know. 
10.2.21 Of the 14 representatives who cited partial alignment with Safe System principles for their 
implementation of local speed limits and speed enforcement, or no alignment at all: 
 2 suggested this is likely or is planned for the future; 
 5 stated this is unlikely or is not planned for the future;  
 5 did not know; and 
 2 did not respond. 
10.2.22 In response to being asked whether data is available on speed limit compliance, average 
speeds and the number of hours of speed camera enforcement: 
 14 reported this data is totally or mostly available; 
 5 indicated partial availability of such data; 
 2 suggested this data is not available at all; and 
 1 did not know.  
10.2.23 Of the 7 representatives who cited partial availability of data on speed limit compliance, 
average speeds and the number of hours of speed camera enforcement, or no availability 
at all: 
 1 indicated this is likely or is planned for the future; 
 1 stated this is unlikely or is not planned for the future;  
 4 did not know; and 
 1 did not respond. 
10.2.24 With regards to whether 20mph zones and or 20mph limits are widely implemented: 
 11 of local authority representatives suggested these are totally or mostly 
implemented; and 
 11 indicated partial implementation of such restrictions. 
10.2.25 Of the 11 representatives who cited partial implementation of 20mph zones or speed 
limits: 
 1 indicated this is likely or is planned for the future; 
 4 stated this is unlikely or is not planned for the future; 
 4 did not know; and 
 2 did not indicate whether these were planned for the future, or not. 
10.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Speed Priority/Strategy 
10.3.1 Most advisory groups, associations and charities promote and prioritise safe speeds and 
speed limits and see speed as being central to road safety.    
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10.3.2 One stakeholder, with a remit for motorcyclist safety, reports working with motorbike 
manufacturers to encourage promotion of safe speeds by reducing marketing of 
highspeed bikes. 
10.3.3 Relaxed public attitudes to speeding and a lack of commitment to road safety, from all 
bodies, creates barriers for safe speed prioritisation. 
Safe Speed Enforcement 
10.3.4 In general, safe speed enforcement is seen as poor, with the suggestion that 20mph speed 
limits, in particular, need to be better enforced.  Poor safe speed enforcement is seen to 
come from a reduction in the use of poorly located speed cameras and a reduction in 
roads policing resource. 
10.3.5 One representative made reference to international best practice, citing increased safe 
speed enforcement levels in France as a contributing factor to reduced collision levels, 
due to an increased fear of detection.    However, it was acknowledged that such a practice 
would not be possible in the UK, due to reduced resource. 
10.3.6 Despite poor safe speed enforcement, camera enforcement is seen by some as a good 
revenue generator, although this was not a commonly expressed view. The success of 
Safety Camera Partnerships between police, local authorities, Highways England and Her 
Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) is acknowledged, however, there is a 
recognition that some had been abandoned.  
10.3.7 Self-enforcement of 20mph limits is perceived by cycling organisations and some speed 
limit reduction advocacy representatives as a red-herring, who would like better 
enforcement of 20mph limits by the police. 
Safe Speed Limits 
10.3.8 In-car technology, such as Intelligent Speed Adaptation (ISA), is generally advocated by 
advisory groups, associations and charities, with several organisations suggesting that 
voluntary overridable ISA should be mandatorily fitted to motor vehicles to fulfil Safe 
System strategy.  
10.3.9 On local roads, speed limit reduction is advocated by many advisory group, association 
and charity stakeholders.  For instance, one charity stakeholder suggested that most 
60mph limits are inappropriately high, and additionally, cyclist safety organisations 
advocated default speed limits of 40mph on country roads and 20mph in residential areas. 
In line with this suggestion from cycle safety organisations, some other advisory group, 
association and charity stakeholders expressed support for the introduction of 20mph 
speed limits, with the suggestion that this speed limit is needed in order to adopt a Safe 
System approach.  However, there is some concern that 20mph speed limits should only 
be introduced where: 
 It is sensible and credible (for example, in urban settings where people are often 
driving at 20mph anyway, or near schools), with appropriate exceptions; and 
 The benefits have been explained before implementing.  
10.3.10 Other stakeholders do not support 20mph speed limit implementation, citing: 
 20mph speed limits are not the best use of funding; 
 20mph speed limits increase pollution by 30% for the average current vehicle; and 
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 Collisions are likely in 20mph speed limits because drivers are focused on their 
speedometer. 
10.3.11 Some stakeholders are waiting for DfT research evaluating 20mph speed limits before 
drawing any conclusions. 
10.3.12 Considerations suggested by advisor group, association and charity stakeholders, when 
changing speed limits, are: 
 Promotion of the speed limit change, including keeping satnavs up to date;  
 The introduction of autonomous vehicles; 
 The cost of change, especially for local authorities; 
 DfT’s Local Speed Limit Schemes Appraisal Tool (2013); 
 Evidence for effectiveness, with Unfit for 80 (2012) being recognised as evidence of 
the ineffectiveness of speed limit increase; 
 Road users’ prioritisation of journey time reliability over safety; and 
 A duty to protect vulnerable road users and the tolerance of the human frame, with 
the acknowledgement that in 2016, over half of those killed on London roads were 
pedestrians. 
10.3.13 On all networks, stakeholders recognise barriers to speed limit change.  For instance, 
populism is often seen to influence speed limit setting, with some speeds not seen as 
acceptable in the local environment. Additionally, compared to the iRAP star rating 
system which accounts for safe speed and Safe System principles, the current road 
classifications system is seen as inefficient.  
Safe Speed Monitoring 
10.3.14 One advisory group, association and charity stakeholder monitors safe speed compliance 
through an annual road user survey.  Results from the most recent survey suggest that 
road users are more likely to report breaking the motorway speed limit than any other 
speed limit.   
10.3.15 Another advisory group, association and charity stakeholder suggested that safe speed 
monitoring statistics should all be kept in one, accessible place. 
10.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Speed Priority/Strategy 
10.4.1 Whilst there was little evidence of strategies in business and industry around safe speed, 
the representatives engaged with were advocates of speed legislation, the Highway Code 
and intelligent in-vehicle systems and telematics. 
10.4.2 One business and industry stakeholder recognised the tendency to take a reductionist 
approach, mistakenly viewing safe speed as the largest risk factor for KSI involvement. 
Safe Speed Enforcement  
10.4.3 One business and industry representative acknowledged the importance of safe speed 
enforcement, citing speed cameras as the most effective intervention for reducing speed 
on all networks.  However, it was suggested that public controversy, namely the influence 
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of populist and inappropriate views, acts as a barriers to effective speed camera 
implementation, with speed cameras often put in place in low-risk areas, where drivers 
cannot go fast enough to do serious harm, and not in high-crash-risk areas. 
Safe Speed Limits 
10.4.4 On all networks, business and industry representatives saw difficulties for physical speed 
limit change. For instance: 
 The influence of populism, without the acknowledgement that the public view is 
non-expert; 
 Communicating with road users that the safe speed limit is lower than the previous 
safe speed limit; and 
 Lack of best-practice awareness in local networks, despite DfT’s Local Speed Limit 
Schemes Appraisal Tool (2013), causing variability in speed limit setting.  
10.4.5 There was some concern for the effectiveness of 20mph speed limits from one business 
and industry representative. 
10.4.6 Business and industry representatives recognised that their main safe speed limit 
interventions focused on intelligent in-vehicle systems, such as cruise control, road speed 
limiters and ISA.  There was an acknowledgement that road speed limiters are required 
to be fitted in commercial vehicles by law and that there is currently a push for ISA to also 
be mandatory.  
Safe Speed Monitoring 
10.4.7 Telematics technology was recognised as a way of monitoring safe speed by business and 
industry representatives.  This technology was thought to be built into larger fleet 
operators logistics programmes, to manage operations processes and performance, with 
the possibility to take action against non-compliant drivers. 
Speed Penalties 
10.4.8 The insurance industry were seen to incentivise safe speed adherence by increasing 
insurance costs for those with speeding penalty points. 
Fleet and Road Haulage Survey Findings 
10.4.9 Of the 17 fleet company managers and four road haulage company managers who 
responded to questions on safe speeds: 
 13 fleet companies and 3 road haulage companies routinely monitor driver 
compliance with rules for speed, alcohol, use of drugs, seat belts and in-vehicle 
telephone use; and 
 9 fleet companies and 2 road haulage companies use telematics to monitor driver 
performance. 
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10.5 Emergency Services/Health  
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Speed Priority/Strategy 
10.5.1 Emergency Services prioritise safe speed interventions and some work with Road Safety 
Partnerships to consider speed enforcement strategies.  
Safe Speed Enforcement 
10.5.2 Emergency services and health sector representative perceived there to be a reliance on 
camera-only enforcement by police forces.  They saw this as   less evident in 20mph limit 
areas and more evident in areas with high collision frequency, due to stretched resource.  
10.5.3 Emergency services reported that communities are often involved in online complaints 
systems which guide safe speed enforcement locations.  One police force suggested that 
it compiled community complaints with internal intelligence, to create a list of at-risk 
offenders that allows for highly targeted enforcement.  Communities are also involved in 
community speed watch teams, however police forces state there is a lack of resource to 
train and shadow community speed watch members and this has caused disinterest.   
Safe Speed Limits 
10.5.4 Emergency Services have been consulted on the introduction of 20mph speed limits in 
their area. This has allowed them to develop targeted enforcement and education 
campaigns. 
Safe Speed Education 
10.5.5 The National Speed Awareness Course, offered as part of the National Driver Offender 
Retraining (NDOR) Scheme was valued by emergency services.  However, concern was 
expressed that: 
 Offenders may be eligible for repeat courses within a 3-year period; and 
 The suitability of the police force for delivering NDOR.  There was a suggestion that 
the fire service would be better suited to this role – one which at least some fire 
services would be interest in.   
10.5.6 Other safe speed education interventions, used by police forces, which are now restricted 
due to limited resource, include: 
 Roadside awareness videos, presented by police to offenders; and 
 ‘Kids court’ initiatives, in which offenders caught outside of schools would be asked 
to explain their actions to a panel of children. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Ten police force representatives responded to the questions on safe speeds in the online 
survey.   
10.5.8 Police force representatives were asked whether they consider local speed limits and their 
enforcement are aligned with safe system principles.  Of these: 
 5 suggested they were totally or mostly aligned; 
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 1 suggested they were not at all aligned but this was something planned for the 
future; and  
 4 did not know whether these two standards were congruent.    
10.5.9 There was mixed response when police force representatives were asked to consider if 
speed enforcement on different roads is coordinated with publicity to achieve a deterrent 
effect.  Of the 10 respondents who answered the question: 
 4 suggested this to be totally or mostly the case; 
 2 argued that it was partially the case;  
 2 said this was not the case; and  
 2 did not know. 
10.5.10 Of those who answered this to be partially or not at all the case, two commented that it 
was planned in the future, and two did not know.  
10.5.11 Of the 10 police force representatives who stated whether data is available on speed limit 
compliance, average speeds and the number of hours of speed camera enforcement for 
road types: 
 5 responded that this information is totally or mostly available; 
 3 said it is partially available (2 of whom said its availability is planned in the future); 
and 
 2 did not know.  
10.5.12 Half of the 10 police force representatives answering the question did not know if speed 
awareness courses were improving compliance with speed limits locally.  Of those who 
considered that the courses do improve compliance with speed limits locally: 
 1 considered this to be totally the case; 
 3 indicated it is mostly the case; and 
 1 considered it to be partially the case.    
10.5.13 Police force representatives were asked whether 20mph zones and / or 20mph limits were 
widely implemented by their police force.  Of those who answered the question: 
 4 said they were totally or mostly implemented; 
 5 indicated they were partially implemented; and  
 1 did not know. 
10.5.14 Of those who suggested they were only partially implemented, 2 stated that there were 
future plans for such zones and speed limits, 2 indicated that such plans were not on their 
police forces’ agenda, and one did not know.  
10.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Speed Priority/Strategy 
10.6.1 Academic institutions did not perceive safe speed interventions to be a priority within DfT 
and key agencies, such as Highways England.  
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10.6.2 Several stakeholders believed that targets should be set to increase compliance with 
speed limits on different types of roads and that speed limits needed to be aligned with 
Safe System principles. 
Safe Speed Enforcement 
10.6.3 Research on the value of speed cameras has been supported by academic institutions.   
However, average and variable speed limits, and supporting camera technology, were 
seen to be more effective interventions.  Academic institutions explicitly encourage the 
use of these technologies in ‘black spot’ areas. 
10.6.4 Academic institutions saw the insurance industry and their use of telematics technology 
as successfully incentivising long-term behavioural change, in particular for young drivers 
and those driving to work, although they felt further evaluation is needed. 
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11. INTERVENTION: SAFE VEHICLES 
11.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Priority Given to Safe Vehicles 
11.1.1 Vehicle safety is seen as fundamental to improving road safety outcomes with the UK.  
Central government departments and agencies made specific reference to tyre safety and 
the influence of vehicle safety on vulnerable road users as priority areas. 
Responsibility for Safe Vehicles  
11.1.2 The responsibility for vehicle safety was seen to be shared between central government 
– departments, particularly the International Vehicles Division, and agencies, namely the 
DVSA and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). The latter was considered responsible 
for the provision of guidance and enforcement of vehicle safety on private building sites 
and premises, once they have been informed of a major failing. 
11.1.3 Although Highways England were seen to have very little responsibility for vehicle safety, 
there was a suggestion that Highways England could run publicity campaigns with a 
vehicle safety focus, shared nationally by DfT. 
Safe Vehicles Standards 
11.1.4 DfT representatives saw the European New Car Assessment Programme (Euro NCAP) as 
the main mechanism for improving vehicle safety quality.  They indicated that they DfT is 
currently carrying out a review of priorities for new vehicle safety regulation within the 
context of the current General Safety and Pedestrian Safety review and has supported the 
take up of Euro NCAP 5* rating + 60% pedestrian tests in the recent consultation by the 
Government car buying service. 
11.1.5 The devolved administrations indicated they are reliant on central government for 
information on European Community Whole Vehicle Type Approval and anticipate the 
influence of BREXIT. 
11.1.6 Vehicle standards were not expected to change post-BREXIT, with the suggestion by some 
that the UK will continue to adopt European standards. 
11.1.7 London has specific procurement standards for lorries, for instance, standards on visibility 
such as the use of mirrors and sideguards.  DfT representatives indicated that other cities 
are also showing interest in this scheme and that they prefer these initiatives to a national 
initiative. 
11.1.8 Central government departments and agencies were aware of measures to address non-
compliance to vehicle safety standards, such as: 
 Operation Trivium, conducted by police forces throughout Europe to target foreign 
vehicles; and 
 HSE improvement notices. 
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Autonomous Vehicles 
11.1.9 There were mixed views on the relationship between autonomous vehicles and vehicle 
safety, with some central government representatives suggesting that autonomous 
vehicles will bring about new vehicle safety issues which need to be resolved, and others 
suggesting that autonomous vehicles are too much in focus, lessening attention to other 
key measures. 
11.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
11.2.1 There was little discussion with local government around safe vehicles apart from in 
London, where there was a focus on HGVs.   
11.2.2 Few local authorities reported that they had embarked on policies to promote vehicle 
safety through public procurement.  Some local government bodies have encouraged 
central government to review their plans for longer articulated vehicles carrying a greater 
weight.  These plans are seen as dangerous for pedestrians, road side furniture and the 
overall network capacity, creating specific consequences for local authorities. 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
11.2.3 Twenty six RSOs responded to the questions on Safe Vehicles in the online survey.  When 
asked whether they require Euro NCAP 5* for all government service cars and taxis: 
 1 suggested they totally or mostly require this; 
 1 indicated they partially require vehicle to meet these standards; 
 3 do not require this at all; and  
 21 did not know.  
11.2.4 All 4 of the RSOs who reported they partially or do not require Euro NCAP 5* did not know 
whether this requirement was planned for the future. 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
11.2.5 Twenty two local authority representatives answered a question on safe vehicles within 
the survey.  When asked whether they require Euro NCAP 5 * for all government service 
cars and taxis: 
 3 do not require this; and  
 19 did not know. 
11.2.6 Of the 3 representatives who reported not requiring Euro NCAP 5* for all government 
service cars and taxis: 
 2 suggested this is unlikely or not planned for the future; and 
 1 did not know if these requirements would be introduced in the future.  
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11.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Vehicle Standards 
 Several stakeholders pointed to the importance of the European review of vehicle 
standards and the many opportunities which existed for new mandatory requirements.   
 Euro NCAP ratings are valued by advisory groups, associations and charity stakeholders, 
as they encourage individuals and businesses to buy and procure cars with better safety 
standards and therefore have potential to improve the level of vehicle safety in the car 
market, including the used and autonomous vehicles market.   
11.3.3 There was some suggestion that Euro NCAP and its promotion could be improved 
through: 
 Introducing ratings based on pedestrian and cyclist safety; and 
 Better promotion of 5* rated cars by central and local government, the British 
Vehicle Rental and Leasing Agency (BVRLA) and the insurance sector. 
11.3.4 There was some focus on standards for HGVs and buses, with stakeholders suggesting 
that the following be considered:  
 The safety of vulnerable road users, particularly pedestrians and cyclists, which 
could be improved through the introduction of minimum vision standards, such as 
the direct line of sight approach, in which drivers sit lower down in the cab.  One 
stakeholder, with a cyclist safety remit, had been involved in EU lobbying 
surrounding this issue; and 
 Better bus driving and design to prevent passenger injury and death, and better 
data on bus passenger injury and death. 
11.3.5 One stakeholder suggested there should be greater clarity in vehicle safety standards, 
making particular reference to: 
 Legislation outlining vehicle safety standards, making particular reference to AEB 
and ISA and the influence of these on all road users, including pedestrians; 
 Government procurement processes; and 
 Guidelines on child restraints, with the suggestion that the provision of multiple 
guidelines from both car and child restraint manufacturers makes it difficult to 
understand the standard expected. 
Safe Vehicles Technology and Autonomous Vehicles 
11.3.6 Future technology, autonomous vehicles and vehicle connectivity are seen as contributing 
factors in accident reduction by many advisory group, association and charity 
stakeholders, with a focus on Anti-lock Braking Systems (ABS), Electronic Stability Control 
(ESC) and Autonomous Emergency Braking (AEB).   
11.3.7 Stakeholders made the following suggestions for advancement in safe vehicles 
technology: 
 Satnav updates to incorporate new speed limits; 
 Compulsory introduction of passenger airbags; 
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 Advanced introduction of AEB; 
 Technological advancements for motorbikes; 
 A focus on key safety issues, rather than commercial value, within vehicle 
automation research; 
 E-call, with concern surrounding the requirement of internet connection, which 
could mean the technology it is less available in remote areas, where it is needed 
the most; and 
 The reduction of in-vehicle distractions, including touch screen interfaces built into 
cars. 
11.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Vehicles Knowledge Sharing 
11.4.1 Business and industry stakeholders reported attendance at regular forums and open days 
with car manufacturers and safety testers to discuss issues of mutual concern and gain a 
greater understanding of vehicle safety. 
11.4.2 One stakeholder, with a responsibility for training drivers, educated trainers on vehicle 
safety as part of a post qualification course.  There was a suggestion that this knowledge 
sharing practice would be further encouraged in the future, as an understanding of vehicle 
safety, for both driver trainers, and drivers, was seen as a large contributing factor to 
driver risk reduction. 
Safe Vehicle Standards 
11.4.3 The development of industry safe vehicle ratings, through Thatcham, the UK’s Euro NCAP 
test centre, was acknowledged.  These ratings calculate insurance risk and therefore 
influence insurance cost, with vehicles that are safer, for instance those with AEB, 
receiving lower risk and insurance costs.   
11.4.4 The current process of updating General Product Safety Regulations (2005) was also 
acknowledged. 
11.4.5 Multiple business and industry stakeholders encouraged compliance with safe vehicles 
standards, including support for vehicles with a 5* Euro NCAP rating, and saw no change 
in these post-BREXIT.   
11.4.6 There were differing levels of encouragement within business and industry organisations 
with regards to safe vehicles.  Some encourage and provide guidance and education on 
best practice in safe vehicle standards without prescription.  Others encourage and ensure 
standard compliance through vehicle checks and audits, some of which have to be paid 
for, including tachograph assessments.  One business and industry organisation reported 
awarding members for safety initiatives.   
11.4.7 Concerns about vehicle safety from business and industry organisations included: 
 Vehicle safety audits and checks are only conducted retrospectively, once a 
problem is identified;  
 There should be an increased number of technical inspections (MOTs) to ensure 
vehicle safety standards are met; 
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 Recall processes for faulty vehicles should be more efficient to ensure standards 
are met; 
 The tourism sector has not expressed an interest in promoting vehicle safety 
standards in vehicle rental and lease; 
 Compliance with standards is harder to measure for businesses using grey fleets;  
 Euro NCAP 5* ratings are not always acknowledged by all who procure cars, with 
the suggestion that some may believe that if a car is available on the UK market 
then it is regulated by standards and safe.  This attitude often means businesses 
and individuals do not procure vehicles with the highest safe vehicles standards and 
procure based on other factors.  One business and industry stakeholder had targets 
for 2020 to ensure that 50% of cars leased will be Euro NCAP 5* rated; 
 Features acknowledged in safety standards, such as AEB and head restraints 
technology, are not always built into vehicles, meaning they are costed with 
additional tax.  If features were built in, and therefore not taxed and mandatory, 
stakeholders suggested that there would be a better uptake of safer vehicles; 
 There was some suggestion that mandatory requirements should be evidence led; 
and 
 Businesses and individuals buy and lease vehicles based on alternative factors, such 
as perks and price (as above). 
Safe Vehicles Technology and Autonomous Vehicles 
11.4.8 Business and industry stakeholders reported differing levels of involvement in safe 
vehicles technology, including assisted and autonomous vehicles.  For instance, 
stakeholders were involved in: 
 The production of legislation surrounding autonomous vehicles, such as the 
Automated Vehicles Bill currently being debated in government; 
 The production of guidance for automated vehicles, outlining underlying safety 
criteria; 
 Training for automated and assisted vehicles, ensuring that drivers still understand 
that they are responsible for the vehicle; 
 The production and installation of technology, including active safety solutions 
(crash preventing technology), such as AEB, and passive safety solutions (crash 
performance technology), for instance, fire suppression systems and e-call 
technology; and 
 The leasing of automated vehicles, although this only makes up a small percentage 
of the leasing fleet. 
11.4.9 Most business and industry stakeholders encouraged safe vehicles technology and the 
development of assisted and automated vehicles, making reference to AEB and 
encouraging improvements in built-in notification systems, providing information on road 
layout, signs, street furniture, speeds, lane discipline, blind spots and pedestrian 
presence.  Some stakeholders suggested that they would like to see a mandatory 
commitment and uptake of this technology. 
11.4.10 There was a belief from many stakeholders that improvements in safe vehicle technology, 
and the development of assisted and automated vehicles, would result in short and long-
term benefits.  Specifically: 
 In the short term, increased driver awareness and reduced driver error from the 
provision of more intelligent and safer cars on the road, leading to fewer road traffic 
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accidents and less severe damage from these accidents.  This short term benefit 
was thought to benefit most people, but some more than others; 
“As technology does role out, the net impact of fewer collisions overall will benefit 
everybody, but will benefit certain groups more” 
  (Business and industry representative) 
 In the long term, new cars with better technology will become more affordable, 
creating widespread safety benefits. 
11.4.11 Stakeholders suggested that the following should be considered in the development of 
safe vehicles technology, including assisted and automated vehicles: 
 Cost: 
 With an awareness that smaller manufacturers are finding it difficult to 
afford technological developments and the research and development costs 
associated with implementing them.  There was a suggestion that this could 
be overcome through the introduction of different transitional periods for 
safety features, depending on the size of the manufacturer; and 
 With an appreciation that benefits will be less evident for those who cannot 
afford cars with such technology, including automated and assisted vehicles.  
This was thought to disadvantage younger drivers the most.   
 Insurance aspects, including clarity over driver liability and responsibility; 
 A clear distinction between automated and assisted vehicles, with reference made 
to ABI and Thatcham’s Regulating Automated Driving Report’ as good evidence of 
this distinction.  There was also a concern over unclear automation levels, with the 
suggestion that levels 3 and 4 provide the same level of technological functionality 
but different levels of driver involvement.  Stakeholders asked that these levels be 
better managed and would like to see a Government White Paper outlining 
transition paths; and 
 Limitations of the technology, with the suggestion that developers should address: 
 The steps that are in place should the technology fail; and 
 That there are some things such vehicles cannot do, for instance, they will 
not have a Theory of Mind and cannot perceive the same way a human 
would. 
 Impacts on the network, for instance the new types of crashes created, and road 
design; 
 Impacts on driver behaviour, with one stakeholder referring to research conducted 
by Goodyear that showed drivers are more willing to take risks when confronted 
with an autonomous vehicle on the road.  However, there was an awareness that 
this study had a small sample size, and may therefore be unrepresentative; 
 The influence of global regulations which can hinder improvements more locally; 
and 
 Competitiveness within the industry which is thought to create: 
 Secrecy, reducing the willingness to share advancements; and 
 A tendency to over-claim technological capabilities within marketing which 
influences driver expectation. 
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“People advocated far too much responsibility to assisted technology, thinking it’s 
almost autonomous. For example, they’ll say that ABS is almost going to take over and 
drive a vehicle out of a skid for you and it doesn’t happen” 
“we are a bit concerned that there will be a blurring of the lines where you’ll get cars 
that have some really good safety technology built into them…but if the manufacturers 
are inclined to overclaim and say, ‘oh, it’s an automated car, this is a driverless car, this 
is like the Google car, you can sit back and read your phone messages, and read the 
paper whilst you drive’ we are really worried that if they are still relying on the driver as 
the back-stop you’ve got issues over driver instruction…we are keen than that doesn’t 
happen” 
“I think the worst computer is already better than the best human, but the mixture of 
humans and computers is a big concern and I don’t think we’ve worked out what that 
means for road design” 
(Business and industry representatives) 
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
11.4.12 Seventeen fleet company managers responded to the questions on safe vehicles in the 
online survey.  Of these: 
 6 indicated that their major clients set specific safety requirements when procuring 
transport services, 9 indicated that they do not and 2 did not consider this question 
applicable to them; and 
 9 indicated that their companies require Euro NCAP 5* for all cars purchased of 
used by the company, 7 indicated they do not, and 1 did not consider this question 
applicable to them. 
Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
 Four road haulage company managers responded to the questions on safe vehicles in the 
online survey.  Of these: 
 2 indicated that their major clients set specific safety requirements when procuring 
transport services, 2 indicated that they do not; and 
 2 did not require Euro NCAP 5* for all cars purchased of used by the company, 2 
did not consider this question applicable to them. 
11.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Vehicles Enforcement 
11.5.1 There was acknowledgement of the work of the police in the enforcement of vehicle 
safety, making reference to Carriage of Dangerous Goods checks and commercial vehicle 
units operations, including Operation Trivium.  
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Safe Vehicles Education 
11.5.2 One emergency service stakeholder reported working with QuickFit to deliver community 
road safety mornings, providing information to the general public on car maintenance and 
tyre checks.  Another cited engagement in social media campaigns addressing tyre and 
vehicles safety. 
Safe Vehicles Technology 
11.5.3 There was an acknowledgement of safe vehicles technology by most emergency services 
representatives. 
11.5.4 In their own vehicles, some emergency services have installed speed limiters which can 
be overridden in an emergency situation.  
11.5.5 Emergency service stakeholders have been invited to look at car designs by car 
manufacturers to gain an understanding of vehicles, including the introduction of new 
technology.  Additionally, mobile data terminals, used by the fire service, were seen to 
have value, providing information on specific vehicle design and technology in order to 
aid the identification of issues during response to road traffic accidents. 
11.5.6 Some raised concerns over the introduction of the e-call system which sends an 
automated alert to emergency services when a car is involved in a road traffic accident.  
This system was believed to overlook: 
 The number of external calls also made, with accidents occurring in a busy urban 
area likely to receive calls from several other witnesses; and 
 The clinical need of those involved in the accident, as the e-call system works 
outside of the emergency services triage processes, meaning all calls are attended 
to, without knowledge of the level of emergency care required.  This can be seen 
to stretch the limited resource of emergency services.  
Police Force Survey Findings 
11.5.7 Only one of the ten police forces who responded to questions on safe vehicles in the 
online survey indicated that their force required Euro NCAP 5* for all police service cars.  
The remainder did not know.  
11.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Vehicle priority 
Several vehicle safety experts identified the need for monitoring and setting quantitative 
targets for improving safety of the vehicle fleet using Euro NCAP ratings, as used in other 
countries. 
Safe Vehicle Standards 
11.6.1 Academics believed that Safety standards, set in legislation, such as the forthcoming 
European General Safety Regulations and Pedestrian Safety Regulations, to have value for 
vehicle safety and road safety more generally, with a focus on improving outcomes for 
vulnerable road users.  A commonly expressed view was that European Community Whole 
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Vehicle Type Approval should continue post-BREXIT, due to the demand on UK legislative 
resource if this was not the case. 
11.6.2 Academic institutions encouraged public procurement based on such standards and on 
the following systems: 
 Euro NCAP 5* rating; 
 UK SHARP ratings; 
 Stars on Cars; and 
 Motorcycle safety helmet ratings, such as Stars on Helmets. 
11.6.3 The following suggestions were made for improvements to vehicle safety standards to 
reduce potential casualties: 
 Regulation on driver distraction with any in-vehicle technology which causes the 
driver to have their eyes off the road for longer than 2 seconds being disengaged 
until the engine is switched off (it was suggested that this regulation could be 
provided by a new body with guidance from SMMT); 
 Basing standards on crash tests using female, child and elderly dummies, as they 
are currently based upon the height and weight of an average North American 
male; 
 A greater understanding of standards for electric vehicles, which do fall within the 
current European Community Whole Vehicle Type Approval, but specific additional 
requirements are still unclear; 
 A greater understanding and regulation of standards for autonomous vehicles, 
which will probably require a new European Community Whole Vehicle Type 
Approval class; 
 A greater focus on the mitigation of death and serious injury; 
 Greater promotion of standards, such as Euro NCAP 5* by fleets and leasing 
industry, including holiday rentals; 
 Increased conformity to standards with vehicle checks and audits; 
 A greater acknowledgement of vehicle safety standards by the DfT at strategic and 
technical levels, with the provision of funding to Euro NCAP from central 
governments, as once was, to ensure engagement with and influence; and 
 A national scrappage scheme for vehicles with poor vehicle safety standards, in 
order to fast track improvements. 
11.6.4 There was some concern that vehicles made with small production numbers can be 
excluded from safety standards, such as European Community Whole Vehicle Type 
Approval. 
11.6.5 Additionally, some were concerned around the DFTs involvement in The UNECE World 
Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29), as it does not mandate 
standards, nor cover vehicle safety standards for vehicle automation, discussed below. 
Safe Vehicles Technology and Autonomous Vehicles 
11.6.6 Academic institutions showed awareness of automated vehicles technology, making 
reference to the Society of Automotive Engineers’ Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms 
Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles. 
11.6.7 Academic stakeholders suggested that the following should be considered in the 
development of safe vehicles technology, including assisted and automated vehicles: 
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 Promotion of new technologies at an EU level, creating updates to standards (e.g. 
Alcolocks and pedestrian protection airbags); 
 Prioritising advanced collision avoidance measures that provide the most safety 
benefit, especially for vulnerable road users, with a suggestion that this would also 
be a better use of resources.  However, some also acknowledged that some 
collisions may be unavoidable, and therefore there should also be a focus on 
passive safety performance; 
 Greater focus on motorcycle technology, with acknowledgement of the benefits of 
ABS and bigger headlights and concerns for the electrification of motorcycles and 
what this means for faster acceleration; 
 The types of crashes possible with automated vehicles, with concern for the safety 
of ‘out of position’ occupants; 
 Driver distraction, with attention to safety being referenced in levels 2 and 3 of 
vehicle automation.  The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration guidelines 
on driver distraction were seen to have value; 
 Driver expectations, misunderstanding and over-trusting of automated technology; 
and 
 A focus on key safety issues, rather than commercial value.  There was some 
concern that the DfT had only just become engaged in the European Commission’s 
High Level Group GEAR (2030) for reporting on automotive competitiveness and 
sustainability. 
  
 136/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
12. INTERVENTION: SAFE ROAD USE 
12.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Road Use Priorities 
12.1.1 Multiple central government departments/agencies cited priorities for safe road use 
interventions, including reference to those in the British Road Safety Statement.  These 
priorities address road user groups and networks, as well as specific driving behaviours, 
and include: young drivers, motorcyclists, school children and rural roads. 
12.1.2 There is some concern that other areas, such as pedestrians and older drivers, are not 
prioritised in safe road use interventions, with the suggestion that a lack of resource has 
hindered investigation of the Older Drivers Task Force’s ‘Supporting Safe Driving into Old 
Age’ report. 
12.1.3 More generally, road safety, and therefore safe road use, was thought to lack priority in 
the freight industry, despite factors such as fatigue management being high priority for 
roads policing. 
Safe Road Use Education 
12.1.4 The success of safe road use education, for instance Bikeability, diversionary courses, Kerb 
Craft and Traffic Club were noted by central government departments and agencies.  
Diversionary courses are only used by one devolved administration.  There was an 
awareness that resource constraints have had an impact on safe road use education.   
12.1.5 Central government departments and agencies are looking to improve safe road use 
education through an analysis of research to understand its effectiveness, with particular 
reference made to diversionary courses, safe road use education in secondary schools and 
the present Driver 2020 project, coordinated by TRL, in which the 5th intervention is an 
evaluation of in-school education interventions.  Additionally, DfT have expressed an 
interest in safe road use education being part of the national curriculum, with a 
Department of Education consultation currently addressing this issue.   
Safe Road Use Enforcement 
12.1.6 There is a belief that police enforcement of mobile phone use had fallen and drink-drive 
enforcement had become better targeted. 
12.1.7 There is an awareness that police resource constraints and delays in the implementation 
of evidential breath testing equipment have had an impact on safe road use enforcement. 
“Stakeholders are concerned that in a world of cuts, police do not have the resources 
to properly enforce things that people would like to be enforced on the strategic road 
network… things like people sat in middle lanes and undertaking or speeding, even if 
they don’t directly lead to incidents, they make people feel unsafe…people feel like the 
police aren’t doing or are able to do what they should be doing to stop those things.” 
 (Central government department/agency representative) 
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Safe Road Use Monitoring 
12.1.8 Central government and agency representatives referenced multiple monitoring methods 
for addressing safe road use, namely: 
 Black box technology, with the suggestion that insurance industry activity is 
promising; 
 Video monitoring, to spot atypical driving, such as seat-belt use, drink and drug 
driving and mobile phone use; and 
 Current trials in London of alcohol tags, which monitor alcohol consumption as part 
of a Community Order Scheme, and could be used to monitor drink driving. 
Safe Road Use Standards and Licensing 
12.1.9 There was some awareness of desire for changes to licensing for motorcycles, as 
provisional license motorcycle riders could gain twelve points before the automatic loss 
of a licence, compared to the six points allowed for full licence holders.  Central 
government and agency representatives therefore suggested restrictions, such as 
motorcycle license withdrawal if six points are gained on a provisional licence, within a 
two year period and the introduction of theory tests for novice riders. These suggestions 
reflect those made in the recent DVSA consultation, ‘Improving moped and motorcycle 
training’.  However, central government and agency representatives understood that 
changes may not be implemented due to legislative resources being focused on BREXIT.  
Additionally, post-BREXIT, there was some concern for the future of the current graduated 
access system for motorcycle licensing. 
12.1.10 Representatives reported a focus on improving and evaluating the promotion of user 
standards, such as cycling and motorcycle helmet use; no monitoring is currently 
conducted on helmet use. 
12.1.11 Additionally, they reported a focus on regulating the standard of driver trainers/ 
instructors, who are recognised as being of a higher standard than most EU countries.  For 
instance, changing the grading structure for driver trainers from 1-6 to ABC and changing 
qualifying processes to include observation of a real lesson, rather than role play.  
12.1.12 Changes to driver training, which came into effect in December 2017, were also noted.  
DfT and agency representatives indicated that the changes have value, however, the 
evidence to support them was questioned.  They also suggested that insurance premium 
increases, which do not reflect the low risk of accompanied driving during pre-test 
learning, have impacted the ability of parents to provide driver training to learner drivers. 
12.1.13 There was recognition that safe road use standards are hard to enforce for foreign 
vehicles and operators. 
12.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Road Use Priorities 
12.2.1 Local government representatives suggested that strategies for addressing safe road use 
are focused on: 
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 Multi-agency working with health and education sectors, the police, fire and rescue 
services and Highways England; 
 Priorities, identified after engagement with local people, rather than evidence-
based; and 
 National campaigns. 
12.2.2 They reported that safe road use priorities are shared by local government advisory 
groups in workshops and conferences. 
Safe Road Use Education 
12.2.3 Multiple local government representatives made reference to safe road use education, 
recognising Traffic Club, Kerb Craft and Fire Service education activities, but they 
questioned whether these were widely implemented. 
12.2.4 Local government representatives raised concerns including: 
 The effectiveness of the enhanced hazard perception education programme is still 
being evaluated; and 
 The lack of resource and volunteers has led to road safety education not being 
available in all schools. 
Safe Road Use Enforcement 
12.2.5 There was an awareness of multiple enforcement activities, such as enforcement at 
junctions to ensure cyclist safety and camera partnership activity. 
12.2.6 However, they saw available police resources as having effect on safe road use 
enforcement. Multiple local government representatives highlighted a need for increased 
roads policing, and suggested that budget should be set aside for roads policing, in order 
to encourage enforcement with limited resource. 
Other Safe Road Use Interventions 
12.2.7 Local government representatives referred to multiple additional methods for addressing 
safe road use, these included: 
 Mass media and social media campaigns; 
 School and business travel planning, with the observation that school travel 
planning has become less of a focus; and 
 Encouraging stiffer penalties at lower blood-alcohol levels. 
General Barriers to Safe Road Use Interventions 
12.2.8 Barriers to safe road use intervention cited by local government representatives included: 
 A lack of national consistency, creating mixed-messaging; 
 Insufficient lead time on national calendars; and 
 Little opportunity for evaluation. 
 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Twenty seven RSOs responded to the questions on Safe Road Use in the online survey.   
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12.2.10 RSOs were asked whether safety standards and rules set for licensing and disqualification 
satisfactorily address high-risk groups: 
 9 indicated that the standards and rules are totally or mostly satisfactory; 
 3 suggested that they are partially satisfactory; 
 4 reported that they are not at all satisfactory; and 
 11 did not know. 
12.2.11 Of the 7 RSOs who indicated that safety standards and rules for licensing and 
disqualification only partially, or do not at all, address high-risk groups:  
 2 indicated it is not planned, or is unlikely for the future; and 
 5 did not know. 
12.2.12 RSOs were subsequently asked whether publicity and enforcement are coordinated for 
excess alcohol, seat belt and child restraint use, in-car telephone use by drivers, and 
fatigue management: 
 15 reported it is totally or mostly in place; 
 10 suggested partial coordination; and 
 2 indicated that there is no coordination at all.  
12.2.13 Of the 12 RSOs who reported that publicity and enforcement are partially or not at all 
coordinated: 
 7  stated that future coordination is likely, or is being planned; 
 1  commented that it is unlikely, or is not planned for the future; and 
 4  did not know.  
12.2.14 In response to being asked if road safety education and training is embedded within a Safe 
System approach and focused on high-risk groups: 
 10 of RSOs reported this is totally or mostly the case; 
 8 indicated this is partially the case; 
 7 suggested this does not happen at all; and 
 2 did not know.  
 Of the 15 RSOs who suggested that road safety education and training was partially or not 
at all embedded within a Safe System approach and focused on high-risk groups: 
 10  indicated that this is planned, or is likely to be implemented in the future; 
 2    suggested that this is not planned for the future, or is unlikely to occur; and 
 3    did not know.  
12.2.16 Lastly, RSO’ s were questioned as to whether an integrated approach encompassing both 
education and engineering is adopted in addressing school journey safety: 
 15 indicated that this was totally or mostly the case; 
 8 reported partial adoption of an integrated approach; 
 3 stated this is not at all the case; and 
 1 did not know.  
 Of the 11 RSOs who suggested that an integrated approach was partially or not at all 
adopted in addressing school journey safety, within their local authority:   
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 3  suggested this is planned, or is likely to occur in the future; 
 3  stated this is unlikely, or not planned for the future; and 
 5  did not know. 
 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty two local authority representatives responded to the questions on safe road use 
in the online survey.   
12.2.19 Local authority representatives were asked whether safety standards and rules set for 
licensing and disqualification satisfactorily address high-risk groups: 
 3 indicated that the standards and rules are totally or mostly satisfactory; 
 4 suggested that they are partially satisfactory; 
 2 reported that they are not at all satisfactory; and 
 13 did not know. 
12.2.20 Of the six local authority representatives who indicated that safety standards and rules 
for licensing and disqualification only partially, or do not at all, address high-risk groups:  
 2  indicated it is not planned, or is unlikely for the future; and 
 4  did not know. 
12.2.21 With regards to whether publicity and enforcement are coordinated for excess alcohol, 
seat belt and child restraint use, in-car telephone use by drivers, and fatigue management: 
 16 of local authority representatives reported that coordination occurs totally or 
mostly; 
 1 suggested partial coordination; 
 1 indicated that there is no coordination at all; and 
 4 did not know.   
12.2.22 Of the two who reported that publicity and enforcement are partially or not at all 
coordinated: 
 1  stated that future coordination is likely, or is being planned; and 
 1  commented that it is unlikely, or is not planned for the future.  
12.2.23 Local authority representatives were also asked to consider if the amount of police 
enforcement of key road safety rules is sufficient to address local road safety needs, goals 
and targets: 
 4 deemed the amount of enforcement to be totally or mostly sufficient; 
 5 felt it is partially sufficient; 
 9 stated it is not at all sufficient; and 
 4 did not know.  
 Of the 14 who suggested that the amount of police enforcement of key road safety rules, 
was partially or not at all sufficient to address local road safety needs, goals and targets: 
 1 indicated that something is planned, or that future changes are likely; 
 7 suggested that nothing is planned, or that future changed are unlikely; 
 5 did not know; and 
 1 did not respond. 
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12.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Road Use Education and Training 
12.3.1 Advisory group, association and charity representatives reported engagement in safe road 
use education and training including the provision of: 
 Safe cycling education videos; 
 Bikeability training for both trainers and attendees, with the suggestion that DfT 
training could greatly improve outreach; and 
 Voluntary re-assessment and education programmes for elderly people. 
12.3.2 Safe road use education and training was thought to be improved through: 
 The adoption of a holistic approach, such as Safe System, in which all road users are 
educated on risks; 
 The involvement of parents, who can influence safe road use, both during their 
children’s driver training and when buying car seats.  There was hope that research 
would support the implementation of tools to support this intervention; and 
 Embedding road safety education in schools, before children are independent road 
users, taking child development issues into account. 
“Children need to be taught basic principles [of road safety] because the world is a 
dangerous place and you need to be aware of the environment and you need to know 
what you should be doing to deal with the hazards because you are never going to be 
able to take them all away.”  
(Advisory group, association and charities representative) 
Safe Road Use Enforcement 
12.3.3 Advisory group/association/charity representatives raised concerns on safe road use 
enforcement, which included:  
 Roads policing resource, with the suggestion that it is not prioritised or monitored 
by Police and Crime Commissioners; 
 Reductions in the number of operational speed cameras;  
 The lack of enforcement in relation to driver distraction, especially with an increase 
of in-car devices.  There was a suggestion that research and regulation on driver 
distraction should be prioritised; and 
 A lack of policing coordination. 
Safe Road Use Standards and Licensing 
12.3.4 There is strong support amongst advisory group/association/charity representatives for 
graduated driver licensing (GDL), eye sight tests and greater regulation of older drivers, 
and restrictions on which cars you can drive when you first pass your test, as is the case 
for motorcycle riders (although this was not supported by all representatives). 
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Safe Road Use Communication 
12.3.5 There are mixed views surrounding safe road use communication campaigns, some 
advisory group/association/charity stakeholders suggested that the THINK! campaign is 
effective and well-coordinated and therefore should continue to be funded, and others 
suggested that there is insufficient lead time for implementation.  
12.3.6 Additionally, cinema, television advertising and social media communication were seen 
to be effective, however, there is an awareness that reduced advertising in the last five to 
six years has created a deficit in national awareness of safe road use. 
Other Safe Road Use Interventions 
12.3.7 Advisory group/association/charity representatives made reference to multiple other 
methods for addressing safe road use, which include: 
 Road safety awards, recognising the achievement of organisations in the 
implementation of road safety initiatives; 
 The use of telematics; and 
 Addressing cyclist and pedestrian motorist intimidation. 
12.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Road Use Priorities 
12.4.1 Business and industry stakeholders made reference to the following priorities, in their 
implementation of safe road use interventions: 
 Young drivers; 
 Older drivers; 
 Drink driving; 
 Mobile phone use; and  
 Fatigue management. 
12.4.2 There was some concern that safe road use is not prioritised during road design as 
designers and transport psychologists do not know enough on how to design the right 
road for good use. 
Young Driver Safe Road Use 
12.4.3 Young driver safe road use was identified as a key priority for business and industry 
representatives because this user group: 
 Have the most serious accidents, some requiring life-long care;  
 Make the most frequent and costly car insurance claims; and 
 Lack confidence on the road, therefore increasing their risk of accident 
involvement.  This belief was supported by research from the University of 
Greenwich, assessing contributing factors to young driver accident risk. 
12.4.4 There are differing levels of engagement in the promotion of young drivers safe road use, 
with some business and industry representatives actively engaged in young driver training 
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and others engaged in providing financial incentives, such as lower insurance premiums, 
for safe use of the road, and social media messaging.  
12.4.5 Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) was viewed favourably, with supportive international 
evidence and the planned implementation in Northern Ireland cited as reasons for UK 
implementation.  If GDL were to be implemented in the UK, representatives suggested 
that corresponding insurance premiums and impact on employment should be 
considered, so that GDL does not influence employability. 
12.4.6 The Driver 2020 project was seen as an important assessment of safe road use 
interventions for young drivers, with particular reference made to controlled trials on 
hazard perception, driving logs and reflections, the engagement of parents and road 
safety classroom delivery.  
Safe Road Use Education and Training 
12.4.7 Some business and industry stakeholders felt negatively toward the Goals for Driver 
Education (GDE) Matrix, which outlines levels of driver training for ADIs, suggesting that 
as a system it compartmentalises learnt behaviours and psychological factors does not 
address the influence of social context, social pressures and attitudes on lower-level 
learnt behaviours, such as manoeuvres. 
12.4.8 Positively cited examples of safe road use education and training include: 
 Specific driver training for drivers with diverse needs, such as physical disabilities, 
hidden learning and medical conditions, by encouraging greater involvement from 
GPs, who do not necessarily know how certain medical conditions will impact 
driving; 
 Education programmes addressing safe road use best practice in the fleet industry; 
and 
 Support for education campaigns based on the safe use of high-speed road 
networks. 
Safe Road Use Monitoring 
12.4.9 Monitoring technology, such as telematics is seen to be valuable for the promotion of safe 
road use, due to the provision of incentives and feedback which can influence driver 
behaviour.  
Safe Road Use Communication 
12.4.10 Multiple business and industry representatives suggested that safe road use best practice 
was communicated with members and the public through the following methods: 
 Weekly member news feeds, some via email, to remind individuals of safe road use 
initiatives, such as safety around cyclists, and changes to legislation, such as mobile 
phone use.  These are increased during national road safety campaigns; 
 Conferences, with organisations hosting and encouraging members attendance; 
 Social media, with the suggestion that this is the best way to reach small businesses; 
and 
 Instant messenger. 
12.4.11 Barriers to these methods of communication which include: 
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 Conferences are usually attended by larger organisations who receive information 
on safe road use from other parties anyway whilst smaller companies, who do not 
receive a lot of information, are not in attendance; and 
 It is unclear whether companies, particularly smaller ones who have less time and 
resource, are actively engaged in membership news feeds. 
12.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Safe Road Use Strategy 
12.5.1 Multiple emergency service representatives reported the use of a service or road safety 
partnership strategy for addressing safe road use and road traffic accident reduction.  
These strategies are seen to inform emergency services powers, joint-working and actions 
and are often based on national calendars such as NFCC, NPCC, Highways England and the 
THINK! campaign.   
12.5.2 Multiple emergency service representatives suggested that safe road use strategies are 
shared with others.  The primary methods of sharing include: 
 Direct communication with external road safety partners, such as local authorities; 
 Whole service internet discussion forums; and 
 Practitioner days and seminars with other services, to share road safety initiatives 
and best practice.  These usually have themes, for instance, specific road user 
groups and resources. 
Safe Road Use Education 
12.5.3 Emergency service representatives reported engagement in safe road use education, 
which include: 
 ‘Safe Drive, Stay Alive’ in schools, or a local equivalent, with dramatised, theoretical 
and practical components; 
 Practical education programmes, pre- and post-test, such as older driver sessions, 
to refresh driving skills and re-educate, BikeSafe (motorcycles), Bikeability and 
BikeRight (cycling) schemes.  These initiatives are mostly carried out by police and 
fire services; 
 Safe Road Use education with community groups of all ages, mostly conducted by 
the fire service.  This was either in presentation format or through attendance at 
road safety interactive experience centres; 
 Education for ADIs to encourage them to address the psychological elements of 
driving in their lessons, such as drink and drug use, peer pressure, distractions and 
independent thinking; and 
 Driver awareness courses, some delivered after non-compliant road use and some 
open to all members of the public.  These address different aspects such as speed, 
mobile phone use, and the emotional demands on emergency services and are 
mostly conducted by police forces, with some input from the fire service, to make 
the public aware that KSI reduction is a joint working project.  Some emergency 
services include a practical element within these courses, in order to make 
individuals aware of scenarios they may, “see, be involved with, or create” through 
their non-compliant driving behaviours. 
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12.5.4 Despite the value placed on safe road use education, multiple emergency services noted 
barriers to its implementation.  These are: 
 The difficulty in scaling successful local projects to whole emergency services; 
 Legislation on statutory responsibility, such as the Fire and Rescue Services Act 
(2004), which outlines the duties of emergency services, with a focus on public 
protection from serious harm, with no recognition for road safety education in this 
duty; 
 Non-compliant courses are only delivered to those who have been identified 
conducting non-compliant behaviour, there was some suggestion that regular re-
testing should be completed to ensure that drivers are continually educated on safe 
road use; 
 Stretched funding, which has caused some services to shrink to statutory 
responsibilities and neglect road safety education; and 
 Stretched resource, with some emergency services using road safety delivery 
volunteers to compensate for resource restrictions. 
12.5.5 There was some suggestion that emergency services would like to do more safe road use 
education in the future, such as greater participation in safe road use education 
campaigns in order to further increase public awareness of road safety, with an additional 
focus on educating the public on what actions to take when an emergency vehicle 
approaches them under emergency driving conditions.  There was the suggestion that this 
could be delivered in video format. 
Safe Road Use Enforcement 
12.5.6 Emergency services, particularly the police, reported large engagement in safe road use 
enforcement, for instance: 
 Safe/Close Pass schemes, in which police officers go out on bikes and a supporting 
enforcement team stops anyone who passes the bike with less than 1.5m 
clearance; 
 Enforcement of particular behaviours, such as seat-belt use, mobile phone use, 
tailgating and speeding;  
 Enforcement of particular road sections, using intelligence from the public to direct 
deployment of enforcement teams to areas of concern or high collision risk;  
 Enforcement of prolific offenders; and 
 The use of ANPR cameras to check for expired licenses. 
12.5.7 Safe road use enforcement is often planned in advance and coordinated nationally, with 
other emergency services and recognised calendars, such as NPCC. 
12.5.8 The following improvements to safe road use enforcement were suggested: 
 Greater national consistency in enforcement across forces for all non-compliant 
behaviours; 
 More assertive enforcement; 
 The use of dashcam evidence; 
 Making roads policing a priority and increasing awareness of enforcement by roads 
policing, with support from senior management; and 
 Faster introduction of evidential breath testing equipment. 
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Other Safe Road Use Interventions 
12.5.9 Emergency services referenced multiple other methods for addressing safe road use, 
these are: 
 The use of signage on the roadside to inform road users of risks; 
 Radio advertisements addressing national campaigns, such as drink driving; 
 Social media campaigns;  
 Community outreach, going to where young drivers congregate to interact with 
them; and 
 Speaking at road safety events. 
General Barriers to Safe Road Use Interventions 
12.5.10 Barriers to safe road use intervention cited are: 
 Time and resources; 
 General awareness of the importance of the road safety agenda; 
 The priority given to road safety; and 
 Lack of national consistency in the implementation of road safety. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Ten police force representatives responded to the questions on safe road use in the online 
survey.  Asked whether safety standards and rules set for licensing and disqualification 
satisfactory address high-risk groups: 
 2 considered they did so mostly; 
 2 considered them did so partially; 
 3 thought they did not at all; and 
 3 did not know. 
 Of those who answered partially/not at all, one stated that future work was planned in 
this area, two indicated that no future work was planned, and two respondents did not 
know.  
 Asked whether publicity and enforcement is coordinated for excess alcohol, excess speed, 
seat belt and child restraint use, in-car telephone use by drivers, fatigue management: 
 5 considered it is totally coordinated; 
 1 considered it mostly coordinated; 
 3 thought it was partially coordinated; and 
 1 did not know. 
12.5.14 Of those who answered partially, one stated that future work was planned for in this area, 
and two did not know.  
 Asked whether they thought there is consistency in how key road safety offences (causally 
related to death and serious injury) are treated in national enforcement policy: 
 3 said totally; 
 2 said mostly; and 
 5 did not know. 
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 Asked whether road safety education and training is embedded within a Safe System 
approach and focused on high-risk groups: 
 2 considered it mostly embedded; 
 4 considered it partially embedded; and 
 4 did not know. 
 Of those who answered partially embedded, 3 suggested that future activity was (or was 
likely to be) planned in this area, whilst one did not know.  
12.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Young Driver Safe Road Use 
12.6.1 Young drivers standards which manage the exposure to risk in the early years of driving 
and riding were seen to have much value in the improvement of road safety by 
representatives from academic institutions. 
12.6.2 Multiple academic institution representatives indicated involvement with the Driver 2020 
project (2017-2020).  This project aims to test 5 potential solutions for addressing young 
driver safety risks, pre- and post-test, including improved hazard perception training.  
12.6.3 Past ministerial opposition to GDL was noted.  Results from the planned GDL 
implementation in Northern Ireland were believed to have value for the possibility of UK 
implementation, due to similarities in context including driving culture and driving age. 
12.6.4 There was support for an increase in driving age, in the interests of safety. 
Other Safe Road Use Interventions 
12.6.5 Academic institutions referenced multiple other methods for improving safe road use, 
these are: 
 DfT’s new approach to innovation in road safety interventions; 
 A focus on driver distraction, due to an increase in in-car devices, with suggestions 
that enforcement of in-car device use is needed; 
 Self-regulation of older drivers, drink and impaired drivers and speeding drivers; 
 Infrastructure development through the Safer Roads Fund; and 
 Improvements to vehicle safety, such as ‘alcolocks’ and seat-belt reminders. 
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13. INTERVENTION: POST-CRASH CARE 
13.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
13.1.1 There was little discussion with central government and agencies around post-crash care 
and it was not possible to secure an interview with either the Department for Health or 
Public Health England.  However, Department for Transport representatives consider that 
whilst improvements in trauma care have made a significant contribution to reducing 
road deaths, more work is still needed in this area. 
13.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
13.2.1 There was little discussion with local government around post-crash care but the local 
authorities engaged are aware of the move from local care to regional trauma care 
centres.  There is a view that more consideration to improving post-crash care would 
further reduce the negative consequences of injuries and long-term rehabilitation costs. 
13.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
13.3.1 There is an awareness amongst some advisory groups, associations and charities that 
there have been improvements in post-crash care with the introduction of trauma 
centres, rapid response units and first response units. 
13.3.2 It was suggested that further improvements to post-crash care could be achieved with: 
 Improved reporting systems to ensure the right medical intervention is received; 
 Strategic placing of trauma units, involving discussions between Highways England, 
the Department for Health and police services;  
 Measures to reduce unnecessary use of the ambulance service by the general 
public, thus helping the ambulance service to better achieve target response times; 
and 
 Accelerating the introduction of eCall into the market. 
13.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
13.4.1 The importance of post-crash care (including fast access by emergency services, fast post-
crash care and accurate diagnoses) in achieving successful outcomes was highlighted by 
many business and industry stakeholders.  These stakeholders also highlighted the 
importance of: 
 Adequate driver training for emergency vehicle drivers; 
 Promotion of fire suppression and eCall systems; and 
 Ensuring that the lack of hard shoulders on future smart motorways does not 
impact on the ability of emergency services to reach crash sites. 
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13.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
13.5.1 Emergency service stakeholders consulted consider that post-crash care is generally very 
good in the UK.  In terms of the ambulance service it is believed that post-crash care 
compares favourably to international standards and has made great strides in improving 
outcomes in recent years.  Much of this is considered to be down to improved working 
between the emergency services, with more training and sharing of expertise.  Many 
examples of current and improved good practice relating to post-crash care (sometimes 
specific to the areas consulted) were provided, as follows: 
Trauma Care 
 The 999 service, which now identifies clinical needs, the treatment which can be 
performed at the roadside, and the best location for ongoing treatment; 
 The development (over the last 10 years) of regionalised major trauma centres, and 
trauma units in hospitals. This development was based on international research 
which provided evidence that regional major trauma centres are more effective for 
life preservation than local hospital care, even if they are further away than local 
hospitals. Trauma Audit and Research Network (TARN) data has replicated this 
finding and recommends this system; and 
 The development (over the last 10 years) of taking people with traumatic brain 
injuries to neuroscience centres, irrespective of whether they need an operation, 
to receive neuroscience specific nursing, physiotherapy and diagnostics. TARN 
research shows that with a specific severity of head injury, neuroscience centre 
care increases survival rate, relative to standard care. This effect was even 
significant after controlling for the need of neurosurgical operations. 
Police Service 
 Police officer training (in some areas, at least) now includes more advanced first aid 
training and training on what to do if you are first to the scene of a bike accident, 
and police vehicles now carry emergency medical equipment such as defibrillators; 
and 
 Provision of a community road safe morning (in one area), provided by the police 
and fire service, which includes informing participants what to do if they are first to 
the scene of an accident. 
Ambulance Service 
 Improved staffing on air ambulances, which usually have a consultant level doctor, 
experienced in trauma care, and a specialist paramedic, thus providing a faster 
response time and delivery of more aggressive roadside treatment (e.g. surgery); 
and 
 Improved training of ambulance crew to paramedic level. 
Fire Service 
 Provision of a five day advanced emergency care course (by the ambulance service 
in a rural area) to operational staff in the fire service, enabling them to administer 
medical care if they arrive first on the scene.  The course covers emergency care 
theory and practical sessions to enable the fire crew to identify advanced signs and 
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symptoms, e.g. of internal bleeding, and to carry spinal boards, neck collars, pelvic 
straps and defibrillators to aid immobilisation and emergency medical care.  As a 
result, the fire service can now give the best care to sustain life and feed important 
medical information to paramedics once they arrive, creating a faster professional 
medical response and a more coordinated system to sustain life.  Being able to 
administer more advanced treatment enables quicker removal from vehicles 
without having to be cut out.  As a result, outcomes are reported to have improved; 
 An improved system on mobile data terminals on fire engines, which carries 
detailed information on every make and model of car, so information such as 
airbags, safety systems and battery location can quickly be determined, thus 
enabling the crew to know where to cut the vehicle to release people safely, 
preventing explosions and reducing dust levels which can get into cuts; 
 Recent changes in road-collision gear from generator powered to battery operated 
means it is lighter, quicker and easier to use and is quieter and therefore reduces 
stress for those involved in an incident; and 
 Improvements in fire fighters’ ability to treat people in vehicles has led to removal 
of targets for time to get people out of vehicles and encouraged fire fighters to take 
their time, with better outcomes.  
“[The] health service, in general, is very keen to minimise the effects of major trauma, 
often sustained in vehicle accidents or on the roads. Trauma care has been recognised 
as a speciality over the last 20/25 years and we now divert victims of major trauma 
away from local care providers to specialised units, known as major trauma centres. We 
use a variety of means of doing that, from aggressive treatment at the roadside from 
specially trained paramedics and critical care paramedics, in addition we have different 
responders, such as air ambulance and specially trained trauma doctors who go to the 
scene of injury to stabilise patients ahead of them being transferred to specialist care 
providers. That’s all changed as of recently, as has the general standard of interventions 
that clinicians make.” 
(Emergency service representative) 
The last couple of road traffic collisions I’ve been to, the [fire] crews have got them out 
very, very quickly onto a spinal board, secured and immobilised, just as the ambulance 
is pulling up and the paramedics think it’s fantastic that they don’t have to wait 20-30 
minutes for us to cut the car to pieces just for them to get to the patients… it has 
speeded up the process.” 
(Emergency service representative) 
13.5.2 Suggested improvements to post crash care, which would improve outcomes, mainly 
focussed around: 
 Increased resources to reduce delays in emergency services attending incidents; 
 Rolling out more medical training for firefighters; and  
 In areas where fire fighters have already received more advanced medical training, 
increasing this to full paramedic training to enable more advanced procedures to 
be performed, for example fitting cannulas to provide the right type of drug at 
scene. This would mimic the American model where one paramedic is always 
available on a fire engine; and   
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 Training fire crews to work better with ambulance crews to make the transitions 
better from the fire service to the ambulance. 
“In major trauma cases, timely response in crucial, we would like to have an ambulance 
on every street corner, waiting for the next emergency…that might be unrealistic, but 
that’s the utopian view…its far from where we are at the moment, where we invariably 
have calls waiting.” 
(Emergency service representative) 
13.5.3 Further suggestions for improving trauma care are:  
 Integration of EMS data with TARN data, (a) to provide insights on post-crash-care 
outcome and deaths occurring pre-hospital, and (b) to enable TARN to view the 
effectiveness of the whole system and identify, for example, which ambulance 
services have better outcomes with which trauma centres (although it would not 
account for factors external to the care system e.g. road quality, landscape 
differences).  Lack of funding and resources in the emergency services are 
perceived as a barrier to this; and 
 Automatic provision of data from roadside interventions completed by the 
Ambulance Service (e.g. oxygen level monitors), to TARN, rather than this be 
completed manually. 
13.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
13.6.1 The importance of post-crash care in reducing the number of people killed and seriously 
injured on the roads was acknowledged by the academic stakeholders, but this was not 
their area of expertise and therefore more detailed discussion on this topic did not take 
place. 
13.6.2 The development of eCall systems were positively perceived by one academic stakeholder 
who considered they will have the potential to provide fast communication with 
emergency services, easier reporting to insurance companies, and alerts to those 
responsible for road maintenance, where applicable. 
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14. INTERVENTION: SAFE AND HEALTHY MODES 
14.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
14.1.1 Safe and healthy modes were not discussed in detail with central government 
departments and agencies, instead the focus was on active travel (walking and cycling).  
14.1.2 DfT representatives recognise the role of the Active Accessible Travel Division and the 
Cycling and Walking Strategy in promoting safe and healthy modes and modal share, 
however, there is an acknowledgement of the strategies’ diminutive focus on road safety, 
despite cycling safety being on the mayoral agenda at city levels.   
14.1.3 DfT reported that goals and targets have been set to increase cycling and walking and a 
target has been set to reduce the rate of cyclists’ deaths and serious injuries but not for 
pedestrian safety. 
14.1.4 This lack of road safety focus for safe and healthy modes is attributed to the difficulty that 
arises in attempting to promote both road safety and sustainable travel, particularly when 
it comes to the promotion of cycling.  
14.1.5 Only one devolved administration has a recognised policy relating to safe and healthy 
modes of transport.  There was no further discussion relating this policy to road safety. 
14.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
14.2.1 There was little discussion with local government around safe and healthy modes, but 
more urban local authorities reported the promotion of active travel and public transport 
within their authority. 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings   
 Twenty six RSOs responded to the questions on safe and healthy modes in the online 
survey.   
14.2.3 RSOs were asked whether they have an active travel policy to encourage walking and 
cycling: 
 22 reported they totally or mostly have such a policy; and 
 4 suggested they partially have such a policy. 
14.2.4 Of the 4 RSOs who reported partially having an active travel policy to encourage walking 
and cycling: 
 3  indicated such a policy was planned or likely in the future; and 
 1  did not know. 
14.2.5 Asked if new measures had also been introduced simultaneously (to an active travel 
policy) to address the safety of walking and cycling: 
 18 of RSOs reported new measures have been totally or mostly introduced; 
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 6 suggested that such measures have been partially introduced; 
 1 said they have not been introduced at all; and 
 1 did not know. 
14.2.6 Of the 7 RSOs who suggested that new measures were partially or not at all introduced 
simultaneously with an active travel policy: 
 3 indicated that the simultaneous introduction of such new measures is planned or 
likely in the future; 
 3 suggested such measures are unlikely or not planned; and  
 1 did not know. 
14.2.7 RSOs were asked if they promote the use of public transport in their road safety policy: 
 13 indicated they do this totally or mostly; 
 4 stated that they promoted this partially; 
 8 reported they do not do this at all; and 
 1did not know.  
14.2.8 Of 12 RSOs who suggested that the use of public transport was partially or not at all 
promoted within their local authority’s road safety policy: 
 4 reported it would be, or is likely to be promoted in the future; 
 5 suggested that such promotion is unlikely or not planned; and  
 3 did not know. 
14.2.9 Asked if they specify safety requirements in the public procurement of public transport 
services: 
 9 of RSOs indicated they do this totally or mostly; 
 1 indicated they do this partially; 
 2 do not do this at all; and 
 14 did not know.  
14.2.10 Of the 3 RSOs who suggested that safety requirements in the public procurement of public 
transport services were partially or not at all specified: 
 1 reported that such specification is planned or likely in the future; 
 1 suggested that such a specification is not planned or unlikely; and 
 1 did not know. 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty two local authority representatives responded to the questions on safe and 
healthy modes in the online survey.   
14.2.12 Local authority representatives were asked whether their local authority has an active 
travel policy to encourage walking and cycling:  
 18 reported their local authority totally or mostly has such a policy; and 
 4 suggested such a programme is partially being carried out. 
14.2.13 Of the 4 local authority representatives who reported only partially having an active travel 
policy to encourage walking and cycling: 
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 2 indicated such a policy is planned or likely in the future; and  
 2 did not know. 
14.2.14 Asked if new measures had also been introduced simultaneously (to an active travel 
policy) to address the safety of walking and cycling: 
 15 reported new measures have been totally or mostly introduced ; 
 6 suggested that such measures have been partially introduced; and 
 1 reported that no such measures have been initiated. 
14.2.15 Of the 7 local authority representatives who suggested that new measures were partially 
or not at all introduced simultaneously with an active travel policy: 
 5 indicated that such an activity is planned or likely in the future; and  
 2 did not know. 
14.2.16 With regards to whether local authorities promote the use of public transport in their 
road safety policy: 
 10 reported they totally or mostly promote it; 
 6 indicated a partial level of promotion; 
 5 indicated such activities are not being carried out at all; and 
 1 did not know. 
14.2.17 Of the 11 representatives who suggested that the use of public transport was partially or 
not at all promoted within their local authority’s road safety policy: 
 4 reported it would be, or is likely to be promoted in the future; 
 4 suggested that such promotion is unlikely or would not occur; and  
 3 did not know. 
14.2.18 Asked if their local authority specifies safety requirements in the public procurement of 
public transport services: 
 10 of representatives reported that they are totally or mostly specified; 
 1 indicated safety requirements are partially specified and did not know if they 
were to be in the future; and 
 11 did not know. 
14.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
14.3.1 There was an awareness and encouragement amongst some advisory groups, associations 
and charities of interventions aimed at promoting cycling as a safe and healthy mode, in 
particular Bikeability.  One association, with a remit for cyclist safety, is highly active in 
such promotion, providing in-person training, guided rides, safe facilities and online 
education programmes to members and organisations, in order to educate individuals on 
how to ride safely on the road network, including whilst travelling to work.   
14.3.2 There was some concern that the delivery of safe cycle education may not always be 
possible, and may take too long to implement.  There was also concern about any new 
legislation mandating the wearing of helmets, as this may put some people off of cycling. 
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14.3.3 Multiple suggestions for improving cycling as a safe and healthy mode were noted. These 
are: 
 Increasing the funding from DfT for Bikeability to ensure wider access to the 
scheme; 
 Implementation of a much broader, holistic approach to road safety, for instance, 
Safe System; 
 Integration of the promotion of safe and healthy modes with public health; 
 Recognition and implementation of the direct line of sight approach in HGVs; 
 The creation of safe cycling infrastructure to encourage more commuting by bike, 
for instance, left turn priority, junction priority clarity, separated cycle lanes and 
advanced green lights; and 
 Appropriate speed limits which take into account the vulnerabilities of pedestrian 
and cyclists. 
14.3.4 One advisory group/association/charity strongly discourages cycling as a safe and healthy 
mode, suggesting that cycling is not: 
 An efficient use of infrastructure as it does not solve capacity issues; 
 Necessarily healthy, due to air quality; and 
 Always suitable, due to landscape and weather conditions. 
14.3.5 Suggested changes to laws relating to cyclists are positively perceived by stakeholders, 
who recognise that cyclists do not always abide by the Highway Code, are not registered 
or insured and do not have to pass a test. 
14.3.6 One stakeholder referred to TfL’s Healthy Streets for London approach, highlighting its 
inclusion of the ‘people feel safe’ indicator.  
14.3.7 Walking is believed to have little priority compared to cycling, and pedestrian training 
activity is generally considered almost non-existent. 
14.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
14.4.1 There was little discussion with business and industry around safe and healthy modes.    
14.4.2 One business and industry stakeholder recognises that modal shift is only possible after 
understanding an individual’s reasoning for modal choice and their propensity to change, 
and encourages others to gain such an understanding.  Results from their own public 
attitude and health outcome measures have shown: 
 Perceptions of cycling as a poor-man’s way of travel, in some cultures; and 
 Increased benefits from cycling for women and Asian communities. 
14.4.3 The same stakeholder is concerned about the lack of understanding surrounding 
pedestrian experience, suggesting that only measuring injury as an index of experience is 
not sufficient and other factors, such as, anxiety, weather conditions, urban design and 
footwear design, should also be considered. 
14.4.4 A different business and industry stakeholder reported working with DfT, at a national 
and European level, on emissions and clean air standards. 
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14.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings  
14.5.1 There was little discussion with emergency services around safe and healthy modes.  
However, police forces are aware of local authority sustainable transport policies and 
local cycle forums. 
14.5.2 Emergency services data, collated in hospitals when trauma care is identified as 
necessary, is believed to include information on the type of vehicle an injured person was 
using, including public transport. 
14.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
14.6.1 There was no specific discussion with academic institutions around safe and healthy 
modes, however VRUs were mentioned in the monitoring and evaluation (see 7.6) and 
safe vehicles chapters (see 11.6). 
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15. INTERVENTION: SAFE WORK TRAVEL 
15.1 Central Government Departments/Agencies 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Responsibility for Safe Work Travel 
15.1.1 Department for Transport (DfT) representatives recognised the role of the DfT and the 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in promoting safe work travel.  Views on how they carry 
out this role were mixed and some felt that there has been a lack of sufficient attention 
given to this intervention.   
15.1.2 HSE’s role in safe work travel is detailed in OM2009/02 (‘HSE’s role in the investigation of 
work-related road accidents’), which clarifies HSE’s policy on enforcement of health and 
safety legislation in relation to work-related road traffic accidents, and INDG382 (‘Driving 
At Work’), which outlines how companies can manage their own work-related road safety.  
There was some recognition that the latter may need to be presented in an alternative 
medium in order to be effective.  Some viewed HSE as having a reactive role to safe work 
travel, investigating incidents only when they are informed of a major failing.    
15.1.3 Driver Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA) were thought not to cover safe work travel, 
however, their strategy for 2017-2022 does include vehicle and driver safety and overall, 
safe travel for all, with the inclusion of license checks. 
Safe Work Travel Legislation/Standards 
15.1.4 One DfT representative referred to the Working Time Directive (WTD) for mobile workers 
and Drivers’ Hours Regulations as key enforcement policies for safe work travel and 
believed to be the responsibility of the DVSA.  The WTD covers all working time, including 
driving, and the Drivers’ Hours Regulations cover driving only.  Both policies set out the 
requirements for breaks and limits on daily, nightly, weekly and fortnightly hours worked 
and hours rested.  There was some concern about the heavy reliance on note keeping for 
manual enforcement by van drivers, compared to automated tachograph and digital 
enforcement in HGVs.   
15.1.5 Some raised concerns about the lack of clarity in safe work travel regulations, which 
means responsibility for safe work travel is often unclear.  For instance: 
 There may be differences between employer policy and regulations in law, such as 
an employer stating that tyres on a work vehicle should not go below a 3mm depth 
and the law stating that the minimum is 1.6mm; and 
 HSE is perceived to be increasingly ‘encouraging’ the industry to conform to certain 
standards rather than say they ‘must’ conform. 
Safe Work Travel in the Future 
15.1.6 Central government departments/agencies anticipated greater engagement with safe 
work travel in the future, for instance, through: 
 The promotion of Euro NCAP during procurement processes; 
 Revisions in Safe Work Travel regulations to acknowledge new driving technology, 
e.g. autonomous vehicles and in-car technology; 
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 A new strategy for logistics in transport, signed off by HSE and other agencies with 
a focus on work related road risk; and 
 A more proactive HSE role. 
15.2 Local Government 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
15.2.1 There was little discussion with local government around safe work travel.  One local 
authority engaged referred to a Safe Travel Policy, however, it was currently under review 
in order to improve implementation.  Additionally, the same local authority reported 
working with local businesses and launching the Driving for Better Business Campaign, 
however, reductions in funding, namely the removal of the Road Safety Grant, created a 
significant barrier. 
Road Safety Officer Survey Findings 
 Twenty six RSOs responded to the questions on safe work travel in the online survey.   
15.2.3 RSOs were asked if they have an in-house safe travel policy: 
 14 indicated they totally or mostly have such a policy; 
 5 reported that a policy was partially in place; 
 4 do not have a policy at all; and 
 2 did not know.  
15.2.4 Of the 9 representatives who reported partially or not at all having an in-house safe travel 
policy within their local authority: 
 2 stated that it is planned or is likely for the future; 
 3 indicated that it is not planned or is unlikely for the future; and 
 4 did not know. 
15.2.5 In response to being asked if they require Euro NCAP 5 * for all government service cars 
and taxis: 
 1 of RSOs indicated they totally or mostly require such standards; 
 1 reported requiring these standards partially; 
 3 stated they do not have this requirement at all; and 
 21 did not know. 
15.2.6 All 4 representatives who reported partially or not at all requiring Euro NCAP 5* for all 
government service cars and taxis did not know if this was planned for the future or not.  
15.2.7 When asked if they engage with local companies on work-related road safety: 
 11 of RSOs reported they are totally or mostly engaged; 
 7 suggested they are partially engaged; 
 6 stated they are not engaged at all; and 
 2 did not know.  
15.2.8 Of the 13 RSOs who reported partially or not at all engaging with local companies on work-
related road safety: 
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 5 indicated that it is planned or is likely for the future; 
 3 stated that it is not planned or is unlikely for the future; and 
 5 did not know. 
15.2.9 Finally, RSOs were asked if their local authority, or any organisation they work with, has 
adopted ISO 39001 on road traffic safety management systems: 
 5 stated this was totally or mostly the case; 
 1 reported partial adoption of these standards; 
 6 indicated these standards have not been adopted at all; and 
 14 did not know.  
15.2.10 Of the 7 RSOs who reported that their local authority, or any organisation they work with, 
had partially or not at all adopted ISO 39001:  
 2 indicated that it is planned or is likely for the future; 
 3 stated that it is not planned or is unlikely for the future; and 
 2 did not know. 
 
Local Authority Survey Findings 
 Twenty two local authority representatives responded to the questions on safe work 
travel in the online survey.  LA representatives who took part in the online survey were 
asked if they have an in-house safe travel policy: 
 13 indicated they totally or mostly have such a policy; 
 4 reported that a policy was partially in place; 
 1 do not have a policy at all; and 
 4 did not know.  
15.2.12 Of the 5 representatives who reported partially or not at all having an in-house safe travel 
policy within their local authority: 
 1 stated that it is planned or is likely for the future; 
 1 indicated that it is not planned or is unlikely for the future; 
 2 did not know; and 
 1 did not respond. 
15.2.13 In response to being asked if their local authority require Euro NCAP 5 * for all government 
service cars and taxis: 
 3 stated they do not have this requirement at all; and 
 19 did not know. 
15.2.14 Of the 3 representatives who reported not at all requiring Euro NCAP 5* for all 
government service cars and taxis: 
 2 indicated that it is not planned or is unlikely for the future; and 
 1 did not know. 
15.2.15 When asked if their local authority engages with local companies on work-related road 
safety: 
 11 representatives reported they are totally or mostly engaged; 
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 8 suggested they are partially engaged; 
 1 stated they are not engaged at all; and 
 2 did not know.  
15.2.16 Of the 9 local authority representatives who reported partially or not at all engaging with 
local companies on work-related road safety: 
 6 indicated that it is planned or is likely for the future; 
 1 stated that it is not planned or is unlikely for the future; and 
 2 did not know. 
15.2.17 Local authority representatives were then asked if their local authority, or any 
organisation they work with, has adopted ISO 39001 on road traffic safety management 
systems: 
 1 stated these standards have been totally or mostly adopted; 
 2 indicated this has not at all been adopted; and 
 19 did not know.  
15.2.18 The two local authority representatives who reported not at all adopting ISO 39001 on 
road traffic safety management systems both indicated that this is not planned or is 
unlikely for the future.  
15.3 Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Responsibility for Safe Work Travel 
15.3.1 Advisory groups, associations and charities acknowledged the importance of safe work 
travel in reducing the number of people killed and seriously injured on the roads. 
15.3.2 Some suggested that safe work travel is not being properly addressed by central 
government departments and agencies.   
15.3.3 Stakeholders requested better direction from HSE and DVSA on: 
 Important measures, such as driver hours, vehicle checks and user standards, 
including the provision of a system for regulation, e.g. ensuring fatigue 
management; and 
 Corporate responsibility for accidents which occur whilst driving for business, as 
HSE do not currently investigate these as work related accidents and this makes 
employer intervention voluntary, meaning employers are not held to account. 
15.3.4 Stakeholders acknowledged that the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), enforced by 
HSE, and the Crown Prosecution Service, both omit safe work travel, therefore refuting 
responsibility for the intervention. 
Safe Work Travel Legislation/Standards 
15.3.5 ISO 39001 was thought to only be adopted by a handful of larger organisations.  One 
stakeholder was engaged in ISO 39001 promotion and training and noted the small uptake 
may be because the standard is not part of the supply chain, drivers are not educated on 
it and it offers no financial gain. Other stakeholders suggested that ISO 39001 is too 
 161/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
complicated and unworkable, and thought awareness and promotion of the standard was 
lacking. 
15.3.6 One stakeholder was engaged in the development of an additional standard, addressing 
commuter safety and hoped that this standard would be made compulsory.   
Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities Safe Work Travel Promotion 
15.3.7 Multiple advisory groups, associations and charities either have their own safe travel 
policies (encouraging safe driving or commuting by public transport), or are active in the 
provision of research, training and guidance on safe work travel for their employees or 
clients.  For example, one association, with a remit for cyclist safety, offers guided rides 
to businesses whose employees commute to work by bike, in order to teach individuals a 
safe route for travel.  
15.3.8 An increased focus on safe work travel was believed to result in: 
 Attempts to address other road safety interventions, such as safe speed, as most 
people who drive for work are more likely to speed; and 
 Better fleet and HGV performance. 
15.4 Business and Industry 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Responsibility for Safe Work Travel 
15.4.1 At a national level, business and industry stakeholders requested a stronger lead from 
central government on safe work travel, suggesting work related road risk could be 
reduced through the introduction of: 
 Policy and national requirements by DfT; 
 Targets and goals; 
 Better data; 
 Better guidance from HSE;  
 HSE taking responsibility for investigating accidents which occur whilst travelling to 
and for work; and 
 Involvement of the DVSA. 
15.4.2 At a lower level, there was recognition that fleet companies would only be seen as 
responsible for safe work travel if an accident had occurred during a business mile. 
Safe Work Travel Legislation/Standards 
15.4.3 There were differing levels of engagement with safe work travel standards, for instance, 
some business and industry stakeholders had actively been engaged in the development 
of driver standards and others were not aware of specific standards, namely ISO 39001.  
Additionally, others were aware of safe work travel standards but were not aware of a 
large industry interest and uptake.  With specific reference to ISO 39001, this lack of 
uptake was thought to be due to a lack of national awareness and promotion of the 
standard. 
15.4.4 Safe work travel legislation was seen as insufficient.  Two main examples were given: 
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 Ambiguous legislation relating to corporate responsibility for road safety.  More 
specifically, one stakeholder suggested that there are fundamental differences in 
corporate responsibility for travel to and for work, with employers and HSE not 
responsible for enforcement or investigation of road accidents which occur on the 
way to work and responsible for accidents which occur during work.  There was 
some suggestion that the UK should follow European best practice and introduce 
employer corporate responsibility for travel to work, incentivising this through 
mitigation and prosecution. Stakeholders responsible for corporate fleets 
welcomed clearer guidelines in fleet policy to address this ambiguity; 
“There is a level of ambiguity, from a corporate fleet perspective, around what the 
requirements really mean and what they should do…there should be some guidelines 
around fleet policy” 
    (Business and industry representative) 
 Unclear legislation on safe work travel for fleets.  More precisely, the following 
would be welcomed:  
 The mandatory introduction of driving license checks in the corporate 
market, with provision being free of charge by the DVLA to encourage 
compliance; and 
 Introduction of employers’ responsibility for ensuring vehicles are serviced, 
insured, have an MOT and have regular tyre and fluid level checks. 
Business and Industry Safe Work Travel Promotion 
15.4.5 Multiple business and industry representatives were engaged in training to directly 
promote safe work travel to other businesses, including fleets.  These training 
programmes were delivered both face to face and online, with one stakeholder suggesting 
they cover corporate obligations and safe driving behaviours, such as ensuring drivers do 
not drive whilst tired.  One stakeholder was involved in the delivery of fleet best-practice 
masterclasses, presented by high-profile industry names, with some recently focusing on 
duty of care for safe work travel and operational road risk. 
15.4.6 Safe work travel was also seen to be promoted indirectly through the incentive of cheaper 
commercial insurance for fewer road accident claims. 
Monitoring Safe Work Travel 
15.4.7 Telematics was believed to be a very common way of managing safe work travel, namely 
work related road risk and driver performance.  Some recognised that telematics 
technology was often a mandatory requirement in commercial insurance policies.  
Despite this requirement in some insurance policies, there was some concern that not 
enough is being done to monitor what vehicles are being used for and where they are 
travelling to.  They thought this would make the development of safe work travel fleet 
policies difficult. 
15.4.8 Additionally, monitoring was also believed to be completed for: 
 Drivers awareness of external pressures and the influence of these on driver safety; 
and 
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 Work related road accidents.  However, there was some concern that 
inconsistencies were evident in the reporting of work related road accidents, with 
one stakeholder suggesting that injuries sustained during work related road 
accidents should be included as part of HSE’s RIDDOR reports, listed under types of 
reportable injuries (regulation 4) and dangerous occurrences (schedule 2).  
Fleet Company Survey Findings 
 Of the 17 fleet managers who responded to questions on safe work travel in the online 
survey: 
 All 17 stated that their organisation provides information on safe road use to 
drivers - 11 stated that the information is comprehensive, 6 stated that it is limited; 
 
 15  indicated that their organisation carries out in-service training to address road 
safety needs, 10 of whom said this is regular and 5 of whom said it is ad hoc.  Two 
stated that their companies do not provide any such training;  
 
 6 indicated that their major clients set specific requirements when procuring 
transport services from their organisation, 9 stated they did not, and 2 said the 
question was not applicable to them; 
  
 All but one indicated that they have an in-house safe travel policy; 
  
 9 require Euro NCAP 5* for all cars purchased or used by the company, 7 do not and 
1 said the question was not applicable to them; and 
 
 11 suggested that standards and rules set for licensing and disqualification partially 
address road safety needs, 5 stated they fully address road safety needs and 1 
indicated that they do not meet road safety needs at all.  
Road Haulage Company Survey Findings 
 Of the 4 road haulage companies who responded to questions on safe work travel in the 
online survey: 
 2 suggested that their organisation provides comprehensive information regarding 
safe road use and 2 acknowledged that although they provided information on this 
topic, it was limited in scope; 
 
 2 stated that their organisation carries out regular in-service training to address 
road safety needs, 1 indicated that their company provides ad-hoc training, and 1 
said their company does not provide any form of training; 
 
 2 said major clients set specific safety requirements when procuring transport 
services from their organisations and 2 said they did not; 
  
 2 have an in-house safe travel policy and 2 do not; 
 
 2 do not require Euro NCAP 5 * for all cars and taxis they purchase and 2 did not 
know; 
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 1 said their organisation is a member of the Construction Logistics and Community 
Safety (CLOCS) scheme, 3 said it was not; and 
 
 All 4 indicated that their organisation has policies / procedures that fully monitor 
licensing and disqualification.  
15.5 Emergency Services 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Emergency Services Safe Work Travel Promotion 
15.5.1 Multiple emergency service representatives, primarily from the police and fire and rescue 
services, were engaged in training programmes to directly promote safe work travel to 
businesses and individuals.  These were aimed at those who uses a vehicle to commute 
to work, or use a vehicle as part of work (fleet and grey fleet, HGV and taxi).  One 
emergency services representative reported multiple methods for identifying training 
programme attendees. These were:  
 Through drivers awareness courses, for instance, if an individual suggests they feel 
pressure when driving for work; and 
 Through high accident reporting within companies. 
15.5.2 These training programmes sometimes coincided with national campaigns, and address 
some or all of the following: 
 Effective time management; 
 Driving whilst tired; 
 Drink and drug driving; 
 Mobile phone use; 
 Seat-belt use; 
 The provision of breaks; 
 Awareness of vulnerable road users through cycling tasks; and 
 An ADI assessment for drivers who are particularly at risk. 
15.5.3 Additionally, one police force suggested that they would contact the company of anyone 
stopped for poor driving whilst driving for work, in order to make the company aware of 
the incident and promote safe work travel. 
Monitoring Safe Work Travel 
15.5.4 Where a road collision was identified as needing trauma care, emergency service 
representatives indicated that data was recorded on the type of vehicle involved.  This 
can highlight those driving for work, for instance, if they were driving a forklift, however, 
journey purpose is not directly recorded, meaning work travel can only be inferred.  
Safe Road Use Within Emergency Services 
15.5.5 Emergency service representatives stated that their own drivers are trained on safe road 
use during emergency and normal driving conditions by advanced driver training leads.  
15.5.6 The tensions between emergency response time and speed, and the resulting threats to 
other road users and their own drivers, were noted.  Representatives highlighted that no 
emergency response driver should risk their own safety during emergency responding. 
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15.5.7 Legislation on exceptions to speed limits for emergency responders was seen as unclear 
in terms of safe road use emergency response training.  Greater clarity is sought on who 
can train on exceeding speed limits, whether speed limits can be exceeded for emergency 
response training purposes and how standards can be measured. 
Police Force Survey Findings 
 Ten police Force representatives responded to questions on safe work travel in the online 
questionnaire. 
15.5.9 When asked if their police force has an in-house safe travel policy, of the 10 
representatives that answered the question: 
 3  indicated that their force has at least some form of in-house safe travel policy (1 
being partial); 
 3  have no form of safe travel policy; and  
 4  did not know. 
15.5.10 Of those who had no policy or a partial policy, two suggested that this was something 
planned for the future, one indicated it was not planned, and one did not know.  
15.5.11 Only one of the ten police forces indicated that their force required Euro NCAP 5* for all 
police service cars.  The remainder did not know. 
15.5.12 Two of the ten police forces totally or mostly engage with local companies on work-
related safety, five do partially, one does not and one did not know.  Half of those who 
partially engage or do not engage indicated that their force plans to work with local 
companies on safety more in the future – the remainder did not know.  
15.5.13 Not one police force representative knew if their police force, or any organisation they 
work with, adopted ISO 39001 on road traffic safety management systems. 
15.6 Academic Institutions 
Stakeholder Interview Findings 
Priority given to Safe Work Travel 
15.6.1 Academic institutions expressed concern that safe work travel is not given priority, 
suggesting more focus on evidence based research is needed.  More specifically, evidence 
on managing exposure to risk, speed, distraction and fatigue issues are believed to have 
value, with one academic stakeholder making reference to PACTS’ report with UCL and 
TRL, titled ‘The changing nature of driving for work and questions for safety policy and 
practice’.   
15.6.2 There was some concern that increasing the priority given to safe work travel will also 
create an increase in cost, however, this cost is believed to be outweighed by evident 
benefits. 
15.6.3 There was specific concern that safe work travel is not a priority in fleet companies, with 
larger fleets only having safe work travel policies for audit purposes and SMEs overlooking 
the topic, despite having large problems with road traffic accidents.  
Safe Work Travel Legislation/Standards 
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15.6.4 The importance of ISO 39001 was recognised by academic institutions, and some noted 
the lack of promotion, awareness and adoption of the standard.   
15.6.5 Suggestions from stakeholders included: 
 Making compliance with ISO 39001mandatory; and 
 HSE should recognise safe work travel under The Corporate Manslaughter Act 
(2007). 
Monitoring Safe Work Travel 
15.6.6 One academic institution has developed a safe work travel monitoring tool to assess 
driver risk, through psychometric assessment, and provide behavioural interventions to 
improve driver behaviour, such as hazard perception training and e-learning programmes.  
The tool has been used globally by multiple organisations. 
15.6.7 It was indicated that there is a need for better data relating to safe work travel. 
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16. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS WORKSHOP  
16.1 Introduction 
 Date: 6th February 2018 
 
 Moderators: Carry Stephenson, Eve Robertson, Kate McMahon, Jeanne Breen, Pete 
Thomas 
 
 Workshop objectives: 
o To discuss select recommendations from the review and their deliverability; 
o To ensure the select recommendations are realistic and practicable and 
appropriately represent the consensus and key themes from our research;  
o To give a strong sense of collaboration between the stakeholders, as it 
represents the start of improved joint working going forward, the early 
'establishment phase'; and 
o To inform the final report. 
 
 Breakout group objectives: 
o To discuss how the recommendations would impact participants’ organisations; 
o To discuss how the recommendations might be delivered by respective 
organisations; 
o To identify any drawbacks in the recommendations; and 
o To build on ideas. 
 
 Morning group composition: A morning session with five breakout groups 
consisted of representatives from local government; emergency services; academic 
institutions; business and industry; and advisory groups, associations and charities.  
 
 Afternoon group composition: An afternoon session with two breakout groups 
consisted of representatives from government and agency officials. 
 
 This workshop summary provides: 
o A full report on stakeholders’ views on each recommendation selected for 
discussion (Sections 16.2-16.7); and 
o A summary of the stakeholder’s views and resultant modifications to the draft 
report (Section 16.8).  
o As with the reporting of stakeholder views in other chapters, the views and 
opinions reported are those expressed by workshop attendees and are not 
necessarily factually correct.  All views and an indication as to whether specific 
views are widespread is provided where possible. 
16.2 A Safe System Performance Framework as the Core of National Strategy   
What are your initial thoughts on a Safe System performance framework as the core of 
national strategy? 
 Across all workshop groups, most attendees welcomed a Safe System performance 
framework as the core of national strategy.  In particular, local authority representatives 
felt that principles were logical, whilst representatives from associations and charities 
suggested Safe System provides a framework for accountability. 
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 However, many groups highlighted the need for a greater understanding of what Safe 
System is, and what it does. There were concerns that this lack of consensus over how 
Safe System is defined by different groups would prevent the road safety community from 
communicating the aims and importance of a Safe System clearly and accurately to other 
stakeholders. Some representatives from associations and charities also commented that 
‘National’ needs to be more clearly defined, as they were unclear whether this referred 
to the UK, or just England.  
“I don’t think there is a consensus necessarily, because people tend to add things and 
take things away don’t they. I’ve seen quite a few different models.” 
(Central government department/agency representative) 
“There are some who have engaged with the [Safe System] model, and have chosen to 
interpret it in certain ways that may not be the way that’s done in the OECD and that 
sort of thing… There is an issue there, and I think that needs to be discussed.” 
(Central government department/agency representative) 
“One of things that would need to be addressed in all of this is making sure there is a 
common and shared understanding of exactly of what Safe System actually means, 
because there are multiple interpretations of it operationally.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
 Many groups cited a lack of support for road safety from central government as another 
potential barrier. This was believed to have filtered its way down to local authorities, who 
tend not to have road safety as a priority item on their agendas. Further still, some 
representatives from associations and charities, as well as some government officials, 
suggested that road safety is not a priority for the general public. They argued that there 
is currently a culture of acceptance around the dangers of the road network, and as such, 
obtaining buy-in from the public may prove difficult. 
“There’s no customer demand, there’s no public demand for increased safety, because 
there’s no vision that it’s unsafe at the moment… There’s no general view that we have 
an unsafe system.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
 Some attendees questioned how some of the Safe System objectives could be applied in 
practice. Some local authorities suggested Safe System is harder to apply to older rural 
roads, and could lead to a loss of tourism in their area. Additionally, some representatives 
from business and industry advised that introducing some measures (e.g. average speed 
checks throughout the network) would not be practical or politically acceptable.  
 There were also concerns amongst some attendees that it is often a struggle to obtain 
agreement on implementing Safe System measures between stakeholders. For instance, 
one attendee suggested that road safety auditors can be undermined by road designers, 
whose priorities lie with financial considerations as opposed to safety. Some attendees 
from associations and charities were also concerned that Safe System could conflict with 
goals set by public health.  
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 To overcome these barriers, attendees proposed a number of strategies to assist in the 
implementation of this recommendation. Firstly, many attendees called for ‘National 
Leadership’ from the DfT, to bring cross-country consistency to Safe System through a 
national framework.  They believed that this would then filter down to local authorities, 
who would have to give more prioritisation.   
“That was the case in Sweden with Vision Zero, it was top down, it didn’t come from the 
bottom-up.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
 To get road safety up the agenda of both government and local authorities, and to obtain 
buy-in from both ministers and the public, many attendees suggested integrating Safe 
System with other objectives that are considered to be of national importance. Many 
attendees suggested linking Safe System to public health objectives, whilst government 
officials in particular called for a sustainable approach to safety.  
“Road safety isn’t working on its own in a vacuum. It has to co-ordinate with these other 
fields.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
“That link in with the sustainable goals as well, can also help that paradigm shift in the 
safety culture, but bringing in in the sustainable element, aspect to it as well, I think is 
really valuable.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
“I think potentially the way to make it [Safe System] sell maybe relates to what [x] said, 
that sustainable safety. The Government is committed to getting more people cycling, 
the key barrier to cycling is the perception that it’s really dangerous.” 
(Central Government Department/Agency representative) 
 Many attendees also suggested that to obtain consensus on how Safe System is defined 
and understood, all road designers need to be educated on its principles. One attendee 
from a charity also argued that road users themselves should be educated. In addition, 
many attendees from local authorities highlighted that funding is required to ensure that 
new, safe roads can be developed, and so the existing network can be maintained.  
Do you agree or disagree with the principle that DfT should be setting objectives/ 
targets? 
 Many attendees agreed with the principle of DfT setting targets, regardless of their 
simplicity. Additionally, irrespective of whether attendees felt that zero KSI’s was 
achievable or not, they agreed that this was a good aspirational aim. Some attendees felt 
that targets focus the minds of those working in road safety, serve as a statement of 
intent, and help education. Several representatives from advisory groups, associations 
and charities stated that targets help organisations to work collaboratively, and provide 
an indication of whether work has been successful.  
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“One of the ways you achieve that education is, actually, setting the targets… Setting 
targets makes it politically important, because it’s something you get seen to have 
either done or not done.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
“I think they’re essential part of the process of getting organisations to work together. 
This is what fell apart when targets were not introduced. If you don’t have clear targets, 
it’s very difficult for organisations to know what it is they’re trying to achieve.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
 However, most attendees pointed to a key barrier, the reluctance of some ministers and 
government departments to set targets. They believed that they would be concerned by 
the ramifications of these targets not being achieved. In addition, there were concerns 
that there would be a lack of appetite for this objective. As such, to make targets more 
palatable to government, and to gain public buy-in, many attendees suggested linking 
Safe System objectives with areas where there is high public demand for change, such as 
sustainable objectives relating to walking/cycling initiatives.  
 Local authority representatives suggested that targets for vulnerable road users need to 
set and be tailored by each local authority individually, to ensure they are relevant to their 
road environments. They also stated that funding would be required, to meet targets and 
that a drink-drive limit of zero should be set to ensure targets can be met.  
 Some attendees were unclear as to whether targets would apply to each part of Safe 
System, or whether the only target would be the outcome of a reduction in KSI’s. Most 
attendees wanted each aspect of Safe System to be measured. Likewise, many attendees 
emphasised that there needs to be a clear reason as to why targets are set, as well as a 
clear strategy for how they will be achieved.  
 One government official argued that different indicators of performance should be used, 
such as rates of compliance with speed limits, or the number of tyre checks undertaken 
by police forces. 
“I actually think that when you just count the number of dead, or killed or seriously 
injured, you’re counting your mistakes. You need to start thinking about other indicators 
of performance.” 
(Central government department/agency representative) 
What language should be used to present any objectives/targets? 
 Most attendees’ preferred terminology was the word ‘target’, on the basis that this 
language was simple, and easy to understand. Conversely, ‘quantitative objectives’ was a 
particularly unpopular term. One representative from an advisory group/association/ 
charity suggested that regardless of the language adopted, there had to be political buy-
in.  
“Don’t call them wishy-washy words like indicators, or other terms. Be clear about the 
fact that they are targets.” 
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(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
 However, many government officials warned against the use of the word ‘target’, as they 
felt this would decrease acceptability of the principle. Instead, they suggested that 
‘objectives’ would be a better word to use. Likewise, another official stated that great care 
and consideration should be given in assigning any numeric value to ‘objectives’, warning 
that good evidence may not be considered by ministers if set figures are included.  
“The door will close, bang, once anybody   says the word ‘targets’… There’s a hunger 
out there for these ‘objectives’, but they’re ‘objectives’. They will be measurable, but I 
can’t work with ‘targets’.” 
“I think if we set numbers we’ll end up having the baby thrown out with the bathwater. 
I think there’s’ a lot of good stuff in here, that won’t get over the threshold anywhere, 
if there is a number set in there.” 
(Central government department/agency representatives) 
16.3 Embedding Safe System Nationally 
Set up a task force of governmental and independent experts to encourage the 
embedding of Safe System 
 Most attendees supported this recommendation in principle. They felt that having a group 
of experts who are able to transfer/disseminate their knowledge to others would be 
useful, and that the task force could strengthen opportunities for collaborative working 
between organisations. However, there were some potential barriers identified by some 
attendees.  Some representatives from business and industry were unsure as to how the 
task force would work in practice, and were concerned that it may not be able to deliver 
anything actionable. Likewise, some representatives from advisory groups, associations 
and charities thought that involving other governmental departments may prove difficult. 
 With regards to implementation and delivery, the following suggestions were made: 
 The role, remit and responsibilities of the task force need to be more clearly 
defined, and thought needs to be given as to how this task-force will collaborate 
with other groups. It was suggested that the RSMCR recommendation incorporates 
a hierarchy of all the different groups to be involved. Attendees did not want the 
task force to resemble a quango. 
“I think the task probably needs slightly more clearly defining, that they are encouraging 
the embedding of Safe System.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
“If it’s some form of a useful body that’s actually going to provide that centralised lead, 
or do the education we talked about earlier… then that’s useful. But punting it off to an 
arms-length quango is a bad plan.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
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 Some attendees suggested that there needs to be an element of independent 
scrutiny / critique of what the task force does, so they are accountable. 
 
 Some attendees felt that in addition to expert disseminators of knowledge, there 
needs to be expert practitioners, to advise as to whether recommendations are can 
be implemented feasibly, and to ensure Safe System principles are applied to a high 
standard. 
 
 Many attendees made suggestions for organisations that should be represented on 
this task force, and needed to be educated on Safe System principles. These 
organisations included: Public Health; UK Roads Board; the Home Office, the 
national health service; Ministry of Justice; and police forces. Cross-governmental 
working was suggested as working well in the ‘Every Child Matters’ campaign. 
 
 Local authorities wanted the task force to support them in the delivery of road 
safety, and to help to deliver a consistent approach cross-country through 
collaborative working. 
“That national oversight allows it be linked. [For example] ‘Well, your targets are very 
similar to these over here, and these over here. So, let’s get you three together to look 
at an approach, rather than each of you doing something different’”. 
(Local authority representative) 
 Some attendees suggested that to instigate meaningful action, top-down 
leadership was required from ministers, not the DfT. 
“It’s not going to work, as a task force, if it’s just set-up by the Department for Transport. 
The minister needs to say, ‘I am setting-up at task force to look at this’, and if the 
minister says ‘I am setting-up at task force to look at this’, it carries much more weight 
that if the Department for Transport dribbles into it.” 
(Academic Institution representative) 
Promote Safe System Towards Zero as the new transport safety culture in Britain to 
professionals and devise community promotion and engagement strategies 
 Whilst many attendees agreed that ‘Towards Zero’ was certainly a good aspirational aim, 
there were some doubts as to whether this was a realistic aim, which could make it 
difficult to obtain buy-in from the public.  
 Some representatives from emergency services suggested that local authorities are not 
currently equipped with the skills to deliver this aim, whilst attendees across multiple 
groups felt the term ‘Towards Zero’ was ambiguous. Some attendees were unsure if this 
meant zero deaths, or zero injuries. Further still, one representative from an advisory 
group/association felt that ‘Towards’ meant there would not be a strong enough 
commitment to achieving zero, and as a result, this recommendation would not mobilise 
fully committed action.  
 Additionally, some charity representatives felt there was an ethical question to be 
considered. They questioned whether it was ethically right to be promoting walking and 
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cycling when the System is not yet safe, as this could lead to increased deaths for these 
modes in the short term. On another note, one government official suggested this ‘culture 
change’ project would be expensive to implement. 
 Furthermore, some attendees suggested that zero will never be achieved, as there will 
always be members of the public who choose not to comply with Safe System. Likewise, 
one government official argued that ‘Safe System Towards Zero’ was trying to tie two 
mutually exclusive concepts together that did not necessarily fit. 
“We have 30% who opt-out of the system. They choose, for one reason or another, to 
opt-out. For example, they break the law, they deliberately break the law. They can’t be 
enshrined in a Safe System, they’re outside the system.” 
(Advisory Groups, Associations and Charities representative) 
“People don’t just make mistakes, they make deliberate mistakes. There are slips, 
lapses, violations, there are all sorts of things. Sometimes a Safe System can account, 
not accept, but can accommodate those, and sometimes they can’t.” 
(Central Government Department/Agency representative) 
 In order to implement this recommendation, attendees made the following suggestions: 
 Most emphasised the need for there to be a clear definition/understanding of what 
Safe System means. One representative from the emergency services stated that 
this could be achieved by providing high-quality training at road safety academies, 
similar to public health. 
“[Public Health] have a whole kind of competency, you know, grades so they can work 
up different levels. They know how to do evidence-based approaches and be really 
systematic in what they do.” 
(Emergency service representative)  
 Local authority representatives re-iterated the need to set drink-drive limits to zero, 
set targets specific to each authority, and to use the government task force to 
promote opportunities for collaborative working. 
 One government official suggested the Cabinet Office should take ownership of this 
recommendation, not DfT. 
 Some government officials agreed that this recommendation could be enforced 
through a ‘Gold – Silver – Bronze’ command structure, similar to that used by Police 
forces. It was proposed that this hierarchy could consist of a: 
 Strategic Vision Group (Gold Level) – The task force state that they will 
promote Safe System Towards Zero, and outline how this will look; 
 Operational Leadership group (Silver Level) – The inter-departmental road 
safety working group has operational oversight of delivering this aim; 
 Delivery Groups (Bronze Level) – Extended fledgling regional road safety 
partnerships can be used to promote Safe System Towards Zero on a day-to-
day basis. 
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Review the national road classification and speed limit hierarchy in line with Safe 
System principles 
 In principle, all groups agreed with this recommendation. Many emphasised the need for 
the review to be credible (as this will help increase compliance with speed limits), and 
most agreed that the current system, where speed limits can change frequently on the 
same road, is dangerous and confusing for drivers.  
 Some attendees pointed to a number of barriers that currently exist: 
 There is a lack of resources at local authority level, both in terms of financial 
resources and headcount; 
 Some representatives from business and industry suggested that politics often 
determines the speed limits that are set;  
 In addition, this group felt that a discrepancy sometimes exists between what the 
speed limit should be intuitively, and what Safe System recommends; and 
 Government officials stated that it is often unclear as to who owns various sections 
of the road network, and that this needs to be clarified. 
 In terms of implementation, many attendees suggested that drivers needed educating, so 
they understand why speed limits are set.  
“When you look at any other pieces of legislation, health and safety at work, they bring 
in Safe System of working. But, the actual bringing in that system is quite a small 
element of it. The majority of the input is with the training on the operatives.” 
(Local authority representative) 
“If one of the key elements of Safe System is Safe Users, they can’t be safe if they’re not 
educated and trained.” 
(Local authority representative) 
 Many attendees called for flexibility, and for there not to be a ‘blanket’ approach to the 
review. Some representatives from business and industry pointed to research that has 
suggested that in some instances, higher speeds may actually be safer for drivers (e.g. to 
overtake HGVs).  
 Likewise, whilst many groups agreed that cross-authority co-operation is required to 
achieve greater consistency in speed limits, there are some instances where local 
authorities know the subtle variations in their roads better, so some flexibility should 
remain. Consequently, this review should serve more as a guideline than a prescription, 
and should not detract from local decision making. As such, many government officials 
called for this recommendation to be re-worded, to explain that limits should account for 
the design and architecture of different roads.  
“We have to bear in mind the huge variation we have in our road structure, so it means 
something. The process that gets you there needs to be a bit more flexible and 
complicated, otherwise it doesn’t achieve anything.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
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“I think it becomes far too complex when you try to set something nationally around 
speed limits, where actually something at a local level could have greater impact.” 
(Central government department/agency representative) 
 One representative from an advisory group/association/charity suggested a blanket 
20mph default should be applied in urban areas. 
 Additionally, one attendee from an academic institution re-iterated the need for political 
buy-in.  
Set goals, targets, objectives for the new Major Roads Network along the lines adopted 
for the Strategic Road Network 
 Most groups agreed with this recommendation in principle. One government official 
suggested that resourcing was an issue for road safety engineers. They also commented 
that whilst Highways England are adapting their iRAP tool for local roads, it is not quite 
ready for use at present.  
Identify road sections for priority treatments on the Major Roads Network and local 
roads using iRAP tools in partnership with local authorities 
 Most attendees agreed with this recommendation in principle. Local authority 
representatives particularly like the easy to understand star rating system, and the logical 
principles of iRAP.  However, many attendees argued that iRAP needs fine tuning, as it is 
not yet suitable for urban roads, whilst local authority representatives argued that 
engineers often find iRAP recommendations difficult to deliver in practice. Likewise, one 
representative from an academic institution suggested that DfT, Highways England and 
sub-regional bodies should be primarily responsible for this, not local authorities, as they 
do not have sufficient resources to implement this.  Many other groups also pointed to 
the fact that in addition to identification, there would need to be adequate funding to 
deliver this recommendation. 
“One of the problems with that is actually keeping to that standard. So, you go for a 5 
star, you manage to achieve it, how are you going to maintain it at that level?” 
(Local authority representative) 
“There’s a couple of words missing there though, aren’t there? After identifying, you 
need identify, and fund.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
 Local authority representatives highlighted the need to educate road designers so they 
have a better understanding of Safe System. They also emphasised the need for Local 
authorities to be involved in the setting of any targets in this area, as they are the ones 
who will inherit them. Furthermore, they also suggested developing a standardised 
measure of risk, to reduce discrepancy between different tools.  
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Provide new focus for vehicle safety policy and research in DfT beyond the current 
emphasis on connected and autonomous vehicles  
 Many non-government representatives agreed with this recommendation. They saw the 
arrival of fully autonomous vehicles as distant, and as such, there is currently a gap 
between current safety and planning for the future. Some representatives from advisory 
groups, associations and charities wanted to see greater focus on behavioural research, 
specifically on how to incentivise the public to buy vehicles with better safety features.  
“In terms of the short to mid-term ambitions in relation to incentivising, further vehicle 
safe technology, I think there is a bit of a vacuum at a governmental level.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
“I think we would probably like to see more emphasis put on how, what role, the 
Government could play in terms of research for incentivising take-up of certain safety 
features within vehicles.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
 Business and industry representatives believed a more pressing need was to improve the 
safety of the grey fleet. They suggested that government review their policy towards 
expenses schemes that incentivise workers to drive business miles in potentially unsafe 
vehicles. They also wanted to see increased focus on Euro NCAP 5* research to improve 
safety in current vehicles. Likewise, many groups called for government to only procure 
Euro NCAP 5* vehicles.  
 However, government officials were not as convinced by this recommendation. They 
acknowledged that DfT’s research is somewhat determined by international research 
focus from the EU and UN, and many perceived the arrival of full autonomy to be close 
enough to justify the current research focus. Yet, one attendee did suggest that DfT should 
not lose sight of ensuring existing vehicles comply with current safety standards.  
Increase compliance with urban and rural speed limits 
 Most attendees agreed with this recommendation. The only reservations attendees had 
were in regards to potential barriers, and how effectively this could be implemented.  
 Some government officials recognised that politically, speed cameras were disliked by the 
public. There has also been a recent backlash in France when 10kmh were taken off speed 
limits. Other groups cited a range of current issues, including:  
 Lack of police enforcement;  
 Lack of funding; 
 Lack of clear communication from authorities to the public about why certain speed 
limits are set;  
 Lack of driver experience/knowledge; 
 Lack of consistency in the speed limit tolerances/margins used by different police 
forces; 
 Poor calibration of speed monitoring equipment; and 
 A ‘cultural issue’ of disregarding speed limits in the UK/acceptance of speeding. 
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 Many groups called for the use of technology to increase compliance. Intelligent Speed 
Assistance (ISA) was seen as a way of ensuring compliance, with representatives from 
business and industry proposing that this should be sold to fleet operators as a form of 
‘corporate social responsibility’ and a method of reducing insurance costs. Other 
attendees suggested the mandatory fitting of black boxes in vehicles. Yet, some attendees 
agreed that technology was not the ‘be all, end all’, and that other psychological methods 
of slowing speeds may be effective (e.g. lining roads with trees, the use of white paint).  
 Some attendees suggested that more organisations need to be involved in enforcement, 
not just the police (e.g. the Home Office and Ministry of Justice). Many called for national 
leadership from the DfT. Here, it was suggested that DfT should reinforce that using 
mobile phones, not wearing a seatbelt, and drink/drug driving are unacceptable. Many 
felt that DfT should also promote individual ownership of road safety and be more visible 
as a lead agency.  
 Education was seen as a key tool in delivery by many attendees. There were calls from 
many groups to reintroduce campaigns that were considered long overdue (e.g. Speed 
Kills). Here, business and industry representatives emphasised the need for ‘intelligent 
communication’ and campaigns that are thought-provoking – not simply administering 
commands. 
“If you push people in a direction, they will push back. If you draw them to it because it 
has 101 good reasons why, then they’re more likely to accept it.” 
(Business and industry representative) 
“Something using humour and thought-provoking, I think, is more likely to change 
behaviour than finger-wagging, because we know that doesn’t work.” 
(Business and industry representative) 
 In a bid to tackle the ‘cultural issue’ of acceptance of speeding, local authorities called for 
a zero tolerance approach. To tackle the inconsistency in speed limits, other groups 
suggested that average speed checks over wide areas achieve better compliance, as 
previous research has indicated that drivers prefer these to fixed position cameras. 
Support walking and cycling with safety improvements as well as measures to increase 
activity 
 Most attendees agreed with this recommendation in principle, and one suggested it is 
extended to include equestrians. A potential barrier is that pedestrians and cyclists are 
still seen as ‘other’ by many road users, and to overcome this need to be prioritised as 
modes in their own right, as opposed to ‘other’ road users.  
 To implement this recommendation successfully, the following suggestions were made to 
increase safety for walking and cycling: 
 Increase compliance with speed limits for vehicles; 
 Provide proper segregation from vehicles; and 
 Reduce road traffic volumes. 
 Some advisory group/associations/charity representatives wanted to see a ‘Road Danger 
Reduction Approach’ implemented to ensure that public health aims were included. 
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“There needs to be an explicit mention of public health. Walking and cycling are sort of 
clear public health beneficiaries.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
“We would have preferred Road Danger Reduction… I think Safe System designs out 
danger, but I think Road Danger Reduction does take into consideration the wider issues 
around environment and health.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
16.4 Co-ordination Needs 
Establish an inter-departmental road safety working group of senior government 
officials to oversee national road safety strategy, goals and targets. (Moderator note: 
not ministers) 
 Although many attendees agreed with this recommendation in principle, and welcomed 
the need for cohesion, some were sceptical as to whether this group would be effective 
in practice. There were concerns that without political buy-in (i.e. no ministerial lead, 
and/or senior officials being unwilling to give up their time to attend meetings), this group 
would not function effectively. Additionally, some representatives from advisory groups, 
associations and charities did not see how this group was different to the task force. 
 As such, the following recommendations for implementation were made by attendees: 
 Local authorities would like members to be from all areas in road safety, and would 
like this group to be responsible for funding authorities based on their 
performance; 
 To obtain political buy-in, some attendees suggested classing meetings as highly 
important (to prevent junior members of staff being sent), and monitoring the 
group’s performance against key road safety objectives; 
“You want to find out what would make those meetings something that you could not 
get out of, that you would move everything else in your diary to attend.” 
(Emergency service representative) 
 To ensure that terms of reference are clear, and to demonstrate how this group 
would work collaboratively with the task force (as well as other road safety 
organisations) it was suggested that a diagram of this process was drawn-up; 
“If you had it as a diagram, how it would work… How it would work in terms of 
governance, delivery and buy-in and leadership, a lovely little diagram, would probably 
be quite good.” 
(Central government department/agency representative) 
 One attendee from an advisory group/association/charity suggested that a Safe 
System approach could be embedded within every departmental plan; and 
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 One government official spoke of an MP who is considering establishing a similar 
group, led at ministerial level. They suggested letting this MP lead this process. 
Extend the fledgling regional road safety partnerships for the strategic road network to 
cover the Major Roads Network in cooperation with local authorities 
 This recommendation was welcomed by many attendees, as they felt that gaps currently 
exist at regional level, and that this would increase the opportunity for collaborative 
working between organisations. Yet, a number of barriers were identified, such as: 
 Some attendees were concerned that existing partnerships could hold 
disproportionate power over new groups;  
 Some were concerned that there may be inconsistencies in how different regional 
partnerships work; and 
 One Business and Industry representative was concerned that drivers may be 
confused if/when new regulations are introduced in their area. 
 In terms of implementation, many attendees suggested that a range of partners should 
be included, not just local authorities. For instance, police forces could be included. 
Likewise, many attendees suggested that the partnerships needed a blueprint to follow, 
so they know how to implement Safe System principles cross-regionally.  
 Local authority representatives felt that DfT should fund and implement these 
partnerships. However, a recent consultation report by Highways England was referred to 
as a potential guide for how these partnerships could be implemented.  
16.5 Funding and Resource Allocation Needs 
Review the funding available to local authorities, as well as funding mechanisms 
 Most attendees agreed that funding and resource allocation did need to be reviewed, 
although there were some barriers identified by various groups. It was acknowledged that 
road safety is low on the government’s agenda, whilst representatives from local 
authorities stated that local authority leaders often determine how money is spent. 
 With regards to implementation, attendees recommended the following actions: 
 Review funding for other agencies involved in road safety (e.g. police forces); 
 Align road safety with other ‘priority’ societal/governmental objectives (e.g. 
environmental, equalities, public health), and leverage funding from these areas; 
“Does it have a future in just being focused on funding for road safety? Or do we have 
to start thinking, well, where are all these other key priority issues for national 
politicians, that aren’t road safety.” 
(Academic Institution representative) 
 Government should provide greater guidance on how funding should be spent, and 
what the funding is intending to achieve; 
 Some government officials suggested reviewing the timeframes when funding is 
available – although they did not specify what these timeframes should be; 
 In terms of type of funding, ring-fenced funding was ‘of interest’, but was not seen 
as a reliable source;  
 180/ 188   Appendix B – Stakeholder Engagement  
 
 
 
 
 
 Many government officials suggested that targeted, non-competitive funding (e.g. 
the Safer Roads Fund) had been well received by the road-safety community; and 
 Some advisory group/association/charity representatives suggested tailoring local 
authority funding to reflect their level of ambition, and that there needs to be 
greater selectivity and a more critical approach taken when choosing schemes to 
be support. 
Increase dedicated road safety research budget and programme management capacity 
to support the implementation of a Safe System approach and demonstration projects 
across the UK 
 Most attendees did not feel that research budgets had to be increased necessarily, it was 
more a case of making better use of existing resources, or in some cases, increasing 
resources. Some felt that specific road safety budgets would help gain political buy-in. 
 The barriers identified by attendees to the successful delivery of this recommendation 
included: persuading local authority leaders to fund research in areas they may not 
understand; the impartiality of research advisory groups; not enough research being 
applied in practice; and difficulty obtaining political interest for evidence-based policy. 
 In terms of implementation, the following suggestions were made by attendees: 
 Improve the dissemination of research, so that research is more visible, co-
ordinated, and quality can be assured; 
 Government officials wanted increased resources within their department, so that 
budgets can be used more efficiently, and more research can be undertaken; 
“There’s lots of money that never gets spent because we don’t actually have the ability 
[to commission enough research]. And projects take such a long time because we can’t 
manage them fast enough.”  
(Central government department/agency representative) 
 Prioritisation would ensure best use of available funds, existing resources could be 
used better, and Safe System could be better implemented; 
“You’ve got to look at where the biggest hurdles are towards the Safe System approach 
being implemented, and target the research on those hurdles first. It’s got to be a 
progressive approach. There’s no point researching the end game if there’s 25 steps first 
that are going to need something to overcome them.” 
(Local authority representative) 
 Advisory group/association/charity representatives stated that independent 
funding must remain (so other areas can be researched, not just the DfT’s 
interests), and wanted ‘development’ to be included in this recommendation; and 
 Many groups called for research to have practical implications. 
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16.6 Monitoring and Evaluation Needs 
Review Safe System monitoring and evaluation needs 
 Most attendees agreed it was important to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of Safe 
System, so the community can see progress and learn from successes and mistakes. One 
advisory group/association/charity representative suggested using the European 
Commissions’ indicators of performance. 
 Government officials stated that data is currently collected in silos, and that there is a 
need to bring this together. Some other groups recognised that this will require additional 
resources.  
“The monitoring bit is going to be relatively straightforward. The ability to do something 
about it, to identify the weak spots, identify the strengths, and create a level, a level of 
output that is excellent across the board, that’s going to be the really difficult part, an 
additional, a significant additional resource.” 
(Advisory groups / Associations / Charities representative) 
Develop the capacity of the DfT Statistics and Analysis Division to fulfil key national 
monitoring and evaluation development and to create oversight related to the 
implementation of Safe System 
 All groups agreed with this recommendation, with some groups feeling that availability of 
data promoted accountability.  
 A number of suggestions were made to improve the delivery of this objective: 
 Many attendees felt this was not only the responsibility of DfT, but was applicable 
to any organisation that collects data; 
 Although some attendees wanted to see a senior position created at DfT to run the 
data warehouse, one government official suggested this should not necessarily 
mean adding more staff, but streamlining current processes; 
 Emergency service representatives suggested collecting data from the ‘Brake’ 
depth investigation  branch, and monitoring data relating to post-crash response 
times and post-crash health; and 
 Local authority representatives wanted to see more monitoring of education, 
training and publicity (ETP). 
Consider any further incentives needed for police forces for take up of the CRASH 
reporting system 
 It was widely acknowledged that there needs to be an improvement in the quality and 
consistency of CRASH data and in the speed of data availability. 
 Many attendees stated that road safety/CRASH data is not a priority for police forces, 
whilst other argued that police forces lacked the required understanding about what the 
data was being used for.  It was also stated that some police forces are using their own 
systems which they consider superior, for example the Metropolitan Police force. 
 Various suggestions were made by attendees as to how the police might be encouraged 
to take up the CRASH reporting system. These included: 
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 Keeping CRASH data free; 
 DfT to display leadership/take ownership of CRASH data; 
 Making CRASH more user friendly (e.g. allowing transfer of data with other systems, 
or enhancing its mobile capability so it is available at roadsides); and 
 Paying police forces more to take CRASH data seriously. 
16.7 Research Needs 
Establish a national road safety research advisory group to provide independent advice 
on research programmes and methods in line with identified good practice 
 Whilst most attendees agreed with this recommendation in principle, many wanted there 
to be a clear terms of reference for this group.  However, some attendees were not 
comfortable with the idea of this group, or DfT dictating to academics what research 
should be undertaken (i.e. they did not want to lose ‘intuitive research’, and rely only on 
research that is formally commissioned).  
 Government officials made a variety of suggestions for this recommendation: 
 Ensure the group undertake quality assurance audits, check that research is not 
duplicated, and ensure lots of visibility for research findings; 
 Ensure that road safety campaigns are based on evidence; 
 Ensure that the advisory group is not just a repository, but translates research 
evidence into practice; and 
 Ensure the group is sensitive to different groups priorities for research. 
16.8 Summary of Findings and Modifications to the Draft RSMCR Report 
 This section provides a summary of stakeholder views on each of the selected 
recommendations (described in full in previous sections), and the study team’s reflections 
and actions for each recommendation.  Actions take the form of modifications made to 
the draft RSMCR report to reflect majority views, including the: 
 Addition of new recommendations; 
 Modification of existing recommendations; 
 Removal of recommendations; and  
 Modifications to other sections of the draft report.  
 These modifications were made to ensure that stakeholders views were taken into 
consideration, ensuring recommendations are realistic, practicable and can be delivered. 
Summary of Findings 
 Across all workshop groups, most attendees welcomed the recommendation for A Safe 
System performance framework as the core of national strategy, although there were 
concerns over the lack of, and differing understanding of the term Safe System, which was 
seen as a barrier to both dissemination and implementation.   
Study team’s reflections and actions:  This workshop finding is already recognised in 
the draft report, along with recommendations for DfT and professions to aid an 
increased understanding of the concept of Safe System.  
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 Many perceived there to be a current lack of support and priority for road safety and the 
principals of Safe System at central government level, and considered this filtered down 
to a culture of acceptance around the dangers of the road network at a local level and 
amongst the general public. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  This workshop finding is already reflected in the 
draft report within a range of recommendations around Safe System and its leadership 
by the DfT. 
 Perceived barriers to Safe System measures being implemented included practicalities, 
political acceptability, financial considerations, and conflicts with goals set by Public 
Health.  National leadership from the DfT, bringing consistency to Safe System through a 
national framework, was considered very important to overcome many of these barriers.  
Integrating Safe System with other key national objectives, such as public health and 
suitability were also perceived as ways of getting Safe System up the agenda in central 
and local government.  Funding and education for road designers were also considered 
important to overcome barriers. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  This workshop finding is already reflected in the 
draft report and recommendations. 
 The principal of DfT Setting national targets for KSIs, alongside a clear strategy for 
achieving targets, and reasons for target setting, was well supported.  Working towards 
zero KSIs was generally perceived as a good aspirational aim as it focuses minds and serves 
as a statement of intent from central government. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  This workshop finding is already reflected in the 
draft report and recommendations. 
 A key barrier to targets was perceived to be buy-in from ministers and government 
departments.  Linking targets with areas where there is high public demand for change, 
such as sustainable objectives relating to walking/cycling initiatives, was suggested to 
overcome this barrier.  Use of words other than ‘target’ was considered inferior by most, 
but it was noted that other terminology would be more politically acceptable.  Many 
representatives suggested additional targets for vulnerable road users, and measuring a 
range of different indicators of performance linked to Safe System. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  The study team believes that targets are of key 
importance.  The lesson to be learned from experience pre-2000 is that targets that are 
evidence based and realistic whilst being ambitious are widely accepted by road safety 
stakeholders.  The draft report reflects the preference of central government 
stakeholders in terms of terminology used. 
The study team considers that key performance indicators are preferable to 
disaggregated targets as the focus should be on the overall goal.  However, in 
developing policy for specific road user groups it will be up to policy makers to decide 
if further targets are desirable.  In the current climate keeping it simple seems best and 
if people are concerned about the politics suggesting a proliferation of targets seems 
unadvisable.   
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A new recommendation has been added to the draft recommendations to address 
comments on linking targets with areas where there is high public demand for change, 
such as sustainable objectives relating to walking/cycling initiatives: 
“Set out the shared benefits that road safety can bring to other societal objectives                                                                               
e.g. public health, occupational health and safety, environment, tourism and the 
economy”   
 Most attendees supported Setting up a task force of governmental and independent 
experts to encourage the embedding of Safe System in principle as they considered it 
would help transfer/disseminate knowledge and strengthen opportunities for 
collaborative working between organisations.  However, there were concerns over its 
ability to deliver actionable outcomes and to bring together different government 
departments.  It was considered the recommendation and those who should be involved 
should be more clearly defined in the RSMCR.  Suggestions included that it should include 
practitioners; there should be cross government representation; there should be 
independent scrutiny; it should support delivery at a local level; ad it should be set up at 
ministerial level. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  Terms of reference and recommendations in the 
draft report have been expanded and revised to reflect these suggestions. 
 Whilst many agreed that the recommendation to Promote Safe System Towards Zero as 
the new transport safety culture in Britain was a good aspirational aim, there were some 
doubts as to whether it is realistic, which some perceived could make it difficult to obtain 
buy-in from the public.  Concerns included: local authorities not being equipped to deliver 
this ambition; the term being ambiguous (i.e. whether it refers to deaths or injuries); the 
lack of a precise ambition; the cost of implementing such a big culture change; its 
implausibility given 30% of accidents involve people breaking the law; and it conflicting 
with promoting walking and cycling in the current road environment. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  Suggestions around definition of Safe System 
and its performance framework as understood internationally would be largely 
addressed in the new strategy.   
Cost of implementation is not incorporated into the draft report as the study team 
considers Safe System to encourage efficiency.  The report notes that Safe System 
treatments have been found to be affordable and cost-effective. Therefore no changes 
have been made to the draft report or recommendations to reflect these concerns. 
 Suggestions to overcome these barriers included education around what it means; a clear 
structure and plan for its promotion; target setting; setting drink drive limits to zero; and 
ownership by the Cabinet Office. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  Suggestions around definition of Safe System 
and its performance framework would be largely addressed in the new strategy.   
Suggestions for a review of the blood alcohol limit and the setting out of roles and 
shared responsibilities in the review are in alignment with these suggestions.  
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 Many attendees agreed that there needs to be A review of the national road 
classification and speed limit hierarchy in line with Safe System principles.  However, 
there was concern over any outcomes that: reduce flexibility of local authorities to make 
local decisions where the roads warrant it; are not credible to drivers; are determined by 
political acceptability. It was also considered driver education and local funding is required 
to roll out any recommendations. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  The draft report is only recommending a review, 
which is fundamental and usually the first step for jurisdictions implementing a Safe 
System approach.   
 Setting goals, targets, and objectives for the new Major Roads Network along the lines 
adopted for the Strategic Road Network was generally supported although there was 
concern that resourcing was an issue for road safety engineers, and that the iRAP tool for 
local roads was not yet ready. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  This workshop finding is already reflected in the 
draft report and recommendations. 
 There was generally support for the recommendation to Identify road sections for 
priority treatments on the Major Roads Network and local roads using iRAP tools in 
partnership with local authorities.  However, many were concerned with practicalities, 
in particular that iRAP needs fine tuning as it is not yet suitable for urban roads; that 
engineers find it difficult to deliver in practice, and would need more resources; that road 
designers need more education; and that local authorities would need to implement this 
but have inadequate funding to do so.  A standardised measure of risk, to reduce 
discrepancy between different tools, was also suggested. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:   An urban iRAP tool is being developed.   
 Most non-government stakeholders supported the recommendation To provide new 
focus for vehicle safety policy and research in DfT beyond the current emphasis on 
connected and autonomous vehicles, and specified research they considered necessary 
including research to understand ways to incentivise the public to buy safer vehicles, to 
understand ways to improve the safety of the grey fleet, and increased focus on Euro 
NCAP 5* research.  Support for this recommendation was less from government and 
agencies who considered current focus to be appropriate. 
 The recommendation to Increase compliance with urban and rural speed limits was 
generally supported.  However, many barriers were identified, which would require the 
following to overcome them: more funding, education, enforcement, and consistency 
between police forces; a change in culture; new technology and other methods to slow 
speeds; and collaboration between different government departments. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  Most of these suggestions are provided as 
recommendations throughout the draft report. 
 The recommendation to Support walking and cycling with safety improvements as well 
as measures to increase activity was broadly supported, with a suggestion it is extended 
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to equestrians.  Some specific suggestions for improving the road environment for cyclists 
and pedestrians were suggested, as well as a change in focus of the recommendation to 
a ‘road danger reduction approach’ to ensure public health aims are also included. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  Consideration of equestrians has been added to 
the draft report.   
A recommendation was added, to “Ensure that the benefits for health of walking and 
cycling are supported by safety improvements by making funding available for safety 
measures as well as measures to increase activity”. 
The study team do not support a perception of danger reduction approach but one 
based on actual risk assessment of death and serious injury and the safety indicators 
which directly relate to these.  
 Whilst there was some support for the recommendation To establish an inter-
departmental road safety working group of senior government officials to oversee 
national road safety strategy, goals and targets, there were concerns over its 
effectiveness, in particular without ministerial lead and attendance by senior officials.  It 
was also suggested attendees would need to be from all areas of road safety and that 
there should be a clear mandate for the group.  Some felt this group should be combined 
with the task force of governmental and independent experts to encourage the 
embedding of Safe System to avoid both silos and duplication. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:  Recommendations on co-ordination in the draft 
report have been revised to reflect these points. 
 The recommendation to Extend the fledgling regional road safety partnerships for the 
strategic road network to cover the Major Roads Network in cooperation with local 
authorities was welcomed by most attendees, although there were some concerns about 
implementation; ensuring consistency across regions; and whether it should be DfT or HE 
led.  There was also a suggestion that the police should be involved. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:   The draft report recommendations suggest that 
this should be Highways England led and that DfT consider introducing a ring-fenced 
grant for the establishment of regional road safety partnerships 
 A review the funding available to local authorities, as well as funding mechanisms, was 
widely supported. It was suggested that this be extended to other government 
departments and agencies with road safety responsibilities including the police. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:   The draft report recommendations suggest that: 
National Health England should review funding for ambulances and accident and 
emergency departments in hospitals to improve response times and trauma care, and 
that Public Health England should review funding for road traffic injury prevention in 
its health improvement plans. 
 Increase dedicated road safety research budget and programme management capacity 
to support the implementation of a Safe System approach and demonstration projects 
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across the UK was less well supported than most recommendations.  It was generally felt 
central government research budgets were not lacking, but that capacity to manage 
research within central government was. At a local level it was thought this 
recommendation would help with political buy in.  The barriers identified to the successful 
delivery included persuading local authority leaders to fund research. Participants would 
like assurance that any increased budget would lead to improved research dissemination, 
quality assurance of research, ensuring research has practical implications, and ensuring 
the findings of research are applied in practice.  There was a concern that independent 
funding and research interests beyond DfT’s requirements must remain.  
Study team’s reflections and actions:   Implementation of a Safe System approach will 
require new research.  The recommendations about independent research advice and 
the need for a research strategy address this together with ones on capacity building.   
 The recommendation to Review Safe System monitoring and evaluation needs was 
perceived as important so progress can be seen, successes and mistakes can be learned 
from, and data collection can be bought into one place rather than existing in silos. Using 
the European Commissions’ indicators of performance was suggested. 
Study team’s reflections and actions: The European Commissions’ indicators of 
performance have not yet been set. 
 All groups agreed with the recommendation to Develop the capacity of the DfT Statistics 
and Analysis Division to fulfil key national monitoring and evaluation development and 
to create oversight related to the implementation of Safe System, although some 
thought that this responsibility should not necessarily be with DfT and some thought that 
streamlining the process rather than recruiting more staff was sufficient. It was also 
suggested that inclusion of more monitoring of education, training and publicity should 
be included within this recommendation. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:   The study team considered that this task must 
lie with the DfT, as lead agency.   A range of implemented interventions would require 
monitoring and evaluation. 
 It was widely acknowledged that there needs to be an improvement in the quality and  
consistency of CRASH data and in the speed of data availability. Whilst some agreed with 
the recommendation to Consider any further incentives needed for police forces for take 
up of the CRASH reporting system, and some suggested financial incentives, some  made 
other suggestions to get police forces using CRASH, including providing them with a better 
understanding about what the data was being used for; keeping CRASH data free; DfT 
displaying better leadership regarding CRASH data; and making CRASH more user friendly. 
Study team’s reflections and actions: This recommendation was removed from the 
draft report following the workshop, acknowledging that the system is free of charge.  
A recommendation for The Home Office, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary, 
and the National Chief Police Council, states that:  “Alongside the DfT, they should 
ensure that one national crash reporting system (CRASH) is used by all police forces”. 
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 Many participants agreed with the recommendation to Establish a national road safety 
research advisory group to provide independent advice on research programmes and 
methods in line with identified good practice, suggesting there needs to be a clear terms 
of reference for the group. It was suggested the group be responsible for quality 
assurance audits, checking research is not duplicated, ensuring visibility of research 
findings, and ensuring road safety campaigns are evidence based.  Some stakeholders did 
not support this recommendation, expressing concern over DfT relying on formally 
commissioned research, and losing the more ‘intuitive research’ from academics. 
Assurance was wanted that the advisory group does not become a repository, that it 
translates research evidence into practice, and that it is sensitive to different groups 
priorities for research. 
Study team’s reflections and actions:   Following the workshop the suggestion about 
terms of reference was added to the main draft report. 
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Appendix C: Assessment Framework 
1.1 Overview 
1.1.1 This section presents the broad scope of the review largely based on the internationally 
recognised road safety management assessment framework produced by the World 
Bank1 and updated for the purposes of this review. The assessment framework provided 
the review team with the system-wide scope for the conduct and the reporting of the 
road safety management capacity review.  A simple model of the framework is presented 
in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Safe System road safety management system model and assessment framework 2 
 
 
                                                          
1 Global Road Safety Facility: Bliss T and J Breen (2009). Country Guidelines for the Conduct of Road Safety Management 
Capacity Reviews and the Specification of Lead Agency Reforms, Investment Strategies and Safe System Projects. Global 
Road Safety Facility, World Bank, Washington. 
2 This road safety management model is based on World Bank Global Road Safety Facility, Bliss and Breen (2009) building on 
the frameworks of Land Transport Authority (2000), Wegman, (2001), Koornstra et al (2002), Bliss, (2004), and updated, 
Breen, (2017) with reference to World Road Association (2015); OECD/ITF (2016).   
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                Results 
 
Final outcomes 
Long-term Safe System goal & interim 
targets to reduce and ultimately prevent 
deaths and serious injuries 
 
Intermediate outcomes 
Targeted, measurable safety performance indicators 
for activity linked to preventing deaths and serious injuries 
 
Institutional outputs 
Deliverables that seek improvements in intermediate and final 
outcomes which can also be measured, targeted and monitored. 
     Interventions 
           Safe Roads and Roadsides, Safe Speeds, Safe Vehicles                                                                 
             Safe Road Use, Post-Crash Care, Safe and Healthy Modes, Safe Work Travel 
                     Institutional management functions   
Results focus - leadership, goal and target-setting, Coordination, Legislation, Funding and resource 
allocation, Promotion, Monitoring and Evaluation, Research and development and knowledge transfer 
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1.1.2 Assessment framework questions to be addressed by the review team were tailored for 
the purposes of this capacity review to assess all three elements of the national road 
safety management system. 
1.2 Institutional management functions 
1.2.1 Based on research into successful, results-focused road safety management, institutional 
management comprises a range of functions. The overarching function is results focus 
supported by coordination, legislation, funding and resource allocation, promotion, 
monitoring and evaluation and research and development and knowledge transfer.  
Capacity for the delivery of each function is important at national, local and organisational 
levels to produce effective, system-wide intervention. 
1.2.2 Successful practice underlines the important role played by the lead agency acting on 
behalf of national government. The overarching institutional delivery role of the lead 
agency is the development of strategy and performance frameworks to facilitate results-
focused, multi-sectoral road safety activity in full consultation with key agencies and the 
broader road safety partnership. The lead agency has a key role in the delivery of all 
institutional management functions while other sectors may lead in the specific delivery 
of intervention. 
Results focus: what results do we want to achieve? 
1.2.3 This part of the framework addresses results management and setting the safety 
performance framework, how priorities are established and the extent to which there is 
strategic planning for road safety based on a good evidence base and reflecting national 
policy.  For each function the specific role of the lead agency is assessed. 
 Is there leadership and accountability for the delivery of results nationally, locally 
and in the top management of organisations? 
 Have road safety goals and targets been set for the long-term and interim? 
 Are evidence-based approaches used in assessing priorities and targeted action? 
 Are strategies and action plans in line with national road safety approaches and 
objectives? 
 Is there organisational capacity and professional expertise in support of achieving 
results? 
 Are there barriers to the delivery of results and, if so, what are they? 
Coordination to achieve results 
1.2.4 This section identifies the key ways in which the organisation is coordinating activity both 
internally and externally, the extent of partnership working, and channels of 
communication. 
 Is results-focused activity coordinated across central governmental organisations? 
 Is results-focused activity coordinated between central and local government? 
 Is results-focused activity coordinated within and across the organisation? 
 Is bilateral coordination pursued, e.g. highways and police, police and social 
marketing? 
 Is results-focused activity coordinated across the road safety partnership? 
 Is there coordination with other sectoral objectives and activities to achieve co-
benefits e.g. public health, environment, occupational health and safety? 
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Legislation meets the road safety task 
1.2.5 This section seeks to assess whether current legislation meets the road safety task, 
whether there are any legislative barriers to the delivery of road safety, and whether there 
are specific changes to legislation that would be beneficial. 
 Does the legislative framework meet the road safety task and the adoption of Safe 
System? 
 Does legislation need to be developed to implement the British Road Safety 
Statement? 
Funding and resource allocation for results 
1.2.6 This section seeks information on the economic framework used to determine 
expenditure, how important road safety investment is considered to be when decisions 
are made about allocation of budgets, and how any budgetary constraints are being 
addressed. 
 Is investment commensurate with the societal value of preventing death and 
serious injury?  
 Is there prioritisation of effective road safety activity in a climate of budgetary 
constraint? 
 Is there evidence of implementation of Safe System into the mainstream of 
national, local, sectoral policies?  
 Is efficient use being made of existing funding opportunities? 
 Are longer term safety benefits taken sufficiently into account in programmes and 
projects? 
Promotion of shared responsibility for results 
1.2.7 This section focused on the extent to which and how the organisation is promoting road 
safety to deliver its responsibilities and its ability to involve other sectors. 
 Is there promotion of road safety as a shared responsibility? 
 Is Safe System promoted at national and local levels to the community, 
professionals and policymakers?  
Monitoring and evaluation of results 
1.2.8 This section covers current practice in data collection and analysis and how the results of 
road safety interventions are monitored and evaluated. 
 Is there regular measurement of the safety quality of roads, vehicles and the 
emergency medical system and compliance with a range of key safety rules related 
preventing death and serious injury?   
 Is there systematic measurement and evaluation of intervention to prevent death 
and serious injuries? 
 Is there available capacity for data systems and surveys and their management? 
 Is appropriate data collected to support Safe System requirements across the 
system? 
Research and development and knowledge transfer 
1.2.9 This section explores the organisation of national road safety-related research and the 
extent to which gaps in knowledge are addressed through research and practical trials 
and demonstration projects as well as how external research and evidence is explored. 
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 Where evidence is lacking, do plans exist for trials and experimentation?  
 Is there adequate professional capability to appraise evidence? 
 Are lessons and effective practice from national and international work shared? 
1.3 Interventions 
1.3.1 Safe System intervention comprises activity within and between the following: Safe Roads 
and Roadsides, Safe Speeds, Safe Vehicles, Safe Road Use, Post-Crash Care, Safe and 
Healthy Modes and Safe Work Travel. The latter two elements  are being given new 
attention in view of encouragement being given to public transport use, the growth of 
active travel and the opportunities provided by more focus on work-related road safety.  
1.3.2 This element of the assessment framework seeks to establish how far current practice is 
aligned with Safe System principles and key aspects of the delivery of interventions at 
system and organisational levels.  
Safe Roads and Roadsides 
 Are the highest KSI risk sections of national and local network ranked for different 
road types? 
 Are surveys being carried out to provide an objective assessment of network safety 
quality? 
 Do standards, rules, guidance address the Safe System approach? 
 Are speed limits being aligned with Safe System design principles?  
 Is safety impact assessment, safety audit, safety inspection carried out?  
 Are longer term safety benefits accounted for in project appraisals and 
investments?  
 Do safe roads and roadsides standards, rules, guidance, practice compare 
favourably with international practice? 
 Do barriers to progress exists and, if so, what are they? 
Safe Speeds 
 Are speed limits and their enforcement aligned with Safe System principles? 
 Is speed limit compliance information available for all road types? 
 Are average speeds measured in high-risk, high-volume network sections? 
 Is speed enforcement coordinated with publicity to achieve deterrent effect? 
 Are the number of hours of speed camera enforcement recorded? 
 Are self-enforcing 20 mph zones widely implemented? 
 Does guidance for speed management reflect Safe System principles? 
 Is Intelligent Speed Assistance trialled, promoted, implemented? 
 Is there continuous speed monitoring in commercial and public transport 
operations? 
 Does speed management practice compare favourably with effective international 
practice? 
 Do barriers to progress exist and, if so, what are they? 
 
Safe Vehicles 
 Do vehicle type approval objectives, policy and standards address road safety? 
 What vehicle safety type approval is envisaged post-BREXIT? 
 Are vehicle measures offering largest safety benefits prioritised and promoted? 
 Are vehicle safety requirements taken up in public procurement? 
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 Are vehicle safety requirements taken up in fleet policies? 
 Are vehicle and equipment safety ratings (Euro NCAP, SHARP) used in public & 
private sector policies? 
 How is the safety impact of new vehicle measures evaluated? 
 Is avoidance of new safety risks an objective in vehicle automation research? 
 Does vehicle safety management compare favourably with effective international 
practice? Do barriers to progress exist and, if so, what are they? 
Safe Road Use 
 Are comprehensive user safety standards and rules set for driver/rider licensing and 
disqualification? 
 Do specified standards, rules, related compliance address safety priorities of high 
risk groups? 
 Are compliance regimes for different road types are in place for speed limits, excess 
alcohol, seat belt and child restraint use, in-car telephone use by drivers, fatigue 
management? 
 Are enforcement and publicity campaigns regularly coordinated? 
 Does user safety management compare favourably with effective international 
practice? 
 Do barriers to progress exist and, if so, what are they? 
Post-Crash Care 
 Are standards, rules, performance targets set for efficient access to the emergency 
medical system: pre-hospital, hospital, long-term care? 
 Is there data/research on the impact of post-crash care in reducing road crash injury 
consequences? 
 Does post-crash care compare favourably with effective international practice? 
 Do barriers to progress exist and, if so, what are they? 
Safe and Healthy Modes 
  Is use of public transport encouraged in local and national policies? 
 Are active travel policies accompanied by increased safety provisions for cycling 
and walking? 
 Are safety requirements for public and commercial transport evident in urban 
transport policies? 
 Does safe and healthy mode activity compare favourably with effective 
international practice? 
  Do barriers to progress exist and, if so, what are they? 
Safe Work Travel 
 Is there available, reliable data on work-related death and serious injuries? 
 Are there national, local and organisational strategies for work-related road safety? 
 Is there consideration of the evidence base in work-related road safety activity? 
 Are there in-house goals targets within organisations for preventing death and 
serious injury? 
 Are there in-house safe travel policies in organisations? 
 Is there widespread adoption of BSI ISO 39001: Road Traffic Safety Management 
Systems standard? 
 Does safe work travel activity compare favourably with effective international 
practice 
 Do barriers to progress exist and, if so, what are they? 
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1.4 Results 
1.4.1 The final element of the assessment framework is to review the results achieved 
nationally in terms of: 
 Final outcomes (deaths, serious injuries and societal value of prevention); 
 Intermediate outcomes (measurable activity directly linked to the prevention of 
death and serious injury (seat belt use, level of average speeds, speed limit 
compliance, safety quality of roads (iRAP rated) and vehicles (Euro NCAP rated), 
emergency medical response times); and 
 Institutional outputs (measurable institutional activity which is directly linked to 
achieving intermediate outcomes). 
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